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Migration, which is one of the most common social processes in the world today, 
brings a number of both benefits and challenges. Unfortunately, in recent years 
and especially in receiving countries, there has been a growing conviction that 
migration is a source of problems such as crime, poverty or lower social cohe-
sion. Many opinions are formed based on stereotypes or unverified information 
repeated in the media. Simplifying somewhat, we can say that attitudes towards 
migrants and migration in Europe and the United States are today more negative 
than at any time since World War II. At the same time, a world without migration 
and migrants simply would not exist. We thus need to search for new theoretical 
concepts which would help to solve this challenge. One of the solutions worth 
considering is a better interconnection between immigration and integration poli-
cies, which, together, form part of a broadly understood migration policy. In the 
past, the two policies were implemented separately, which is one of the reasons 
for the current problems. Forgetting or consciously forgoing integration activities 
and subordinating immigration to the needs of the labour market in the hope that 
migrants will return home after some time was a mistake. We must draw conclu-
sions and not repeat the mistakes of the past. This particularly concerns countries 
which are now transforming into immigration hubs, such as those of Central and 
Eastern Europe.
The migration and refugee crisis in Europe in 2015–2016 gave a new urgency to 
the issue of immigration and integration policies on the continent. Political deci-
sions, first to let in all those seeking international protection and then to attempt 
to keep them outside European Union borders, have strongly divided leaders and 
public opinions in the EU. This book takes a step back in order to reflect on 
the decision- making processes in immigration and integration policies in Europe, 
not only in recent years but also in the last few decades and regarding not only 
refugees but also migrant workers, family migrants and all other categories of 
international migrants. It aims to contribute to the theoretical and practical debate 
regarding immigration and integration policies by arguing that – contrary to what 
is often assumed – immigration policy should not be treated as having precedence 
over integration policy. In fact, the present migration and refugee crisis and sev-
eral other decisive moments in Europe’s immigration history have demonstrated 
that it is the integration policy and its effectiveness which later determine a given 
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state’s admissions policy. Integration policy can thus be equally as important as 
or even take precedence over immigration policy. The answer to the question of 
how many people a given country plans and is able to integrate can determine its 
immigration policies.
Consequently, this book focuses on relations between immigration and integra-
tion policies. The fact that integration outcomes can influence future immigration 
policies has been acknowledged since at least the 1980s, especially following 
the canonical writings of Tomas Hammar (1985, 1990, 1992) and Brochman and 
Hammar (1999). However, integration policy has often been treated as a subsec-
tion of immigration policy (Hammar 1985, 2010), as something that comes chron-
ologically later or as an (often late) reaction to the inflow of foreigners (Messina 
2007). We assume that the two are separate but related policies. Immigration 
policy – focused on admissions – is understood here as the state’s activities aimed 
at controlling the rules of entry and stay on its territory of people who are not 
citizens of the country, in order to obtain the optimum scale and structure of the 
inflow of foreigners. Integration policy is defined as the state’s actions aimed at 
achieving a dynamic and bi- directional process of mutual adaptation (adjustment) 
of immigrants and the receiving society, so that the potential of foreigners in the 
economy and society can be utilised optimally for both parties. We thus follow 
in the footsteps of a number of scholars (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003; Hellgren 
2015) and, in recent decades, the European Union (European Commission 2004, 
2005, for example; see also Duszczyk 2011) in underlining that integration is a 
two- or three- way process (Garcés- Mascareñas and Penninx 2016) which also 
demands some adjustment on the part of the receiving society. Both policies may 
be formalised as strategic documents, but the absence of a strategic document 
does not mean the absence of policies as such and is sometimes a policy statement 
of its own (for more on this, see Chapter 2 of this book).
From objective to subjective factors in migration- policy 
decision- making
This book is the result of our analysis of decision- making processes regarding 
migration in several key moments of Europe’s postwar history: from the guest-
worker period of the 1950s to early 1970s, to the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015–2016. 
Analysis of factors taken into consideration by states in key moments when 
immigration policy was (re)formulated shows that Europe is moving away from 
rational, economic arguments and towards more political ones.
In the years of the guestworker period, it was the objective needs of the labour 
market which dictated immigration policy. Other areas of migration policy, most 
notably integration policy, were largely nonexistent (Messina 2007; for a detailed 
discussion, see Chapter 3), and the subject was nonpolitical and managed by state 
bureaucrats barely influenced by public opinion.
Nevertheless, some scholars (notably Hammar 1992) believed that, as early as 
the 1970s, some influence of public opinion on decision- making was visible and 
the end of the guestworker policy in many countries was the result not only of 
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the economic crisis but also of perceived problems with the integration of new-
comers. In the 1980s, some countries responded to these problems with elements 
of integration policy, for example the somewhat paradoxically named ‘tempo-
rary integration’ in Germany, which meant that workers had rights linked with 
the labour market, such as unemployment benefits or trade- union membership 
but that no steps were taken towards their legal or cultural integration (Hammar 
1985). By the 1990s, the politicisation of migration issues in Western Europe, 
which had already begun in the 1970s, was irrevocable (Messina 2007).
The period preceding the enlargement of the European Union in 2004 was 
an interesting case of decision- making in immigration policy. The enlargement 
of the EU by ten countries, including eight from Central and Eastern Europe, 
raised public fears in neighbouring countries, especially Germany, regarding the 
potential mass inflow of workers and persons who would burden the social secu-
rity system. A majority of the German population at the time was in favour of 
limiting or stopping immigration from Central and Eastern Europe (see Chap-
ter 8). The decisions of political leaders reflected these fears, but – in part due 
to the nature of the accession negotiations, with European institutions acting as 
quasi- impartial brokers and basing their proposals on objective economic factors 
and migration forecasts – evidence- based factors still played a significant role in 
decision- making. Nevertheless, some authors believe that the delay in opening 
up the German labour market to new EU citizens was not justified by economic 
factors; rather, they believe that public fears were the main argument (Elsner and 
Zimmermann 2013).
The ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015–2016, the next period when European countries 
had to make decisions regarding a major inflow of newcomers, seems to be a time 
when the decisions of particular states were based even less on objective fac-
tors. The number of asylum applications was certainly not a determining factor, 
as some of the most affected countries, such as Germany, were also initially the 
most refugee- welcoming ones, while countries not frequently chosen by refugees, 
notably those in Central and Eastern Europe, adopted an unwelcoming attitude 
and discouraged refugees from applying for international protection. The growing 
anti- immigration sentiments and the securitisation and criminalisation of migra-
tion issues, fuelled in part by right- wing politics, seem to have contributed to stark 
changes in the positions of the governments of, for example, Germany and Swe-
den, by 2016. Significantly for this book, the issue of possibilities for immigrant 
integration was also a key argument. Previous failures in this field led directly to a 
limitation on the numbers of newcomers, which was stated directly, for example, 
by the government of Sweden.
These events demonstrate an increasing focus on issues of migrant integration 
in Europe. However, the relations between immigration and integration policies 
remain under- investigated and frequently overlooked when making fundamen-
tal political decisions. Hence this book aims not only to draw attention to the 
importance of integration policies but also to show that the effects of these poli-
cies frequently determine attitudes to immigration and immigration policies later 
on. Integration policy can, then, be treated as a primary concern or, at least, as 
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being equally as important as immigration policy; it should not be seen – as many 
policy- makers and academics have done – as a nonfundamental and secondary 
subsection of immigration policy.
Structure of the book
The book consists of ten chapters, of which the first three – written by the 
IMINTEG team (an interdisciplinary group led by Prof. Maciej Duszczyk at the 
University of Warsaw, comprising political scientists, sociologists, an economist 
and a lawyer) – are based on our own findings and analysis. Chapter 2 provides 
a theoretical background and discusses both how migration policies are created, 
which factors influence their creation and how – in the eyes of other scholars 
and ourselves – they should be created. Chapter 3 takes a historical look at how 
these policies were implemented in various European countries and in the EU as 
a whole. Chapter 4 presents the results of our Delphi survey. We confronted our 
findings regarding immigration and integration policies and the links between 
them with 79 experts from central and local governments, academia and NGOs 
from various parts of Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany, the UK, 
France, Spain, the Netherlands and Sweden).
The following six chapters, written by some of the most prominent migration 
scholars in Europe, take the reader to various parts of the continent, where the 
authors analyse the relations between immigration and integration policies in their 
countries of residence. The countries have been chosen to represent a wide geo-
graphical spectrum – from Scandinavia to the Iberian Peninsula to Central and 
Eastern Europe – and a diverse range of immigration histories and models. One 
of the book’s strengths lies in the fact that it enlarges the usual Western European 
perspective to include experiences from Central and Eastern Europe, regions with 
countries which either have very recently become net immigration (the Czech 
Republic) or are currently on their way to becoming so (Poland).
The chapter on Germany talks about the history of relations between immigra-
tion and integration policies and analyses the country’s latest experiences of the 
inflow of more than one million refugees after 2015. The following chapter is 
devoted to the Netherlands, which has many experiences of both immigration 
policy and attempts to integrate foreigners into Dutch society. The two policies – 
immigration and integration – were implemented separately, which influenced 
their effectiveness. We may, however, risk saying that Netherlands has the rich-
est experiences, both positive and negative, in implementing integration policies. 
Scandinavia is represented in this book by a chapter on Denmark. The authors 
focus on demonstrating the change in the country’s approach to migration, which 
is visible in both its immigration and its integration policies. They argue that the 
present restrictive immigration policy is a response to the growing influence of 
anti- immigrant and populist parties. The chapter on Spain describes the experi-
ences of a country which transformed very dynamically from being one of emi-
gration to one of emigration/immigration and, finally, to one of immigration. The 
authors also discuss the role of local governments in creating and implementing 
immigration policies.
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The authors of the chapter on Poland took a similar approach. In practice, the 
country does not really have an integration policy. Actions of the state are focused 
on managing economic immigration, particularly from the Ukraine. The country 
has, in recent years, faced a very significant wave of immigration, which brought 
unprecedented challenges. The Czech Republic is also discussed in its own chap-
ter. Especially interesting in this chapter are the reasons for abandoning the liberal 
immigration policy of the 1990s, which also regarded economic immigration. It 
seems that this was due to problems resulting from an ineffective or almost non-
existent integration policy.
The European Union’s experience in the area of migration and integration and its 
relevant policies – the EU being a unique supranational regional organisation on the 
Old Continent – has also been included, ranging from postwar developments to recent 
events related to the refugee crisis. Finally, to allow for a more global comparison 
of policies implemented in Europe (and in the EU) and other immigration states, we 
invited experts from Australia – a country somewhat less present in migration lit-
erature than the US or Canada – to reflect on the migration and integration policies 
implemented in that country and point to the lessons that Europe can draw.
Our book transfers academic knowledge, based on interdisciplinary and inter-
national research results, in an accessible way (and in online open access), so that 
it can be widely used for research, publishing, teaching and other dissemination 
purposes. It is directed at various audiences in Europe and beyond. We believe the 
book will be of interest to both the academic community – researchers, teachers 
and students – and representatives of public administrations, international and 
nongovernmental organisations and, indeed, anyone interested in migration and 
European studies. We hope that the content will encourage readers from across 
the globe to explore the relations between immigration and integration policies in 
their countries. Today, such reflection is absolutely necessary if we are to create 
more effective and more just migration policies which will benefit both the receiv-
ing societies and the migrants themselves.
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Introduction
Looking at migration policies in Europe today, one cannot help but see chaos. It 
seems that, in many respects, they have gone from labour- market- based decisions 
to decisions which are highly politicised and not based on solid rational premises.
This is obvious when we look at Western Europe. In the 1950s to 1970s, the 
subject of immigration did not seem highly controversial, and decisions were 
made based on the needs of the labour market. In the 1980s and, especially, the 
1990s, the issue became more politicised in many countries, and decision- makers 
started balancing between the needs of labour markets and public fears. This 
was the situation, for example, during subsequent enlargements of the European 
Union, when countries of the ‘West’ had to decide when to grant new EU members 
access to their labour markets and did so in part based on economic arguments 
and in part due to public fears of a wave of ‘Polish plumbers’ inundating Western 
Europe. Later, especially during the so- called ‘migration crisis’ of 2015–2016, 
decisions seem to have been made almost entirely on emotion (first on humanitar-
ian grounds and then in acknowledgement of public fears) or politics (how to gain 
more voters using these fears).
Central and Eastern Europe, which were just becoming a region of immigra-
tion, went through a similar transformation at accelerated speed. Labour migrants 
had been quietly welcomed over the previous two decades without much public 
debate, but the so- called migration crisis brought a sudden politicisation of the 
subject and a fierce anti- refugee reaction from the governments and society – this 
in spite of the fact that the region (with the exception of Hungary) was not directly 
affected (Klaus et al. 2018).
Part of this politicisation seems to be a reaction to the lack or failures of integra-
tion policies (in the case of Central and Eastern Europe, the perceived failures of 
integration policies in other countries, as presented by politicians and the media). 
A thorough discussion on how we create and how we should be creating migration 
policies is thus very urgent. This book aims to be part of that debate. In this chap-
ter, to provide a context for the more practical discussions in subsequent ones, 
we summarise the main theoretical thinking on migration and integration policies 
and the links between them. We argue strongly in favour of treating the issues of 
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integration and integration policy as equally important as or even more important 
than immigration policy. We also demonstrate that, in contradiction to what has 
been happening in Europe in recent decades, policies in both domains have to be 
created in tandem as their effects will be felt far beyond the field which a policy 
is meant to influence.
In this text, migration policy is understood broadly as a reaction of the state to 
migration processes – both immigration and emigration. It covers:
• admission policy, which is understood as allowing foreigners onto the terri-
tory of a given state and permitting them to stay and especially to access the 
labour market (immigration policy);
• actions directed at emigrants from the state – especially with the aim of 
attracting them back – as well as diaspora policies;
• actions aimed at stemming illegal immigration, including human trafficking 
and human smuggling; and
• issues related to the inclusion of foreigners in the host society, including their 
social, political and other rights – in other words, integration policy (Duszc-
zyk 2012; Hammar 1992; Natter 2018; Peters 2015).
In most of the literature, immigration and integration policies are analysed sepa-
rately, although they are often included in a broadly understood migration policy. 
It is also often assumed that actions taken within integration policy – and their 
results – influence regulations regarding the inflow of foreigners into a given state 
only in a very limited way – policies intended to control and manage the arrival 
of potential immigrants also have a limited impact (Crawley and Hagen- Zanker 
2019). Integration policy is thus considered as reactive: it is reacting to situa-
tions brought about by immigration policy. Such an approach can be found in the 
canonical works of Tomas Hammar (1985b, 1985c, 2010): migration policy is 
treated as built of two components – the regulation of the inflow of foreigners to 
a given state (immigration policy) and actions taken by that state in relation to 
immigrants (integration policy). Anthony Messina (2007), who analysed the rela-
tions between migration and politics in Europe, takes a similar approach.
Such a view appears to be a simplification. It should be assumed that there are 
important relations between immigration and integration policies and that these 
relations may determine, to a large degree, how a state approaches the inflow 
of foreigners. This would mean that the degree of openness towards foreigners 
may significantly depend on the level of integration of those immigrants who are 
already living in the state. Obviously, migration is a phenomenon which cannot 
be fully controlled, except in extreme circumstances. This means that every state 
should have both an immigration and an integration policy. It is key that the two 
be tied, so that actions within one policy are coordinated with and result from the 
other. If an integration policy proves ineffective and social cohesion on a given 
territory is under threat, this should lead to a change of policies: either the limiting 
of immigration, a change in the direction of migration flows or a reform of existing 
integration policies which have proved ineffective in the case of particular groups. 
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The success of integration policy should lead to the liberalisation of migration 
policy and the opening up of a country to a larger number of foreigners.
The experiences of recent years, especially the so- called ‘migration crisis’ 
in Europe and the USA’s policies under President Donald Trump, demonstrate 
clearly that it is impossible to have an open immigration policy without an effec-
tive integration policy. We should expect that political decisions on the opening 
or closing of borders and labour markets to foreigners will increasingly be made 
depending on the degrees of integration of the foreigners who are already in the 
country – although it should be underlined that frequently other political processes 
altogether, not the integration of foreigners, determine policies. A good example 
is the deporting of some undocumented but well- integrated and long- established 
migrants from the USA, done clearly for political reasons (see Welch 2003). Pub-
lic opinion will force politicians to make decisions regarding foreigners based 
on their own experiences or those of others, as pictured in the media. Objective 
factors, such as the needs of the labour market or demographic processes, can 
be expected to play a much smaller role. It is hard to imagine many societies 
agreeing to an open immigration policy if integration policies are not successful. 
Governments which realise the benefits of immigration will have to devote more 
resources and attention to integration policies.
Ideally, migration policy formulation should follow that of a general migra-
tion doctrine and should take the form of a document accepted by the govern-
ment or parliament. This helps to present it to society and – perhaps even more 
importantly – helps government and local government officials to act in accord-
ance with its spirit when implementing not only migration policy but also other 
regulations which impact on the presence and rights of foreigners. In Hammar’s 
(1992: 256) opinion, a migration policy is not necessary when the inflow of for-
eigners is small and thus usually not of interest to politicians. However, such a 
lack of policy is also a kind of policy by omission. A migration policy is neces-
sary and is usually created when the inflow of foreigners becomes large. Usually 
the goal is to halt it and gain a sense of control (which is frequently just a sense – 
cf. Castles et al. 2014). It can also be created to steer the inflow of migrants who 
have been deemed necessary in the labour market or for other reasons.
It is difficult to measure the effectiveness of migration policy, especially in the 
long term. If we measure against goals set out in laws or other documents, we will 
find that many have failed. As an example, we can cite the policies of Germany 
(which, in the years 1950–1970, wanted to import labour, not people – see Chap-
ter 5, this book) or Australia (which wanted to keep its ‘White Australia Policy’ 
in the years after World War II – see Chapter 11, this book). In both cases, reality 
proved far removed from what was planned. However, we certainly cannot say 
that these countries or societies failed. Both have managed to develop relatively 
cohesively. It is often the case that officially stated goals of policy are differ-
ent to their unofficial, forecasted or even welcomed effects (cf. Castles 2004). 
Although it is difficult to measure the success or failure of migration policies, 
certain elements are worth looking at: maintaining external and internal security; 
economic development, especially the situation in the labour market; maintaining 
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an optimal demographic balance in society; and social cohesion. If success in 
these fields is to be achieved, an intense integration policy is a necessary part 
of migration policy (as well as a selective immigration policy). This – again – 
demonstrates that both policies should be analysed and conducted together.
Factors influencing migration policies –  
theoretical perspectives
As a part of social policy, migration policy should be aimed at solving particular 
social problems and facilitating socio- economic development. This is the per-
spective we should keep in mind when looking at the factors which influence (or 
should influence) migration policies. Such factors are often underlined in the very 
definitions of these policies (Chałupczak 2013; Duszczyk 2008). Many authors 
point to the objective factors which should be taken into consideration by policy- 
makers: the existent and forecasted demographic structure of the society, eco-
nomic development and the situation on the labour market, including the needs 
of employers. Many definitions place labour market and related economic issues 
as the central points of reference of migration policies (Castles 2004; Duszczyk 
2012; Hammar 1985b).
From an economic perspective, the flow of labour is frequently considered 
jointly with the flow of capital. If there is a free flow of capital, there is no need 
for immigration, because workplaces can be created in the countries of origin of 
potential migrants. The relation between migrations (migration policy) and type 
of economy (economic policy) was studied, among others, by Margaret Peters 
(2015), who argues that closed economies, which limit the free market and the 
inflow of merchandise from abroad, will be more open to immigrants (and should 
have a liberal immigration policy) because, as they develop economically, they 
will need more cheap labour, which they can only find abroad. Of course, in times 
of crisis, migrant labour becomes unnecessary (Welch 2003). It also becomes less 
necessary when a country opens up to the world market and globalises. Compa-
nies then change strategies – they export work abroad by moving their factories 
and then import products. In such situations, access to the labour market is closed 
to workers, because they can do their work in the countries of origin. This the-
ory concerns low- skilled workers, although jobs requiring low qualifications are 
the ones most often filled by migrants (Peters 2015). As James Hollifield (2004) 
points out, governments face a ‘liberal paradox’: because of economic factors, 
they should be interested in an inflow of migrants – thus, they should have an 
open migration policy; however, issues of security or social cohesion push them 
to control borders and limit the inflow of migrants. It seems this paradox could be 
solved through a better coordination of decisions within immigration and integra-
tion policies.
Factors resulting from foreign policy and the international obligations which 
states take upon themselves can also not be omitted. The global, regional and 
bilateral agreements into which states enter and their membership in international 
organisations all influence governments’ actions. The scope of the decisions taken 
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by states is limited, for example, by the obligations they have taken upon them-
selves through signing the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees or through membership of the European Union. The free movement of 
people is one of the fundamentals of the EU. Additionally, since the mid- 1980s, 
member states have been tightening their cooperation regarding immigration both 
from outside the EU and from asylum. In 1997, these issues were moved into the 
first pillar, which means EU institutions gained the competencies to influence the 
shape of legislation. As Scholten and Penninx (2016: 96, italics in the original) 
write:
Europeanization clearly involves loss of control for nation states, given the 
supremacy and direct effect of EU directives. (. . .) EU institutions [are] exert-
ing top- down control over immigration policies throughout Europe.
In the context of the functioning of the EU, the Schengen Agreement should also 
be mentioned. Members of the Schengen Zone limit their sovereignty regarding 
border control and visa policy. This reduces the freedom of individual states in 
creating migration policy.
The foreign policy of a given state is also important. Underlining the close rela-
tions with a given region (such as the Commonwealth or the Eastern Partnership 
between the EU and its neighbours) is often accompanied by regulations concern-
ing migration from those states – usually giving their citizens certain privileges. 
Thus, migration policy also depends on alliances, neighbourhood policies, the 
aspirations of a given state and its economic and military power (Hammar 1992). 
Opening the doors to citizens of a particular state may also be a form of grati-
tude for the ‘services’ of the governments of that state. In recent years we have 
frequently witnessed this form of ‘return favours’ for not letting through other 
inhabitants of a region. This concerns, for example, Mexico, whose citizens ben-
efit from certain facilitations of entry to the US in exchange for a greater securiti-
sation of the southern border, or Morocco, which has a similar agreement with the 
EU (see Del Sarto 2010; Walker 2018).
Migration policy may also result from national traditions and sentiments. This 
frequently manifests itself in citizenship policy – the granting or repealing of 
citizenship to encourage both persons living outside the state to repatriate, as in 
the case of Germany or Poland (Harpaz 2015), and inhabitants ‘on the historical 
territory’ of that state, as is the case, for example, in Hungary. Interestingly, the 
Hungarian case also demonstrates how such policies can be counterproductive: 
many inhabitants of bordering regions apply for Hungarian citizenship to gain 
freedom of work and travel elsewhere in the EU – for example in Czechia or the 
UK (Jóźwiak 2017). Another variant of such a policy is to grant other types of 
instrument facilitating entry and residence to people who have national, historic 
or family links with the state. Poland is one such example, having created the Pol-
ish Card (Karta Polaka) for people with Polish roots who, for historical reasons, 
have found themselves outside the borders of the state (Szulecka 2016). Germany 
drew up a similar policy in the 1990s, which allowed numerous inhabitants of the 
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Commonwealth of Independent States, including Russia and Uzbekistan, who had 
German ancestry, to go to and reside in Germany.
Katharina Natter (2018: 7, 9) sums up factors influencing migration policy as 
follows:
Existing reviews of immigration policy theories [. . .] suggest four primary 
determinants of immigration policy: (1) the role of socioeconomic inter-
ests at the domestic level, operating via interest groups and public opinion; 
(2) the importance of foreign policy and diplomatic interests; (3) the role 
of state institutions’ potentially conflicting interests; and (4) the impact of 
international norms on national policy- making. [. . .] Ultimately, most immi-
gration policies – regardless of the political system in place – are likely deter-
mined by the dialectic between interests, institutions and ideas evolving at the 
intersection of domestic and international spheres.
When naming the determinants of migration policy, Natter draws attention to a 
very important element – the persons or interest groups who influence the choice of 
solutions and policies. Such groups lobbying in favour of particular solutions are 
especially important in democratic states. Gary Freeman (1995) calls this process 
‘client politics’. He argues that, up to the present, most migration policies were 
created in line with the preferences of business, which can influence parliamentar-
ians. It is employers who gain the most from particular regulations regarding the 
access of migrants to the labour market. At the same time, Freeman believes that 
the costs of immigration are borne mostly by society and the state coffers, whereas 
business participates to a relatively small degree. The influence of employers is 
also visible at the level of definitions, since – as we have already mentioned – 
labour- market policies often influence migration policy the most. Historically, in 
most liberal economies, migration policies were created in response to the needs 
of the economy and employers. In many countries, business and politics are close 
to each other and, in the interest of guaranteeing economic growth, politicians pay 
close attention to the voices of employers, who tend to be well organised and have 
the resources to effectively lobby in favour of their interests.
Another important group which influences migration policies is NGOs (Dusz-
czyk 2012). The nongovernmental sector also tends to be quite well organised and 
to know how to find resources for its activities, has particular goals – usually in 
the field of human rights and protection of the rights of migrants – and is increas-
ingly effective in what is called ‘advocacy’ (which is, in fact, similar to classic 
lobbying). NGOs are particularly active in the fields of humanitarian protection 
and asylum- related issues. What sets them apart from other lobbyists is that they 
act to protect certain values, not particular interests. In many countries with a 
limited experience of immigration (such as Poland or other countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe), NGOs are among the few with expert knowledge in the 
field of migration. As long as their subject matter is not of interest to politicians, 
NGOs are frequently the main partners of the government or officials in shaping 
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migration policies – either de facto through practical work or by participating in 
various ways in the creation of official documents (Lesińska and Stefańska 2015).
Here we come to the question of who creates and who should create migration 
policy. Since these are political documents, it should be politicians in public office 
or high- level bureaucrats. Other groups also participate in the decision- making 
processes in democratic societies. This process of influencing politicians and the 
solutions they create by various groups in society (‘clients’) is thus completely 
normal and useful, especially if we assume that these groups present the factual 
arguments behind their positions and that the process is transparent. The debate is 
thus enriched with data and knowledge rather than relying on emotions and imag-
inings. This clashing (or even battle) of views helps rational decision- making and 
improves the quality of the documents created (cf. Castles 2004).
As mentioned earlier, politicians are not always interested in the subject of 
migration. The lack of a ‘migration policy’, however, does not mean that such 
a policy is not being created or does not exist. In such a situation, it is simply 
being created by other actors – most often officials: ‘[T]he decisions of street- 
level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope 
with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the public policies they 
carry out’ (Lipsky 2010: xiii). Policy, in such a case, is being created by practical 
actions, settlements and decisions. It is necessary for bureaucrats because it cre-
ates a basis (also a legal one) for actions in the fields of migration and the integra-
tion of foreigners. Such a policy, however, is often incoherent, created ad hoc and 
case by case through trial and error, which leads to its being fragmentary at best. 
Many officials look at so- called best practices from other countries. However, 
these are not always adequate due to different legal or structural circumstances; 
sometimes, their implementation results in quite unintended results. NGOs and 
local governments also play their part in the creation of such migration policies 
(Hammar 1985c).
In recent years, especially, migration policies have become the subject of public 
disputes and arguments between political parties. The subject has become highly 
politicised and parties exploit it to win or retain power. This is an unfortunate situ-
ation which does not favour rational decision- making.
It is also important to note that the role of local authorities at different levels has 
been increasing. They are involved not only in implementing integration policy – 
for which they frequently are legally responsible – but also in formulating policy, 
sometimes even in opposition to the central government (Scholten and Penninx 
2016). This is so in big hyper- diverse cities like Berlin, London or Amsterdam, 
whole regions like Scotland or Catalonia and also smaller cities in states where 
strongly anti- immigrant forces are in power (in Central and Eastern Europe, the 
cities of Warsaw, Poznań, Lublin or Gdańsk are good examples in Poland; in 
Hungary, the capital, Budapest). In Poland, which has not created an integration 
policy, local governments make their own efforts to integrate immigrants, realis-
ing that if they do not do so they face a higher risk of social conflict (Duszczyk 
et al. 2018).
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It is worth underlining that even the mere fact of whether a country formu-
lates a written migration policy or not is an element and a demonstration of a 
political decision in itself. A state has no choice but to control its borders and set 
rules regarding the entry of foreigners. In the case of integration policy, however, 
inactivity is an option. As Hammar (1985a) points out, when a state wants to 
have ‘guestworkers’ – that is, migrants who are temporary and whose presence 
is dependent on economic trends – it will not develop an integration policy, since 
this may encourage migrants to stay (even though many experiences demonstrate 
that such an approach is not enough to discourage migrants from remaining).
Even some of those states which assumed their immigrants would settle believed 
and claimed in their migration policies that no instruments to facilitate integration 
were necessary. They believed that the instruments of general social policy, open 
to all inhabitants, including immigrants, were sufficient. Such an assumption was 
frequent, particularly among post- colonial states, when immigrants had a (better 
or worse) grasp of the host country’s language (although Sweden, which had no 
colonies, followed a similar logic).
Such a non- integration policy became problematic when the number of immi-
grants increased and when immigrants came from a wider spectrum of countries. 
The receiving countries were caught unprepared, with no policies to determine 
how to include the newcomers into society. It was too late to create an integration 
policy only when migration had started to be perceived as a social (and frequently 
political) problem; such a policy could not bring the expected results. That is why, 
in many cases, the only reaction consisted of limiting the inflow or organising 
deportations. Some states, notably Spain and Italy, took a different route by con-
ducting the regularisation of undocumented migrants (De Bruycker et al. 2000). 
However, only a coherent immigration and integration policy could have limited 
the problems resulting from migration.
To be effective, an integration policy needs to be a coherent set of actions aimed 
at including migrants in various dimensions of the functioning of the receiving 
society. Decisions made in all fields of migration policy should be interrelated. 
It is a mistake to consider decisions in immigration policy as primary and those 
regarding integration policy as secondary.
It is worth pondering, then, both on what influences the restrictiveness of migra-
tion policies and on the role of integration policy and its effectiveness. When we 
look from a global, long- term perspective, most basic parameters do not seem to 
influence migration policies. The level of democratisation does not play a role; 
neither does the level of GDP or GDP growth – that is, a country’s level of either 
crisis or prosperity does not determine the openness or restrictiveness of migra-
tion policies (Peters 2015). It is also not clear how the positions and values of 
traditionally present political parties influence the approach to migration. Some 
researchers underline that right- wing parties are more prone to restrictive migra-
tion policies (Freeman 1995), whereas others see left- wing parties as display-
ing such tendencies more often (Peters 2015). Much depends not only on the 
given state but also on the period when a given party is in power. Since all politi-
cians, irrespective of alignment, must heed to the wishes of their voters, it is the 
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voters – who are currently more and more in favour of limiting immigration – who 
may have the last word.
This seems to have been the case since the 1990s, when immigration policy 
became highly politicised and was included in the programmes of extreme parties 
(on both sides of the political spectrum) which are highly anti- immigrant and pop-
ulist. Migration became part of the game of power. Mainstream parties also intro-
duced this question into their rhetoric and programmes, not wanting to leave the 
terrain to the extremists. They softened the message only somewhat, remaining 
within the border- closing trend (Lesińska 2010). At the same time, societies of the 
Global North increasingly perceived migration as unwelcome and believed that it 
should be stopped because it threatened the security of states and social cohesion 
(Castles 2004). It is worth noticing, though, that a certain political dualism has 
developed. In some countries, politicians publicly use anti- immigrant language 
but, at the same time, have a sort of hidden agenda, quietly implementing policies 
open to immigrants because employers demand they do so (Castles 2004). The 
behaviour of the Polish government since 2016 is a prime example of such duality 
(Klaus 2020, forthcoming).
This is undoubtedly a kind of circle. Politicians influence public opinion. They 
are the ones who create ‘the figure of the migrant’ – a politically useful portrait 
with the characteristics they ascribe to it (Nail 2015). Studies demonstrate, for 
example, that the more open and equality- focused the migration policy, the less 
endangered by migrants the locals feel. It is difficult, however, to pinpoint which 
is the cause and which the effect, Does a more open migration policy influence the 
openness of societies, or do more tolerant societies choose politicians who imple-
ment their views (Wysieńska- Di Carlo 2018)?
We also cannot underestimate the role of the media in discouraging societies 
of the Global North about migrants, who are often presented as the dangerous 
‘other’. As Teun van Dijk (2009: 199) notices, ‘[T]he press continues to be a 
part of the problem of racism, rather than its solution’. In his text, he presents the 
various techniques and procedures used by traditional media, which give rise to 
or reinforce xenophobic positions in society instead of doing the opposite. This 
situation is long in the making. Already in the 1990s, refugees were presented in 
the British or Austrian media as persons who need to be controlled, who com-
mit crimes and who ‘abuse’ the asylum system (most readers do not differentiate 
between the various categories of foreigners and direct their negative feelings 
towards immigrants in general). They were presented as waves or hordes of 
invaders and thus became the subject of a ‘moral panic’. Stan Cohen (1972: 1), 
who coined the term, described it as follows:
A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined 
as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a styl-
ized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are 
manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right- thinking people. [. . .] 
Sometimes the object of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is some-
thing which has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears in the 
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limelight. Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten [. . .] at other 
times it has more serious and long- lasting repercussions and might produce 
such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way the society 
conceives itself.
As a result, the ‘moral panic’ linked with migration and migrants was transferred 
into the political field, and a phenomenon called ‘governmental xenophobia’ 
started. Such a xenophobia exists when there is a combination of public discourse 
and concrete actions by the authorities aimed at stigmatising migrants and pre-
senting them as a source of problems, evil or danger (Valluy 2011). Maggie Ibra-
him (2005: 165–166) gives this process a different name: ‘new racism’. In other 
words, foreigners are presented as ‘other’, as a threat to the security of society – a 
physical, a cultural, an economic or any other kind of threat made up to fit the 
moment, such as a threat to ‘national identity’. As a consequence, there appears a 
demand for the government to ‘solve the problem’ – that is, to act to increase secu-
rity. The only way of eliminating the threat in such a situation is by eliminating the 
migrants from social life. The government attempts to do so by legal and political 
means, including migration policy. Borders are closed and securitised, the rights 
of migrants are curtailed and new types of offences are created which can be com-
mitted only by immigrants. As a result, they are punished as criminals. The law 
and its agents start viewing all migrants stereotypically as dangerous breakers 
of the law who should be kept under control (Gliszczyńska- Grabias and Klaus 
2018). All this is done to reduce the scale of migration and remove at least some of 
the foreigners from the territory of the states of the Global North. Fears of migra-
tion and migrants increase, especially in times of a migration crisis. In recent 
years, over a dozen such crises took place in the world, which were caused both 
by wars, such as the Balkan wars or the war in Syria, and by dramatically worsen-
ing living conditions, such as those in Venezuela or Myanmar. In such moments, 
which cause much emotion, decisions are frequently irrational and destroy the 
existing order; at times they even lead to the breaking of basic human rights.
At the same time, countries undertake what can be termed ‘nonimmigration 
policies’ (Castles 2004: 864–865) – they attempt to support the development of 
the Global South through instruments of a liberal economy. As an effect, it is 
mostly wealthy corporations from the Global North who benefit from free trade. 
The economic situation and related migration pressure from countries of the South 
do not change as a result or change only to a very small degree.
Some of the solutions to the problems described in this introduction could 
be found through an effective integration policy, which would be an element of 
decision- making in the whole migration policy. This would have to be based on an 
inclusive model which would assume that immigrants will eventually become full 
members of the destination society. An inclusive approach is also necessary in the 
case of short- term (seasonal) migrants or guestworkers. From the very first days 
of their residence in the state, they should be offered basic integration mechanisms 
such as language courses and instruction in local rules and customs. This would 
limit their ‘otherness’ and would prevent the creation of ethnic enclaves. The fear 
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of others in the receiving society would decrease, and the pressure on government 
to limit the inflow of foreigners would be smaller.
The experiences of integrating various groups of immigrants could influence 
decisions regarding the size of inflows from particular countries or regions of the 
world. Such an integration policy would allow for the adaptation of immigrants in 
the economic, social and legal spheres, as well as in many aspects of the cultural 
sphere. Integration policy, or rather its effects, would become an important argu-
ment in deciding how restrictive migration policy should be and what kinds of 
foreigners a country prefers to let in. We do not mean preferences in terms of eth-
nic groups or nationalities; rather, we mean particular features of migrants which 
may favour their integration. This would not mean closing the borders to forced 
migrants, who must be accepted, or to those who integrate slowly. In the latter 
case, we can simplify by saying that their number should be limited depending 
on the integration capacity of the receiving state. The existence of an integration 
policy should increase this capacity. We should also never forget that integra-
tion is a two- way process between immigrants and the receiving society. Efforts 
should be made to increase the acceptance of migrants’ differences and to fight 
racism and xenophobia.
State sovereignty and the freedom to create  
migration policies
The body of international law regarding migrations is somewhat limited if we 
compare it, for example, with trade law or environmental protection law. No state 
is legally obliged to let in immigrants, but it should formulate rules according to 
which it intends to do so. Hammar (1992) promotes such an approach, stating that 
human rights, such as those formulated in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948, declare humans free to leave any country, including their own, but 
that this freedom does not extend to entering another country (Art. 13, Point 2 of 
the Declaration). Is it then the case that states and governments can exert almost 
unlimited control over their territory and the people living there? Can they – in 
the name of ‘sovereignty’ – formulate their migration policies as they wish and 
decide who can enter their territory and when they have to leave? Giorgio Agam-
ben (2000) links the notion of sovereignty with nation states, which tie the rights 
of a certain group of people with their place of birth and the resulting status of 
citizen. He also points out that, for centuries, sovereignty was linked with the 
‘justification of violence’ or ‘the threshold on which violence passes into law and 
law passes over into violence’ (Agamben 1998: 31–32).
Most researchers believe that the principle of sovereignty in migration issues 
is very broad (Kicinger and Saczuk 2004). In accordance with such a view, states 
and governments have a full right to regulate admissions and the question is 
excluded from under the protective umbrella of human rights, which usually limit 
the discretion of those in power. The full right of deciding who can enter the terri-
tory is correlated with the right to decide how long and under what conditions an 
individual can remain. If a state refuses someone the right to remain, it is entitled 
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to deport a foreigner and this concerns all persons, irrespective of whether they 
entered the territory illegally or legally and were later refused permission to stay.
Hammar believes states are entitled to conduct selective immigration policies, 
a selectiveness which can even concern such features of migrants as their ethnic-
ity, religion or culture, as doing so may be in the interest of avoiding conflict or 
disrupting ‘ethnic or religious balance’ (Hammar 1992: 256). He argues that limits 
are a result of the limited integration capacity of states and the need to guarantee 
migrants appropriate access to the welfare systems. A large inflow of migrants 
could lead to financial problems in the state or endanger social cohesion. How-
ever, he puts into question his own argument by pointing out that most migrants, 
at the moment of arrival, do not obtain privileges comparable to those of locals. 
Their rights are much more limited, especially concerning access to the welfare 
system and, generally, the support of the state. They gain this access only after 
many years of residence and after fulfilling additional conditions (Hammar 1992). 
This brings us back to the integration offer for migrants from the first days of their 
stay. A selective immigration policy seems to make sense only if it is accompanied 
by a developed model of integration policy, which would allow for the effective 
and relatively speedy integration of foreigners in the receiving state.
Joseph Carens (1987) stands at the other extreme of the spectrum of views 
regarding immigration policies. Having analysed liberal political theories and 
their assumptions, he argues that it is difficult to find a rational and philosophical 
justification for closing borders. Interestingly, open- door policies are advocated 
by scholars on two sides of the philosophical spectrum: neoclassical economists 
on the one hand and left- wing scholars on the other, of course for different rea-
sons (Castles 2004). Carens believes that, if humanity decided that the freedom of 
movement is a basic human right and if states guarantee it within their borders, it 
is hard to justify why it should be restricted between countries. As he wrote:
Our social institutions and public policies must respect all human beings as 
moral persons and this respect entails recognition, in some form, of the free-
dom and equality of every human being.
(Carens 1987: 265)
This corresponds with the words of Hannah Arendt, who wrote about refugees, 
although it seems that her thoughts can be extended to all migrants. She feels that 
they are in a situation, ‘not [of] the loss of specific rights, [. . .] but the loss of a com-
munity willing and able to guarantee any rights whatsoever’ (Arendt 1951: 297). 
From this perspective, integration policy is also key because of the potential mul-
ticulturalism of society. It would have to be quite different to the approach known 
today and would have to focus on building the society’s adaptability to a constant 
inflow and outflow of both foreigners and its own citizens. It should also be based 
on the idea of society as a community which does not exclude any of its members.
Michael Walzer’s views lie between the two extremes described earlier. He 
believes that states should generally be allowed to decide who and under what 
conditions they wish to allow on their territory. However, humanitarian reasons 
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provide an exception to this general rule. States are thus obliged to let in refu-
gees and offer them protection ‘because its denial would require us to use force 
against helpless and desperate people’ (Walzer 1983: 51). This is in line with the 
limitations resulting from international human- rights law. The non- refoulement 
rule resulting from the Geneva Convention (Art. 33) forbids countries from send-
ing people back to a place where their life, health or freedom could be in danger, 
especially if the person is in danger of being tortured (DeBono 2016). The second 
important rule stipulated by Walzer is that persons who have permission to enter 
and remain should quickly be integrated and subsequently naturalised. The point 
is that, if they are living in a society, they should become full legal members of 
that society. This is, again, an inclusive integration model. In other words, while 
governments can, to a large degree, decide who to let in, their decision- making 
power becomes more limited at later stages. Carens develops his thinking by pro-
posing the theory of social membership. He believes that migrants who have spent 
some time living in the country are, from a moral perspective, members of that 
society and should be treated as such. This kind of belonging is more important 
than other, legal kinds. According to Carens (2013: 159):
it is not citizenship but social membership that provides the basis for moral 
claims to most legal rights because social membership is what citizens and 
residents have in common and what distinguishes them from visitors.
Integration and naturalisation also mean that states are obliged to give migrants 
political rights which guarantee their participation in society and in the system of 
power, instead of treating them as guests (or guestworkers) whose status is unsure. 
The abuse of migrants in society and oppression on the part of the authorities are 
the result of a lack of political rights. Without such rights, the economic position 
of migrants is also unable to improve. Politicians only listen to people who can 
vote for them and fight for their rights. When certain groups in society are not 
voters, nobody fights for their rights. Because of this, Walzer (1983: 62) believes:
Immigration, then, is both a matter of political choice and moral constraint. 
Naturalization, by contrast, is entirely constrained: every new immigrant, 
every refugee taken in, every resident and worker must be offered the oppor-
tunities of citizenship. [. . .] No community can be half- metic, half- citizen 
and claim that its admissions policies are acts of self- determination or that its 
politics is democratic.
In practice, however, such an approach often fails. As Lewicki (2017) points out, 
even naturalised migrants are treated by parts of society and its elites as foreign, 
not as equal members who fully belong to the society. Theoretically they have 
full civic rights but, in practice, these rights are often limited. The main barrier is 
structural or institutional racism, directed the most often at people of a different 
skin colour or at Muslims, which makes their full economic and political integra-
tion difficult (Lewicki 2017; Williams 1985).
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Conclusions
States formulate or attempt to formulate their migration policies, which have 
diverse aims. On the one hand, they try to increase migration flows and encourage 
certain groups to come (for example, highly qualified workers or those whose pro-
fessions are in short supply on the market); on the other, they try to limit inflows. 
These policies do not necessarily influence the behaviour of migrants. Like all 
other people, they have their plans and life strategies and navigate between states 
and their policies, using those which fit their aims and trying to circumvent the 
inconvenient ones (Hammar and Lithman 1987).
If policies are created only to satisfy the wants and needs of the host state, 
while ignoring reality and the expectations of migrants, they may well remain 
void. Castles (2004: 852) even claims ‘that states always, or even mostly, fail to 
influence migration through their policies’, especially if we look at the policies in 
the long term. This is because policies created by states are usually short- sighted 
and aimed at answering current challenges; their creators do not understand or do 
not take into consideration the logic of migration movements. Quoting Castles 
(2004: 864) again: ‘State migration control efforts still follow a national logic, 
while many of the forces driving migration follow a transnational logic’; this dis-
crepancy leads to the ineffectiveness of state policies. State policies can be made 
more effective if they involve the full spectrum of the state’s areas of intervention 
in migration: immigration, emigration, preventing irregular migration and – most 
importantly – integration. This is the main argument both of this chapter and of 
the whole book. All partial policies must interact with each other, and in fact, they 
do, so decisions made in one field must (and do) cause effects in the others.
Immigration and integration policy cannot thus be treated as separate, as many 
states up to now have done. The experiences of recent years and the so- called 
migration crisis demonstrate that it is impossible to have an open immigration 
policy without a developed and effective integration policy. We must thus focus 
on integration policy more than in the past, and decisions in immigration pol-
icy must be made based on the effects of previous integration policies. We thus 
assume that we would have a selective immigration policy; however, this selec-
tion would be based on rational and nondiscriminatory criteria and would result 
from our knowledge, not from social fears and stereotypes.
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Introduction
Analysing the development of immigration policy in postwar Europe, one may 
hypothesise that the evolution of the destination country’s response to the influx 
of immigrants is a process which starts from a (wide) open- door policy for for-
eign workers (as a result of dynamic economic development and a high demand 
for a cheap foreign labour force). Such a policy has been replaced over time with 
one of increasing limitations and strict control over the inflow and settlement of 
immigrants. Migration policy, however, is a set of regulations not only covering 
immigrants’ entries and exits but also adapting to cope with the long- term conse-
quences of the settlement of foreigners – i.e. their integration. There are signifi-
cant connections between immigration and integration policies, yet it requires a 
long- term perspective to understand the importance of this interplay. Moreover, 
both entry regulations and integration policies are affected by a whole range of 
factors (see Chapter 2, this book).
European countries’ experiences of immigration and integration and the corre-
sponding policies have been miscellaneous and conditioned by specific historical 
and socio- economic contexts, different concepts of nationhood and citizenship, 
geographical location and regional political constellations. In this chapter, the 
focus will be on those Western European countries that were at the forefront 
in experiencing immigration processes and developing models of integration – 
which then became points of reference for other countries. The dynamics of the 
relationship between immigration and integration policies are closely related to 
the migratory history of individual countries. In receiving countries, the interest of 
the authorities and public opinion on immigration and integration issues varied in 
different periods, depending on the intensity of the inflows of newcomers and their 
characteristics. This chapter will particularly concentrate on Western Europe for 
several reasons. Firstly, in the postwar period, countries such as Germany, France, 
the Netherlands and others in the region were the most important destinations 
for immigrants both from other continents and from Europe. They had to tackle 
mass inflows of foreigners and became, in a relatively short time, countries of net 
immigration – Western Europe became a net immigration regime in the 1950s, 
whereas Northern and Southern Europe did so in the 1970s (see Okólski 2012). 
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Although national variations may be found in the composition and number of 
foreigners, in the stage of their immigration process and in the models of admis-
sion policy implemented by each individual state, the governments had to face the 
challenge and design their political response to the process of these immigrants’ 
settlement – in other words, integration policy. The diversification of the modes of 
integration policy developed in Western European countries is another reason for 
focusing on this particular region. The third reason is that migration flows to and 
within the European continent have traditionally been regulated by nation- states; 
however, in recent decades, competence in this field has been partially delegated 
to the European Union (Scholten and Penninx 2016: 92). The strict connection 
between national and EU levels in terms of the management of migration flows 
and attempts to implement a common migration regime operating in all member- 
states is an extraordinary example of interstate cooperation; there appear to be no 
other similar examples noted in the world on such a scale.
The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to examine and reflect on relations between 
immigration (admission) and integration policies, using the example of selected 
European countries and their grouping (EU). The starting point is that – contrary 
to traditional thinking – immigration policies are not and should not be considered 
as superior to and independent from integration policies. Integration policies, par-
ticularly their failures, frequently determine immigration policies at a later stage. 
Thus, both policies appear to be very interdependent. In detail, the issue of the 
relationship between immigration and integration policies is examined from three 
perspectives reflected in the following parts of this chapter. The first of these pro-
vides a historical analysis of postwar migration, with special attention paid to the 
reconstruction of developments in each policy as well as the connections between 
them (if any). Analyses of state responses to migration show that, in general, 
efforts to facilitate migrants’ integration result from actions already undertaken 
within admissions measures. In other words, integration policy is reactive and 
subsequent to immigration policy (see the discussion on this issue in Chapters 1 
and 2, this book).
The second part of the chapter examines the approaches to integration and the 
corresponding policies in selected European countries. On the one hand, integra-
tion models implemented in Western European countries with the richest immi-
gration histories and, consequently, with the most advanced integration measures 
on the Old Continent, are discussed. On the other hand, references to countries 
that are in transition from emigration to immigration countries in Central Europe 
are also presented (Van Mol and de Valk 2016). To this end, the third part of the 
chapter explores the European Union’s approach to broadly understood migra-
tion and immigrant integration and corresponding policies, underlining their legal 
framework. The EU as an international organisation whose competence in the field 
of migration is shared with its member- states, is a special case study. Within its 
integration policy, the EU only supports national efforts and provides incentives – 
both financial and nonfinancial – to states to enable them to take various actions to 
empower both third- country citizens living legally in the EU and receiving com-
munities. The reconstruction of the development of immigration and integration 
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policies in Europe also serves as an introduction to the following part of the book, 
dedicated to case- studies of particular countries.
The interplay between immigration and integration policies – 
an overview of postwar developments
As the history of the twentieth century shows, perceptions of immigration as a 
threat increased during wars and periods of political instability, economic crisis 
and high unemployment, which often coincided with mass population movements. 
The implementation of immigration control and entry regulations has generally 
been regarded as necessary by state authorities. Immigration flows that took place 
between the 1950s and the 1970s can be grouped into two main streams: colonial 
migration regimes (common for former colonial powers such as the UK, France 
and the Netherlands) and guestworker policies – which were implemented, inter 
alia, in Germany, Austria, France, Denmark and Sweden (Hansen 2003: 25). The 
massive human flows gave rise to a number of challenges for Europe’s receiving 
countries which have remained to this day, with the integration of immigrants 
being the most notable. The postwar era of the early 1970s requires more com-
prehensive examination here, as a starting point for European countries’ policies 
aimed at controlling and reducing immigration (Hansen 2003; Van Mol and de 
Valk 2016). Although the concern to restrain newcomer inflows and to manage 
the integration of those already settled was originally limited to Western European 
countries – as ‘traditional’ destination states – new pressures emerging during the 
1980s and 1990s made the immigration issue a salient problem also for ‘new’ 
immigration countries in Southern Europe and, in later decades, for Central Euro-
pean countries as well (Okólski 2012).
Until then, migration was determined mainly by market forces and migrants 
were viewed as strictly temporary – necessity for the purposes of the national 
economies’ recovery in the postwar period and to fill sectoral labour shortages 
caused by the current rapid economic growth. In many Western European coun-
tries, employers were free to recruit foreign workers abroad or to employ those 
who arrived on their own initiative in search of work. It was – following Thomas 
Hammar’s words – a period of laissez- faire, when governments left the regulation 
of migration flows to companies and labour- market forces (Hammar 1992: 248). 
Migration policy was based primarily on the rules of entry and work and on the 
notion of migrant circulation – entry, work and return – on which the guestworker 
system was based. Immigrants were to stay only on a temporary basis, with no 
opportunities for permanent settlement, family migration or societal integration. 
At that time no measures were taken to integrate foreigners. There was a lurking 
assumption that this labour migration was temporary and that migrants would 
return to their home countries once their economic role had been completed.
The economic slowdown and oil crisis that took place in the early 1970s 
became turning points in the history of migration processes in Europe and marked 
the beginning of a new way of thinking about immigration and integration poli-
cies. In 1971, the UK, followed a year later by Germany, France and then other 
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countries, announced the end of an active recruitment policy and employment of 
foreigners. Subsequent governments began to proclaim the slogan ‘zero immigra-
tion’, meaning the closure of borders to stop the influx of new foreign workers 
and the implementation of stricter regulations of stay and work for already settled 
migrants.
Whereas the inflow of foreign workers was limited for the next few decades, 
family members as well as asylum- seekers from Central and Eastern Europe, 
Africa and Middle Eastern countries continued to arrive using still- available entry 
channels. After the borders were closed to labour migrants, legal entry was only 
possible through the asylum path and arrangements for family reunion. Despite 
the tightening of the immigration law, the number of newcomers increased in 
the following years: by 13 per cent in the cases of West Germany (1974–1982) 
and Great Britain (1971–1981) and by 33 per cent in France (1969–1981) (Moch 
1992: 184). Moreover, despite losing their jobs during the economic slowdown, 
foreign workers did not return to their countries of origin, knowing that rearrival 
would be difficult, if not impossible. The return programmes introduced by gov-
ernments to encourage foreigners to leave were also unsuccessful. As a result, the 
policy of ‘closed borders’ caused the opposite effect to the expected one: inflows 
did not stop and, moreover, thousands of foreigners decided to stay in their coun-
tries of residence, having no reason to return to the much lower standard of living 
and development in their countries of origin. By the late 1970s, it was clear that 
supposedly temporary migration had turned into permanent settlement, resulting 
in the emergence of multicultural and multilingual societies. The stabilisation of 
immigrant populations began, family reunion and refugee status gave way to per-
manent settlement and Western European governments and societies began to per-
ceive immigrants as more permanent rather than merely a temporary component 
co- shaping national communities. The profile of immigrant- origin communities 
changed when, instead of male workers, more women as well as younger and 
older people arrived, with the increased engagement of key social institutions, 
particularly the welfare state. After all, the governments acknowledged that set-
tled migration meant new challenges in terms of integrating into host societies.
This process caused de facto new policies to emerge. There had been surpris-
ingly little recognition of the potential social and political impacts of immigration 
and nothing in the way of long- term planning for the integration of immigrants. 
Traditional assimilation channels were projected in the interwar period for those 
few who had decided to stay and settle. Since these policies were intended for rel-
atively small groups originating from culturally similar areas, they were unlikely 
to be successful in the case of diversified and large waves of immigrants arriving 
from other continents (Doomernik 1998). The recognition of immigrants’ perma-
nent settlement led Western European governments to gradually develop activities 
aimed at the greater integration of immigrants. Initially integration policies had 
been formulated in a reactive way – as policy- makers did not expect migration to be 
permanent, they responded to specific problems as they arose, rather than through 
the formulation of comprehensive and far- sighted strategies (Collison 1993: 90). 
The state’s role was limited to control and to limited forms of integration policy 
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focused mainly on legal solutions in the field of anti- discrimination legislation 
and on the socio- economic dimension (education, housing, the welfare state).
The main aim of a state’s activities in this area was to prevent the economic 
marginalisation of immigrants and to better integrate them into the labour mar-
ket in order to increase their productivity through access to education, language 
learning and vocational training. The immigrants’ integration was perceived as 
a one- way process (immigrants were expected to adjust to the host society) and 
as voluntary (as a right, not an obligation) and felt to be concerned mainly with 
the economic and social spheres of life, rather than the cultural. It was widely 
believed that integration was an inevitable process: if not the first generation, 
then the second and subsequent ones would be sufficiently integrated as a natural 
consequence of the processes of education and socialisation into the host society. 
Moreover, an argument was pursued that a successful integration policy depended 
on strict entry control, meaning in practice that the free influx of foreigners was 
seen as the major obstacle to the establishment of a peaceful relationship between 
immigrants and the host society (Brochmann 1995: 115). This approach still 
remains a key argument shaping migration policies in many countries: integration 
measures aligned with reinforced attempts to limit any further immigrant inflows.
Demands for the improved enforcement of migration regulations and especially 
for better control of the admission of asylum- seekers have been raised since the 
1990s throughout Europe. It was a time of political instability in many European 
regions. The collapse of the Iron Curtain, the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
and Yugoslavia, the opening of the borders of Central and Eastern Europe and, 
later, the Balkan Wars all induced new migration flows across the Old Continent. 
Asylum- seekers and refugees joined the guestworkers and family members arriv-
ing primarily in the Northwestern European countries. These flows and their con-
sequences created the impetus for an integrated European approach that became 
part of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, in which migra-
tion and asylum were formally defined as a common policy concern. An overview 
of several periods in the history of postwar migration processes and policies in 
Western Europe is presented in Table 3.1.
The variety of integration models in Western  
European countries
As evidenced in the previous section and Table 3.1, despite the changing dynam-
ics between immigration and integration policies in postwar Europe, the integra-
tion of migrants remains a subsequent and secondary component of migration 
policy, which explains the certain delay in implementing solutions within admis-
sions policies. Since the integration of migrants is a rising concern not only of 
individual European countries but also of its supranational representation (EU), 
in this part we focus on the reconstruction of particular states’ responses to this 
challenge. Making a comparison of policy approaches in this domain is difficult 
as they are shaped not only by different historical and structural (social, eco-
nomic and political) or institutional settings but also by dissimilar ideological and 
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political understandings of national identity, national cohesion and social order 
(Rudiger and Spencer 2003; Scholten and Penninx 2016; cf. Favell 2001; Mahn-
ing and Wimmer 2000; Penninx 2007). Some are empirically grounded and refer 
to particular examples of European countries; other are ideal types based on gen-
eral assumptions and so are not used consistently in any country. They are not 
stable and permanent but, on the contrary, constitute dynamic and flexible systems 
Table 3.1  Periods in postwar migration processes and policies in Western Europe
Period Main Characteristics Immigration  
(Admissions) Policies
Integration Policies
1945–1971 Migration inflows 





Policy of open borders 
and active recruitment 
of foreign workers, 
guestworker system
–
1971–1973 ‘Immigration stop’ The end of an active 
recruitment policy 





Inflows due to family 




Tightening of political 
measures: visa 
policies, the selective 
admission of low- and 
high- skilled migrant 
workers, restrictions 
in family reunion 
and asylum schemes; 
differentiated national 














Increasing intra- EU 
mobility and 





Building of integrated 
European migration 
space: common visa 
and asylum policy, 
freedom of movement 
in the EU; policy of 
control of external 
borders









integration as a 
condition for third- 
country nationals 
to enter and stay 
in an EU country; 
EU initiatives in 
integration area
Source: Authors’ elaboration
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of principles that undergo some (even fundamental) transformations depending 
on the macro- structural circumstances. Public attitudes towards immigrants and 
concepts of integration are continually changing under the influence of a trans-
forming social reality, new political and socio- economic priorities and unexpected 
events – e.g. the 2015 refugee crisis (cf. Favell 2001; Penninx 2007). Despite 
these limitations, in the migration literature there are conceptualisations and cat-
egorisations of integration policies in Europe that help to clarify that domain.
A good starting point is a well- known study by Rogers Brubaker (1992) on con-
cepts of citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany. He argues that, among 
others, the postwar immigration and integration practices of these two countries 
have their roots deep in contradictory ways of nation- state formation, with the 
French ius soli (granted on the basis of territory or place of birth) and German ius 
sanguinis (ascribed to the children of citizens) as principles for obtaining citizen-
ship. Two different nation- building processes are reflected in more universal and 
assimilationist approaches to migrant integration in France and more particularis-
tic and exclusive ones in Germany (Scholten and Penninx 2016).
The deconstruction of different historical patterns of nation- state formation also 
led Stephen Castles (1995) to propose a typology of policy models concerned with 
immigration and ethnic diversity. He refers to the degree of acceptance of minor-
ity group cultures and distinguishes the differential exclusion model, the assimi-
lation model and the pluralist model. Following the same path, Steven Weldon 
(2006) proposed a typology of citizenship regimes (i.e. the ways in which citizen-
ship is granted and, thus, determines immigrant integration) that corresponds to 
the actual immigration policies of European countries (Niekielska- Sekuła 2016). 
He differentiates between, respectively, collectivistic- ethnic, collectivistic- civic 
and individualistic- civic regimes (Weldon 2006). Similar categorisation has been 
elaborated by Rinus Penninx (2007) who provides empirical examples of two 
basic models of integration policy: exclusionary policy and two variants of inclu-
sion policy – the French (Republican) model and the Anglo- American model. The 
latter two policies are responses to two different visions of state – citizen relations 
and, in consequence, the position and role of immigrants in the host societies.
First, within the models oriented towards the exclusion of specific migrant groups 
(Castles’ differential exclusion model, Weldon’s collectivistic- ethnic regime and 
Penninx’s exclusionary policy), citizenship is equivalent to ethnicity, which 
means its acquisition is solely based on the ius sanguinis rule. The host countries 
which apply this approach are not defining themselves as immigration countries. 
Since newcomers are perceived as temporary ‘guests’, they are prevented from 
permanent settlement (Castles 1995; Weldon 2006). Penninx notes that, since 
a migrant is defined as an ‘alien’ and an ‘outsider’, this approach can, follow-
ing Alexander’s (2007) concepts, be described as a non- policy or a guestworker 
policy. Migrants are included only in one sphere – usually the labour market – 
but are excluded from civic and political participation and lack a secure legal 
status. Consequently, it is assumed that there is no need for a complex integration 
policy that would include the newcomers as full citizens or political actors. Policy 
instruments are usually accidental and based on ad hoc responses to emerging 
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problems. They can be implemented to make immigrants’ stay potentially com-
fortable and profitable for both immigrants and the host country, but the expected 
result is that the aliens will return to their countries of origin sooner or later (Pen-
ninx 2007).
The model was being implemented in Germany, Austria, Denmark, Italy and 
Greece almost up until the end of the twentieth century (Rudiger and Spencer 
2003). In the following decades they withdrew in favour of policies based on a 
combination of the ius sanguinis and ius soli principles (cf. Favell 2001; Süss-
muth and Weidenfeld 2005). Interestingly, elements of this policy can be observed 
nowadays in Poland (Gońda and Klaus 2018). Castles (1995) argues, however, 
that this model is difficult to maintain as it may lead to social tensions, and it 
contradicts the democratic rule of including all members of civil society in a 
nation‐state. Other scholars underline the fact that it restrains integration by leav-
ing migrants in a situation of legal uncertainty, which may lead to a lack of iden-
tification with the receiving country’s social order and, in turn, increase the host 
society’s xenophobic attitude towards the newcomers (Doomernik 1998).
Second, the assimilationist model is based on the idea of loyalty towards the 
nation- state. An immigrant is seen as a full member of the host society and is incor-
porated into the host society through naturalisation. It is expected that immigrants 
will seek citizenship and, referring to the main political principle of equality, will 
become fully fledged participants in political life (Penninx 2007). However, given 
that ethnic roots are not a precondition for attaining citizenship, immigrants of 
various backgrounds are expected to resign from their cultural distinctiveness. 
Expressing one’s culture of origin is possible only in the private sphere. In order 
to facilitate the assimilation process, the host country applies different cultural 
incorporation instruments, e.g. an obligatory official language or education for 
immigrant children (Castles 1995; Weldon 2006).
This model is commonly associated with the republican tradition of France, 
which does not officially recognise ethnic minorities as groups with distinct 
rights. Consequently, there are no relevant policy differences between individu-
als once they become French citizens. Their national belonging is supposed to be 
determined by the political order based on substantive values rather than by racial, 
ethnic or religious background. In this context, the emergence of minorities would 
lead to a failure of integration (Rudiger and Spencer 2003; cf. Favell 2001). Pen-
ninx (2007) also adds that, since immigrant communities are not considered to be 
separate political actors, the use of notions such as ‘ethnicity’, ‘ethnic minority’ 
or ‘multiculturalism’ (which may imply collectiveness or institutionalised differ-
ence due to origin, culture or religion) is avoided. The issue of immigrants and 
their integration is then principally depoliticised, which does not mean, however, 
that they are not present in political debates. This vision, as defined by Penninx, 
of inclusive policies then has direct implications for integration measures. In the 
French model, driven by the principle of equality, policies are not targeted at 
any specific groups (priority is given to general policies) as these would amount 
to recognising these groups as separate political actors. The result of the imple-
mentation of this approach might, however, be counterproductive, as issues with 
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mobilising and engaging members of not fully recognised immigrant groups may 
appear.
The third type of policy model concerns the multicultural approach (as defined 
by Weldon, an individualistic- civic regime). It is based on a pluralist idea of 
democracy in which the presence of different ethnic groups is accepted and regu-
lated through a specific management strategy (Rudiger and Spencer 2003). Coun-
tries implementing these policies tend to grant ius soli citizenship at birth. Since 
substantive equality remains a fundamental element of a political system and may, 
in practice, be related to membership of ethnic or cultural groups, governments 
should allow for cultural diversity by providing citizens of different backgrounds 
with the right to manifest their cultural distinctiveness publicly (Weldon 2006). 
Penninx (2007), in what he calls the Anglo- American inclusive model, underlines 
that ‘ethnicity’ or ‘multiculturalism’ seem relevant terms with which to describe 
the composition of the host society and, thus, also to become important subjects of 
political life. Consequently, particular policies are aimed at target groups so that 
even specific integration instruments (such as positive discrimination or affirma-
tive action) are being used.
This model, however, occurs in various forms, depending on the degree and 
manner of accepting differences at the institutional level. In practice, the plural-
ist approach implemented in the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden relies not on 
the recognition of minority group rights but on a pragmatic management of rela-
tions between different ethnicities. This can be achieved not only through ena-
bling different cultural practices but also through anti- discrimination legislation, 
equal opportunities policies (including access to full civil and political rights) and 
tailor- made arrangements at the local level to facilitate communication between 
ethnic groups (Rudiger and Spencer 2003; cf. Bertossi et al. 2015; Favell 2001). 
Of the three described here, this approach, according to Castles (1995) is the most 
successful in incorporating immigrants into the host society. Ascribing ethnic 
and cultural differences in integration processes may lead to a stimulation of the 
representation of such groups – for example, by extending subsidies directly to 
immigrant entities. Thus, countries applying the assimilation model have gen-
erally moved to a mixed approach, embodying some elements of the pluralist 
model – which, in consequence, has led to public controversies because of contra-
dictions between explicit goals and actual policies.
To sum up, the typologies mentioned are based on a large body of histori-
cal evidence of integration policies developed in different European countries. 
Their relevance in today’s fast- changing realities has, however, been questioned 
by many scholars. The variety of national models of integration policy has been 
criticised for over- emphasising the importance of the transnational and local lev-
els, as well as for minimising internal tensions and certain changes over time 
(Penninx and Garcés- Mascareñas 2016). The optimistic overview of the results 
of national approaches to integration has also been much present in academic 
analyses, although there has also recently been some doubt (Scholten and Penninx 
2016; cf. Bertossi et al. 2015; Joppke 2007). While the models presented under-
line national specificities, a closer analysis shows that, as some scholars argue, 
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integration and – especially – immigration policies are convergent in practice, 
proposing parallel solutions for dealing with increasing immigration. This is espe-
cially evident at the local level, where problems and their solutions often appear to 
be similar across Europe. These transnational similarities leave space for a more 
active role of the EU in facilitating integration, which could help to overcome the 
limitations created by national policies (Rudiger and Spencer 2003; cf. Mahning 
and Wimmer 2000).
Many studies show that migrant integration still remains a nation- state’s sphere 
of influence because ideas for the newcomers’ integration are much correlated with 
notions of national identity and belonging. However, several research outcomes 
suggest that the top- down or centralist model has become much less applicable 
to the practice of migrant integration policy- making in many European countries. 
Interestingly, in this domain, we can also observe shifts away from historically 
grounded state- centric policies towards integration strategies developed and 
implemented at the local level (cities and local governments). This ‘local turn’ in 
migrant integration policies is supposed to better answer to migrants’ needs and to 
effectively help to manage growing ethnic diversity (Scholten and Penninx 2016; 
cf. Alexander 2007; Caponio and Borkert 2010; Entzinger and Scholten 2014). At 
the same time, apart from the decentralisation of integration policies and follow-
ing the terminology applied by Scholten and Penninx (2016), a tendency towards 
the multilevel governance of migrant integration is observed. State authorities 
maintain their influence on integration policies (mostly through funding mecha-
nisms) or are even asked by local governments to become more involved. Since 
the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon, the EU has also left its institutions with the mandate 
that they should do whatever is required.
Towards a European model of immigration  
and integration policies?
With the deepening of European integration processes and the subsequent legal 
and institutional reforms of the European Communities and the European Union, 
the place of migration issues and their scope have also changed. The number of 
member- states has been increasing and, thus, the migration experience and the 
catalogue of national policies have diversified. Until the late 1990s, the driving 
force behind European integration was the states of Northwestern and Southern 
Europe, whose interests shaped the EU approach to migration. Among them were 
former colonial states dealing with the consequences of the past as well as new 
immigration countries receiving labour migrants and asylum- seekers. On the 
contrary, the new member- states that joined the Union in 2004, 2007 and 2013 
were the Central and Eastern European countries from the former Eastern Bloc 
and the USSR, as well as Croatia, once part of the former Yugoslavia, whose 
experiences with international migration until the 1990s were limited and whose 
migration policies were thus not developed (see Castles et al. 2014; Doomernik 
and Bruquetas- Callejo 2016). While the old EU members had a greater impact on 
the creation of a migration policy towards third- country nationals from outside 
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the EU in a bottom- up way, new countries have, instead, been adopting certain 
solutions based on a top- down logic while preparing for their EU accession and 
then in the first years of their membership (see Doomernik and Bruquetas- Callejo 
2016; Van Wolleghem 2019).
The founding treaties did not yet refer to international migration (that is, to 
third- country nationals) per se. Until the mid- 1980s, the issue of the influx of citi-
zens from third countries was the subject of intergovernmental cooperation which 
was beyond the competence of the European Communities. In the second half 
of the 1980s, several working groups were set up as part of the preparations for 
establishing the internal market. The result of cooperation between member- states 
at this stage was, among others, the adoption of the Dublin Convention, determin-
ing the state responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of 
the member- states of the European Communities in 1990. The second half of the 
1980s was also marked by the cooperation between European countries in order to 
gradually abolish the checks at their common borders and to create the Schengen 
Area without internal borders. The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) was crucial for 
the development of EU policies towards third- country nationals. The legal basis 
and the institutional framework for cooperation in this area were covered under 
the third pillar of the EU legal system, encompassing justice and home affairs. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) limited the scope of the third pillar to police 
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, while issues regarding migration and 
asylum were transferred to the first pillar, based on the Community integration 
method with the strongest supranationalism (see Borawska- Kędzierska and Strąk 
2011; Duszczyk 2011).
Of the greatest importance for the development of the EU’s approach to 
 migration and integration of migrants was the Treaty of Lisbon (2007)1 which 
gave the European Union a full legal personality. Consequently, nowadays, EU 
policy in relation to broadly understood migration is part of the area of freedom, 
security and justice, which is subject to shared competences between the EU and 
its member- states. This means that both parties can legislate and adopt legally 
binding acts in this field. Article 3(2) of the TEU stipulates
The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice 
without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured 
in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border con-
trols, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.
(European Union 2016a)
Only a few articles (Articles 67, 77–80) under Title V of the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the EU outline the general legal framework for three specific policies 
on border checks, asylum and immigration in EU primary law. The scope of the 
latter covers such matters as
the efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment of third- 
country nationals residing legally in Member States, and the prevention 
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of, and enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking 
in human beings.
(European Union 2016b: Article 79(1))
In order to make this possible, the Union may reach for specific measures con-
cerning, inter alia, conditions of entry and residence on its territory, the rights 
of third- country nationals legally living in the EU, the prevention of illegal 
immigration and residence, the fight against trafficking in human beings and the 
conclusion of readmission agreements with third countries. Regardless of these 
provisions, member- states have the power to decide on the scale of admission of 
third- country nationals onto their territory in search of work, whether employed 
or self- employed.
The growing importance of migration issues on the EU’s political agenda was 
reflected in the gradual development of EU secondary law (directives, regulations 
etc.) in recent decades. Many strategic EU acts of law have been adopted since 
the early 2000s and several have already been revised or subject to proposals for 
replacement or recasting. They concern the entire spectrum of matters, includ-
ing EU border management, regular migration, irregular (illegal) migration and 
human trafficking, forced migration and asylum. However, it was the 1985 Schen-
gen Agreement with its 1990 Implementation Convention that had a symbolic 
meaning, providing the basis for a common area without internal borders and 
which – step by step – was joined by new countries.
Particular attention can be paid to legal instruments concerning regular immi-
gration that reflect the EU approach, which assumes the adoption of sectoral legis-
lation, by category of migrant, to finally achieve a comprehensive policy package. 
In this regard, the vast majority of legal acts in force deal with labour migration 
into the EU and establish the conditions of entry and residence of third- country 
nationals with high qualifications; those interested in seasonal work; those in the 
framework of an intra- corporate transfer; those pursuing research, studies, train-
ing, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational projects; and au 
pair placements. This is supplemented by the rules of a common, simplified pro-
cedure for third- country nationals applying for a residence and work permit in 
an EU member- state. The EU also regulates the conditions for the exercise of 
the right to family reunification by third- country nationals residing lawfully in 
the territory of the member- states – including persons granted refugee status and 
third- country nationals who are long- term residents – and the conditions for the 
exercise of the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the member- states.
The 2010s saw a significant change in the migration and asylum situation in 
Europe due to the increase in the inflow of forced and irregular migrants from 
the Middle East and Africa. The years 2015–2016 were considered the peak of 
the so- called migration and refugee crisis, with one million crossing the Medi-
terranean Sea to Europe in 2015 (UNCHR 2018), 1.8 million detected cases of 
illegal crossings between border- crossing points at the EU’s external border in 
2015 (European Border and Coast Guard Agency – Frontex 2018) and a very 
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high number of asylum applications submitted by third- country nationals in the 
EU- 28 – that is, 1.3 million annually in 2015–2016 (Eurostat 2018). This time, it 
was the European Commission’s ‘European Agenda on Migration’, announced in 
May 2015, which turned out to be a key strategic document in framing the EU’s 
approach to migration in the following years. It identified emergency actions to 
be taken immediately in the EU and in its neighbourhood in order to face the most 
urgent challenges of the crisis. These were, inter alia, two- year relocation and 
resettlement schemes in 2015–2017 dedicated to asylum- seekers and to setting up 
hot spots in Italy and Greece. The Agenda also proposed several actions designed 
to better manage migration in the medium and long term, divided into four main 
pillars aimed at reducing the incentives for irregular migration, saving migrants’ 
lives and securing the external borders, strengthening the common asylum policy 
and developing a new policy on legal migration. In the context of the latter, rep-
rioritising funding for integration policies was listed among the key actions to be 
taken in the future. The Agenda clearly stated that
Our migration policy will succeed if underpinned by effective integration 
policies. Although the competence lies primarily with Member States, the 
European Union can support actions by national governments, local authori-
ties and civil society engaged in the complex and long term process of foster-
ing integration and mutual trust.
(European Commission 2015: 16)
In other words, it can be deduced that integration policies in EU member- states 
supported by the EU framework determine the success of EU migration policy. 
Returning to the solutions proposed in the Agenda, these have been gradually 
implemented in the EU since 2015, albeit at different speeds and with varying 
degrees of success. The migration and refugee crisis showed that a reform of EU 
policy in the area of migration, asylum and border management was necessary, 
making it one of the priorities of the EU’s political agenda. In its progress report 
of March 2019, the Commission stressed that a comprehensive approach based on 
the joint efforts of member- states and the EU, in close cooperation with external 
actors, was still necessary in order to provide better management of migration in 
Europe (see European Commission 2019).
The regular increase in the inflow of migrants to the EU in recent decades 
has resulted in the need to address the issue of their admission and integration 
from a long- term perspective. Integration- related issues began to appear gradually 
in subsequent EU (political) documents focused on migration, usually regard-
ing legal migration and third- country nationals. This list included the Tampere 
Programme (1999), Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on a Community Immigration Policy (2000), Communica-
tion from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Immigra-
tion, Integration and Employment (2003), Thessaloniki European Council Con-
clusions (2003), The Hague Program (2005), the European Pact on Immigration 
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and Asylum (2008) and the Stockholm Programme (2009) (see Duszczyk 2011). 
In these documents, information on the relationship between integration and 
 immigration – or, rather, about the importance of integration for migration  policy – 
appeared in different ways. For example, in the Thessaloniki European Council 
Conclusions, in the section discussing immigration, borders and asylum, it was 
stated that ‘the issue of the smooth integration of legal migrants into EU societies 
should also be further examined and enhanced’, while the section dedicated to 
integration proposed to understand integration policies as ‘a continuous, two- way 
process based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of legally residing 
third- country nationals and the host societies’. If they are successful, they could 
contribute to social cohesion and economic welfare. The formulation from the 
Stockholm Programme is also interesting, in which the European Council stated 
that
the long- term consequences of migration, for example on the labour markets 
and the social situation of migrants, have to be taken into account and that the 
interconnection between migration and integration remains crucial, inter alia, 
with regard to the fundamental values of the Union.
(European Council 2010)
To this end, the Council stressed the key importance of the successful integration 
of legally residing third- country nationals in order to maximise the benefits of 
immigration. Once again, it has been said – implicitly – that integration policy 
determines immigration policy and is not just its simple sub- policy or a comple-
mentary element.
In the light of today’s EU’s primary law, ‘integration’ in the context of migra-
tion is mentioned only once in the treaties, while the term ‘integration policy’ does 
not appear at all. Article 79(4) of the TFEU states that
The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordi-
nary legislative procedure, may establish measures to provide incentives and 
support for the action of Member States with a view to promoting the integra-
tion of third- country nationals residing legally in their territories, excluding 
any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States.
(European Union 2016b: Article 79(4))
There are two important conclusions that flow from this provision. Firstly, ‘inte-
gration’, for the EU, refers only to third- country nationals – that is, to non- EU 
citizens – and only those who legally reside in its member- states, which would 
indicate that EU citizens do not need to integrate when they live in an EU country 
different from their country of origin. Secondly, integration is not subject to the 
harmonisation of national law at the EU level, which means that states conduct 
their own integration policies within national legal regimes in this matter and that 
the EU supports them only in integration efforts and provides incentives in this 
regard. If the EU competence in the field of integration is limited, the inclusion of 
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Article 79(4) in the TFEU is an important milestone that gives EU institutions any 
mandate in the field of migrant integration. In this context and in light of the scope 
of this book on the relations between immigration and integration policies, the 
integration of immigrants (and, more specifically, of third- country nationals) and 
the corresponding policy from a legal perspective are part of a wider immigration 
policy at the EU level. The superiority of immigration policy over integration pol-
icy was noticeable before the Treaty of Lisbon. Strengthening the integration of 
third- country nationals legally living in EU countries as an essential goal for EU 
immigration policy was stated by the Commission of the European Communities 
in 2004. In practice, following the stipulations of Article 79(4) of the TFEU, EU 
integration activities are mostly carried out using nonbinding tools (e.g. common 
standards and principles or good practices such as 11 EU- wide Common Basic 
Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy or the European Web Site on Integra-
tion) as well as dedicated funds and programmes (such as the European Integra-
tion Fund for 2007–2013 and the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund for 
2014–2020) which the member- states can use for the purpose of the integration 
of third- country nationals. Geddes and Scholten (2016) perceive these measures 
as an expression of soft(er) governance mechanisms at EU level, while Van Wol-
leghem (2019) approaches the EU’s policy on the integration of migrants through 
the prism of the concept of a soft Europeanisation that is understood as the process 
encompassing both bottom- up and top- down phases.
The review of EU legal and political documents shows that integration is, in 
general, understood as a dynamic, two- way process based on the mutual rights 
and corresponding obligations of legally resident third- country nationals in EU 
member- states and the host society. In its December 2003 opinion, the European 
Socio- Economic Committee confirmed that integration is a bilateral process 
which involves gradually bringing the scope of immigrants’ rights and obliga-
tions, as well as their access to goods, services and methods of civic participa-
tion, closer to those enjoyed by the rest of the population, with regard to equal 
opportunities and equal treatment. Since then, this understanding of integration 
has been regularly mentioned in different EU documents and has become the core 
component of the EU approach in this regard.
An important milestone in the development of an EU integration policy was an 
adoption of the set of 11 Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Pol-
icy in the EU in 2004 by the Justice and Home Affairs Council (JHA) (Council of 
the European Union 2004). They started with the general definition of integration 
as ‘a dynamic, two- way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and 
residents of Member States’, followed by the presentation of the wide spectrum of 
dimensions of this process (employment, education, equal and non- discriminatory 
access to public and private goods and services, cultural and religious diversity, 
participation in democratic processes and a basic knowledge of the host society’s 
language, history and institutions) and ended with a request to monitor and evalu-
ate integration policies using appropriate indicators. Employment – corresponding 
to economic integration – was recognised as a cornerstone of the integration of 
immigrants in a new society. Even if the principles themselves did not refer to 
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the relationship between immigration and integration policies, in the introductory 
considerations, the Council stressed that
A critical aspect of managing migration is the successful integration of legally 
residing immigrants and their descendants. At the same time immigration 
policy can contribute to the success of integration policy.
(Council of the European Union 2004: 15)
Thus, the interdependent links between immigration and integration and their pol-
icies have been highlighted. The success of an integration policy is of key impor-
tance in ensuring well- managed migration processes. Another thing that draws 
attention is the fact that integration is related only to ‘legal’ migrants (today, 
referred to instead as ‘regular’ migrants) – in other words, those living legally in 
the EU.
In 2005, the Commission of the European Communities announced ‘A Com-
mon Agenda for Integration – Framework for the Integration of Third- Country 
Nationals in the European Union’. It referred to the aforementioned Common 
Basic Principles, which should be seen ‘as main elements of all national and EU 
integration policies’. Also, the need to foster a more coherent EU approach to 
integration was expressed. In its conclusion, the Commission stated that ‘legal 
migration and integration are inseparable and should mutually reinforce one 
another’, indicating their co- occurrence and close relationship (see Commission 
of the European Communities 2005). Another key document was the ‘European 
Agenda for the Integration of Third- Country Nationals’, adopted by the Euro-
pean Commission in 2011. As a new EU strategy in the field of the integration of 
migrants, the Agenda pointed out that integration management is a shared respon-
sibility and should involve both immigrants and residents, through more action at 
the local level and with the participation of the countries of origin, with the sup-
porting role of the Commission in the planning of integration activities (see Euro-
pean Commission 2011). Finally, 2016 saw the adoption of the Commission’s 
‘Action Plan on the Integration of Third Country Nationals’. The successful inte-
gration of third- country nationals in the EU was identified as a matter of common 
interest to all member- states, especially because European societies are becom-
ing more and more diverse and human mobility in the world will continue in the 
twenty- first century. The 2016 Action Plan offered a common policy framework 
to help EU member- states to develop and strengthen national integration poli-
cies for migrants from third countries, combined with the corresponding financial 
support. The actions planned at the EU level to support member- states in their 
integration efforts covered such areas as pre- departure and pre- arrival measures, 
education, employment and vocational training, access to basic services such as 
housing and health care, active participation and social inclusion, as well as tools 
for coordination, funding and monitoring. In this way, the Action Plan became the 
next stage in the evolution of the EU approach to the integration of migrants – this 
time, considered a holistic one. The Action Plan highlighted the need to think 
about integration measures at pre- departure and pre- arrival stage, that is, at the 
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earliest possible moment in the migration process, which allows both migrants 
and receiving communities to better prepare for the former’s full integration. The 
pre- integration measures are beneficial for anyone moving legally to the EU but 
are especially important for resettled refugees (see European Commission 2016).
There is no EU legislation focused on the integration of third- country nationals 
per se, although certain aspects of this process are regulated under the acts of law 
regarding immigration – that is, those on family reunification and conditions of 
entry, stay, residence and work in the EU. EU legislation, which indirectly affects 
their integration, includes acts on combating discrimination, xenophobia and rac-
ism, counteracting social exclusion and strengthening social cohesion. A separate 
issue is acts of law and activities directed at asylum- seekers (instead related to 
reception conditions during the asylum procedure) and beneficiaries of interna-
tional and national protection – mostly refugees as they are a group with specific 
needs.
Conclusions
This chapter has examined the issue of relations between immigration (admissions) 
and integration policies in Europe from several angles. The first part focused on the 
reconstruction of postwar migration processes that had revealed specific moments 
when (inter)dependencies of these policies were especially evident. In the first 
decades after World War II, the migration flows to Western European countries 
were highly determined by market forces, with migrants being recognised as an 
interim solution to the recovery of local economies and, subsequently, to filling 
workforce shortages in rapidly growing industries. It was not until the economic 
crisis of the early 1970s and the ‘zero immigration’ policy proclaimed by the 
main destination countries in Western Europe that many governments faced the 
transformation of temporary guestworkers into permanent settlers and recognised 
the request for an integration policy. It appeared, then, to be a pivotal moment in 
European governments’ perceptions of and political approaches towards migra-
tion. The concerns of managing the admission of immigrants and preventing their 
socio- economic marginalisation also became a key issue for ‘new’ immigration 
countries in Southern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s and, in subsequent decades, 
for Central European countries.
In the second part of this chapter, more detailed considerations were pre-
sented on selected European countries’ approaches to integration. Despite the 
fact that states’ policy responses in this domain are conditioned by various his-
torical and institutional circumstances as well as different frames of negotiating 
national identity and belonging and of assuring social cohesion, the migration 
literature – as well as a substantial body of historical evidence of integration poli-
cies implemented in the Western hemisphere – brings to light several theoreti-
cal conceptualisations and practical references that enable the clarification of the 
issues being investigated. One can recognise that states’ responses to the pres-
ence of immigrants stretch from models oriented towards the exclusion of specific 
migrant groups (where citizenship is equivalent to ethnicity), to the assimilationist 
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models based on the idea of loyalty towards the nation- state (whereby an immi-
grant becomes a full- fledged member of society through naturalisation), to mul-
ticultural approaches that allow for cultural diversity by providing citizens of 
nondominant backgrounds with the right to openly manifest their cultural distinc-
tiveness. On the other hand, as many scholars argue, despite these seemingly wide 
discrepancies between particular policy models, there is, in practice, significant 
convergence in policy solutions towards immigration. It is particularly visible at 
the lowest governance level (cities and local administration) and results in the 
transformation of policies from the historically grounded top- down (centralist) 
models to seemingly more applicable and efficient bottom- up policy- making – 
or, where state authorities still tend to shape both immigration and integration 
policies – to the multilevel governance of migrant issues.
In this context there is also room for supranational entities, like the Euro-
pean Union, which operate traditionally in the sphere of migrants’ admission but 
which have recently also developed policy solutions to facilitate their integration. 
The importance of migration issues and the scope of their regulation in EU law 
changed along with the development of European integration. The growing inter-
est in this field was already noticeable at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, although 
the key moment was the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, giving the EU a legal 
personality and ordering the EU legal system. Since then, the EU has been pursu-
ing a policy, known as common, in the areas of borders, immigration and asy-
lum, based on shared competence. Consequently, the EU approach to migration 
is firmly anchored in its legal and institutional framework. Recent years marked 
by the migration and refugee crisis have shown that the governments of many 
EU member- states are increasingly emphasising their national competence in the 
migration arena, especially in the field of asylum policy. The interest in immi-
grant integration began to increase at the EU level at the turn of the 1990s and 
2000s. At that time, integration policy was treated as complementary to migration 
policy, whose high efficiency and achievement of migration goals would not be 
possible without the implementation of an effective (successful) mechanism of 
involving foreigners in European societies and their institutions (Duszczyk 2011). 
This complementary nature of integration policy has already been outlined in the 
first EU documents comprehensively dealing with migration, such as the Tampere 
Program (1999), and following EC communications and Council’s conclusions 
(Duszczyk 2011). From the beginning of 2000, in subsequent EU documents, inte-
gration was mainly related to legal immigration and third- country nationals. At 
the same time, a change in the EU approach could be observed from that promot-
ing multiculturalism to the model aimed at foreigners’ full socio- economic inde-
pendence (Duszczyk 2011). The Treaty of Lisbon turned out to be a breakthrough 
in the development of an integration policy because it formally provided the EU 
with the possibility of influencing integration in its member- states. From a legal 
point of view, as already mentioned, integration is part of the EU’s immigration 
policy and does not constitute a separate, common policy. In such a way, as the 
entire immigration policy is subject to shared competence, it falls under the area 
of freedom, security and justice. In practice, the broadly understood integration of 
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migrants remained the domain of the member- states and their national law. How-
ever, the changing migration reality of Europe and the transformation of Euro-
pean societies into more culturally diverse ones in recent years have increased the 
demand for integration initiatives at the EU level. Van Wolleghem (2019: 190) 
claims that EU integration policy does not exist; however, ‘there is a consistent 
set of policy instruments that together form a policy relating to integration but 
talking of an EU integration policy as of yet is hardly valid’. In the same context, 
Geddes and Scholten (2016: 171) conclude that ‘there is not an EU migrant inte-
gration paradigm and it is highly unlikely that one will emerge’. What, however, 
draws their attention, are various measures of a binding and nonbinding nature at 
the EU level which correspond to transgovernmental and multilevel dynamics. 
The Union is distinguished by the promotion of integration as a two- way process 
which concerns not only immigrants but also residents. It draws attention to the 
fact that rights and obligations apply to both parties in this process and common 
efforts are required. The weakness of the EU’s approach is in limiting integration 
only to third- country nationals, which questions the need to integrate citizens of 
one EU country living in another member- state. Thus far, the lack of a common 
EU integration policy has resulted in a soft, gradual Europeanisation of national 
policies by using such incentives as good practice and dedicated funds.
Note
 1 The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Community, signed in Lisbon on 13 December 2007, OJ C 306, 
17.12.2007. With this signing, the Treaty Establishing the European Community was 
renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the Union 
replaced the Community, becoming its legal successor. Since 1 December 2009, the EU 
has been functioning as a full international organisation (in fact, a supranational one) 
whose legal basis are two treaties: the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the 
aforementioned TFEU.
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Pracowników- Ewolucja i Teraźniejszość. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA- JR.
Entzinger, H. and Scholten, P. (2014) ‘Models of immigrant integration? Between national 
and local integration policies’, in Martiniello, M. and Rath, J. (eds) An Introduction 
to Immigrant Incorporation Studies: European Perspectives. Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, pp. 371–390.
European Border and Coast Guard Agency – Frontex (2018) Annual Risk Analysis for 
2018. Warsaw: European Border and Coast Guard Agency.
European Commission (2011) Communication from the Commission to the European Par-
liament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions – European Agenda for the Integration of Third- Country Nationals, COM 
(2011) 0455 final, Brussels, 20.07.2011. Available at https://eur- lex.europa.eu/legal- 
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52011DC0455 (accessed 29 September 2019).
European Commission (2015) Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Com-
mittee of the Regions – A European Agenda on Migration, COM (2015) 240 final, 13 
May 2015. Available at https://eur- lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/?qid=14852553
62454&uri=CELEX:52015DC0240 (accessed 29 September 2019).
European Commission (2016) Communication from the Commission to the European Par-
liament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions – Action Plan on the Integration of Third Country Nationals, Strasbourg, 
7.6.2016, COM (2016) 377 final. Available at https://eur- lex.europa.eu/legal- content/
EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2016:0377:FIN (accessed 29 September 2019).
European Commission (2019) Communication from the Commission to the European Par-
liament, the European Council and the Council “Progress report on the Implementa-
tion of the European Agenda on Migration”. Brussels, 6.3.2019, COM (2019) 126 final. 
44 Marcin Gońda et al.
Available at https://ec.europa.eu/home- affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what- we- do/poli 
cies/european- agenda- migration/20190306_com- 2019- 126- report_en.pdf (accessed 29 
September 2019).
European Council (2010) The Stockholm Programme – An Open and Secure Europe Serv-
ing and Protecting Citizens, OJ C 115, 4.5.2010. Available at https://eur- lex.europa.eu/
legal- content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52010XG0504(01)&from=EN.
European Union (2016a) Treaty on European Union (Consolidated version 2016). OJ 
C 202, 7.6.2016. Available at https://eur- lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/?uri= 
CELEX:12016M/TXT (accessed 29 September 2019).
European Union (2016b) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated 
version 2016). OJ C 202, 7.6.2016. Available at https://eur- lex.europa.eu/legal- content/
EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12016E/TXT (accessed 29 September 2019).
Eurostat (2018) Asylum and First Time Asylum Applicants by Citizenship, Age and Sex: 
Annual Aggregated Data (Rounded). Available at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/
products- datasets/- /tps00191 (accessed 21 September 2019).
Favell, A. (2001) Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in 
France and Britain. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Geddes, A. and Scholten, P. (2016) The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe. 
London: Sage.
Gońda, M. and Klaus, W. (2018) ‘Czynniki kształtujące polską politykę imigracyjną i 
integracyjną w opinii badaczy i praktyków’, Polityka Społeczna, 11–12(536–537): 
16–23.
Hammar, T. (1992) ‘Laws and policies regulating population movements: A European 
perspective’, in Kritz, M.M., Lim, L.L. and Zlotnik, H. (eds) International Migration 
Systems. A Global Approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 245–262.
Hansen, R. (2003) ‘Migration to Europe since 1945: Its history and its lessons’, in Spencer, 
S. (ed.) The Politics of Migration: Managing Opportunity, Conflict and Change. Oxford: 
Wiley- Blackwell, pp. 25–38.
Joppke, C. (2007) ‘Beyond national models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in 
Western Europe’, West European Politics, 30(1): 1–22.
Mahning, H. and Wimmer, A. (2000) ‘Country- specific or convergent? A typology of 
immigrant policies in Western Europe’, Journal of International Migration and Integra-
tion, 1(2): 177–204.
Moch, L.P. (1992) Moving Europeans. Migration in Western Europe Since 1650. Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press.
Niekielska- Sekuła, K. (2016) ‘Selected aspects of Norwegian immigration policy towards 
children’, Central and Eastern European Migration Review, 1(5): 129–144.
Okólski, M. (ed.) (2012) European Immigrations: Trends, Structures and Policy Implica-
tions. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Penninx, R. (2007) ‘Integration processes of migrants: Research findings and policy chal-
lenges’, Migracijske i Etničke Teme, 1–2: 7–32.
Penninx, R. and Garcés- Mascareñas, B. (2016) ‘The concept of integration as an ana-
lytical tool and as a policy concept’, in Penninx, R. and Garcés- Mascareñas, B. (eds) 
Integration Processes and Policies in Europe: Contexts, Levels and Actors. Dordrecht: 
Springer, pp. 11–30.
Rudiger, A. and Spencer, S. (2003) ‘Social integration of migrants and ethnic minorities: 
Policies to combat discrimination’. Paper delivered at the conference The Economic 
and Social Aspects of Migration, Brussels, 21–22 January. Available at www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/15/4/15516956.pdf.
Postwar immigration/integration policy 45
Scholten, P. and Penninx, R. (2016) ‘The multilevel governance of migration and integra-
tion’, in Penninx, R. and Garcés- Mascareñas, B. (eds) Integration Processes and Poli-
cies in Europe: Contexts, Levels and Actors. Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 91–108.
Süssmuth, R. and Weidenfeld, W. (eds) (2005) Managing Integration: The European 
Union’s Responsibilities Towards Immigrants. Washington, DC: Migration Policy 
Institute.
UNHCR (2018) Operational Portal – Refugee Situations: Mediterranean Situation. Availa-
ble at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean (accessed 21 September 2019).
Van Mol, C. and de Valk, H. (2016) ‘Migration and immigrants in Europe: A historical and 
demographic perspective’, in Penninx, R. and Garcés- Mascareñas, B. (eds) Integration 
Processes and Policies in Europe: Contexts, Levels and Actors. Dordrecht: Springer, 
pp. 31–55.
Van Wolleghem, P.G. (2019) The EU’s Policy on the Integration of Migrants: A Case of 
Soft- Europeanization? Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Weldon, S.A. (2006) ‘The institutional context of tolerance for ethnic minorities: A com-
parative, multilevel analysis of Western Europe’, American Journal of Political Science, 
50(2): 331–349.
Introduction
Immigration and integration policies are usually analysed as two separate spheres 
of a state’s activity. This division is based on a conviction that actions performed 
under an integration policy and their effects have limited impact on regulations 
regarding the inflow of foreigners into a given state. Various research findings 
show, however, that there are relevant interdependencies between immigration 
and integration policies and that the scope of their connections largely determines 
a state’s approach to immigration (cf. Hammar 1985a, 2010; Messina 2007). This 
means that the degree to which borders are open to immigrants could depend on 
the level of integration of those foreigners who already reside in that state (cf. 
Bosswick and Heckmann 2006). However, integration measures might also result 
from a state’s admission practices. Immigration and integration policies counting 
among a state’s public policies has a long tradition in migration analyses (cf. Ged-
des and Scholten 2016; Hammar 1985b; Penninx and Garcés- Mascareñas 2016; 
Schain 2008). This gained momentum during the so- called refugee crisis of 2015, 
which resulted in a strong polarisation of political scenes and of Europeans’ opin-
ions regarding immigration (cf. Schain 2018). In the context of European migra-
tion challenges, there is a need to re- assess relations between both policies and 
their role in public policies of certain EU member states.
This chapter discusses the findings of an online Delphi- method- based survey 
conducted in 2017–2018 among diversified groups of experts on relations between 
immigration and integration policies in selected EU states. Among the nearly 80 
respondents representing eight European states (Czechia, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) were local- and 
state- level policy- makers, researchers and members of NGOs. The survey’s aim 
was to reconstruct experts’ opinions on current and desirable links between the two 
policies and to collect their forecasts for the development of these policies in the 
next few years. Diverse factors influence both policies: historical, socio- economic, 
internal and foreign policies, as well as political philosophy or current social 
convictions. Various entities and interest groups of different levels – including 
international institutions but also politicians, officials, employers or social 
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organisations – also affect their formation (Natter 2018). In this context the fol-
lowing questions emerge:
• What determines the shape of these two areas of public policy in particular 
EU states?
• What are the relations between them?
• What are the dynamics of these changes in recent years in a situation of grow-
ing reluctance towards immigrants and the politicisation of the immigration 
issue?
• Considering the increasing attention paid by Europeans to immigration, what 
are the future scenarios for the development of the two policies as foreseen 
by experts?
Research methodology
In order to face the challenge of describing the current shape of immigration and 
integration policies and of anticipating their future development in the European 
countries investigated, the IMINTEG research team carried out a comparative 
study using the Delphi method.1 On this basis the team sought the opinions of a 
deliberately chosen panel of experts on a subject requiring complex and barely 
accessible knowledge – used mostly to assess trends in the development of given 
phenomena (Linstone and Turoff 1975; Martino 1972). In subsequent rounds of 
the study, a version of the questionnaire was used which was extended by the 
presentation of the results from the previous round. This allowed anonymous par-
ticipants to compare their own answers and, as a result, change or maintain their 
opinion on a given issue. This procedure also enables researchers to sift through 
the various opinions, rejecting those which are extreme and atypical, until a uni-
form statement of experts is achieved (Drbohlav 1997). Rather than obtaining 
numerous and therefore separate opinions, it is important to gather fewer but more 
in- depth ones that lead to a consensus on a given issue in the course of subsequent 
research phases. The Delphi method is currently used to predict phenomena of 
high social significance – for instance public health, education or environmen-
tal protection. It is also gaining increasing popularity in migration analyses (see 
Bijak and Wiśniowski 2009; Jaroszewicz and Lesińska 2014; Lachmanová and 
Drbohlav 2004).
The online Delphi survey was conducted in two rounds in the autumn of 2017 
and the spring of 2018. In the first round, the online questionnaire was distrib-
uted to more than 200 experts from eight EU member states. In total 79 experts 
responded, who were then approached again in the second round. In the end, 
answers from 56 experts were collected (see Table 4.1). In our analysis we focus 
on two axes of interpretation of the data collected. First, the countries were chosen 
to take into account the differentiation in immigration and integration policy mod-
els and, in consequence, their position on an historical map of European popula-
tion transfers. We decided to cluster the data from the eight states into two blocks 
representing the two stages of immigration phenomena in Europe. The first block 
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consists of states with a long immigration tradition, including those with a post- 
colonial history (France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom) and those expe-
riencing mass postwar labour immigration as well as recent refugee immigration 
(Germany, Spain, Sweden). The second block is made up of new immigration des-
tinations (Czechia, Poland). This distinction also comprises an overlap between 
Western Europe and Central Europe. The proposed interpretation scheme allows 
us to observe potential approaches to the relations between immigration and inte-
gration policies in the context of clashes between old and new migration patterns.
Secondly, the group of respondents contained representatives of four sectors: 
researchers from academia and scientific entities (hereinafter marked as RE), 
Table 4.1  Structure of the panel of experts
Researchers 
(RE)












Germany (DE) 5 4 1 2 12
France (FR) 3 2 0 0 5
The Netherlands 
(NL)
4 1 0 0 5
Spain (ES) 7 0 2 1 10




4 0 0 1 5
Czechia (CZ) 4 4 0 6 14




39 16 7 17 79
Round II
Germany (DE) 2 1 0 2 5
France (FR) 3 1 0 0 4
Netherlands 
(NL)
2 1 0 0 3
Spain (ES) 3 2 0 1 6




3 0 0 0 3
Czechia (CZ) 3 4 0 6 13




26 15 3 12 56
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policy- makers from central (AC) and local administration (AL) as well as prac-
titioners working in nongovernmental sectors (NGO). For this chapter, special 
attention was paid to the comparison between the academic (theoretical) point of 
view and the practical one represented by policy- makers and practitioners. Such 
an approach cannot easily be found in the existing literature but is crucial for 
pinpointing the potential inconsistencies in the European debate on immigration 
and integration policies. Consequently, the answers collected among researchers 
(39 in the first round and 26 in the second) were compared to the responses of the 
aggregated group of policy- makers of central and local administration and NGO 
practitioners (40 in the first round and 30 in the second round). On the other hand, 
in total 48 and 26 answers (in the first and second round, respectively) were gath-
ered from respondents in Western European states (Germany, France, the Nether-
lands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom), whereas Central and Eastern Europe 
were represented by 31 and 30 (in the first and second rounds, respectively) Pol-
ish and Czech respondents. The experts in the first round had an average of over 
13 years of professional experience (nearly 15 years in the researchers’ group and 
almost 12 years among policy- makers and practitioners), while those answering 
the second- round questionnaire had been dealing professionally with migration 
issues for about 15 years (18 for researchers and 13 for practitioners).
The main challenge in the organisation of the Delphi survey was to find a suf-
ficient number of experts within each predefined group in all the states being 
researched and to maintain constant respondent representation between the two 
rounds. Despite the IMINTEG research team’s efforts to secure an equal number 
of respondents in each category, the most underrepresented subcategory was that 
of local administration employees. We think there are two reasons for this. The 
first is the position of immigration/integration policies in the local context – for 
example, in the United Kingdom, responsibility for local activities in migration 
issues were delegated to NGOs whereas, in France, migration policy is tradition-
ally highly centralised (Scholten and Penninx 2016: 99). The second reason is 
because we encountered difficulties in recruiting relevant respondents – local 
officials dealing precisely with immigration/integration issues, for example. Sur-
prisingly, it was also hard to reach selected experts from the ‘core’ migration 
countries: France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, where the number of 
research centres on migration problems is extremely high.
The survey included 16 closed questions referring to three main topics: immi-
gration policy; integration policy towards migrants; relations between these two 
state activities. The last set of questions concerned the linkages between immigra-
tion and integration policies and factors shaping them in three periods (during the 
five years prior to the survey, at the moment of the survey and within the follow-
ing five years) as well as in the desired situation (optimal for the state’s interest). 
In addition, we asked about the impact of EU institutions on the implementa-
tion of these two spheres. Although the survey did not directly refer to refugee 
and asylum policies, it was conducted at the time of the European refugee crisis, 
which might have influenced respondents’ opinions. As we were aware of this, we 
asked the experts, in the methodological instructions, to focus on the broader and 
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longer- term perspective rather than the present migration situation of their respec-
tive countries. Nonetheless, since the experts, apart from answering the closed 
questions, also had the opportunity to add comments to the issue, they still under-
lined the challenges their countries had faced at the time of the refugee crisis.
In the questionnaire, we also included definitions of the policies being inves-
tigated. As stated in the introduction to this book, the principles and scope of a 
state’s actions towards migration are variously described in the migration litera-
ture (cf. Boswell 2006; Brochmann and Hammar 1999; Dell’Olio 2004; Duszczyk 
2008; Zapata- Barrero et al. 2017). The legal acts and/or practices of particular 
states also define them in different ways. For the IMINTEG project, we conceptu-
alised immigration policy as the action taken by a state to control the rules of entry 
and stay on its territory of people who are not citizens of that state. We perceived 
integration policy as the action taken by a state to ensure a dynamic, two- way 
process of mutual adjustment between immigrants and the receiving society (for 
more on this, see Chapter 2).
In the rest of this chapter we focus only on those selected results of the survey 
that directly refer to the different relations between immigration and integration 
policies. In detail, we present expert assessments on current (answers to Q11) 
and desirable (Q12) relations between the two policies in particular EU states, as 
well as the experts’ predictions regarding the direction(s) which these two poli-
cies are likely to take in the future (Q13). We show the quantitative distribution of 
responses, deepened by qualitative analysis of the experts’ comments (highlighted 
in italics). The results of the second round of our study (56 expert responses in 
total) are presented. Where the opinions of experts were significantly different 
between the two rounds, we present the results of both research stages.
Current relations between immigration  
and integration policies
First the respondents were asked to describe the current relationship between 
immigration and integration policies in their countries (see Table 4.2). Irrespec-
tive of the experts’ sector of professional engagement as well as the history of 
immigration to their countries, the vast majority of the participants noted that the 
two policies being investigated were interconnected but that immigration policy 
played the dominant role. For instance, all four French and all four Dutch survey 
participants saw the dominance of immigration policy over integration policy. 
We may assume, then, that they agreed that the integration of foreigners was sub-
ordinate to a state’s migrant admission policy, as a state normally needs first to 
respond to the arrival of migrants before, subsequently, implementing integration 
measures step by step, as indicated by this Czech respondent:
It is a question of building a ‘foreigners’ infrastructure. Immigration policy 
has been dealt with as a priority; integration policy has established itself grad-
ually, slowly and with difficulty. As a younger and somewhat forced guide.
(I_CZ_7_RE)
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One of the British experts bitterly underlined the actual dominance of immigra-
tion policy in the UK which resulted from a lack of adequate social policy instru-
ments in the field of migrants’ integration:
The ‘needs of industry’ should not be prioritised over integration measures; 
at the moment they are. But ‘integration’ also needs to include the provi-
sion of housing, school places, health and other services and these have to 
expand to the meet the needs of a larger population – this has not been the 
case.
(I_UK_3_RE)
Table 4.2  Responses to Q11: ‘Please select the statement below which best describes the 











Policies are implemented 
independently 
(decisions taken 
in migration and 
integration policy are 
not interrelated)
6 1 4 3




policy decisions are 
a consequence of 
immigration policy 
decisions)
18 22 18 22




policy decisions are 
a consequence of 
integration policy 
decisions)
0 0 0 0
Policies are implemented 
jointly, but it is difficult 
to say which one plays 
the dominant role
0 7 4 3
Other situation (please 
specify)
2 0 0 2
TOTAL 26 30 26 30
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Only in a few cases did the experts tend to see a lack of connection between 
these policies or, on the contrary, their simultaneous implementation without the 
possibility of determining the precedence of one over another. This last idea is 
described here by another Czech expert:
In my opinion, the Policy for the Integration of Immigrants is integral to legal 
migration, to which it must be directly linked. Successful integration is a 
direct prerequisite for the expediency and efficacy of migration. The integra-
tion policy is based on experience – that preventing problems in co- existence 
is always easier than facing the consequences of ill- handled integration.
(II_CZ_3_AC)
The latter opinions were delivered mostly by policy- makers and practitioners 
(from Czechia, Germany, Spain and Sweden) and contradicts the stances taken 
by researchers who – besides their still- dominant opinion on the leading role of 
immigration policy – also specified that the two policies are unrelated and imple-
mented separately.
What needs to be emphasised is that, whereas in the first round of the Delphi 
survey few respondents placed integration measures over immigration policy – 
and justified this point of view with ‘Language capabilities and job offers play 
a major role in decisions on immigration policy’ (I_DE_1_NGO) – none of 
the experts in the second round prioritised integration policy over immigration 
policy. This proves that the Delphi survey procedure enables researchers to set-
tle for more uniform statements and to reject opinions that seem to be unreal 
and atypical.
Interesting comments on the issues being investigated were also given by 
the Polish experts. They refused to clearly determine the relationship between 
Poland’s immigration and integration policies since, as one of them argued, ‘inte-
gration policy basically does not exist’ (II_PL_3_RE). They underlined that state- 
centric integration measures are limited to education (foreign children are subject 
to compulsory schooling) whereas, in practice, one Polish expert posited that:
all (integration) activities are undertaken by NGOs and financed from exter-
nal sources and integration strategies appear at the level of cities, where 
activities are financed from the communal budget.
(II_PL_15_RE)
What is more, due to the lack of mature immigration and integration solutions, 
these policies overlapped or were even contradictory, as another Polish expert 
confirmed:
There are dependencies between them but, at the same time, immigration 
policy plays a leading role. Nevertheless, integration activities are happening 
independently and even contrary to what emerges from immigration policy.
(I_PL_3_AC)
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Consequently, it is not possible to indicate any current dependencies between 
these two spheres of a state’s activity (cf. Gońda and Klaus 2018). What needs 
to be underlined is that these critical opinions were expressed by two academ-
ics (researchers) and one central administration officer. On the other hand, civil 
servants also tended to look for excuses regarding the lack of integration tools 
(and, thus, found no relation between the two types of policy). One of the Polish 
respondents argued that:
Institutions responsible for integration policy have until now conditioned the 
adoption of (conceptual) measures on migration policy, based on the princi-
ple: ‘If there is no migration policy, then we do not have to create an integra-
tion policy’.
(II_PL_16_AC)
The desired relationship between immigration and 
integration policies
Besides determining the contemporary relationship between immigration and 
integration policies in each of the eight EU states, the experts were also asked 
to discuss how they would prefer to see the connections between these two 
spheres of state activity – in other words, how should this relationship look, 
taking into account a given state’s interests and characteristics (see Table 4.3). 
What should be strongly stressed is that almost all respondents from both par-
ticipant groups distinctly agreed that, contrary to the present policy practices 
of European states, immigration and integration policies should be imple-
mented jointly and simultaneously. The experts underlined the fact that, as far 
as decisions on the scale of immigration and the scope of integration activi-
ties were concerned, they needed to be part of one decision- making process. 
Interestingly, there were no discrepancies in this domain between the experts’ 
professional backgrounds or their countries of residence. Furthermore, what 
makes the present and desired relationship between the policies we are inves-
tigating even more pronounced was that today’s precedence of immigration 
over integration policies would be favourable only for one respondent. No sig-
nificant differences in the distribution of answers to this multiple issue were 
noted between the two rounds of the Delphi survey, which proved that the 
experts already had grounded and well- established visions of how adequate 
immigration/integration policies should be.
The predicted relationship between immigration and 
integration policies five years from now
Finally, the experts gathered for the Delphi survey were asked how they fore-
saw the future development of the two policies and their mutual dependency (see 
Table 4.4). Interestingly, when it comes to the relationship between immigra-
tion and integration policies in the next five years, the predicted scenarios varied 
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more than did those observed today or those desired by the respondents. Despite 
the majority of respondents, in particular those from Central Europe, still seeing 
the dominant role played by immigration policy (and, thus, integration policy 
being dependent on the scale of the immigrant influx and the duration of the for-
eigners’ stay) as the most probable in the future, several researchers and policy- 
makers/practitioners also predicted that the two policies would be implemented 
Table 4.3  Responses to Q12: ‘Based on your own knowledge and experience, please select 
the statement below which best describes the desired relations between immi-











The two policies should 
be implemented 
independently






depend on the scale of 
the influx of foreigners 
arriving for different 
reasons)
0 1 0 1
Integration policy should 
determine immigration 
policy (decisions 
concerning the scale 
of immigration and the 
duration of migrants’ 
stay should depend on 
the effectiveness of 
integration policy)
1 2 1 2
The two policies should 
be implemented jointly 
and simultaneously 
(decisions on the scale 
of immigration and the 
scope of integration 
activities should be 
taken as part of a 
single process)
24 27 24 27
Other situation (please 
specify)
0 0 0 0
TOTAL 26 30 26 30
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independently. Although the forecasts delivered by Western European respondents 
were, in general, very dispersed, they were particularly eager to anticipate such 
a scenario. Furthermore, a few researchers agreed that immigration policy would 
be reactive towards integration policy, whereas the majority of policy- makers/
practitioners also predicted that both policies would be implemented as part of 
Table 4.4  Responses to Q13: ‘What do you expect the relations between immigration and 
integration policies in your country to be like over the next five years?’
Round II
Researchers Policy- 
 Makers and 
Practitioners
Western Europe 





Implemented as two 
independent policies 
(any relevant policy 





6 7 8 5
Integration policy 
decisions will depend 
on scale of immigrant 
influx and duration of 
stay – on the priorities 
of the immigration 
policy in place 
(integration policy will 
be reactive towards 
immigration policy)
13 16 9 20
Immigration policy 
decisions – the scale 
of immigrant influx 
and duration of stay – 
will depend on the 
effectiveness of prior 
integration efforts 
(immigration policy 
will be reactive towards 
integration policy)
5 1 5 1
The two policies will be 
implemented jointly 
(the relevant policy 
decisions will be taken 
as part of the same 
process)
1 6 4 3
Other situation (please 
specify)
1 0 0 1
TOTAL 26 30 26 30
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the same decision- making procedure. One of the German experts interviewed was 
confident about the latter scenario:
As in the current situation, the two policies are implemented jointly and, in 
the case of a growing immigrant influx, both policies will be changed or 
adapted jointly.
(II_DE_3_NGO)
One respondent also pointed to another possible situation but, like the opinions 
already expressed in the question on the current relations between the two poli-
cies, it was a pessimistic conclusion that one of these two policies (integration 
policy) ‘does not exist’ (II_PL_3_RE). Like the issue – discussed earlier – of 
desired immigration and integration polices, no significant differences in predic-
tions were observed between the first and second round of the Delphi survey. We 
may again assume that the experts were stable and realistic as to the development 
of both policies.
Conclusions
Our findings from the Delphi survey conducted among European experts on 
migration issues showed that perceptions of the current and future development 
of relations between immigration and integration policies were not specifically 
dependent on their state context: despite contradictory macrostructural condi-
tions (particular states’ immigration histories, political profiles, modes of crea-
tion and implementation of public policies and coherent visions nor any clearly 
defined objectives for either policy) and the evaluation of immigration (less or 
more restrictive) and integration policy (less or more effective),2 similar opinions 
on relations between the policies now and prospects for the next five years were 
observed. Table 4.5 presents the main axes of experts’ stances on all the questions 
in the survey:
Table 4.5  Relationship between policies (aggregated findings)
WHAT DOES IT LOOK LIKE?
Dominant role of immigration policy
WHAT SHOULD IT LOOK LIKE?
Should be implemented simultaneously and jointly (one decision- making process)
WHAT WILL IT LOOK LIKE IN 5 YEARS?
Researchers Policy- makers and 
practitioners
Western Europe
(DE, FR, NL, ES,  
SE, UK)
Central and Eastern 
Europe
(CZ, PL)
Dominant role of immigration policy
(half of the responses in each group)
Different approaches
(all scenarios)
Dominant role of 
immigration policy
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When trying to conclude the results of the survey’s second round, we found that 
it was worth combining three modes enabling us to understand the relationship 
between immigration and integration policies. In general, regardless of the field of 
expertise and state affiliation, our respondents indicated that the current relation-
ship between the policies was marked by the dependence of integration activi-
ties on directions for the implementation of immigration policy. As was distinctly 
expressed by one Delphi panelist from Czechia:
Immigration policy is naturally in the lead but must be done with a thorough 
understanding of the socio- cultural context, and must be immediately fol-
lowed by integration measures.
(I_CZ_9_NGO)
At the same time, the experts agreed that the ideal relationship between these 
two policies should have been founded on their interdependence – i.e. a situation 
when decisions undertaken within each of them were part of the joint decision- 
making process and were complementary to each other. The opinions of our panel 
of experts in this respect were well grounded and stable, since the vast majority 
of them in the first round of the survey also tended to agree with these scenarios.
Slightly more diverse responses were noted when it came to the key issue of 
forecasting the future developments of the two policies and their relationship. 
Half of the respondents representing both the group of researchers and that of 
policy- makers/practitioners indicated that, within the next five years, the state 
of dependence between the two policies would remain the same as today – i.e. 
integration practices would be determined by a state’s migration admission policy. 
The prospects for other scenarios were less probable, with some likelihood that the 
two policies would be implemented independently (any relevant policy decisions 
would be undertaken without specifying their mutual interdependence). Interest-
ingly, however, the belief that immigration policy would be still dominant was 
particularly popular among the experts from Czechia and Poland – which are cur-
rently transforming from emigration to immigration countries. In West European 
countries that have both greater experience in managing large waves of migration 
and better developed practices for newcomers’ integration, the responses were 
spread in a more diverse way. However, what needs to be distinctly underlined is 
that none of the experts gave the priority to integration policy over immigration 
policy; thus, based on the results of our study, this scenario would seem to be 
totally unlikely. It is also worth noting that, despite the assumed ‘natural’ diversity 
in the stances taken by scientists on the one hand and people directly involved in 
the implementation of specific policy solutions on the other, the opinions of the 
experts and practitioners in our study proved to be quite consistent. Just as with the 
whole group of experts, the biggest discrepancies were observed when assessing 
the shape of any future relationship between immigration and integration polices. 
Both groups of respondents agreed on their assessment of the current situation and 
indicated similar ideal scenarios for these policies’ future development.
58 Marcin Gońda and Karolina Podgórska
The prognosis for the development of relations between integration and immi-
gration policies in the future turned out, then, to be inconsistent with the situation 
which, as the experts suggested, would be the most favourable for the European 
states in our study. Only a few respondents indicated that, in the short term, an 
ideal scenario would be found – both policies would be interdependent and devel-
oped complementarily. It is perhaps worth asking why half of the experts who par-
ticipated in our Delphi survey, who came from various professional backgrounds, 
thought that the current relationship between policies (with the dominant role 
of immigration policy) would prevail over the next five years. Why did not they 
take into account what they themselves deemed to be the ideal and thus opti-
mal scenario of the interdependence of these two policies? Both categories of 
expert, irrespective of their country background, appeared to be very pragmatic 
and, based on their expertise in the development of national policies as well as 
particular societies’ responses to the recent refugee crisis, perceived this scenario 
as fundamentally improbable. The following two opinions, by a Spanish and a 
Dutch expert respectively, reflect their realistic approach in this domain:
The two policies will be implemented separately. Nevertheless, they are actu-
ally deeply interconnected, so a joint implementation is strongly desirable.
(I_ES_3_RE)
[Joint implementation] sounds ideal but, in practice, immigration policy 
always takes priority over integration policy, especially when the former aims 
at restrictiveness. Therefore, the other option [that immigration policy should 
determine integration policy] is more realistic.
(I_NL_4_RE)
Our study does not, then, bring a clear answer to our research questions but would 
appear to be a good starting point for further analysis. It seems that the expert 
outlook presented to us on the relationship between immigration and integration 
policies was framed by the proposed short time frame – five years is not a lot 
of time in which to change the modes or directions of public policies (none of 
the experts suggested such a circumstance, though). On the other hand, given 
the dynamic migration situation in Europe in recent years, stable expert opinions 
on the lack of change in the functioning of these two policies may have been 
an expression of their concerns about growing migration challenges in Europe – 
framed by categories of securitisation and threats – and the emphasis on border 
protection. The compatibility of these expert opinions may also have been con-
nected with the impact of according priority to the development of EU migration 
and asylum policies.
Notes
 1 The field research was conducted by Marcin Gońda and Karolina Podgórska as part of 
the IMINTEG – ‘in search for models of relations between immigration and integra-
tion policies’ project implemented at the Centre of Migration Research, University of 
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Warsaw. The project was financed by the Polish National Science Centre (grant agree-
ment No. 2014/14/E/HS5/00397). The research team, apart from the authors of this 
chapter, included Maciej Duszczyk (head), Witold Klaus, Magdalena Lesińska, Marta 
Pachocka, Dominika Pszczółkowska and Dominik Wach, whom we thank for their valu-
able input to this text.
 2 In the survey we also assumed the outcome (or the lack) of the implementation of the 
two policies, understood as follows: an ineffective integration policy – immigrants do 
not integrate at all and social tensions caused by their lack of integration are on the 
increase; effective integration policy – immigrants integrate very well and their presence 
and everyday activities do not give rise to any major social tension; a very restrictive 
immigration policy – the so- called closed door policy; and a non- restrictive immigration 
policy – the so- called open door policy.
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Introduction
Until the early 2000s, German politicians often refused to accept the country’s 
position as a de facto country of immigration, despite the high share of migrants in 
the population. Even if ignoring the significant inflow of ethnic Germans directly 
after World War II, Germany could factually be considered a country of immigra-
tion, since at least 1957. Since 1985, net immigration to Germany was positive 
almost every year, reaching a peak of 1.14 million net immigrants in 2015 (SVR 
2019). In 2017, almost 24 per cent of the German population had a ‘migration 
background’ – i.e. had immigrated themselves or were the descendants of immi-
grants (Statistisches Bundesamt 2019).
However, since immigrants were expected to stay only temporarily, a structured 
integration policy was lacking until recently. The immigration of workers tended 
only to be possible for certain specialists for a limited amount of time and for EU 
workers as part of the freedom of movement within the European Union. How-
ever, regarding ‘ethnic Germans’ and, at least compared to many other countries, 
asylum- seekers and refugees, Germany’s immigration policy has been relatively 
liberal since the aftermath of World War II (see Bauer et al. 2005).
Immigration and integration policies began being adjusted to the new empiri-
cal realities from 2000, when the government passed new regulations concerning 
immigration to Germany, such as the so- called Green Card for non- EU informa-
tion technology (IT) specialists. Activities culminated in the aligning of the Ger-
man asylum law with the newly enacted integration law in 2016, following the 
inflow of more than one million refugees between 2015 and 2016 (SVR 2018, 
2019). Most recently, in 2019, the German government submitted several legal 
proposals to parliament, including regulations concerning the immigration of 
workers from non- EU countries. If passed, these regulations would mark a histori-
cal turn in Germany’s migration and integration policy in several respects. Immi-
gration policy towards skilled workers would be liberalised and be refocused on 
permanent rather than temporary immigration, helping to counter demographic 
change and the increasing shortage of skilled labour. In light of the recent inflow 
of refugees, the government also recognised the importance of a more active and 
structured integration policy. The new migration policy covering labour migrants 
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has deliberately been denominated ‘immigration’ law (Einwanderung) rather than 
‘inward migration’ law (Zuwanderung), which signals that, for the first time, Ger-
many formally calls itself an ‘immigration country’.
Against this political backdrop, our chapter discusses the dynamics and inter-
linkages between immigration and integration policy in Germany after World War 
II. Following the German Expert Council on Integration and Migration (SVR), we 
refer to integration as the socio- economic incorporation and socio- cultural adap-
tion to legal – political and cultural – religious norms, which enable newcomers 
to participate as accepted citizens of the host society (SVR 2018; see also Garcés- 
Mascareñas and Penninx 2016). The chapter starts with a review of the data on 
public attitudes on immigration in Germany. It then situates current policies and 
politics in their historic context and finishes with a reflection on the degree to 
which Germany addresses the challenges of migration- related diversity.
Public sentiments towards immigration and integration
Integration and migration policies may affect the attitudes of German- born nationals 
towards immigrants, as they can impact on who gains and who loses from immi-
gration. Economic theory predicts that those German citizens whose skills may be 
substituted by those of immigrants will suffer, while those who have complemen-
tary skillsets to those of immigrants will benefit from immigration (Bauer et al. 
2000). Hence, sentiments towards immigrants, which may affect their integration, 
are likely to depend on whether German- born nationals fear the labour market com-
petition of foreigners or whether they expect to benefit from immigration.
Generally, since the substantial inflow of refugees in 2015, the topic of immigra-
tion to Germany and the integration of migrants has continuously gained impor-
tance in public discussion. According to a 2015 survey, 88 per cent of respondents 
ranked the issues on immigration as being among the key challenges to Germany 
society (SVR 2019). The German Socio- Economic Panel (SOEP), one of the larg-
est household panel surveys in Germany, revealed that an increasing part of the 
German resident population considers immigration to be a concern. While, in 
2014, about 26 per cent of respondents in Germany worried about immigration, 
the percentage rose to 32 per cent in 2015 and to 46 per cent in 2016 – the high-
est share observed since 1999. In contrast, the percentage of those who did not 
consider immigration to be an issue halved from 33 per cent in 2014 to 15 per cent 
in 2016 (Sola 2018). We can note, however, that similar numbers were observed 
in earlier years. In 1999 and 2005, 36 and 39 per cent, respectively, worried about 
migration issues while, in both years, about 19 per cent stated ‘no worries’.
Other studies, such as a survey carried out by the Bertelsmann Foundation, 
offer some insights into why immigration might be perceived in such ways (Ber-
telsmann Stiftung 2015, 2017). In 2012 and 2015, the majority of respondents 
claimed that immigration is beneficial for Germany because it helps to attenuate 
demographic change and to dampen the shortage of skilled workers. Immigration 
was also considered to make life in Germany more interesting and important for 
foreign investments. Nevertheless, the share of respondents perceiving immigra-







































Figure 5.1  Perceptions of the impact of immigration
Source: Based on Bertelsmann Stiftung (2017: 15–17)
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Respondents expressed concerns about the repercussions which immigration 
might have on the German social security system, on the social fabric regard-
ing conflicts between German- born and foreign nationals, on the performance in 
schools or on the situation on the housing market. Furthermore, the percentage 
of respondents sharing these concerns increased in 2017 compared to 2012 and 
2015. Yet these numbers consider only the potential benefits and costs of immi-
gration in total and do not differentiate between the different types of immigrant. 
The inflow of refugees throughout 2015 and 2016 is likely to have affected per-
ceptions on the comparatively higher costs of immigration.
Surveys that ask about people’s sentiments towards the immigrants from dif-
ferent countries of origin or of different skill levels support this interpretation. 
According to recent public attitude data from Eurobarometer (November 2018), 
the resident population judged the immigration of EU nationals to Germany as 
more positive than that of third- country nationals. About 71 per cent of the Ger-
man population considered immigration from other EU member- states to be a 
positive phenomenon but only 39 per cent felt the same about the arrival of non-
 EU immigrants.1 However, attitudes towards the immigration of both EU and 
non- EU immigrants overall have become more positive in recent years. Between 
2014 and 2018, the percentage of respondents seeing EU immigration as positive 
rose by 20 per cent and of non- EU migrants by 10 per cent.
A similar picture emerges when asking about attitudes towards the immigration 
of different types of immigrant. Data from ALLBUS, another representative sur-
vey of the German resident population, suggested that, in 2006, about 30 per cent 
(8 per cent) of the respondents voted for the unrestricted immigration of workers 
from the EU (non- EU) respectively, while about 60 per cent (65 per cent) opted 
to restrict this type of immigration and only 11 per cent (26 per cent) wanted to 
prohibit it altogether (SVR 2019: 140). In 2016, almost 48 per cent advocated the 
unrestricted immigration of EU workers and 19 per cent that of non- EU workers, 
while only 3 and 12 per cent, respectively, wanted to prohibit labour immigration 
from these regions (SVR 2019: 140). Asking about attitudes towards the immi-
gration of workers with different skills provides a similar picture. According to a 
survey by the Expert Council of German Foundations for Migration and Integra-
tion, 63 per cent of German nationals think that the number of skilled immigrants 
should be increased (SVR 2014).
The results are more ambiguous concerning attitudes towards the intake of 
refugees. According to the ALLBUS survey, the share of Germans voting for the 
unrestricted immigration of refugees increased from almost 13 per cent in 2006 to 
23 per cent in 2016, while the share of respondents asking to stop refugee immi-
gration altogether decreased from 14 to 7 per cent (SVR 2019: 140). In contrast, 
findings of the Bertelsmann Foundation indicate that attitudes towards refugees 
became more disapproving over time, especially amongst the older generation. 
While about 40 per cent of respondents thought Germany should not accept 
more refugees in 2015, the share rose to 54 per cent in 2017 (Bertelsmann Stif-
tung 2017). However, a survey by the Expert Council of German Foundations 
for Migration and Integration in 2015 and 2018 found no clear trend indicating 
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whether or not refugees were perceived as a threat to the German economy and 
the cohesion of its society (SVR 2019).
Surveys conducted by the Bertelsmann Foundation (2017) and by Zick and 
Preuß (2019) provide some insights into the factors that German nationals con-
sider to be important for immigrants’ integration into the host society. Both sur-
veys highlighted the strong expectations which Germany’s resident population 
has of newcomers. In 2015, three out of four respondents expected immigrants to 
adapt to and assimilate into ‘German culture’. Interestingly, though, 80 per cent 
simultaneously claimed that they would like immigrants to share more of their 
cultural background with the majority population (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2015). 
Younger and highly educated respondents had fewer expectations of immigrants’ 
duties to proactively integrate (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017).
How newcomers could demonstrate their willingness to integrate is mostly 
related to their acquiring knowledge of German cultural norms, learning the lan-
guage, being aware of the civic obligations to respect the rules of the political 
system and the economic conditionality to be engaged in gainful employment, 
while more formal markers of acquiring German citizenship are of less impor-
tance (see Table 5.1). Data collected by the Expert Council of German Founda-
tions for Migration and Integration provide a similar picture. When being asked 
about the factors that are important when a person aspires to belong to German 
society, 89 per cent of German- born nationals stated being in work and 65 per cent 
having German citizenship, 27 per cent following a Christian religion, 25 per cent 
being born in Germany and 20 per cent having German ancestors (SVR 2019).
In sum, four main messages on attitudes towards immigration and integration 
in Germany emerge from the review of public attitude data. First, the topic of 
immigration has gained salience in the public debate, with concerns over immi-
gration issues being on the rise. Second, a high proportion of Germans appears to 
favour the immigration of EU workers, while the acceptance of immigration from 
third countries is much lower, although increasing. Thirdly, the inflow of almost 
one million refugees since 2016 did not change public opinion drastically but 
Table 5.1  Indicators of immigrants’ obligations in the German society (selection)
Expected Behaviour (%) Bertelsmann 
(2017)
Zick and Preuss 
(2019)
2012 2017 2014 2018
Learn the German language 96 99 86 92
Respect the German constitution 91 98 83 87
Work 86 86 79 78
Adapt to ‘German culture’ 73 82 – – 
Respect German norms and traditions – – 65 72
Acquire German citizenship 50 38 48 35
Be born in Germany 30 23
Source: Based on Bertelsmann Stiftung (2017), Zick and Preuss (2019)
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raised some more critical voices. Finally, the German resident population appears 
to have strong expectations that newcomers will assimilate into ‘German culture’ 
by acquiring knowledge of the German language, norms and values and by par-
ticipating in the labour market. Traditionally prevailing descent- based markers 
appear to define belonging to a lower degree.
Immigration and integration policies
Migration policy may influence the integration of migrants into the host society in 
several ways (Bauer et al. 2000). To the extent that migration policy is selective, it 
affects the characteristics of the immigrants. A policy that focuses on the demands 
of the labour market predominantly attracts migrants whose skills could be easily 
transferred to the needs of the host country’s economy. Such a policy would appear 
to reduce the necessity of an integration policy, since immigrants are expected to 
integrate rapidly into the labour market and society. In contrast, the integration of 
individuals accepted for humanitarian reasons is harder to achieve and involves 
higher costs, since forced migrants usually did not plan their migration in advance. 
Compared to labour migrants, their skills could be expected to be less transfer-
able to the needs of the host society which, in turn, increases the necessity of a 
well- designed integration policy. Integration may also be affected by the extent 
to which migration policy focuses on permanent or temporary migrants, since the 
latter may be perceived to have lower incentives to acquire the skills necessary to 
integrate into the host society, such as language competence. As illustrated in the 
following paragraphs, these sorts of premise have shaped German political think-
ing on migration and integration policies.
Historically, Germany’s migration and integration policies have been charac-
terised by ethnic understandings of citizenship and belonging, based on descent, 
shared norms and a common language (Triandafyllidou 2001). The German con-
ception of nationhood relates closely to what Anderson (1983) captured by the 
term imagined community, which he conceptualised as a symbolic political com-
munity, based on shared values, and a common language and descent. Gosewinkel 
(2016) traced the exclusionary logics that have characterised German citizenship 
policies since the nineteenth century. This included, among others, the expulsion 
of Polish workers from Prussia based on their non- German origin and the with-
drawal of citizenship rights from the Jewish population living in Germany in the 
antecedent of World War II.
Strong economic growth and the resulting labour shortages led some European 
countries to actively recruit immigrants (Bauer et al. 2000). Between 1955 and 
1973, the government operated a guestworker scheme, which turned the country 
into one of the most diverse European countries. About 14 million people came 
as labour migrants to Western Germany, many of whom stayed, founded families 
and naturalised (Schierup et al. 2006). These guestworkers were predominantly 
of Italian, Spanish, Greek and Turkish origin. As Schönwälder (2004) pointed 
out, policy- makers deliberately sought to recruit white European immigrants. 
The government practiced a selection based on national origin – for instance, 
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excluding Portuguese workers of African or Indian descent. The guestworker pol-
icy was terminated in 1973, when Germany experienced an economic downturn 
in the aftermath of the global oil crisis (Davy 2005). After guestworker recruit-
ment stopped in 1973, migration to West Germany was mainly characterised by 
the immigration of the family members of those guestworkers who entered the 
country before 1973. The Eastern half of the country, the German Democratic 
Republic, also managed a small guestworker programme, recruiting workers from 
other socialist countries such as Poland, Hungary, Cuba, Vietnam, Angola and 
Mozambique (Davy 2005).
History may help to gain an understanding of the partially ethnically motivated 
selection at entry. Compared to its neighbours, the German nation- state emerged 
relatively late by uniting the fragmented territorial entities of the Holy Roman 
Empire of the German Nation. The latter was a loose political structure, whose 
geographic borders were difficult to delineate, bound together as they were by 
their common traditions and language (Brubaker 1992; MacGregor 2014; Paul 
2015). Language defined belonging, mirroring the collective myth of the German 
nation as an entity ‘where people speak German’ (Hogwood 2000).
Since the late 1980s, East–West migration and the inflow of asylum- seekers and 
refugees dominated immigration to Germany. Large parts of the immigrant popu-
lation were ethnic Germans (Bauer et al. 2005). The repatriation route was closed 
in the early 1990s, after a heavy inflow of about 1.6 million ethnic Germans fol-
lowing the collapse of the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia (Bommes and 
Geddes 2000). Between 2015 and 2016, the country experienced a renewed influx 
of almost one million refugees, this time mostly originating from Syria, Iraq and 
Afghanistan (SVR 2019), of whom almost half were female. Since then, about 35 
per cent of them have been granted some form of protection while another 35 per 
cent had their asylum claim rejected. Syrians and Eritreans were granted protec-
tion status in almost all cases (SVR 2019).
German immigration policy has also been characterised by the re- opening of 
immigration pathways for economic migrants since the 2000s, starting with the 
IT Green Card, a temporary work permit for IT specialists. The changes coincided 
with the political realisation that Germany needs immigrant labour to sustain its 
economic growth and to stabilise its social security system against the background 
of a dramatic demographic change which manifests itself in a strongly ageing 
workforce (Kaiser and Paul 2011; Paul 2015). For instance, in 2001, an inde-
pendent commission chaired by Rita Süssmuth proposed a reform of German 
immigration policy which, among other changes, envisaged a points system for 
labour migrants similar to that in Canada or Australia, as well as greater efforts 
to ensure the integration of migrants (Unabhängige Kommission Zuwanderung 
2001). While the points system was not supported by the German parliament, the 
report of the Commission led to changes in German immigration and integration 
policy. Moreover, the 2005 Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz) and the most recent 
EU- wide Blue Card initiative created special legal reception pathways for quali-
fied non- EU workers. State- sponsored visas for up to four years, based on a labour 
contract with an employer in Germany and minimum earnings of 52,000 euros 
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per year, were meant to attract highly skilled labour to fill job shortages (Mourão 
Permoser 2017; SVR 2018).
The Expert Council of German Foundations on Migration and Integration has 
qualified the German labour migration scheme for the highly skilled as one of 
the most liberal schemes worldwide (SVR 2018). Overall, recent policy initia-
tives could be seen as a continuation of the historic guestworker schemes, premis-
ing selective entry depending on labour market needs. However, compared to the 
guestworker policy, the new policy initiatives aim to foster permanent immigra-
tion, since the requirements to obtain a permanent residence permit have also been 
liberalised. While the Blue Card aims to attract workers from non- EU countries 
with an academic degree, the German government currently plans to improve the 
immigration possibilities for skilled workers who do not have one.
However, EU migrant citizens, one of the largest immigrant groups in Ger-
many, are exempt from these rules. Of all the immigrants in Germany in 2017, 
about two- thirds came from another EU member- state (Bundesamt für Migration 
und Flüchtlinge 2019). EU Directive 2004/38 (Article 6) stipulates an uncondi-
tional right to reside for all EU citizens for the first three months, provided that 
they hold a valid identity card or passport and that they register their local address 
with the German authorities. The three- monthly unconditional residence right can 
be renewed by leaving and re- entering the country. After three months, the rights 
of EU citizens diverge, depending on their labour market status. Economically 
inactive EU citizens can only continue to reside in Germany if they are covered by 
comprehensive health insurance and on condition that they have sufficient finan-
cial resources to fund their living. Employed EU citizens can reside indefinitely. 
After five years of legal and continuous residence, EU migrants can obtain the 
right to reside permanently, independent of their employment status.
With respect to integration policy, Germany is a latecomer. For decades, the 
country had declared itself a ‘nonimmigration country’. Until the mid- 2000s, the 
idea of supporting migrants’ participation in German society had barely surfaced. 
Guestworkers were assumed to return to their home country instead of settling 
permanently (Doomernik and Bruquetas- Callejo 2016; Traenhardt 2014). Such 
an approach fuelled public perceptions of immigrants as foreigners and transient 
guests (Gosewinkel 2016; Triandafyllidou 2001). The approach delegitimised any 
state- sponsored pursuit of immigrant integration (Ellermann 2015; Kaiser and 
Paul 2011). Furthermore, it reduced the incentive for these guestworkers to inte-
grate into German society (Dustmann 1993). Only ‘ethnic German’ immigrants 
were granted access to language courses and to special public transfers to foster 
their integration.
To date, historic ideas of German nationhood as a homogeneous ethno- cultural 
and linguistic entity continue to shape policies and laws on migrant naturalisation. 
Germany’s immigrant integration regime appears to be dominated by assimilation-
ist elements (Ersanilli 2010), even though recent integration policy points towards 
some renunciation. In principle, immigrants who settle for at least eight years 
and who prove their loyalty to the country through language skills and knowl-
edge of ‘German culture’ are granted German citizenship. While ius sanguinis 
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principles tend to dominate naturalisation policy (Brubaker 1992; Ditlmann et 
al. 2011; Doomernik and Bruquetas- Callejo 2016), the 1990 Aliens Act (Auslän-
dergesetz) and its revised version of the 1999 Citizenship Act, introduced some 
civic ius soli elements. Nevertheless, naturalisation remains difficult in practice 
(Amjahid 2017). An exception has been made for ‘ethnic repatriates’ (Aussiedler) 
who lived outside the German state boundaries after 1949. Based on their German 
ties by family origin, ‘ethnic repatriates’ were recognised as conationals and given 
immediate and permanent access to German citizenship (Bommes and Geddes 
2000; Hogwood 2000).
Nevertheless, over the last decade, German policy has increasingly recognised 
the empirical reality of Germany as a country of permanent immigration (Eller-
mann 2015; Kaiser and Paul 2011). State- sponsored integration policies have 
come into effect quite recently, starting with the 2004 Immigration Law and the 
2007 National Integration Plan. The 2005 Immigration Act (Zuwanderungsge-
setz) established state- sponsored civic integration and language courses. These 
courses constitute the central instrument of German integration policy, offering 
newcomers 600 hours of German language teaching and 100 hours of orientation 
about Germany’s legal system, ‘culture’ and history (SVR 2019).
Current integration policy seeks to find a balance between the necessity to 
foster the integration of recent immigrants and efforts to reduce potential pull 
factors for migrants resulting from fast integration (SVR 2019). For refugees 
whose countries of origin give them a high probability of being recognised as 
asylum- seekers and to stay in Germany for a longer period, state- sponsored civic 
integration and language courses are mandatory and may already begin during 
the asylum application process. In contrast, refugees with a ‘medium probability’ 
of having their status as asylum- seekers recognised are not granted immediate 
access to these courses. Instead, they have the possibility to attend alternative, 
less- intensive courses, which provide them with basic language skills as well as 
some knowledge of German laws and ‘culture’. Refugees and asylum- seekers 
from so- called safe countries are not permitted access to any state- sponsored inte-
gration measures. All other immigrants, including EU migrants, may participate 
in these courses voluntarily and, if they do, are required to contribute financially 
to cover the costs. Since 2007, family migrants must prove that they have some 
basic German language skills in order to be allowed to immigrate. Yet this regula-
tion has been amended in the light of a judgement by the European Constitutional 
Court, which considered the regulation to violate the Treaty of Association of the 
European Union with Turkey (SVR 2019).
Overall, the political focus has remained on immigration policy, while inte-
gration policy has remained either nonexistent or reactive. As one effect, about 
half of Germany’s resident population with a migration background generally 
tends to have lower qualifications than German- born nationals (Kohn 2015), 
except for EU migrant groups who often find themselves on the (highly) quali-
fied end of the spectrum (Bruzelius et al. 2015; Foti 2015). The difference in 
educational background and labour market performance can be explained through 
a path- dependent, demand- driven migration policy which focused on recruiting 
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low- skilled guestworkers to fill unwanted industrial jobs (Bauer et al. 2000). 
Complemented by family reunification and asylum as the only other legal entry 
pathways for third- country nationals for many years, selection mechanisms and 
the absence of a structured integration policy led a structurally deprived immi-
grant population (Jaehrling and Knuth 2010; Schierup et al. 2006).
Regarding immigrants’ social integration, within the comparatively inflexible 
and hierarchical labour market, low qualifications translate into unemployment 
and underemployment (Soskice and Hall 2001). Immigrants become shuffled into 
occupational niches of the labour market – which may not reflect their formal 
education (Bruzelius et al. 2015; Faist 2013). This relates to their comparatively 
lower German skills and their foreign, often unrecognised qualifications (Can-
ceedda et al. 2015; Frings 2009). In short, one of the main labour market problems 
of immigrants lies in the recognition of the skills they obtained in their home 
countries (Basilio et al. 2017). Partly due to the unique German apprenticeship 
system and the importance of occupational licences, the recognition of skills is 
still difficult and costly, even though a law which took effect in 2012 – Gesetz zur 
Verbesserung der Feststellung und Anerkennung im Ausland erworbener Berufs-
qualifikationen or Law to Improve the Establishment and Recognition of Profes-
sional Qualifications Acquired Abroad – aimed to improve the situation. Survey 
experiments also suggest that local employers discriminate against job applicants 
whose name or appearance hints at a foreign descent. Applicants with a migra-
tion background are up to 10 per cent less likely to be invited for a job interview 
than German- born job- seekers (Koopmans et al. 2018). In light of the this, 59 per 
cent of the respondents in a 2017 representative survey considered discrimination 
based on their origins as one of the main obstacles to socio- economic integration 
in Germany; 65 per cent felt that there was a lack of equality of opportunity on the 
job market (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017).
Immigrants’ socio- economic profile and their experiences of disadvantages in 
the labour market translate into rates of unemployment and poverty which are 
more than twice as high for residents with a migration background compared to 
German- born nationals (Barrett and Maître 2011; Kaiser and Paul 2011; SVR 
2018). Immigrants to Germany are not per se more welfare- dependent, since 
most of the differential in welfare- dependency between German- born nationals 
and individuals with a migration background can be explained by differences in 
socio- economic characteristics, such as education or labour market experience 
(Bauer 2002; Barrett 2012; Barrett and Maître 2011; Wunder and Riphahn 2013). 
Higher reliance on social assistance- type benefits relates to their household char-
acteristics (Beste et al. 2014; Bruckmeier and Wiemers 2016).
Despite their privileged residence and labour market rights, EU migrants expe-
rience similar economic and social problems as third- country nationals residing 
in Germany. Technically, EU citizens can move to Germany, work there without 
a work permit or visa and enjoy non- discriminatory treatment compared to third- 
country nationals (Articles 18 and 21, Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union). However, workers from other EU member- states tend to often only access 
precarious, atypical jobs at the bottom of the labour market hierarchy, for which 
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they are formally overqualified (Brändle 2018; Foti 2015). In this respect, posted 
EU workers (Molitor 2015; Wagner and Berntsen 2016) and those working in the 
informal domestic and care sectors (Anderson 2000) are the most marginalised, 
without access to adequate social security coverage. Nevertheless, the situation 
has improved over recent years due to the economy’s comparatively strong per-
formance and a labour market that is increasingly characterised by a shortage of 
workers (SVR 2019).
Moreover, EU migrants, once they interact with local welfare and employment 
agencies – which may hamper their social integration efforts – often face informal 
barriers when seeking to access employment benefits and services. A qualitative 
study of German job centres documented how some eligible groups of EU migrant 
applicants were denied substantive receipt of the benefits to which they were legally 
entitled, particularly when they found themselves in situations of marginal employ-
ment (with salaries below 450 euros/month and fewer than five to ten hours of 
weekly work). The data pointed to instances of institutional discrimination, related 
to organisational blind spots with respect to EU citizens’ legal entitlements and to 
occurrences of individual discrimination, whereby administrators relied on group- 
based stereotypes and welfare chauvinist preferences when exercising discretion 
during claims- processing, seeking to deter applicants (Ratzmann 2019).
However, while EU and non- EU labour immigrants receive comparatively little 
support for integrating into their host society, state- sponsored integration policies 
for refugees have recently expanded in scope. As of last year, asylum- seekers 
can access the labour market after three months of residence in Germany. They 
may also participate in integration courses and vocational training while their 
asylum claim is under review. According to an assessment by the Expert Coun-
cil for Migration and Integration, the integration courses provided are lacking in 
quality (SVR 2019). Moreover, channels for family reunification have been liber-
alised by allowing family members to immediately become active on the labour 
market. Asylum- seekers’ labour market participation nevertheless bears practical 
challenges, as employers often become discouraged by their uncertain residence 
status. Additionally, non- recognised qualifications are commonly treated as no 
qualifications. However, informal skills assessments are currently being piloted. 
Thus, refugees’ employment rates have been on the rise since 2016, with 32 per 
cent being economically active in 2018. Experts consider this to be a success 
compared to former refugees’ experiences of labour market integration, which 
took substantially longer. Yet employment opportunities have remained confined 
to low- qualified, temporary jobs in the construction, service, hospitality and logis-
tics sectors, taken up by men rather than women (SVR 2019).
Overall, insufficient language skills, a lack of local social networks and 
unrecognised qualifications remain the main stumbling blocks for all immigrant 
groups in Germany. Whilst state- sponsored integration policies were nonexistent 
for many years, they have recently gained in importance on the policy agenda. 
Whether these policies are effective in accelerating the sustainable economic 
and social integration of immigrants yet remains to be seen, as they tend to nar-
rowly focus on the newcomers acquiring the German language and on their labour 
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market integration. Moreover, a political approach to regulating inward migration 
through integration policy is increasingly discernible. Stratified access pathways 
to the labour market, to social security or to housing are implicated in determining 
which migrant groups are allowed to stay and settle in Germany. As Bommes and 
Geddes (2000) have argued, national social policies can act as political filters that 
thwart migrants’ efforts to achieve social inclusion by incorporating certain kinds 
of migrant while excluding others.
For instance, a study of implementation dynamics in German social adminis-
tration (Ratzmann 2019) unravelled how welfare bureaucrats tend to grant access 
to subsistence- securing social benefits, in practice, only those EU migrants whom 
they perceive to ‘culturally fit’ and who have the potential to become involved in 
non- marginal, gainful employment. Moreover, German legislation tightened legal 
benefit entitlements in 2017, now only allowing to apply for social assistance- type 
benefits in Germany those EU migrants who have ‘worker status’. The ways in 
which policy is implemented allow all EU citizens to move freely but not all are 
made to feel welcome and enabled to residing without restrictions in their member- 
state of choice. It may be argued that local- level processes of enabling or refusing 
access to basic income benefits create a filter with which to keep EU migrants who 
are deemed ‘unproductive’ from settling by depriving them of any state support in 
their host country. In the absence of traditional instruments of migration control, 
local implementers may engender an informal rebordering of the internal, border-
less Schengen Area through keeping certain types of EU migrant in precarious liv-
ing conditions. Every day, almost invisible functional borders against EU citizens 
shape who can afford to stay in Germany (Ratzmann 2019).
In light of this, social integration efforts might have to be rethought in a more 
holistic manner to facilitate migrants’ meaningful societal participation in Ger-
many as equal conationals. Public legislators may have to address questions of 
policy coherence, considering that fields beyond classic immigration policy affect 
newcomers’ settlement in Germany – fields such as labour market and social 
security policies, whose goals may conflict with the logics of migration control 
through selective immigration policy. This also includes questions of political 
representation and visibility in the public sector, especially schools and admin-
istration. Moreover, the role of federal and local government in migration and 
integration politics might be worth rethinking. To date, the federal level is solely 
responsible for shaping immigration policy, while regions and cities have very lit-
tle or virtually no voice. As for integration policies, local government has a more 
active role than the federal legislator, especially when it comes to insuring the 
social cohesion and inclusion of migrant residents locally. While both policy areas 
tend to be legislated and implemented independent of one another, they neverthe-
less commonly interact and thus would need to be codeveloped jointly.
Conclusion
This chapter has traced the developments of German immigration and integra-
tion policies since the antecedent of the postwar period. Policies regulating 
immigrants’ entry have existed for decades. As immigration tended to be seen 
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as predominantly of a temporary nature, policy- makers did not perceive a struc-
tured policy to foster the sustainable integration of migrants and their descendants 
into society to be a necessity. However, in recent years, the country’s integration 
paradigm has undergone a fundamental shift. Not least, the inflow of a substan-
tial number of refugees in 2015 and 2016 illustrated the need for more effective 
integration policies. The considerable number of new laws and adjustments to 
existing laws concerning migration and integration issues in the last decade hints 
at the German government’s willingness to pro- actively address the challenges of 
migration- related diversity.
What remains open to debate is whether ideas about nationhood have merely 
changed on paper. To date, cultural markers of belonging continue to be embed-
ded into policy design, filtering immigrants based on their ‘cultural fit’. Evidence 
also suggests that public- service providers continuously abide by assimilationist 
understandings of integration and tend to discriminate against residents with a 
migration background (Ratzmann 2018; see also Hemker and Rink 2017). While 
policy cannot prescribe integration efforts, it has the potential to steer perceptions 
of ‘cultural integration’, which oscillate between civic duties of abiding by the 
German constitution and the prescriptive norms of everyday life. A move away 
from a ‘deficit’ or ‘cultural assimilationist’ perspective, addressing instead the 
shortcomings of what immigrants ‘lack’ compared to German- born nationals, 
may be required. Questions further persist as to whether perceptions of diversity 
as a resource and value in and of itself have trickled down to the local level or 
whether understandings of integration as an interactive process aimed at ensuring 
the meaningful participation of all residents remain confined to the policy rather 
than the implementation level.
Note
 1 See http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/index (accessed 
28 September 2019).
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Introduction: studying the relationship between immigration 
and integration policies
Immigration and the settlement of newcomers in the Netherlands have a long 
and rich history that has been well documented recently (Lucassen and Lucassen 
2018; Lucassen and Penninx 1997; Obdeijn and Schrover 2008). The volume and 
patterns of immigration and emigration, however, have varied strongly, as has 
the reaction of Dutch society towards immigration and newcomers. Over quite a 
long period – roughly between 1580 and 1800, thus including the Dutch Golden 
Age – immigration into the Republic of the Seven United Provinces took place on 
a large scale. Most of these newcomers flocked to Dutch cities, where trade and 
industry flourished.
In contradistinction, in the next period – roughly between 1870 and 1960 – 
more people left the Netherlands than came into the country. The country built up 
a tradition of emigration, particularly to North America, until the USA closed its 
borders in the early 1920s. This emigration tradition was picked up again after the 
end of World War II: civil society and the government (re)built an infrastructure to 
promote emigration to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the USA and destinations 
in South America.
Postwar emigration fever receded in the 1960s and migrant workers arrived to 
fill the lowest ranks of the labour market of a booming economy, recovered from 
the war. From 1960 to the present, a period followed in which immigration was 
systematically more important than emigration (except for a few years – 1966/67 
and 2002–2007 – with a small negative net migration).
Key questions and how to study them
It is against this historical background of the migration experience in the Nether-
lands that I focus on Dutch immigration and integration1 policies and how these 
have related to each other since the end of World War II in 1945. The key issues are:
• firstly, how Dutch society and the Dutch government looked at newcomers 
and decided who they wanted to admit;
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• secondly, how immigrants were assigned a place in Dutch society and how 
they were helped to find that place; and
• thirdly, how the ideas and practices concerning the admission of newcomers 
(i.e. immigration policies) were influenced or determined by those of assign-
ing a place to newcomers (i.e. integration policies), or vice versa.
How to study immigration and integration policies?2 The essence of policies is the 
intention to guide and steer processes in society. Immigration and integration poli-
cies are part of a normative political process in which the issues of immigration 
and integration are formulated as problems; these problems are given a normative 
framing and concrete policy measures are designed and implemented to achieve 
the desired outcome.
In order to study immigration and integration policies empirically and their 
changes over time, I examine them on two levels. The first is the framing and aims 
of policies – i.e. looking at how the problem is actually defined and explained and 
at what can and should be done about it. Definition of the problem takes into con-
sideration how immigration is perceived: is it seen as a problem, as an opportunity 
or as a necessity? Who has the moral or legal right to be or become an immigrant? 
Who are the wanted immigrants and who the unwanted ones? For those immi-
grants already present in the host society, a basic issue is whether they are seen as 
‘foreigners’, as ‘temporary guests’ or as permanent members of society for whom 
the state accepts the same responsibilities as for native citizens, guaranteeing the 
same rights and providing the same facilities. To study these elements of framing, 
I refer to original policy documents and contemporary sources.3
The second level refers to the embodiment of policies in regulations, organisa-
tions, programmes and budgets. The study of these concrete aspects of policies 
allows a distinction to be made between symbolic and substantial policies and to 
measure the seriousness and possible selectiveness of policies in practice.
Such an analysis leads me to distinguish five periods in the postwar Netherlands 
in which migration and/or integration policies were defined differently and their 
practices changed. In the next section I describe migration and integration poli-
cies in these five periods and, for each period, ask how the relationship between 
migration and integration was framed.
Emigration fever in an ‘overpopulated’ country and 
unsolicited newcomers, 1945–19604
In the postwar period, the Netherlands regarded itself as an ‘overpopulated’ coun-
try. It had the fastest demographic growth (and highest fertility) rate in Europe 
and an economy – destroyed by the war – that could not offer employment for its 
growing population. This ‘population pressure’ was to be combatted by a govern-
mental policy designed to stimulate industrial development on the one hand and 
emigration on the other (Beijer and Oudegeest 1952). Emigration was encouraged 
and assisted by Emigration Boards in this pillarised Dutch society (a Catholic, 
a Protestant and a nonreligious Board) that revived their pre- 1920s activities. 
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Government policies saw emigration as part of the solution to unemployment 
and poverty. The government subsidised the Emigration Boards that prepared and 
assisted individuals and families to leave for a new home elsewhere. The general 
public’s willingness to emigrate was so high that observers spoke of ‘emigration 
fever’. Indeed, many left the country for Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the 
USA and destinations in South America. Between 1946 and 1969, about 450,000 
Dutch emigrated – 4.5 per cent of the population of 10 million (as of 1949).
Although the preceding paragraph makes it abundantly clear that the Nether-
lands did not see itself as an immigration country, this same period saw nearly as 
many people coming into the country as left it. These newcomers were not defined 
and seen as migrants or immigrants (this terminology was used later by research-
ers but did not fit in public discourse and policy frames at that time and was not 
used). The first large category to arrive in the Netherlands was that of repatriates 
from the Dutch East Indies/Indonesia and New Guinea. Their arrival was a conse-
quence of the War of Independence (1945–1948) and the actual independence of 
Indonesia in 1948. In the period 1945 to 1962, an estimated 300,000 people left 
Indonesia for the Netherlands. Some were white European settlers in the former 
Dutch colony. The majority, around 180,000, was of mixed Indonesian–Dutch 
descent, who were entitled to settle in the Netherlands due to their Dutch citi-
zenship but were not encouraged to do so.5 The term ‘repatriates’ thus actually 
reflected their legal status: only those who could claim Dutch citizenship by rec-
ognised descent from a Dutch citizen were allowed to come to Patria (most had 
never been there before). Native Indonesians and even persons of mixed origin 
who had not been recognised as a descendant by a white parent, were not allowed 
to ‘repatriate’.
The restrictive application of the right to ‘repatriate’ became very clear for 
Moluccan soldiers of the former colonial armed forces.6 After Indonesia gained 
its independence, part of the former colonial army was interned in a camp on the 
island of Java. Most were of Moluccan origin. They refused to demobilise on Java 
and instead wanted to go back to the Moluccas, to the independent Moluccan state 
that they had expected to be established there. However, the Indonesian govern-
ment did not allow them to go there and the Dutch government did not want them 
taken to the Netherlands. After three years of imprisonment on Java, they finally 
won a court case against the Dutch government; the latter was obliged to bring its 
soldiers to the Netherlands: 12,500 persons – soldiers and their families – arrived 
there in 1951. Both the soldiers themselves and the Dutch government regarded 
their stay as temporary, as they intended to return to a Free Republic of the Moluc-
cas (which, however, never came into existence).
What were the ideas and policies concerning these newcomers in Dutch soci-
ety, who had arrived unsolicited and who were ostensibly not called immigrants? 
As for repatriates, it was clear that the Dutch government felt responsible for 
these citizens, for whom a place had to be found in Dutch society. There was 
a consensus between the government and the leaders of the different pillars to 
define ‘repatriates as “Dutchmen in need” as the basis of the policy’ (Amersfoort 
1982: 96). So, an active reception (in contract pensions) and settlement policy 
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was put in place, assistance in (re)schooling and finding work was provided and 
social assistance was organised in cooperation with pillared welfare organisa-
tions, including courses on how to manage a family business in the Netherlands – 
a full- fledged assimilation policy. The mainly quick and smooth integration of 
the repatriates was helped by their relatively high educational level and strong 
orientation towards the Netherlands on the one hand and a quickly recovering 
and expanding economy and labour market in the 1950s on the other (Amersfoort 
1982; Surie 1971).
How different were the ideas, policies and practices relating to the future place 
of Moluccans (at that time called Ambonezen) in Dutch society. The soldiers 
were formally dismissed from the army upon arrival in the Netherlands in 1951, 
thereby losing their status, work and income. Their stay in the Netherlands was 
seen as temporary and they were housed in isolated camps, mostly in rural areas. 
A special service – the ‘Commissariaat Ambonezenzorg’ – was created within the 
Ministry of Social Work to care for these temporary guests.
The educational level of the Moluccans was low and knowledge of the Dutch 
language virtually absent (Bartels 1989). These were unfavourable conditions for 
any kind of adjustment to Dutch society. Furthermore, the Moluccans themselves 
had the firm intention to return to an independent Moluccan state. Add to this a 
government policy that intended to keep the group intact with a view to return to 
the Moluccas. However, the desired return never materialised, which led to the 
long- lasting ‘temporary’ existence of an isolated group in exile under ambivalent 
governmental policies. It was only in 1978, after a series of violent occupations 
and hijackings by Moluccan youths in the mid- 1970s, that the Dutch govern-
ment’s policy objectives were explicitly changed: the permanent residence of this 
group in Dutch society was to be accepted. Relations between Moluccans and 
the state were to be revised, rehabilitation for Moluccans would be provided and 
an active policy for the structural and socio- cultural emancipation of the group 
in Dutch society was proposed and accepted. The policy paper on the future of 
the Moluccans (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1978) turned out to be the 
forerunner of the Ethnic Minorities Policy (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 
1980, 1983).
An ‘unwilling immigration country’7 that needs  
(guest)workers:8 1960–1980
By the end of the 1950s, the country’s postwar economic reconstruction was so 
successful that labour reserves decreased significantly and, in labour- intensive 
industries (metallurgy, food and textile industries and mining), it was difficult 
to find sufficient workers. Initially, foreign workers arrived ‘spontaneously’ or 
were directly recruited by employers but, from 1961, a state- organised official 
recruitment drive started to fill vacancies, mainly with un- or low- skilled work-
ers. First came Italians, then Spaniards, Portuguese, Greeks and Yugoslavs; still 
later came Turks, Moroccans, Tunisians and Algerians. Between 1961 and 1975, 
some 85,000 migrant workers were officially recruited until the drive was ended 
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in 1974. However, many more came. By 1975 there were about 170,000 legally 
resident citizens from the recruitment countries in the Netherlands, the great 
majority being workers.
The first oil crisis of 1973 led to the recruitment drive ending but this did not 
mean decreasing immigration. Immigration from Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece 
and Yugoslavia halted and return migration for these groups was substantial. This, 
in combination with a significant naturalisation, led to a gradual decrease of these 
‘foreign populations’ from the mid- 1970s. However, the Turkish and North Afri-
can workers reacted quite differently: where possible, these workers took their 
families to the Netherlands and, in five years, their population doubled to 121,000 
Turks and 73,000 Moroccans by 1980.
So how was this immigration of workers perceived and what policy frames 
can be recognised (Entzinger 1975; Penninx 1979)? Policy was dominated by 
the belief that foreign workers’ engagement was only temporary – which is why 
they were popularly called ‘gastarbeiders’ (guestworkers). Initially (1960–1967) 
they were seen as a buffer for industrial sectors being restructured and for general 
fluctuations in economic activity. The government was willing to cooperate in 
satisfying industry’s need for manpower, as long as the best interest of Dutch soci-
ety (housing, public health, employment) was not in danger (Staay 1967, 1973). 
In the interests of efficiency and to avoid abuses, official recruitment agreements 
were drawn up with countries of origin. At the same time, the Ministry for Social 
Affairs and Employment set up a tripartite system for the approval for recruitment 
in which employers had to prove that no one was available on the labour market 
to fill the vacancies and trade unions had to give their consent.
The new Aliens Act of 1965 laid down a general legal framework that could 
be applied as flexibly or strictly as desired by means of Aliens’ Regulations – 
which could easily be amended – and of internal circulars laying down adminis-
trative guidelines. In this way, the Act could readily be applied in accordance with 
the demands of the labour market. Responsibility for foreigners’ social welfare 
was devolved to the lower levels of government (Praag 1973), as was finding 
accommodation for them in the tight housing market. Private initiatives at local 
or regional levels were encouraged – especially those by churches (the initial 
migrants being Catholic Italians and Spaniards) – and Foreign Workers Assistance 
units were widely set up. By subsidising these units, the government was able to 
transfer important responsibilities to them.
As a result of the brief economic recession in 1966/7 – which did not cause 
a substantial return of guestworkers – the concept of the foreign worker acting 
as a buffer against fluctuations in economic activity receded but the temporary 
nature of ‘guestwork’ remained a basic policy premise. ‘The Netherlands is not 
an immigration country’ was the crucial sentence in the Memorandum on Foreign 
Workers of 1970, the first official document of the Ministry for Social Affairs and 
Employment on the subject (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 
1970). At the same time, there was a growing awareness that a significant number 
of foreign workers were staying for increasingly lengthy periods. The government 
answered by exclusively highlighting the part played by foreigners as buffers in 
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the restructuring of the Dutch economy. It maintained that ‘guestwork’ would 
become redundant when the restructuring process was complete. The concept of 
‘temporary employment during the restructuring process’ had two logical impli-
cations for the government’s policies. Firstly, there had to be greater control over 
immigration and employment and, secondly, the temporary nature of ‘guestwork’ 
should be stressed where possible.
Greater control over migration was exercised particularly through a work- 
permit policy. The Work Permits Act of 1969 ruled out spontaneous recruitment in 
principle while a tightening of residence- permit procedures led to the requirement 
for foreigners to obtain a temporary residence visa before being admitted to the 
Netherlands. Visas could only be applied for in the country of origin. During the 
boom years of recruitment (1969–1971), however, the stricter regulation of their 
admission proved to have little effect on the actual inflow of recruited workers. 
The increasing demand for labour made foreign workers indispensable until the 
economic crisis of 1973.
Encouraging the idea of temporariness in terms of policy instruments had long 
been nonexistent. The discussion did get an impulse from the General Employers’ 
Association, which laid down a number of basic principles on temporariness and 
rotation in 1969 (AWV 1969). They proposed a selective and limited employment 
of a non- permanent nature for individual foreigners; their stay would be restricted 
to two or three years. A rotation system would prevent the permanent settlement 
of foreigners, while employers would be able to recruit fresh labour. The costs 
associated with such matters as family reunification and the integration of foreign 
children would then be avoided. Similar ideas were sounded out by policy- makers 
at a somewhat later stage which, in 1972, led to the expectation that a two- year 
regulation would be proposed by the government. However, resistance to policies 
of this kind was so great that these proposals were not even tabled in parliament.
The period between the 1970 Memorandum on Foreign Workers as a draft 
policy document of the Ministry for Social Affairs and Employment and its finali-
sation as a policy document in 1974 (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkge-
legenheid 1974) was a turbulent period in several ways. Firstly, the years 1970 
and 1971 were the absolute peak years of recruitment, followed by a period of 
recession and the first oil crisis of 1973 and the factual halt of the recruitment 
drive in 1974. Secondly, the societal debate on guestworkers was broadened. One 
important criticism was directed particularly towards the narrowly nationalistic, 
one- sided economic character of the Memorandum of 1970 and the absence of 
any reference to a migration- for- development perspective for countries of origin. 
Another complaint voiced by welfare organisations was that too little attention 
was paid to the social consequences of labour immigration in the Netherlands. 
Finally, in the period between the draft Memorandum of 1970 and the final docu-
ment of 1974, a new centre- left coalition led by the Labour Party had replaced the 
coalition of religious parties.
The Memorandum of Reply in 1974 (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werk-
gelegenheid 1974) by the Den Uyl Cabinet was a new policy document in that 
it introduced fresh topics such as the relationship between labour migration and 
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economic development in the countries of origin and the long- term economic 
and social consequences of labour migration in the Netherlands, as well as con-
crete policy areas such as housing and education. There was more balance in the 
sense that more facets of the problem were explored and more ministries had been 
involved in the writing of this final document. At the same time, nevertheless, 
it is fair to conclude that there was little substantive change in the basic prem-
ises underlying policy: the Netherlands was not an immigration country and the 
employment of foreign workers was therefore a temporary phenomenon. Increas-
ing recognition was given to the fact that foreign workers tended to be employed 
in certain types of work – i.e. poorly paid and generally unpleasant and heavy 
work. Despite this recognition, however, the Memorandum of Reply continued to 
maintain that foreign workers could be dispensed with in the long run: it referred 
to the need for ‘specific labour- saving’ investments in order to do away with the 
need for unskilled labour.
As a follow- up to earlier discussions about a possible two- year regulation, the 
Memorandum of Reply proposed the payment of a return premium (reference 
being made to a sum of 5,000 guilders, i.e. some 2,273 euros) to every foreigner 
who had worked in the Netherlands for two or three years, in order to encour-
age their remigration and the rotation principle. Such a departure premium would 
also have the policy advantage of clearly distinguishing ‘temporary’ from ‘long- 
standing’ migrants. This proposal – which soon became popularly known as the 
‘rot- op- premie’ (piss- off premium) – came in for sharp criticism and its imple-
mentation proved politically unfeasible.
In November 1975, in another effort to control the immigration of workers, the 
Minister of Social Affairs submitted a proposal for a law titled ‘Provisions govern-
ing the employment of foreign workers’ (Foreign Workers Act, TK 1975–1976 13 
682, 1–4). The proposal obliged an employer to obtain an employment permit – 
valid only for the named foreigner – before he could engage a foreign worker. 
This made the latter tied to and dependent on ‘his’ employer. Furthermore, the bill 
envisaged the imposition of limits by the government on the number of foreign-
ers who could be employed by a company. The new law would mean that, after 
a foreigner’s contract had expired, work could only be obtained with employers 
who had fewer foreigners on their staff than their limit.
The proposal met with strong resistance by employers, trade unions and law-
yers, although an amended version was, nevertheless, approved by the Lower 
House in 1976. The most significant change by amendment was that foreigners 
who had worked in the Netherlands legally for three years (as opposed to the 
original five) would fall outside the scope of the Act. Given the small number of 
foreign workers who would currently be subject to the Act, the bill became an 
impotent instrument. Use could, however, be made of the legislation if recruit-
ment were to be resumed. The law came into force in 1979 – more than five years 
after the classical guestworker period had ended.
From the foregoing it is clear that guestworkers were the category that domi-
nated migration flows and policies in the period 1960–1980 though they were not 
the only newcomers in that period. Colonial immigration from Suriname9 was an 
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important second category of newcomers who – like the repatriates before – were 
not seen as immigrants. Until its independence in 1975, Suriname was part of the 
Dutch Kingdom. The inhabitants of Suriname were called ‘Overzeese Rijksgen-
oten’ (overseas fellow countrymen); they were Dutch citizens and migration was 
free. Immigration from Suriname to the continental Kingdom of the Netherlands 
gained some weight in the 1960s (partly as a consequence of the recruitment of 
workers) but became significant in the years before the independence of Suriname 
(1973–1975). The country’s independence in November 1975 would mean that 
those who were there would in principle get Surinamese nationality and would 
fall under the immigration regime for foreigners in the Netherlands.10 This was an 
important reason for many to move to the Netherlands before November 1975. In 
1975 alone, some 40,000 moved to the Netherlands, followed by a second wave in 
1979–1980, prior to the expiration of the transitional agreement on the settlement 
of mutual subjects (for five years after Suriname’s independence, its inhabitants 
could opt for Dutch nationality). By 1980, the population of Surinamese origin in 
the Netherlands was about 180,000.
As for reception and integration policies for Surinamese in the 1970s, there was 
a strong resemblance with those for repatriates from the Dutch Indies, which were 
about receiving fellow citizens in the mother country. The Ministry of Culture, 
Recreation and Social Work (formerly just Social Work) coordinated a housing 
policy of dispersal (to relieve the big cities) and special measures for integration 
in the labour market and education.
Accepting immigrant minorities in a nonimmigration 
country: ethnic- minorities policy 1980–1994
In the 1970s, when sizeable immigration from Suriname took place and the Medi-
terranean guestworker populations grew quickly through family immigration, 
the ‘tension between norm (that the Netherlands should not be an immigration 
country) and fact (that there were significant immigrant populations)’ increased 
(Entzinger 1975: 327). The ‘fiction of temporary stay’ was deeply ingrained in 
admission policies, in laws and regulations governing the legal position of (alien) 
immigrants and in reception policies. Reception facilities were meagre and organ-
ised for certain groups of immigrants, apart from the regular social services. The 
Netherlands was not only an immigration country against its will (Entzinger 1985: 
67), it was also an ‘unwilling immigration country’ (Amersfoort and Surie 1987; 
Groenendijk 1981).
At the end of the 1970s the political discussion on immigrants changed. The 
hijackings of trains and the occupations of buildings by groups of young Moluc-
cans in the mid- 1970s had a dramatic impact on Dutch society but also triggered 
a new policy vision: the fiction of temporality was declared outdated and the 
future of this group within Dutch society became a central topic in a new policy 
document on Moluccans in 1978 (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1978). The 
report Ethnic Minorities by the Scientific Council for Government Policy (1979) 
formed the impetus for politics to apply the same kind of reasoning for other 
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immigrant groups. This led to the announcement of a new ‘overall ethnic minori-
ties policy’ in 1980, the Draft Minorities Bill in 1981 and the final Minorities Bill 
in 1983 (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1980, 1981, 1983). It is important 
to underline here that the changes did not relate to immigration policies: these 
should be restrictive, as before. The change related to integration and the posi-
tion of vulnerable groups in Dutch society – (immigrant and other) groups with 
a low socio- economic status who were seen as socio- culturally different from the 
mainstream and in danger of permanent marginalisation. These groups should 
emancipate in the socio- economic and socio- cultural sense. It was not a policy for 
all immigrant groups and not all target groups of ethnic- minorities policy (EMP), 
such as Dutch caravan dwellers, were immigrants. The most important change for 
immigrant groups was that policy should be based on the expectation that current 
immigrants would be permanent residents in Dutch society.
In the new EMP documents, two main aims were formulated. On the one hand a 
tolerant, multicultural or multi- ethnic society should be created in which cultural 
and ethnic difference would be accepted and appreciated and ethno- cultural groups 
could emancipate. On the other hand, EMP was a policy of socio- economic equal-
ity: it aimed at solving the arrears of minorities’ social position in Dutch society 
and fighting the (institutional) discrimination which leads to unequal chances and 
sustains these arrears.
The first aim demanded by its very nature group- specific measures but, in the 
new policy, this was done from the perspective of the fundamental rights of these 
groups in and as part of an envisaged multicultural Dutch society. Organisations of 
immigrants themselves were given important tasks in ‘maintaining and develop-
ing their own culture and identity’. As to the content of this maintenance and the 
development of culture and identity, governmental agencies should not intervene 
but, rather, keep their distance. The main task of these agencies and their policies 
was to remove barriers and fight intolerance of the society or of certain groups.11
To realise the second aim it was stipulated that a consistent policy of fighting 
arrears and promoting equal opportunities should be applied within the general 
policies applicable to the domains of labour market, education and housing. The 
accessibility of facilities and institutions, non- discriminatory treatment and equal 
opportunities were the key words. In governmental facilities and institutions, the 
new key term ‘proportional representation or share’ was introduced in the 1980s 
as a yardstick of good functioning in relation to immigrants.
The Dutch government intended to specify these general aims in a number 
of domains: the improvement of the social position of immigrants should be 
traceable in the fields of labour and income, education and housing. As to the 
first domain, the policy included improvement of the service of Employment 
Exchanges for immigrants; stimulating the participation of immigrants in training 
and (re- )schooling programmes; realising the proportional participation of immi-
grants in ‘job placement’ and ‘employment’ programmes; removing obstacles for 
small entrepreneurs among immigrants and providing (information) services for 
them; and, finally, opening up employment opportunities for immigrants within 
governmental services by removing formal (legal) hindrances and by striving for 
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the proportional representation of minority groups among government employees 
(including affirmative action programmes since 1986). For the private market, 
a softer legislation, the ‘Employment Equity Act’, borrowed from Canada, was 
discussed for quite some time and was finally introduced in 1994.
EMP also invested strongly in educational policies for minorities. The two 
goals of this plan were equal educational opportunities and the equivalence of 
cultures. The first goal was to be achieved by putting more emphasis on Dutch 
language- teaching and by intensifying contacts between immigrant parents and 
their children’s schools. To enable them to provide such extra and special instruc-
tion in the Dutch language, extra facilities were given to schools, depending on 
the number of immigrant pupils, their duration of stay and their country of origin. 
It was particularly assumed that pupils from non- Dutch- speaking backgrounds 
needed extra lessons in Dutch during the first two years of their stay. The sec-
ond goal, the equivalence of culture, would be achieved through two different 
provisions: Education in Mother- tongue and Culture (EMC) and Intercultural 
Education (IE). EMC teaching was set up in the Netherlands in the early 1970s 
to facilitate the eventual reintegration of pupils in the society of origin. In the 
1980 policy plan, the goals of mother- tongue teaching were reformulated in psy-
chological terms (Eldering 1989: 120): fostering the well- being and the ethnic 
awareness of children and guarding them against alienation from their parents and 
family, strengthening their identity etc. It was intended to contribute (indirectly) 
to greater achievements by these children. Intercultural Education should prepare 
the children of both ethnic/cultural groups and the indigenous Dutch majority to 
live together harmoniously in a multicultural society.
With regard to housing, the most important task, developed from the beginning 
of the 1980s, was to open up the market for rented family accommodation for 
immigrants on the same footing as for native- Dutch candidates. Regulations for 
application, urgency rules and distribution were made ‘neutral’ for immigrants 
and discriminatory rules were outlawed. These policies were the most success-
ful in that part of the market owned by municipalities and housing corporations 
(which was quite sizeable in the large cities in the Netherlands).
In the Minorities Bill (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1983: 107 ff) a mul-
ticultural society was envisaged in which immigrants would have the same rights 
and opportunities to practice and develop their own cultural and religious identity 
as other groups in Dutch society. Immigrants should be given room to develop 
their identity; Dutch society and its authorities should be open to these develop-
ments and adapt to the situation of a multicultural society.
As for the right to maintain and practice their culture, religion and language and 
to organise themselves as groups, immigrants were not been confronted with too 
many problems. The religiously ‘pillared’ and compartmentalised Dutch society 
had long recognised such fundamental rights, provided that the immigrants’ cul-
tural or religious norms, values and practices were not incompatible with the ‘fun-
damental norms of our pluriform society’ (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 
1983: 107 ff). The existing facilities were available for the newcomers on the 
same conditions as for settled Dutch (religious, cultural or language) groups.
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As for the opportunities, however, policy- makers were realistic enough to see 
that these newcomers would not be able to make use of these rights on an equal 
footing, because of their small number, their low social position, low level of 
education and weak degree of organisation, which is why special efforts were 
made, such as:
a) strengthening immigrant or ethnic organisations by subsidising these at the 
local level and umbrella organisations at the national level;
b) stimulating the participation of immigrant organisations in the formation 
of policy through a National Consultative Council (Landelijk Overleg en 
Inspraakorgaan) that had sub- councils for each of the different immigrant 
groups;
c) facilitating religious activities for ‘new’ religions like Islam, Hinduism and 
Buddhism: religious chaplains in the army, prisons and hospitals were sub-
sidised; there were religious instruction (IR) teachers in public schools and 
subsidies for houses of prayer (the latter were the first to be cut, after 1986); 
and
d) adapting laws and regulations to facilitate particular religious practices, such 
as ritual slaughtering and burials according to Hindu and Islamic rites. The 
public call for prayer of the Imam was formally accepted on the same footing 
as church bell- ringing in Christian churches.
An important element of EMP for non- Dutch citizens was also a policy of strength-
ening their legal position. The first aspect of this referred to security of residence. 
A permanent permit was to be extended after five years of continuous residence in the 
Netherlands and, for family members, after three years. Revocation or withdrawal of 
a permanent permit and its subsequent expatriation was only possible in very excep-
tional circumstances, like long- term prison sentences. Long- term unemployment and 
a dependency on social security benefits were insufficient grounds for revocation.
The second aspect concerned the equal treatment of legal immigrants and the 
native Dutch. An inventory was made of articles and phrases in Dutch laws and 
regulations in which discrimination according to nationality, religion, culture and 
language was made (Beune and Hessels 1983). Many of these articles were thus 
changed or deleted.
A third way to ameliorate the juridical position of aliens (and particularly their 
children) was a change in the law on Dutch citizenship and procedures of natu-
ralisation. On 1 January 1985, a new law was introduced that made it much easier 
for the non- Dutch spouses of Dutch nationals and for third- generation children 
(born to parents who, themselves, were born in the Netherlands) to become Dutch 
citizens. An option was made available for aliens – born in the Netherlands and 
reaching their majority (at the age of 18) – to become Dutch citizens. Further-
more, government policy relating to dual nationality changed: the requirement 
that the former nationality should be rejected was dropped in many cases. These 
changes led to a steep rise in naturalisations (and dual- nationality cases) in the 
late 1980 and 1990s.
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Fourthly, aliens residing legally in the Netherlands for more than three years 
gained voting rights at municipal elections – implemented for the first time in 
1986.
Lastly, another important element of the new minorities policies was the fight 
against discrimination. A number of amendments in laws were introduced to 
anchor the non- discrimination principle in Dutch law and to give more possibili-
ties to prosecute discriminating persons and organisations. In Article 1 of the Con-
stitutional Law, a new non- discrimination article was introduced forbidding, inter 
alia, discrimination according to race or religion. Some articles in the Penal Code 
were also adapted to facilitate the pursuit of discriminatory practices. Certain 
provisions in the Civil Code proved useful, too, in fighting discriminatory prac-
tices. It was also deemed necessary to make juridical procedures for complaints 
easier. Police and prosecutors were given instructions on how to deal effectively 
with cases of discrimination and the government subsidised a National Bureau 
for Combatting Racism which worked together with local anti- racist registration 
and service groups. Anti- discrimination training for government and municipal 
employees was introduced, and Intercultural Education facilities were created in 
schools.
The EMP, as outlined earlier, was not only comprehensive in its content and 
in the number of ministries and governmental agencies involved but was also 
organised differently. Where, in the past, it had been the Ministry for Social Work/
CRM that was made responsible for the reception and integration of repatriates, 
Moluccans and Surinamese, and the Ministry for Social Affairs and Employment 
had made policies for guestworkers, it was now the Ministry of the Interior that 
was made responsible for the coordination of EMP and that received a significant 
special budget to build and implement the new policies. This coordination related 
not only to the horizontal alignment of the various activities of ministries but also 
to the vertical alignment of policies with cities and municipalities, including the 
funding of research relevant for the development and evaluation of EMP.
We saw at the beginning of this section that the complete reframing of integra-
tion policies in EMP did not imply changes in the perception of immigration. On 
the contrary, ‘the government’s policy aims to prevent immigration as much as 
possible without violating national and international obligations. This means that 
family reunion and the admission of political refugees will be kept outside the 
restrictive policy’ (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1980: 21–22). So how did 
this work out in practice in this period?
Indeed, the period 1980–1994 was one of relatively lower overall immigration 
compared to the preceding decades. In terms of policies, however, we should dis-
tinguish three main categories: immigrant workers, the family members of immi-
grants and refugees and asylum- seekers.
For migrant workers, we have seen that the Foreign Workers Act was intro-
duced in 1979 in order to control and channel labour migration. In the new eco-
nomic context of the 1980s, characterised by a loss of employment in industry 
and the expansion of the service sector, these policies were meant to restrict the 
entrance of low- skilled foreign workers while facilitating the immigration of the 
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highly skilled (who often came from extremely industrialised countries (Böcker 
and Clermonts 1995). By the end of the 1980s, persistent labour shortages in par-
ticular economic sectors forced the Dutch government to deal with the demand for 
foreign labour in a more structured fashion. As a consequence, the Dutch Employ-
ment Organisation, together with trade unions and employers, started to man-
age temporary labour migration through so- called ‘covenants’. These tripartite 
agreements permitted workers in particular economic sectors to be temporarily 
admitted into the country while also anticipating the availability of newly trained, 
qualified Dutch workers. Contrary to what might be expected, however, these 
agreements did not always lead to a more liberal admission policy (Lange 2004). 
In any case, this type of labour immigration formed a negligible part of the total 
immigration in this period.
The new EMP, however, had initially positive consequences for the immigra-
tion of family members (particularly of guestworkers). EMP accepted the perma-
nency of immigrants’ stay as a starting point for integration policies. In principle, 
this new approach made the family part of the integration process. In practice, too, 
family reunification (i.e. the bringing over of the spouses and children of resident 
foreigners) thus went unquestioned and peaked in the early 1980s. When the Min-
istry of Justice decided to introduce restrictions on family formation (i.e. bringing 
over new marriage partners), there was fierce resistance from political parties, 
which argued that the measure undermined the principle of equal treatment at the 
heart of the new minorities policy. In this regard, liberal family migration policies 
were part and parcel of EMP.
Refugee and asylum policies in the Netherlands have been developed, mainly 
ad hoc, following the increase in asylum- seekers during the 1980s and 1990s. 
From 1977 to 1987, annual quotas were established to determine the number of 
refugees invited to resettle in the Netherlands. However, the growing numbers 
of spontaneous asylum- seekers, a housing shortage and the increased costs that 
municipalities had to pay for social and other benefits, led to the introduction of 
the Regulation on the Reception of Asylum- Seekers (ROA) in 1987. The first 
aim of the ROA was to curtail asylum- seekers’ access to independent housing 
and social benefits and, instead, to offer them central reception and modest sums 
of pocket money. Muus (1997) observed that the ROA, described as ‘austere but 
humane’, was instated not only to relieve the growing housing and financial prob-
lems of the major cities but also – and above all – to prevent the Netherlands from 
becoming an attractive destination country. This shift made evident how reception 
policies were, both in fact and in perception, a significant component in the man-
agement of asylum flows.
Due to the growing number of newly arriving asylum- seekers from 1989 
onwards, the ROA became a policy of providing minimal first accommodation; yet 
within just a few years, it became overburdened. In 1990, for example, the Minis-
try of Welfare, Health and Culture, in charge of the reception of asylum- seekers, 
‘tried to solve the problem by means of buying or renting holiday bungalows 
and caravans and finding more municipalities that were prepared to accommodate 
asylum- seekers’ (Muus 1990: 47). In 1992, the New Admission and Reception 
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Model for Asylum- Seekers (NTOM) was introduced. Under this system, recep-
tion centres were the responsibility of the ROA; municipalities would henceforth 
only bear responsibility for the reception and integration of those who had passed 
asylum procedures – namely status- holders and the gedoogden (persons with 
a temporary expulsion waiver). Moreover, in the early 1990s, the Ministry of 
Justice introduced several measures to reduce the number of asylum requests. 
First and foremost, measures were taken to prevent asylum- seekers from even 
arriving in the Netherlands by increasing the number of countries whose citizens 
needed a visa. Secondly, in 1994 a temporary status – referred to as a Conditional 
Residence Permit (VVTV) – was introduced. This new status only carried with 
it a relatively weak provisional residence title and provided barely any access to 
public facilities. Thirdly, in 1994, like other countries, the Netherlands introduced 
procedures to expedite certain asylum applications such as ‘manifestly unfounded 
applications’ – those that were filed by people coming from safe countries of 
origin or safe transit countries where they could have applied for asylum. What is 
more, people who had applied elsewhere were excluded.
Notwithstanding these restrictive measures, the number of asylum- seekers did 
grow significantly, both absolutely and as part of total immigration, particularly 
in the beginning of the 1990s. In 1994, a peak of 52,600 asylum applications was 
registered in the Netherlands.
Restrictive immigration and neoliberal ‘citizenship policies’ 
of integration: 1994–2002
Already, in the late 1980s, discontent about EMP was growing. The first strong 
critique was formulated in a new report by the Scientific Council for Government 
Policy (1989), the same institute that had promoted EMP ten years earlier. The 
report’s message was that too little progress had been made by EMP in the crucial 
domains of the labour market and education and too much attention was being 
given to issues of multiculturalism and (financial and other) support to ethnic 
organisations and to cultural aspects. It was suggested that the group approach 
and the prominence of cultural aspects in the policy had hindered – rather than 
enhanced – individual participation and the use of opportunities in the labour mar-
ket and education. The advice of the Scientific Council for Government Policy 
(1989: 99) was thus to make more efforts in the key areas of labour and education 
and to do so with more compulsory measures. The message was that obligations 
of migrants should be more balanced with the extended rights and policies should 
focus less on cultural rights and facilities.
Other elements of criticism were later added. For one, Frits Bolkestein (1991), 
the then Liberal Party leader and head of the political opposition in the Dutch 
parliament, suggested in a public speech in 1991 that Islam formed a threat to 
liberal democracy. He also intimated that Islam was a hindrance to the integra-
tion of immigrants and that immigrant integration should be handled ‘with more 
courage’.
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Policy did not change immediately in response to the critiques but the seeds for 
a different framing of integration were sown, to grow later. The distinct change 
in policy focus was found in the policy document Contourennota (Ministerie van 
Binnenlandse Zaken 1994). In this document a renewed integration policy was 
adopted, of which the keywords were ‘good citizenship’ and ‘self- responsibility’. 
It argued that citizenship entails not only rights but also duties and that each citi-
zen must be active and responsible for him- or herself. In accordance with the 
advice of the 1989 report of the Scientific Council for Government Policy, this 
new ‘integration policy’ confirmed three main deviations from EMP: a shift away 
from target groups to individuals who are in a disadvantaged position, a strong 
focus on socio- economic incorporation through labour market and education 
measures and a shift away from cultural and multicultural policies as well as from 
recognition and support for immigrant organisations.
The social- democrat victory in the national elections of 1994 led to the so- 
called Purple Coalition: the Labour Party (PvdA) together with the conservative 
liberals (VVD) and left- wing liberals (D66). The focus on the economic integra-
tion of individual immigrants recommended by the 1989 Scientific Council report 
fitted very well in the general policy line of the government, whose motto was 
‘work, work and, once again, work’. In this general approach, measures specifi-
cally targeted at migrants or ethnic minorities were abandoned.
A new policy instrument that fitted well in the new philosophy was that of civic 
integration courses.12 This instrument was developed at the local level in a number 
of Dutch cities in the early 1990s. On these reception courses, newcomers were 
given a toolkit consisting of Dutch- language training and information about the 
functioning of important institutions in Dutch society. Local policy- makers felt 
the urge to provide such a toolkit to all newcomers who needed it. This locally 
developed instrument for integration was taken over by national authorities in the 
second half of the 1990s and developed as a national reception policy in the 1998 
WIN Law (Wet Inburgering Nederland or Law on Civic Integration).
Another way of transforming policies was by framing many of the integration 
facilities in area- based (rather than group- based) policies. In 1994, the Ministry 
of Home Affairs began to formulate a policy for ‘deprived areas’ in major Dutch 
cities. Ethnic- minority populations were strongly represented in these areas and 
holistic programmes that integrated measures on housing, economic issues and 
socio- cultural dimensions were developed. This policy was referred to as the 
Grotestedenbeleid (Urban Policy) from 1994 on. In 1998, a new Minister for 
Urban Policies and Integration (within the Ministry of Home Affairs) was made 
responsible for integration policies.
Finally, the new ideas of ‘good citizenship’ and ‘self- responsibility’ were 
not only expressed in the mandatory integration courses but also in the change 
of naturalisation policies in the second half of the 1990s. The lenient natu-
ralisation practices under EMP that accepted dual nationality (and had trans-
formed a large majority of foreign immigrants of the 1960s to 1990s into 
Dutch citizens) were inverted: naturalisation was reframed as the final result 
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of an integration (inburgering) trajectory to be earned by immigrants and dual 
nationality was no longer to be accepted. The formal confirmation of this pro-
cess of reframing the relation between migration, integration and naturalisa-
tion took place in the next phase of hyper- policisation: the New Nationality 
Law of 2003 re- introduced the requirement to give up a former nationality, 
introduced strict tests on knowledge of the Dutch language and society and 
strongly promoted the symbolic and ceremonial value of naturalisation. It thus 
formed one of the building stones of the Ministerie van Justitie’s Integration 
Policy New Style of 2003.
When it came to immigration policies, the framing (of restrictiveness) did 
not essentially alter much in the period 1994 to 2003. However, there were two 
important changes to note. The first related to family migration. The shift in the 
framing of integration policy from a group- oriented approach to one focusing 
on individual integration caused a turn away from the principles of protecting 
family unity. Family migration started to be seen as a problem for the integration 
of individuals. As presented in the media and stated in many public debates, a 
broad majority within parliament believed that, due to a lack of knowledge and 
skills, those newcomers who immigrated in the framework of family formation or 
reunification would, if not fail to integrate, at least delay the integration process. 
This reasoning justified restrictive family migration policies (Walsum 2004). As a 
consequence, in the 1990s and 2000s, more- restrictive family migration measures 
were introduced with little debate.
The second change related to practices of policies to reduce irregular immi-
gration from the early 1990s. The Linkage Law proposal was intended to make 
not only all social security benefits but also rights and access to secondary or 
higher education, housing, rent subsidy, handicapped facilities and health care 
for an immigrant contingent on his or her legal residence status. Practitioners 
in these fields were supposed to check legal residence before serving foreign 
clients. Driving this act was the assumption that an exclusion of access to public 
services would help to discourage irregular migration. The Linkage Act pro-
posal generated widespread protest from doctors, teachers, legal experts, promi-
nent politicians and representatives from a broad range of public, semi- private 
and private organisations. Representatives of local governments also cam-
paigned against the law and seemed to steer a course towards non- enforcement. 
In general terms, the new law was claimed to be unnecessary, immoral and 
unworkable. This opposition produced a number of substantial alterations to 
the proposed bill. For instance, professionals were not forced to report irregu-
lar immigrants to the Aliens Department, restrictions concerning education for 
children were lifted and, whereas irregular immigrants would initially have only 
been entitled to medical care in ‘acute and threatening situations’, this specifica-
tion was eventually superseded by the prospect of requiring ‘imperative medical 
treatment’. The Linkage Law (Koppelingswet) came into force in 1998. It was 
presented as the centrepiece of an ‘integrated immigration policy’ (Pluymen 
2004: 76).
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Hyper- politicisation: socio- cultural integration demands 
as a condition for (restrictive and selective) immigration: 
2002–2018
A series of events around the turn of the millennium triggered a new shift in the 
public and political discourse on immigration and integration issues that would 
lead later to a revision of policy towards assimilationism (Vasta 2006). The social 
and the cultural dimensions of integration were even more central than before 
and were viewed through the normative lens of what were supposed to be Dutch 
norms and values. The search was no longer for ‘compatibilities’, but for ‘com-
monalities’ that would help to preserve national norms and values, thereby restor-
ing and enhancing the social cohesion of society (Entzinger 2003). One of the 
initial catalysts in this new framing of immigration and integration was a news-
paper article by Scheffer (2000) that spurred a new national debate. The article 
stated that multicultural society in the Netherlands could be dismissed as either a 
‘tragedy’ or a ‘disaster’.13 Integration policy was declared a failure; moreover, a 
call was made for a more assimilationist policy that would revive Dutch history, 
norms and values. Islam and the integration of Muslim immigrants were identified 
as being especially problematic.
At the same time, Dutch politics witnessed the rise of Pim Fortuyn, a populist 
politician who profiled himself through harsh statements on criminality, direct 
democracy, immigration and integration. He pleaded for ‘zero migration’, argued 
that ‘the Netherlands was full’ and called for ‘a cold war against Islam’.14 To 
these arguments – which were not completely new – he added two elements: the 
accusation that the political elite had enabled the failure of integration in the past 
by ‘hiding the real problems behind a curtain of political correct speech’ and the 
contention that the victim of all this was the common – and, at that, native – Dutch 
voter.
Fortuyn’s populist campaign exploited this discourse very successfully. His 
party won a great victory in the March 2002 local elections in Rotterdam, the 
Netherlands’ second largest city. Only a few weeks later, Fortuyn was murdered – 
just before the national elections of May 2002 in which the newly established LPF 
party (Lijst Pim Fortuyn) won a landslide victory, winning 26 of the 150 parlia-
mentary seats and thus entering parliament as second largest party. This success 
radically changed political discourse on immigration and integration; other parties 
adapted their ways of speaking about the issues (Penninx 2006).
Another sequence of notable events followed. Firstly, a series of violent acts 
committed by immigrants drew wide media attention. Secondly, several events 
emerged around the issues of so- called fundamentalist mosques and radical 
Imams. Finally, a major climax came when the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh 
was murdered by a Dutch- Moroccan youngster who was affiliated with a radical 
Islamist network in the Netherlands.
These events had two significant effects. First, they contributed to the image 
of failure of the country’s integration policy. Parliament thus established a 
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Parliamentary Inquiry Committee on the Integration Policy, made up of MPs from 
all parties in parliament, in order to examine ‘why policy had thus far resulted 
in such limited successes’. When the Committee concluded that integration had 
actually been relatively successful (Blok Commission 2004), this judgement was 
widely dismissed as naïve. A new political correctness seemed to have emerged 
that would taboo positive statements on integration policy and on multicultural-
ism.15 Secondly, these events reinforced a new mode of policy discourse, described 
by Prins (2002) as ‘hyperrealism’ – a shift from the 1990s ‘realist’ style of dis-
course demanding a ‘tough’ approach to integration that should turn immigrants 
into full citizens, to a type of discourse in which ‘being tough’ became a goal in 
itself, regardless of its potentially problematic effects.
Thus, from 2002 onwards, a new policy and a new policy style became visible. 
The first element of this shift was the renewed institutional embedding of policies 
in the first Balkenende Cabinet in 2002: integration policies were moved from the 
Ministry of Home Affairs (in which they had been located since 1980, the begin-
ning of EMP) to the Ministry of Justice, under a new special Minister for Aliens’ 
Affairs and Integration. It signaled the subordination of integration to immigra-
tion policies.16 The new Integration Policy New Style, formulated in a letter by 
the new minister (Ministerie van Justitie 2003), continued to follow the leading 
concepts of ‘citizenship’ and ‘self- responsibility’ of the 1990s17 but the emphasis 
had shifted strongly from the socio- economic aspects of integration to the cultural 
adaptation of immigrants to Dutch society. Integration policy was thus narrowed 
considerably, mainly down to civic integration courses.
These courses – and the WIN Law of 1998 – had to be transformed into ‘a 
new style’, according to Minister Rita Verdonk.18 To begin with, civic integration 
courses were not only mandatory but also had to be passed within a certain period 
(three and a half years); passing was a condition for the obtention of a permanent 
residence permit (and, for asylum- seekers, a definitive residence permit (after a 
temporary one). In the implementation of these courses, a new distribution of 
responsibilities among their stakeholders was proposed (and formalised in the 
new WIN Law that came into force in 2007). Firstly, the migrant coming to the 
Netherlands was expected to find and fund the course him- or herself. Only if s/he 
eventually passed the exam would s/he be entitled to a refund of up to 70 per cent 
of the cost of the course. Secondly, the responsibilities of local authorities were 
changed: although they still had to monitor newcomers and their efforts to follow 
courses, the authorities’ organisational and financial resources to promote such a 
process were minimised. Thirdly, civic integration courses were to be privatised: 
while, since 1998, a nationwide network of state- sponsored Regional Educational 
Centres (ROCs) had developed which offered civic integration courses, now any-
one could offer such programmes. This led to the rapid dissolution of the existing 
infrastructure of ROCs and to a market with many low- quality and inexperienced 
new educators – and to a chaotic field for the migrant, who had to make this choice 
him- or herself (see evaluations done in subsequent years: Algemene Rekenkamer 
2017; Significant 2010).
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The Minister for Alien Affairs and Integration, Rita Verdonk, also tried to 
expand the target population of the new reception policy: civic integration courses 
should be mandatory for all immigrants between the ages of 16 and 65, regard-
less of the amount of time they had spent in the Netherlands and of whether they 
were foreigners or naturalised Dutch. However, the Minister lost this battle on 
legal grounds. From the final version of the law that was ultimately passed at the 
very end of the cabinet’s legislative term, in July 2006, the obligation to follow 
and pass civic integration courses was removed for Dutch citizens – native or 
naturalised.
The star measure in this new policy was the WIB Law (Law on Civic Inte-
gration Courses Abroad) of 2006, which introduced a pre- migration test for new 
migrants who wanted to move to the Netherlands, particularly family migrants. 
Since 2006, newcomers have to pass an exam in their country of origin that proves 
their Dutch language skills and basic knowledge of Dutch culture and society 
before a provisional visa to enter the Netherlands is given. Once admitted to the 
Netherlands, migrants must attend – and successfully complete – civic integra-
tion courses in order to be granted both temporary and permanent permit renew-
als. In this law, integration policy had become clearly linked, instrumental even, 
to immigration policy. It facilitated the selection of migrants and restricted new 
flows, particularly those of family reunion and marriage migration.
The four years of this New Style policy were different not only in content but 
also, markedly, in the style of policy- making and implementation. The process of 
policy- making – in a strongly politicised context – was predominantly led by the 
Minister and political parties in parliament. At the same time, this policy- making 
was very selective in the topics it chose: in the first place, as we have seen, manda-
tory civic integration courses, both before arrival and after, as well as the restric-
tive admission of new immigrants and forced return of failed asylum- seekers and 
illegal immigrants.
As for immigration policy, the (very restrictive) policy of the New Style was, 
firstly, visible in the additional conditions for immigration described earlier: 
the mandatory tests that (certain categories of) aspiring immigrants had to pass 
before they would receive their first provisional visa to enter the Netherlands 
and the strongly increased costs, for aspiring immigrants, of visas, (temporary) 
permits and mandatory courses. Secondly, there was the stricter application of 
policies set earlier. In this latter category fall, among other things, implemen-
tation of the Linkage Act (combatting illegal residence) and the application 
of asylum procedures and return policy for refused asylum- seekers and other 
irregular migrants.
As for labour migration, restrictive policies continued, expressed, in this period, 
the most concretely in the postponement of free access to the labour market for 
the citizens of the new EU accessor states from Central and Eastern Europe in 
2004 and 2007: a transitional period of five years was established in which, for 
example, Poles, Romanians and Bulgarians could freely move to the Netherlands 
but still needed a work permit to take up a regular job.
96 Rinus Penninx
As for family migration, the discourse introduced in the 1990s that family 
migration was a potential threat for integration became more dominant than ever 
before – the WIB Law of 2006, which required the pre- migration examination of 
the non- Dutch family members of residents who wanted to immigrate, was the 
embodiment of this discourse.
As for asylum migration policies, two sets of measures were relevant in this 
phase. In the first place, measures continued to be taken which aimed to reduce 
the number of asylum applications and the duration of asylum procedures. These 
measures were taken so far that they aroused concerns not only from refugee 
advocacy groups and academics within the Netherlands but also from the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Human Rights Watch 
(HRW). Secondly, there was the problematic non- return of failed asylum- seekers 
to their country of origin. In February 2004, the Minister for Immigration and Inte-
gration proposed to expel up to 26,000 ‘failed asylum- seekers’ over the following 
three years – a proposal that was accepted by the Dutch parliament but which also 
generated the opposition of local authorities and grassroots organisations.
The strong anti- immigration climate and the concrete restrictive measures were 
obviously effective during the Balkenende I, II and III Cabinets (2002–2007): 
all four immigration categories (labour, study, asylum and family immigration) 
decreased compared to the previous period. For the years 2003–2006, a negative 
net migration (more people left the country than arrived) was registered for the 
first time since the 1960s (it turned out to be temporary, as we will see later).
I have been somewhat elaborate here about what happened to immigration and 
integration policies between 2002 and 2007 because a new framing was estab-
lished in which immigration and integration policies became linked in a special 
way and a structure was created of pre- and post- migration civic integration 
courses of an assimilative nature. This framing and this structure were embodied 
in the new Wet Inburgering 2007 (Law on Civic Integration) which was essen-
tially maintained later, in its revisions in 2013 and 2017. There were, however, 
periods of partial revision of these policies – depending on the political orienta-
tion of coalition cabinets. I outline briefly here some of the specific developments 
which occurred between 2007 and 2018.
The fourth Balkenende Cabinet (2007–2010) had shifted colour from Centre- 
Right to Centre- Left. The cabinet returned, to a certain extent, to ideas and struc-
tures of the late 1990s. Immigration and integration competences were again split: 
the first remained at the Ministry of Justice but integration was moved to the Min-
istry of Housing, under a special (Labour Party) Minister for Housing, Residential 
Areas and Integration, Ella Vogelaar. So, apart from the new now- national Civic 
Integration infrastructure embodied in the Civic Integration Law 2007, the local, 
urban social- cohesion challenge of the 1990s was brought back on the agenda: 
socio- economic renovation and cohesion policies for vulnerable urban residential 
quarters. ‘Burgerschap’ (citizenship) in this context was also redirected towards 
‘common interests and the common future of all residents’ of the vulnerable resi-
dential quarters.
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The new minister also partially relaxed the mandatory individual civic integra-
tion measures: the unilateral obligatory character was redefined and the interest 
of newcomers, their future participation, their learning of competences and tools 
for participation and interaction were stressed. However, the structure of pre- 
and post- migration integration courses of an assimilative nature was maintained. 
Moreover, the comprehensiveness of civic integration was enhanced in the so- 
called Deltaplan Vogelaar that aimed at the full implementation of the civic inte-
gration plans that had suffered thus far from insufficient offers of quality courses, 
unclear organisation and a problematic division of tasks between the stakeholders 
involved.
In 2010 this temporary partial relaxation of integration policies was followed by 
a full swing back in the centre- right minority Rutte I Cabinet that had negotiated 
the parliamentary support of the anti- immigrant PVV party of Geert Wilders. This 
‘Integration New Style Revisited’ was readily identifiable in the mission state-
ment of the new cabinet (Regeringsverklaring 2010): the government announced 
that it intended to ‘substantially reduce immigration’, particularly family migra-
tion; ‘to secure integration’ by increasing the level and requirements of integration 
courses; to increase the responsibility of the migrants by obliging immigrants to 
bear the costs of immigration and integration; to couple failure on integration 
courses with the noncontinuation of residence permits; to make naturalisation 
more conditional on measured qualifications, participation and integration of the 
candidate to be awarded; and to stop diversity and affirmative action programmes. 
A practical target of the government was, furthermore, to bring the costs of civic 
integration (estimated at about 350 million euros annually) back to zero by the 
year 2014. The cabinet also went back to combining immigration and integration 
into one ministry: the Ministry of Justice.
However, the Rutte I Cabinet fell after two years and, in 2012, the Liberal 
Party (VVD) and the Labour Party (PvdA) came together in a Purple Coalition of 
the Rutte II Cabinet. The tone on migration and integration issues in the mission 
statement of this new cabinet was much more moderate and the text much shorter 
than that of its predecessor of 2010. Nevertheless, the framing was not essentially 
different:
In the immigration and integration policy we opt for clear and strict require-
ments for newcomers, for example in the field of income and command of the 
Dutch language. All admissions procedures will be tightened, but the Nether-
lands continues to offer room for real refugees. An arrangement will be made 
for the group of children and young people who have been staying here for 
years. In this way we pursue a strict but fair immigration policy that takes into 
account the capacity (draagkracht) of our society.
(Regeringsverklaring 2012)
That the new Purple Coalition government did not, in essence, deviate from the 
existing policies becomes clear in the third version of the WIN Law on civic 
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integration of 2013 (proposed and defended by the Minister for Social Affairs and 
Employment of the Labour Party, Lodewijk Asscher). The stated aim of new law 
was ‘to reinforce the responsibility of the newcomer for his own civic integra-
tion . . . he should take the initiative . . . choose a course on the market and pay 
himself’. The main actors in the implementation were DUO (a state agency for 
loans to students and now also to immigrants to pay for their integration courses) 
and private educational entrepreneurs on the market who offered courses. Munici-
palities were only supposed to monitor and sanction new immigrants who did not 
live up to their obligations. The new law foresaw one central exam for all and 
shortened the period within which it had to be passed from 3.5 to 3 years. The 
sanctioning of noncompliance by fines (of 1,250 euros) was foreseen. Loans made 
by DUO to refugees were acquitted when the exam was passed in time.
It was during this period of the Purple Coalition (2012–2017) that all categories 
of immigrants (migration for labour, for study, for family reasons and for asy-
lum) increased, particularly in 2014–2016. Most of the attention went on asylum- 
seekers (the ‘EU asylum crisis’) although the labour and family categories each 
brought more newcomers to the Netherlands in these three years than the swell-
ing category of asylum- seekers. The ‘tightening of admission’ promised in the 
government statement of 2012 had obviously not been successful in restricting 
immigration.
In 2017, after national elections in which the Labour Party was decimated, a 
four- party centre- right coalition (VVD, CDA, D66 and CU) was formed in the 
Rutte III Cabinet. In its official statement, the new coalition committed itself to an 
‘effective and humane migration and civic integration policy’ that would ensure 
the efficient and fast reception and civic integration of newcomers on the one hand 
and the fast return of those who were not allowed to stay on the other (see Regeer-
akkoord 2017). The cabinet also considered it important that the root causes of 
refugee flows be tackled, that refugees be received in accordance with interna-
tional conventions and that irregular migration be counteracted.
The most concrete action of the Minister for Social Affairs and Employment, 
in the cabinet responsible for integration, was his efforts to make the Civic Inte-
gration Law of 2013 work. The (implementation of the) law had repeatedly been 
criticised in various evaluation reports (Algemene Rekenkamer 2017; Nationale 
Ombudsman 2018; Significant 2018). The shortcomings were many: the priva-
tisation of the civic integration courses, making it a market commodity that was 
difficult to control; the expectation that the unknowledgeable newcomer should 
choose an appropriate course in a market that is not transparent; the sidelining 
of municipalities as directors and monitors of reception and integration; and the 
resulting low percentage of newcomers who successfully completed their integra-
tion courses within the time allotted. The Minister for Social Affairs and Employ-
ment admitted that the 2013 WIN Law had not been successful and slightly refined 
it in 2017. Newcomers were now obliged to learn about core Dutch values and 
had to sign a declaration that they would uphold them.
More fundamentally, however, the minister announced, in July 2018, that a 
new civic integration law would be enacted in 2021 (EK 2017–2018, 34 584, 
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I). Important elements of the new law would be a better control of the market 
in course offerings, making the civic integration trajectory more individualised 
through Personal Integration and Participation Plans (PIP), the improvement 
of the connection between integration courses and employment, and the bring-
ing back of municipalities as directors and monitors of the civic integration of 
newcomers.
To sum up these developments in migration and integration policies in the 
period 2002–2018, we can see that the framing of immigration was stable over 
the whole period: as before, immigration was not wanted and should be restricted 
as much as possible. The seven Cabinets of this period all had the same message, 
albeit that the tone varied somewhat. In this light, it is remarkable that the prac-
tice of immigration varied significantly: it was effectively low, with negative net 
migration in 2003–2006, was back at the 2002 level in 2008 and started to grow 
from then on. In 2018, a net migration peak of 88,000 was reached.
Integration policy- making underwent a thorough reframing in the first period 
of 2002–2007: civic integration had become the main element of national policy- 
making – and in a very specific way. The courses that had been introduced in the 
late 1980s and 1990s as a toolkit offered to certain immigrants to facilitate their 
integration were now mandatory courses that aimed to also teach Dutch norms 
and values and (where possible, as in the case of family migration) to select those 
immigrants who were the most likely to integrate. In this new framing, the immi-
grants’ responsibility was enlarged: not only should the immigrant accept and 
adapt to the norms and values of Dutch society but the financial costs of immi-
gration in general and of integration courses specifically were also increasingly 
laid on his or her shoulders. This new framing became standard – i.e. it formed 
the starting point of both centre- right and centre- left coalitions in the period after 
2007. What made centre- left coalitions distinct from those of the centre- right was 
that the former brought other elements of integration to the table in addition to 
civic integration. This difference was consistently expressed in the institutional 
embedding of integration policies: centre- right coalitions always brought immi-
gration and integration together within one ministry (and under one minister), that 
of Justice (and Security). Centre- left coalitions (and the present coalition) wanted 
to keep immigration (preferably at the Ministry of Justice) separate, in principle, 
from integration by choosing the Ministries for Housing (2007–2010) or Social 
Affairs and Employment (2012–2017).
Conclusions
In this chapter we have seen how the immigration policies of the Netherlands are 
related to integration policies. We have examined immigration and integration 
policies and their changes in time at two levels: the framing and aims of poli-
cies as formulated in governmental documents and the embodiment of policies in 
regulations, organisations and budgets. Such an analysis leads us to distinguish 
five periods in the postwar Netherlands in which the relation between migration 
and integration was framed in different ways.
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A comparative analysis of these periods shows that the framing of immigra-
tion policies, on the one hand, was relatively consistent over time: the mantra in 
all five periods was ‘The Netherlands is not an immigration country’ and admis-
sion policies should be restrictive and selective for foreigners (newcomers from 
former colonial territories were selected on their citizenship and not defined as 
immigrants). The results of such policies and measures of restrictiveness, how-
ever, varied significantly: since the beginning of the 1960s there were consist-
ently positive net migration figures, with only two brief exceptions in 1966/67 and 
2003–2006. This contradiction between the aims of immigration policies and their 
outcomes made the Netherlands an ‘unwilling immigration country’, with 23 per 
cent of its population having a migration background – i.e. born or having parents 
born abroad – in 2018.
Integration policies, on the other hand, showed major frameshifts. In the first 
two periods (1945–1960 and 1960–1980) there were integration and absorption 
policies for newcomers from (ex- )colonies who were citizens but, for all other 
foreign newcomers, the non- integration and assumed temporariness of stay 
dominated policies. In the third period (1980–1994) the Ethnic Minorities Policy 
brought about a fundamental frameshift: for those newcomers – whether citizens 
or not – who had found a place in Dutch society but in the lower strata, a policy of 
structural integration and socio- cultural emancipation aimed to prevent the forma-
tion of an ethnic underclass and to bring about social mobility and societal accept-
ance. The next period of neoliberal citizenship policies (1994–2002) redefined 
integration and integration policies as offering opportunities to immigrants to pro-
mote their structural integration and adaptation to Dutch society – first and fore-
most as a duty for the immigrant. Finally, under conditions of hyper- politicisation, 
integration policies were increasingly narrowed down to mandatory civic integra-
tion courses to teach immigrants how to fit into Dutch society. On these courses 
they would learn about the language, structure, norms and values of their new 
society (and subscribe to the latter).
The relation between immigration and integration policies changed in each 
period. In the first two periods (1945–1980) the immigration of noncitizens was 
defined as temporary; thus, integration should be avoided and return promoted 
(when former colonial citizens came into the country, however, absorption and 
assimilation were the course of action). In the third period (1980–1994) the inte-
gration of those who had arrived in spite of restrictive immigration policies should 
be enhanced in order to avoid a permanent ethnic underclass in Dutch society. 
This new framing of integration in the Ethnic Minorities Policy did not, in princi-
ple, change the undesirability of immigration and the restrictiveness of immigra-
tion policies. However, in practice the new framing did change the practice for 
certain categories of immigrant – the importance given to the completeness of 
families for the integration trajectory was a particularly strong argument for more 
lenient family migration practices in the 1980s.
Since the early 1990s, the ‘failed integration of immigrants’ argument has been 
used to reinforce the restrictiveness of admission policies in general – it especially 
reversed the argument in favour of family migration in EMP policies into one 
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against it in integration policies of the 1990s. New family members and particu-
larly new marriage partners were now seen as hindrances to integration. Thus, 
family migration policies would became stricter in the fourth period (1994–2002).
Since 2002, a more systemic connection between immigration and integra-
tion has developed. Not only do policy memoranda explicitly address the need to 
restrict immigration in order not to endanger the ‘absorption capacity’ of Dutch 
society (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 2001) but tougher integration poli-
cies have also increasingly become a tool for restricting immigration. The new 
pre- and post- migration civic integration programmes described in this chapter 
have become a way for the Dutch government to promote the integration of new-
comers as well as to discourage further immigration. In so doing, they simultane-
ously function as a mechanism through which to select those migrants who could 
prove beneficial for the Dutch economy and society.
Notes
 1 I define the integration process as the two- sided settlement process of newcomers in 
a new society that has three dimensions in which they become (or not) an ‘accepted 
part of society’. The three dimensions can be studied separately: the legal/political 
dimension (which concerns the legal status of the migrant and access to political 
decision- making), the socio- economic dimension (which can be measured by equal 
opportunities and participation in hard sectors of work and income, housing, educa-
tion and health care) and the ethnic/cultural/religious dimension – where it concerns 
the (non- )acceptance of world views/religion, culture and ethno- cultural identity (see 
Penninx and Garcés- Mascareñas 2016: 14–19). Integration policies aim to steer the 
integration processes of immigrants towards an outcome desired and formulated by 
politics. In the analysis of the content of integration policies it is important to look at 
what they aim to achieve and what is done in each of these dimensions.
 2 For a more extensive treatment, see Penninx and Garcés- Mascareñas (2016: 11–30).
 3 For the most comprehensive analysis of framing and frameshifts in Dutch integration 
policies, see Scholten (2011).
 4 Some important historical overview studies using contemporary documents and 
sources for emigration in this period are: Beijer and Oudegeest (1952); Faassen (2014); 
Hofstede (1964); Lucassen and Lucassen (2018); Obdeijn and Schrover (2008). On 
immigration, see: Amersfoort (1971, 1982); Kraak et al. (1957); Smeets and Steijlen 
(2006); Surie (1971).
 5 ‘The Dutch government was of the opinion that the Indonesian Dutch, in view of the 
altered conditions, should desist and orient themselves to the new state of Indonesia’ 
(Amersfoort 1982: 83). See also Kraak et al. (1957).
 6 Important historical overview studies using contemporary documents and sources 
are Amersfoort (1971); Bartels (1989); Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken (1978); 
Smeets and Steijlen (2006).
 7 The term was coined by Groenendijk (1981).
 8 For a comprehensive account of labour migration in the Netherlands, 1945–2006, see 
Lange (2007).
 9 For a detailed analysis, see Amersfoort and Surie (1987) and Amersfoort and Niekerk 
(2006).
 10 The independence of Suriname was seen by many Dutch politicians as a means to stop 
immigration from the country. However, the approaching independence prompted a 
new wave of last- chance migration to the Netherlands.
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 11 For key texts on how ‘maintaining culture and identity’ should relate to ‘developing 
and adapting culture and identity to the new society’ see Ministerie van Binnenlandse 
Zaken (1981: 36 ff, 1983: 107 ff).
 12 These courses are known in Dutch as inburgeringscursussen. The word ‘inburgering’ 
contains the word ‘burger’ (meaning ‘citizen’); however, its denotation is not that of 
naturalisation (i.e. becoming a national citizen) as much as that of becoming a well- 
informed and active participant in society. That is why I prefer to use the term ‘civic 
integration courses’ rather than ‘citizenship programmes’.
 13 The meaning depends on the translation of the Dutch word ‘drama’ in the title of the 
article, ‘Het multiculturele drama’.
 14 Interview published in the newspaper De Volkskrant, 2 November 2001.
 15 See comments on the report of the Blok Commission in Parliament in TK (Lower 
House) 2003–2004, nr. 63, pp. 4093–4150 (6 April 2004).
 16 The Balkenende I Cabinet was a short- lived coalition of Christian Democrats, Liberals 
and the extreme- right LPF; LPF- member Nawijn was the Minister for Alien Affairs 
and Integration. The Balkenende II Cabinet, a coalition in which the LPF was substi-
tuted by the progressive liberals of D66 followed in 2003. VVD- member Rita Verdonk 
became Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration (until 2007).
 17 That responsibility also had its financial aspects: all costs of admission and immigra-
tion for the state should be borne by the immigrants themselves. This principle was 
introduced – without much debate – following implementation of New Style integra-
tion policy. Immigrants had to pay sums of money for visas and residence permits – as 
well as their renewal – that were previously unheard of.
 18 The principles of the new policies are formulated and developed in the policy docu-
ments the Hoofdlijnenakkoord Balkenende II of 16 May 2003 (TK 2002–2003, 03 
28637, No. 19) and the Contourennota Herziening van het Inburgeringsstelsel (TK 
2003–2004, 29543, No. 1).
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7 The ‘housebroken’ far- right 
parties and the showdown 
in Danish migration and 
integration policies
Shahamak Rezaei and Marco Goli
Introduction
Therefore, I say to the Danish People’s Party (DP): No matter how many efforts 
you make – in my eyes – housebroken, you never will become.
(Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, Opening debate in the Danish 
Parliament, 7 October 1999)
Migration and integration policies in Denmark have been linked not only with 
one another but also, increasingly, with many other policy areas. The conflict on 
whether migration management and integration policies have been a success seems 
to be settled. These policies are widely considered to be failures as far as migrants 
of and descendants from non- Western countries – notably Muslim immigrants – 
are concerned. Nevertheless, the debate continues between competing political and 
societal actors, all seeking support from ‘objective’ observations – i.e. statistical 
‘evidence’. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the dominant interpretation 
(of the results of previous migration management and integration policies) has 
influenced a wide range of policy areas. This is specifically the case with regard 
to reforms in the field of labour- market, social and welfare policies and educa-
tion. These policy areas have undergone tremendous, even fundamental, changes 
which, in academic and political circles, are usually addressed as the institutionali-
sation of a dominant ‘neoliberal’ discourse (Torfing 2003). The two most obvious 
impacts of the development of migration and integration policies on development 
in other areas are election outcomes and the move from a universal to a particular 
welfare state:
• Election outcomes – changes in public opinion have been decisive with regard 
to who, among the competing political parties and coalitions, has actually 
succeeded in taking over governmental power. Typically, migration manage-
ment and integration policy has been one of the very top issues in political 
debates prior to national elections for decades. On the other hand, the voters’ 
evaluation of the outcomes of the practices and priorities of parties in govern-
ment within migration management and integration has been decisive on the 
issue of whether or not to let them continue to run the country.
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• From universal to particular welfare state – the ‘objective facts’ and sub-
jective attitudes have contributed to pushing fundamental changes through 
in migration management policies themselves. Paradoxically, these changes 
quite often had consequences for natives, too, of which reforms in social 
citizenship (i.e. conditions that are to be met in order to be entitled to and 
eligible for certain social benefits and rights – reform of the cash aid system 
being the most discussed and contested) are only one. With Denmark being 
a universal welfare state par excellence over many years, a number of policy 
reforms, specifically within the field of welfare policy – i.e. the redistribution 
of wealth and social rights – have been introduced, with the status and atti-
tudes of migrants from non- Western countries being the implicit and recently 
quite outspoken legitimation when arguing that the ‘sustainability of the uni-
versal welfare state’ is at stake. This is despite the fact that the principles on 
which the ‘universal’ welfare state is built and developed exclude a focus on 
ethnicity, religious or national background as criteria for inclusion. On the 
other hand, the proclaimed goals and widely shared premises, when arguing 
for the necessity of such policy changes, have been a reduction in both the 
number and the rights of migrants from non- Western countries.
Reforms in labour- market, social and welfare policies are not the only manifest 
indications of how a (supposed) failure in migration management and integration 
policies has contributed to societal changes in recent years. Many other areas have 
been influential, including cultural policies, national- identity discourses, crime 
management, housing and reforms in the education system etc. It seems that the 
right- wing parties have managed to bring about answers to what are publicly and 
increasingly perceived as major challenges to both current and future society. 
Mainstream parties had not been able to sufficiently address the challenges but, 
over the last few decades, have been remarkably successful at adopting definitions 
and solutions to the problem that have been introduced by ‘so- called’ radical- 
wing parties.
The aim of this chapter is to provide an understanding of how perspectives 
on migration and integration which, a few decades ago, were considered to be 
‘radically right’, are a today mainstream policy in Denmark. First, we explain 
the categories in use in the Danish debate on migration management and inte-
gration policy. Second, we elaborate on the historical responses to challenges of 
immigration and integration. A description of the current results of integration 
policies follows, where we focus exclusively on non- Western migrants and their 
descendants, particularly on their records within certain spheres of citizenship. 
This description will be followed by elaborations on the impact of EU enlarge-
ment and the similarities and differences between two periods – the early 1970s, 
when the first non- Western migrants came to Denmark and this last decade, when 
labour from Eastern European member- countries of the EU found their way to 
Denmark. This discussion will be followed by an elaboration on the very recent 
changes in the Danish policy within migration management and integration. The 
concluding part will present future perspectives on Danish migration management 
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and integration and why the radical right’s framing of the challenges and solutions 
seems to be durable.
Core definitions of categories
In order to grasp the complexities of integration and migration issues in the Dan-
ish context and their overwhelming impact on other areas of policy, it is essential 
to start by clarifying the definitions of categories established in public debates, 
academic research and political discourses. According to the ‘Integration Barom-
eter’ (Udlændinge- og Integrationsministeriet 2019) we usually use the following 
categories of migrant in Denmark:
• migrants from Western countries, which includes migrants and their descend-
ants from Nordic countries, EU countries, Switzerland, Canada, the USA, 
Australia and New Zealand,
• migrants from non- Western countries, which includes migrants and their 
descendants from all other countries.
Apart from this, statistical definitions also shed light on / operationalise the con-
tent and connotation of the following core concepts:
• An immigrant is a person born outside Denmark, with neither parent being 
both a Danish citizen and born in Denmark.
• A descendant is a person who is born in Denmark, with neither parent being 
both a Danish citizen and born in Denmark.
In Danish migration research, a core distinction has been established between 
migration policy and integration policy. Migration policy is defined as politics and 
legislation (and processes and outcomes) that relate to the actual process of immi-
gration to the country. Integration policy, on the other hand, is understood as policy 
[processes and political outcomes, legislation or lack of the same] that concerns 
residents from countries other than the Nordic, EU and North America, i.e. persons 
from the so- called third countries. Here, third countries are defined as countries with 
social, economic and cultural conditions that are very different from our own, as 
immigrants from the Nordic countries, the EU and from North America are largely 
expected to manage themselves (Goli 2002; Bøgelund Nielsen 1984). The purpose 
of migration policy is to either tighten or liberalise rules on travel and residence 
permits for foreign nationals, while the purpose of integration policy in Denmark 
is to do something special for those who have difficulty in the integration process, 
in order to prevent them from developing into a minority group which could be, at 
worst, in opposition to society (Bøgelund Nielsen 1984).
The history of immigration and immigration law
On 1 January 2018, Denmark had 5,781,000 inhabitants, a figure which included 
approximately 592,000 immigrants and 179,000 descendants of immigrants. 
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Among them, about two- thirds were immigrants and descendants from non- Western 
countries, who thus constituted 8.6 per cent of the population. About 60 per cent 
of them had their origins in the following nine countries: Turkey (12.6 per cent – 
60,000 persons), Syria (8.2–40,978 persons), Iraq (6.5–32,494 persons), Lebanon 
(5.4), Pakistan (5.4), Bosnia and Herzegovina (4.6), Somalia (4.3), Iran (4.2) and 
Afghanistan (3.7 per cent) (Udlændinge- og Integrationsministeriet 2018). Among 
those from Western countries, the number of immigrants was much higher than 
for their descendants. Their net immigration increased dramatically in the years 
2007–2017, with the largest flow coming from Romania. Together, immigrants 
and their descendants constituted slightly more than 13 per cent of the residents of 
Denmark in 2018. This is a tremendous demographic change for a society which, 
until the late 1960s, was ethnically quite homogeneous. As late as 1980, the coun-
try had only 3 per cent of immigrants and their descendants among its population 
(Udlændinge- og Integrationsministeriet 2019). It is crucial to understand how this 
change was brought about and why many in Denmark do not wish this develop-
ment to continue.
The beginning of its transition from a fairly homogenous Denmark to the con-
temporary multi- ethnic state it is now is explained partly by the Danish industry’s 
need for labour in the 1960s and partly by refugee flows in subsequent decades. 
In 1967, the first foreign workers – known as guestworkers – arrived from Tur-
key, Pakistan and (the former) Yugoslavia. The catalyst and main external cause 
of the guestworkers’ arrival in Denmark was the temporary economic downturn 
in Germany after a long period of growth and increasing needs (Hjarnø 1983). 
This temporary downturn meant that Turkish guestworkers, in particular, spon-
taneously ventured north. The internal factor which legitimised the import of 
foreign labour to Denmark was the boom in the Danish economy, which lasted 
until 1973 and which brought infra  structural changes, a rapidly growing uni-
versal welfare state, the expansion and proliferation of long term education and 
shifts in the attitude of the new generation to the labour market (Albæk et al. 
1992). It was widely believed that the increased demand for labour in certain 
parts of the industry could not be met by the domestic workforce alone (Würtz 
Sørensen 1988b). The lack of domestic labour was significant, especially in the 
manufacturing industry and in unskilled and low- paid work. If the industry’s 
need for labour was not covered in the short and long term, labour shortages were 
likely to give employees incentives to demand wage increases, leading to supply- 
and- demand- driven inflation, with a subsequent deterioration in competitiveness 
(Albæk et al. 1992).
Six years later, in November 1973, due to the rise in unemployment, the gov-
ernment, trade unions and employers’ organisations agreed to immediately stop 
the immigration of guestworkers. However, the flow of refugees (from Vietnam, 
Chile and, later, Iran, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Somalia, Iraq, Syria etc.), together 
with the internationally guaranteed right to family reunion, contributed to the 
growing number of refugees and migrants in Denmark.
The first Migration Act in Denmark was introduced in 1983. It was described 
by some as the world’s most liberal immigration law and one of its most humani-
tarian asylum policies. Critics who, back then, were labelled as radical right 
110 Shahamak Rezaei and Marco Goli
(almost racist) by dominant mainstream parties, pointed out that it was too easy to 
enter the country. In the following years, the immigration and asylum policy was 
tightened – the first time in 1992 – and reformed several times after 2002, when 
the liberal- conservative government, together with the Danish People’s Party, 
tightened the rules on family reunification.
The history of policy results, migration management and 
integration policy
With regard to demographic and socio- economic composition, there are cer-
tain interesting differences when comparing native Danes, on the one hand, and 
the population of immigrants and descendants, particularly non- Western immi-
grants and their descendants on the other. The latter have an age distribution 
that differs significantly from the rest of the population. There is a much larger 
proportion of children and young people. Only 7 per cent of the non- Western 
immigrants are more than 65 years old compared to 21 per cent of the native 
Danes. Among their descendants, there is an even bigger proportion of children 
and young people – 80 per cent of them are under the age of 25. This implies 
an overwhelming share of children and young people among the non- Western 
immigrants and their descendants (Udlændinge- og Integrationsministeriet 
2018). The group of immigrants – of both Western and non- Western origin – is 
mainly composed of persons of working age, i.e. 16 to 64 years – 82.9 per cent 
of immigrants of Western origin and 85.3 per cent of non- Western origin are 
aged 16–64.
Participation in the education system
A look at the most recent data on immigrants’ and their descendants’ participation 
in the Danish education system reveals that 79 per cent of 16- to 19- year- olds 
of non- Western origin are in education. For the same age group of Danish ori-
gin the figure is slightly below 83 per cent. Of the female 16- to 19- year- old 
descendants of non- Western origin, 69.5 per cent are studying at college or are 
in vocational or higher education – a figure which is slightly higher than the cor-
responding proportion for women of Danish origin (65.4 per cent). This means 
that, in the near future, the Danish labour market will receive many applications 
for skilled positions from non- Western migrants and their descendants (Tal og 
Fakta 2019).
Labour- market attachment
There are currently 3.6 million persons in Denmark in the occupationally active 
age range – i.e. individuals between the ages of 16 and 64 years. On average, 7 out 
of 10 people (72.8 per cent) are employed. This corresponds to about 2.6 million 
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people. The employment rate among male and female non- Western immigrants 
aged 25 to 64 years is 58 per cent and, for corresponding female non- Western 
immigrants, only 47 per cent in 2016. The difference between the employment 
rate for 25–64- year- old native women and immigrant women of non- Western 
origin was 30 per cent in 2016, which was perceived as disastrous. The most 
significant differences in the employment rate are found among women aged 
50–59, where the difference between native women and immigrant women of 
non- Western origin is 39 per cent. The corresponding difference between native 
men and immigrant men of non- Western origin in the same age range is 34 per 
cent. The smallest gap in the employment rate between persons of Danish and 
those of non- Western origin, respectively, is observed among men aged 16–24 
which, all other things being equal, should be considered good news for future 
development.
Welfare
Non- Western immigrants and their descendants are over- represented among 
the recipients of unemployment ‘cash aid’ (those with insufficient employment 
records to get unemployment benefits) – 19 per cent are non- Western immigrants. 
Male and female immigrants from Syria, Somalia, Lebanon and Iraq have the 
highest rates of persons receiving cash aid – for the women in this category, seven 
out of ten are on public support in general.
Self- employment
Immigrants – and especially non- Western males – are significantly over- represented 
among the self- employed. Non- Western immigrants are also over- represented at 
the bottom of the job hierarchy (‘other employees’) and under- represented at the 
top of the job hierarchy (‘senior executives and employees at the highest level’ 
and ‘middle- level wage earners’). For Western immigrants, the picture is slightly 
different. They are also over- represented at the bottom of the job hierarchy but, 
unlike non- Western immigrants, have almost the same percentage of positions at 
the top of the job hierarchy as the Danes.
Citizenship
With regards to citizenship, the data (Udlændinge- Og integrationsministeriet 
2019) reveal that around 35 per cent of immigrants and their descendants 
have Danish citizenship, with the descendants of migrants of non- Western 
origin demonstrating the highest rate (73.4 per cent). Immigrants of Western 
origin do not seem eager to apply for Danish citizenship, as only 13 per cent 
have it.
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Expenditure
According to a recent estimation, non- Western immigrants and their descend-
ants cost Danish society 4 billion euros in 2016. The calculations include some 
719,000 people’s imprints on government finances, in terms of what this group 
contributes to the community in the form of tax revenue and what they cost the 
state in spending on, for example, transfer income, education, the judicial system 
and health care (Funding 2019). Criticising the calculation, a member of the Dan-
ish Social- Liberal Party stated:
We are a bit critical of the calculation because a lot of immigrants and their 
descendants are children and young people. Children and young people are, 
by definition, a cost but, if they do well in the education system, they will 
later become a benefit.
(Waarsøe and Funding 2019: 1, Authors’ translation)
Public opinion, the position of trade unions and political 
developments
Since the very beginning – the late 1960s and early 1970s – both the integra-
tion and migration problems, challenges or, as they recently have been framed, 
threats, implicitly (and over recent years increasingly outspoken) refer, quite often 
exclusively, to the category of immigrants and descendants from non- Western 
countries. Similarly, public opinion and mainstream discourses depart from and 
continuously highlight that this category and, to be more accurate, a particular 
substratum of this category – i.e. immigrants and descendants from Muslim 
countries – not only face the greatest integration challenges in terms of unemploy-
ment but also oppose Danish discourses of integration, which have shifted from 
integration in the labour market as the criterion for success, to cultural integration 
or assimilation and societal cohesion. They are portrayed as those who set up ‘par-
allel societies’, in competition with and even hostile to the norms of mainstream 
Western, Nordic society.
Initially, back in the 1960s, it was widely believed that there was no planned large- 
scale import of labour. The widespread perception at the time was that the guest-
workers had appeared more or less spontaneously on the Danish business landscape 
and that they would disappear again as soon as the industry no longer needed them 
(Würtz Sørensen 1988d). However, they stayed and they grew in number. In order to 
find out how and why, we have to look at the attitudes of the stakeholders involved.
For the trade unions, the guestworkers were uninvited/unwelcomed. However, 
from the perspective of employers and the government, they were considered to 
be highly welcome guests (Hjarnø 1983; Würtz Sørensen 1988c). As far as the 
general population’s attitudes towards foreign workers were concerned, opinion 
polls back then showed clearly that, regardless of the economic situation, the Dan-
ish population had not at any time been predominantly positive in relation to the 
import of foreign labour. Their concerns in many ways resembled attitudes today 
(Würtz Sørensen 1988a; Togeby 1996, 1997) (Figure 7.1).
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There was a variety of arguments for and against the import of foreign labour. 
Employer organisations’ arguments for importing labour were:
• a better utilisation of the capital stock of labour- intensive companies,
• an increase in production,
• a reduction in wage levels with consequent greater competitiveness, and
• foreign workers would not compete with Danish workers, as foreigners would 
have to go home or be fired as soon as the demand for their labour ceased.
Speculation on the consequences of the liberal migration regime and, later, the 
humanitarian asylum policies for social and cultural cohesion in Denmark is not 
a new phenomenon. There had already been concern in the early 1970s that the 
immigration of foreign labour would have an impact on future society, not least in 
terms of demographic challenges. For example, Kaj Westergaard wrote: ‘Denmark 
is an extremely homogeneous country without ethnic or religious minority groups 
of importance’ (cited in Hjarnø 1983: 13). Some of the problems that had already 
arisen in the early stages were explained by reference to culture, where the Danes 
met ‘new neighbors with miserable housing conditions and with quite deviant – 
and far more demanding – lives, including in particular poor wages and bad labour 
conditions in general’ (Hjarnø 1983: 15). So which externalities are linked to the 
use of foreign labour? Westergaard presented (Hjarnø 1983: 16) a cost- benefit anal-
ysis. The costs included increased investment in jobs in the public sector, housing 
costs, education and social rights, and the export of income and savings. The ben-
efits mentioned were the excess capital of the capital stock, the reduction of infla-





Immigrants from non-Western countries
Figure 7.1  The positioning of the import of labour from abroad in the early 1970s
Source: developed on the basis of Goli (2002)
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acute bottlenecks in production (immigrants were single, young and mobile males) 
and the fact that foreign workers increased the proportion of the active population 
and filled gaps in production. The latter could, according to Westergaard (Hjarnø 
1983) generate a domino reaction – i.e. the cultivation of Danish labour. However, 
the interests of the employers, the foreign labour and the government converged, 
while the interests of the Danish trade unions were the complete opposite.
The dilemma of the trade unions
Already in 1967, the National Umbrella Union’s Chairman stated that it was neces-
sary to ensure that foreign labour did not erode domestic workers’ wage- bargaining 
position. The trade union’s attitude at the beginning of this period was character-
ised by a dilemma between three concerns, respectively for domestic workers 
(native Danes) and their members; for solidarity with foreign comrades; and for 
national economic growth and competitiveness. These concerns were mutually 
incompatible. The dilemma was reinforced by the fact that the import of unskilled 
foreign labour particularly out- competed the unskilled among the domestic labour 
forces – i.e. the weakest among Danish workers. Next, the trade unions had both 
implicit and explicit co- responsibility for the improvement of Danish industry’s 
competitiveness, as industry, the government and the employer organisation 
argued on numerous occasions. Traces the history of the trade union’s dilemma 
back to 1905 and 1907 – to two international congresses held in Amsterdam and 
Stuttgart respectively. Here, social- democratic parties were confronted with pro-
posals to oppose any kind of importation of contract workers, among other things, 
by demanding control over labour imports, wages and working hours, demands 
for payment for travel, acceptable housing conditions, the training of immigrant 
workers and, finally, ensuring that foreign workers were not recruited if domestic 
labour were available (Hjarnø 1983). The so- called Polakker- Lov (Polish Act on 
the Use of Foreign Workers of 1908) was an expression of this endeavour: prior 
to this law, claims were made especially from the Social Democracy, but also by 
the Catholic Church and by employers. The employers’ interest in protecting the 
Polish immigrants was to avoid that Denmark gets a bad reputation causing dif-
ficulties in recruiting necessary people (Nelleman 1973).
The trade unions, therefore, had to learn to master the art of balancing and rec-
onciling the interests of domestic workers, the concern for the national competi-
tiveness and the long- praised tradition of solidarity with the international working 
class. Opposing ‘the massive deprivation among, and exploitation of foreign/
guest workers’, reported repeatedly in the press (Würtz Sørensen 1988a) came to 
be the key word and strategy in the trade unions’ efforts to curb the influx of for-
eign labour – in the report ‘Same Terms’ (Andersen 1970) these arguments were 
formally formulated.
Same terms (Samme Vilkår)
The trade unions had already managed to make provisions that foreign work-
ers should be registered, that they should be contributing members of a sickness 
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and unemployment fund and that employers should be obliged to pay wages in 
accordance with the level agreed upon through collective agreements. Würtz 
Sørensen argues (1988d) that, in the middle of the 1970s, the trade unions were 
in favour of a temporary halt, and they managed to convince the public through 
massive campaigns and activism. Gallup and Observa, two leading quantitative 
research institutes, showed in surveys studies in 1969 and 1970 that a majority of 
the population opposed the continued import of foreign workers and 80 per cent 
believed that foreign workers should be subjected to the ‘Same Terms’ (Andersen 
1970) – i.e. to equal treatment.
The trade union’s slogan ‘Same Terms’ was then supported by concrete propos-
als for solving problems regarding the foreign workers’ wage, housing, employ-
ment, occupational and leisure conditions and contracts with their employers. 
By the end of 1973 and as a consequence of the international oil crisis and the 
following recession, the great majority of guestworkers were fired, in accord-
ance with the theoretical propositions of the ‘dual market theory’ (Rezaei 2004), 
which indicated that the last to be hired would be the first fired; they were equal 
in almost every way with domestic workers but had lost their competitiveness, 
which mainly was limited to their being cheaper for the employers (they did 
not require the same wage) and to their being satisfied with working conditions 
which were much below the standard. Their competitive advantage was eroded 
systematically through ‘Same Terms’. In the following years they changed their 
status from guest- and foreign workers and immigrants to ‘ethnic minorities’ and 
the construction of ethnicity, cultural differences and multiculturalism began to 
develop.
The construction of ethnicity in Denmark
Designations such as ‘foreigner’, ‘foreign/guestworker’ or ‘immigrant’ were 
common concepts in political and public debate and common denominations in 
parliamentary debates right up to the 1990s. Academic research on the issues of 
both migration and integration in Denmark which, according to Schierup (1993) 
has, due to its emancipatory and critical approach, always been involved as a 
stakeholder and not just a neutral observer or provider of objectively reliable data, 
was already, from the beginning, somewhat occupied with the construction of 
‘ethnicity’ and the term ‘ethnic minorities’.
Over the following years, particularly in the 1990s, the concept of ethnicity 
and ethnic categorisation became popularised in Denmark, with a stigmatising 
and social labelling bias. In public and political debate as well as in academic 
research the concept of ethnicity, most usually with a negative connotation, refers 
exclusively to migrants and descendants of non- Western origins. It is, in Denmark 
as well as in other Scandinavian countries, appropriate to address and approach 
individuals with, inter alia, a Turkish, Pakistani or Somali background, as mem-
bers of ethnic minorities but it would be inappropriate, even surprising, to address 
and approach in the same manner a person, for instance, from EU countries such 
as Poland, Spain, France etc. – in other words, practically anyone who is a white- 
blonde ‘ethnic’. The latter have national backgrounds while the first group are 
116 Shahamak Rezaei and Marco Goli
supposed to have ethnic backgrounds. ‘Ethnic’ in the Danish context means devi-




The number of ‘non- ethnics’ has grown rapidly in recent years. In 2011, 52,979 
individuals received a residence permit on various grounds in Denmark – the 
lowest number over the last ten years. The number of residence permits issued 
peaked in 2015 at 84,693. It is noteworthy that the group of refugees who have 
been granted asylum in Denmark, despite the much greater political and public 
attention, represents a quite tiny proportion of the total immigration to the coun-
try. Refugees and family reunion together make up less than 3.5 per cent of all 
types of immigrant who went to Denmark in 2018. In comparison, just over half 
of the people who received a residence permit in Denmark in the same year were 
holders of an EU- country passport.
In 2018, 139,854 individuals from EU countries other than the Nordic ones 
resided in Denmark (Videbæk and Gyldenkærne 2019). Earlier, the number was 
99,809 people, which corresponds to an increase of about 40 per cent in four 
years. Looking at the development of net immigration by origin from 2007 to 
2017, national statistical data reveal that the net immigration of people of Western 
origin has been increasing dramatically; the total net immigration in 2017 was 
25,000 individuals, divided into almost 12,000 non- Westerns, 11,300 Westerns 
and around 1,500 Danes. The net immigration from non- Western countries fell 
from just under 25,300 in 2015 to just under 12,000 in 2017, mainly due to the 
decline in the number of refugees and family- reunion migrants going to Denmark. 
The largest immigration country in 2017 was Romania, with a total net immigra-
tion of just over 2,000.
An identical game, played differently
A quite similar, in fact almost identical, scenario, although with a few still domi-
nant differences, has been observed since the eastward enlargement of the EU 
(Figure 7.2).
In public opinion, migrants from EU countries are not very different to native 
Danes with regard to cultural norms. Their social identity is not portrayed as devi-
ant in any way. Quite the contrary, they have a positive image in public opinion. 
Denmark being a member of the EU, no official or semi- official persons (from 
unions, NGOs etc.) or political parties in the country are allowed to mount moral- 
panic campaigns against migrants from Poland or Romania. Due to their supposed 
considerable similarities with regard to cultural preferences, migrants from EU 
countries are expected to adopt to Danish norms quite quickly, too.
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Monika, from Poland, is a good example. She went to Denmark from Poland 
for the first time following the eastward enlargement of the EU in 2004. Back 
then, Monika picked berries and cut trees in a small town in the Zealand region of 
Denmark. Illustrating why labour from Eastern European EU member countries 
seek to migrate west (to Denmark), Monika stated, in appreciation of the Danish 
labour market culture, ‘Here in Denmark I can talk and drink coffee with my boss. 
In Poland you just have to work, work and work, and there is a big difference 
between employees and bosses’ (Videnbæk and Gyldenkærne 2019).
Unlike many migrants from non- Western countries who migrate to Denmark 
under the family reunion act and all refugees who, by definition, do not go to 
Denmark with the particular aim of seeking a job, EU migrants’ primary moti-
vation for travelling to Denmark is to work. Many of them do not even wish to 
stay in Denmark if they do not find a job – which is in itself unusual, as they 
typically have a contract with an employer in their own home country or with 
an employer in Denmark, prior to arrival. The free movement of EU citizens, an 
established framework in which every issue related to the residence and work 
and rights of EU members should be addressed, indicates that, as an EU citizen, 
an individual has the right to seek work in another EU country and to work 
without a permit: to stay there while they work, to stay there even when their 
employment contract ends and to be treated equally with the country’s own 
citizens with regard to access to work, working conditions and all other social 





Immigrants from The EU
Figure 7.2  The positioning of the import of labour from abroad in 2019 – An identical 
game, played differently
Source: developed on the basis of Goli (2002)
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For the first five years, Monika travelled back to Poland when there was no 
work; however, she then landed a permanent job with a local firm. She decided 
to stay:
I am happy to work with Danes, and I would like to stay here, because I love 
this country. . . . It is important to us that it is stable here. And that one does 
not need to worry. . . . Another advantage is the culture of the labour market. 
EU migrants are easy to integrate linguistically, as well as with regard to 
culture and norms.
The same attitude is expressed by ‘Dansk Byggeri’, a Danish organisation which 
represents companies in the building and construction sector (Videbæk and 
Gyldenkærne 2019).
There is also widespread recognition of EU migrants’ contribution to the Dan-
ish economy, as stated by Steen Nielsen, head of labour market policy for Danish 
Industry in 2018:
In fact, a very large part of the job progress and growth we have had in Den-
mark in recent years is because we have received more foreign employees.
‘It does not take long, on arrival in Denmark, for a person from Poland to integrate 
into Danish norms and contribute to the Danish labor market’, says director Lars 
Storr- Hansen (Videbæk and Gyldenkærne 2019). Both Danish construction and 
Danish industry express satisfaction with and welcome (EU) workers who wish 
to stay permanently. The reason?
This means that Danish companies can grow big and strong. . . . Many compa-
nies are very dependent on their foreign employees and they would have dif-
ficulty coping with challenges and increasing demand without those worker.
(Videbæk and Gyldenkærne 2019)
As mentioned before, issues concerning EU citizens are addressed within well- 
established EU law and represent mutual benefits – a principal of reciprocity, as 
the same goes for Danes who might wish to settle or work in other EU countries. 
However, this is not the only difference. What is probably even more important, at 
least with regard to public discourse on migrants and integration, is the question of 
their cultural integration. EU migrants do not represent any significant ‘otherness’, 
cultural deviance, cultural challenges or clashes of art. They do not demand the 
protection of their collective cultural rights, as has been reported in many cases with 
regard to ‘non- Western migrants and their descendants’, a category which, when 
addressing cultural differences, exclusively refers to migrants and their descend-
ant with a Muslim background. Another aspect that should be mentioned is that 
EU migrants and their descendants do not deviate from everyday norms of behav-
iour. It is probably unpleasant to mention, although still very crucial, that migrants 
from EU countries, unlike non- Western migrants and their descendants, are not 
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visible minorities. By the same reasoning, EU migrants do not experience or invoke 
tribal stigmatisation, which can be a devastating experience for many non- Western 
migrants and their descendants, who might feeling that their belonging to the 
national community, despite having been born in the host country, is implicitly and 
occasionally explicitly questioned based purely on their physical appearance. They 
represent ‘the stranger’ (Wolff 1950). The status of a stranger shapes the everyday 
life experiences of belonging to the national community and the demarcation of 
‘us’ and ‘the others’. When approaching a person who does not look ‘Danish’ – for 
instance, someone whose phenotype is African or Middle Eastern – there are still 
Danes who speak English to them or ask them if they speak Danish. They cannot 
know that the person was born in the country. When approaching a person from 
Poland, Romania or Ukraine, they start speaking Danish to them, sometimes only to 
find out that they have only been in the country a single day (Goli 2002).
The migration paradigm shift and the elections of 2019
By 1 March 2019, three months prior to the national elections, a new act was put in 
operation – ‘The Paradigm Shift in Danish Integration Policy’ (Ingvorsen 2019) – 
which contains major institutional and discursive revisions of the Aliens Act, the 
Integration Act and municipal and regional electoral law. The new act covers poli-
cies within the field of integration as well as migration management, particularly 
the elements of migration that concern refugees and migrants from non- Western 
countries. The act is, in many ways, the culmination of an ongoing showdown 
with the dominant premise from which Danish migration and integration policies 
have departed over the years. Included in the new act are three provisions:
1 Residence permits for refugees, in future, will only be temporary. The resi-
dence permit for refugees and family reunion will be withdrawn or exempted 
where possible, unless it is in direct conflict with Denmark’s international 
obligations. Refugees must be returned to their home countries whenever 
possible. In the future, it will also be possible to set a limit on the number of 
family reunions. In such cases, the limit can be set from month to month.
2 The name of the ‘integration benefit’ that refugees have received has changed 
to that of ‘self- support’ or ‘repatriation’ – i.e. deportation. If an individual has 
legally resided in the kingdom (Denmark, the Faroe Islands or Greenland) 
for a total of at least nine years within the previous ten years and met the 
employment requirement, he or she can get cash or educational assistance 
if needed. Integration benefit is a substitute for those who do not meet the 
requirement to be entitled to ‘cash assistance’ – i.e. persons who have stayed 
in the kingdom for a short time can get integration benefit. The term ‘return 
assistance’ or repatriation aid is chosen to emphasise that residence permits 
are temporary. With the term ‘self- support’, the act seeks to ensure that refu-
gees take responsibility for their own integration. At the same time, the ben-
efit is reduced by 250 euros a month (which is a considerable amount/share 
of money for individuals at the absolute lowest end of the income hierarchy).
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3 The legal residence period required before a foreigner may vote or be elected 
to local government has been extended from three to four years.
The so- called Paradigm Shift was an absolute requirement of the Danish People’s 
Party prior to negotiations on the budget act with the government. Explaining why 
the act is called a ‘paradigm shift’, PM Peter Skaarup, one of the most prominent 
members of the Danish People’s Party, stated: ‘This means that we turn the whole 
policy in this area upside down from today, from being about integration, to being 
about repatriation’. The Paradigm Shift was supported by the Social Democrats, 
the party that came to power after the June 2019 election. During the election 
campaign, the leader of the Social Democrats stated repeatedly that she would 
give up the wish to become the prime minister of Denmark if she was unable to 
tighten the migration and integration policies. Emphasising and celebrating the 
contribution of the Danish People’s Party to the tremendous tightening of the 
migration and integrations policies prior to the June election, Martin Henriksen, 
a prominent member of the party, listed 144 austerity measures in the policies. 
These include:
• border control,
• the limitation of freedom of belief for the purpose of affecting political Islam,
• the prohibition of wearing the burka in public spaces,
• an emergency brake that would allow asylum- seekers to be rejected at the 
border,
• the criminalisation of homeless/Roma camps,
• the encouragement of voluntary return/repatriation,
• annual calculations of immigration costs,
• the restriction of the number of English- language students at business 
academies,
• the introduction of the need to demonstrate at least 225 hours of paid work as 
a requirement for receiving cash aid,
• the introduction of a limit on total cash aid from governmental offices and 
agencies,
• the abolition of access for refugees to include residence time in the country of 
origin when calculating national pensions,
• a stronger monitoring and supervision of Muslim free schools; and
• the abolition of the Green Card scheme etc. (Henriksen 2019).
After the power takeover, no considerable reforms of migration and integration pol-
icies have been introduced by the Social Democrats. However, there is no doubt that 
discourses that were considered ‘radical right’ are today established as mainstream.
Further steps to the right
While the DP has become a mainstream party involved in policy- making within all 
areas, two new parties – the New Right and Hard Line – focus almost exclusively 
on migration and integration. The public and the media perceive them as being 
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at the very far right end of the political scale as they do not find policy reforms 
like the Paradigm Shift and 144 austerity measures either substantial or efficient 
enough to safeguard the future cohesion of society. During the June 2019 elec-
tions, the New Right introduced a set of ‘non- negotiables’ under the heading ‘A 
fair migration policy’. The main principles of this policy include the requirements 
that asylum be stopped completely, that foreigners must support themselves, that 
integration must be a personal responsibility and not a public task, that criminal 
aliens should be deported after the first sentence, that becoming a Danish national 
should require assimilation and, finally, that international conventions that stand 
in the way should be terminated.
The other party, Hard Line – even more radical – take it further to the right (Stram 
Kurs 2019). Their agenda is an uncompromised and complete showdown with 
migration and integration from (explicitly emphasised) Muslim countries. The 
party considers ‘Muslim migrants and their descendants’ as a ‘non- integratable’ 
population and has portrayed them actively throughout their campaign as not only 
culturally incompatible and deviant but hostile to Western/Danish culture. They 
actively question Muslim migrants’ substantial loyalty to the nation- state and 
Western and Danish traditions, lifestyle, values, priorities etc. and see them as a 
growing demographic threat to the very existence of the nation. Muslim migrants 
are portrayed by Hard Line as invaders, a ticking time bomb. Throughout the 
recent elections, the party pushed for a complete showdown through some very 
confrontational street- level campaigns12 that repeatedly put them on the front 
pages of all the media.
Hard Line’s party policies are categorised under two pillars – the Identity Pil-
lar and the Libertarian Pillar. ‘Identity politics’ focuses, according to the party, 
on Danes as an ethnic, cultural, religious, linguistic and normative commu-
nity. Policies departing from this pillar relate to actions that will maintain and 
improve national homogeneity. The key terms are ‘community affiliation’ and 
‘ethno- nationalistic cohesion’. The vast majority of residents in Denmark, again 
according to the party, must be Danes who ethnically, linguistically, religiously, 
culturally and normatively profess the same or related values:
• Hard Line does not recognise that Denmark must process applications for 
asylum from any person who is not a native citizen from one of Denmark’s 
neighbouring countries.
• Denmark must withdraw from international conventions governing refugees.
• Denmark must expel any non- Western person who is not a Danish citizen. No 
‘non- Western’ persons’ temporary residence permit should be renewed.
• foreigners who have been granted Danish citizenship by law must have the 
citizenship reviewed and, as a rule, cancelled (Stram Kurs 2019).
Conclusions: how did we get this far and  
what can we expect?
A wide range of circumstances and factors will potentially contribute to the fun-
damental shift or the showdown in Danish migration and integration policies in 
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years to come. First of all, the entire cognitive framework in and premises by 
which migration and integration causes and effects are evaluated, addressed and 
framed, not only by far- right parties but also by the mainstream parties – including 
the party that took over government power, the Social Democrats – have changed 
radically. Besides, considerable segments of native voters who somehow have 
the subjective feeling of being ignored by mainstream parties, have found their 
voices. The median voter has moved towards the right of the political scale.
With regard to the national identity and identification question – ‘What actually 
makes up a Dane?’ – we have just taken the very first steps towards an even more 
fundamental shift from inclusive nation- building, where integration and multicul-
turalism were considered as both the goal and the means, to an exclusive nation- 
building project in which only two options seem to be available: assimilation or 
segregation/deportation. The latter means a change from individually subjective 
choice- and will- based incorporation in the national community towards a collec-
tive objective ethnicity- based definition of nationhood.
The ethnic and ethno- cultural diversity which, during the 1990s, was the cor-
nerstone of recognition, inclusive citizenship and ‘multiculturalism’ is now almost 
completely absent in public and political debate and discourse. It is replaced by the 
quite widely politically supported requirement of assimilation. Among economic 
causes that will push migrants from non- Western countries, specifically Muslims, 
to the margins, the role of the free movement of labour within the enlarged EU 
cannot be overestimated. EU enlargement has provided the Danish economy with 
the necessary and much more skilled labour from other EU countries. The free 
movement of new labour from the East is by nature regulated by the size of supply 
and demand curves – i.e. following economic rather than political or humanitar-
ian rationales. The labour force from the ‘new’ EU countries seems to be much 
more attractive than those which Denmark used to get from non- Western coun-
tries, alongside a wide range of criteria, among which should not be ignored the 
importance of quite compatible cultural elements, including religion and religious 
affiliation, fundamental norms of behaviour and principles such as gender equal-
ity, democratic affiliation etc. Besides, the majority of new immigrants from the 
EU are not visible minorities, making ‘the (might be) stranger’ unrecognisable in 
the passage of everyday life (Goffman 1963).
A considerable share of the Danish population seem to feel that the universal 
welfare state has been burdened by non- Western immigrants and their descend-
ants, that the national identity has been challenged and that values completely 
different from and, sometimes, opposite to their own have been introduced and 
have challenged social cohesion.
Even though the June 2019 national elections brought ‘the reds’ – the Social 
Democrats – into power and saw the end of ‘the blues’ or liberal- conservative 
government, it would be a mistake to consider this as a step to the left. The issue 
is, rather, whether the far- right parties themselves would carry these new priorities 
into Danish institutions or whether these policies would be adopted even more 
obviously and systematically by mainstream parties in power. Today’s Social 
Democratic Party (the new government) is, with regard to its policies towards 
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migration and integration, completely different to what it was two to three decades 
or even five years ago. They have adopted a wide range of ‘Danish People Party’ 
standpoints, rhetoric and policies.
No matter whether red or blue, the governments of today and of tomorrow 
should be expected to act in accordance with and to further institutionalise domi-
nant previously named radical- right discourses by demonstrating substantial 
shifts:
1 from a reactive to a pro- active policy: it is in charge; it is able to control the 
flow of migration from non- Western countries;
2 from humanism to utilitarianism: it can reallocate the resources from helping 
non- Western migrants residing in Denmark to refugees in their own or neigh-
bouring countries and regions;
3 from universality to particularity: it can bind the social rights of individuals 
to social duties towards the community and the state;
4 from globalism to nationalism: it can demonstrate greater concern for the 
nation’s own children, youth and the elderly – i.e. the natives – than for the 
equivalent citizens of other countries; and, finally;
5 from principled politics to realistic/pragmatic politics: it can sacrifice 
party principles whenever needed and argue in favour of the most practical 
solutions.
These circumstances are here to stay, making further moves towards the right end 
of the political scale unavoidable. Nevertheless, it is obviously not a move towards 
‘the right’ as we defined it traditionally. In order to comprehend what is happen-
ing, we should probably invent a new concept that would encompass the core fea-
tures of the new phenomenon. We would call it the ‘Rational Right’. The concept, 
to be further investigated, refers to a political joint venture between parties and 
movements which mutually disassociate themselves from each other’s conflicting 
ideologies but which, despite this, bring parties and movements together under a 
new umbrella, where discourses of neoliberalism, competition state, efficiency, 
concern for social cohesion and national interest, pragmatic policy and practical-
ity and, finally, reciprocity with regard to the nation- state’s obligations towards 
nationals of other countries, are the core pillars.
Notes
 1 See https://nyeborgerlige.dk/politik/udlaendingepolitik/
 2 See https://stramkurs.dk/Stram Kurs
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Introduction
This chapter maps out the main structural and policy frameworks which govern 
the integration of immigrants in Spain. It offers a clear example of a practical 
approach and of ‘multiple diversity’, in which two frameworks interact. The 
first of these is an old, unresolved framework, arising from democratic transi-
tion and based on Kymlicka’s (1995) term ‘plurinational’. The second is a new 
framework due to immigration and described as ‘polyethnic’. Spain is also situ-
ated at the geographical border of Europe, allowing important flows of migrants 
from the south keen to enter the Schengen space. The multilevel governance 
of integration influences the distribution of competence; the fact that multiple 
integration policy approaches can coexist, with their own intergovernmental 
tensions, makes Spain an exceptional rara avis. In this sense, the country has 
become a laboratory for integration in complex institutional settings (Zapata- 
Barrero 2010). Understanding how these flows have shaped Spanish society and 
how the different levels of administration have incorporated this phenomenon 
into their governance agenda is key to understand contemporary Spain (Zapata- 
Barrero 2012b).
The aim in this chapter is to identify the main drivers that may help us to under-
stand these social and structural transformations in Spanish society over the last 
30 years. The first part concentrates on reviewing flows and stocks in order to 
provide a clear overview of who the migrant population in Spain are and how they 
become part of Spanish society. The policies related to migrant flows – as part 
of border control – are under the ordinance of central government; however, 
integration policies are under different levels of administration, mainly local 
( autonomous communities or municipalities). The second part analyses how pub-
lic administration has developed a set of instruments and actions to deal with 
these migratory dynamics. Our focus is on integration and inclusion policies from 
a multilevel perspective. Apart from examining the instruments promoted by cen-
tral government, we examine the role of Catalonia, the first autonomous commu-
nity to develop integration tools – and at the local level – even a year before the 
central government did in 1993.
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The overall purpose of this chapter is to emphasise the paradigmatic case of 
Spain as a multilevel scenario in which integration policies have also been intro-
duced in diverse socio- demographic contexts.
The demographic factor
The extraordinary intensity of international immigration in Spain throughout the 
twenty- first century and its no- less- spectacular decline during the economic cri-
sis are perhaps among the best examples of the complex relationship between 
a demographic phenomenon, the economic context and legislation. In order to 
assess this interaction, we keep three elements in mind:
• the evolution of flows;
• the characteristics of the immigrant population and its integration into the 
labour force; and
• spatial distribution.
Demographic flows: from boom to bust
Between 1996 and 2017, 10 million arrivals from other countries were reg-
istered in Spain, the high point being in 2007, with a figure of 958,000, after 
which the numbers dropped to a little over half that estimate (64 per cent) in 
2013 owing to the economic crisis. After this, they slowly started to rise again to 
reach 637,000 arrivals in 2017 – similar to the level recorded for 2004 (Cebolla- 
Boado and Pinyol- Jiménez 2019). Indeed, in the twenty- first century, until the 
onset of the economic crisis, Spain was one of the countries which received the 
most immigrants from abroad, second only to the United States (Widmaier and 
Dumont 2011). What caused this migratory boom? Several reasons come together 
in the explanation: economic factors (a flourishing economy with a labour mar-
ket based on unskilled workers), demographic influences (a notable rise in lev-
els of educational attainment, especially in generations of women, as well as a 
remarkable increase in life expectancy) and political dynamics (weakness of the 
welfare state and hence an absence of measures for reconciling family and work-
ing life, thereby inducing a large- scale externalisation of reproductive work in the 
market – particularly domestic tasks and care of children and the aged).
Observing how this situation developed, it is not difficult to see how, first, legal 
measures and, second, economic evolution have marked patterns of growth and 
decline. Among the former, some initiatives stand out, especially the impact of the 
extraordinary regularisation measures of 2000, 2001 and 2005. Announcement 
of these measures not only brought to light workers who were already living in 
the country and who now registered as if they had only just arrived but also, in 
some cases, resulted in the much- maligned ‘pull factor’. Nevertheless, there are 
other noteworthy measures, outstanding amongst which is the Schengen Visa. The 
anticipated announcement of a demand for visas from Ecuador in 2001, Colombia 
in 2003 and Bolivia in 2007, not only ended up with a downturn in migratory 
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flows but also had two striking results: the flows were moved forward during the 
year in question and there was a change in structure by sex and age thereafter as 
a consequence of family reunification. A third legal factor with major – although 
less evident – repercussions in the evolution of international immigration in Spain 
is the advantageous policy giving priority in access to nationality to people com-
ing from Latin America, with a requirement of just two years’ continuous legal 
residence compared with the 10- year period stipulated for immigrants from other 
origins (Domingo and Ortega- Rivera 2015). This policy partly explains why the 
migratory boom consisted of large numbers of people from Latin America, with 
over 3 million arrivals. The fact that this coincided with the pan- ethnic discourse 
of Spanish nationalism after the Partido Popular (PP – People’s Party) led by 
José María Aznar came to power and favoured an ethnically based replacement of 
Moroccan immigrants. One of the inadvertent results of this ‘selection by origin’ 
(Joppke 2005) has been the thwarting of hopes for upwards social mobility among 
Moroccan immigrants (Domingo 2018).
Fluctuating numbers of immigrants from European countries are mainly the 
result of EU enlargement. Hence landmarks were established with the first arrival 
of immigrants from Poland in 2004 and later, in 2007, from Romania and Bul-
garia, as shown by the sharp rises in Figure 8.1.
As for the falling numbers of immigrants in relation to the economic crisis, 
observers tend to agree that the measures taken to facilitate the return of immi-
grants to their respective countries were ineffective (Cachón Rodríguez 2012). 
The vast majority of the 2.4 million returnees or re- migrants between 2008 and 
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Figure 8.1  Arrivals in Spain from abroad showing nationality by general continental ori-
gins, 1996–2017
Source: Authors, based on Residence Variation Statistics, 1996–2017 (INE – Spanish National Statisti-
cal Institute)
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(ILO 2009). Note that, with all this background, policing pressures in the first few 
months after the Spanish government recognised the situation of crisis, combined 
with the rhetoric which came with austerity policies, were fuelling resentment 
among the Spanish population when immigrants were often presented not only 
as competitors for public services and in the job market but also as fraudsters. 
Measures like that adopted by the Spanish government in 2012 suppressing the 
right to free health care for undocumented immigrants – but not applied by gov-
ernments in some autonomous regions like Catalonia or the Basque Country – or 
cuts in unemployment benefits (which were supported by the regional govern-
ments), using as an excuse the alleged fraud committed by unemployed foreign 
workers, fanned the flames of xenophobic discourse. A final interaction between 
the economic crisis and the legal system with regard to migratory flows took the 
form of increasing numbers of immigrants who applied for Spanish citizenship 
even while planning to emigrate, but now with the security that nationalisation 
offered for a possible return to Spain, mobility in or re- migration to the countries 
of the Schengen Area or moving to other EU countries.
The recovery of immigrant flows after 2014 mainly features people com-
ing from Latin America and the EU. The composition of the group from Latin 
America, however, points to the importance of expulsion (i.e. a push factor) rather 
than pull factors. Countries with the greatest presence in these rising numbers of 
immigrants are Venezuela (owing to the serious political and economic crisis), 
Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala (with increasingly high levels of citizen 
insecurity and the progressive closure of the border with the United States), as 
well as older countries of origin like Argentina (due to the expulsion caused by 
the Macri government’s neoliberal policies). The forced nature of some of these 
migratory movements also explains the rising numbers of applicants for asylum 
in Spain among these immigrants.
Employability of the immigrant population in Spain: dualisation
Despite the predominance of immigrants from countries of Latin America, one 
of the characteristics of Spain’s immigrant population is its heterogeneity, even 
among those who have come from this continent. On 1 January 2018 the foreign- 
born population residing in Spain numbered 6.4 million or 13.7 per cent of the 
total population. The first ten places in Figure 8.2, showing immigrant origins, are 
occupied by countries from four continents, which are as different as Morocco 
(almost 826,000 people), Romania (around 593,000) and Ecuador (404,000). The 
differences among the groups between immigrants born in the counties of origins 
and those who are citizens thereof are very conspicuous due to the fact that prefer-
ential access to Spanish citizenship was given to immigrants from Latin America. 
Hence, if the difference between the number of people from Morocco and those 
with Moroccan citizenship is only 55,151 people, the figure for Ecuador rises to 
269,139; the disparity is even more extreme in the cases of the Romanian or Chi-
nese populations, among which those who keep their original nationality are more 
numerous than those actually born in those countries.
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As suggested in the earlier discussion of the causes of the migratory boom, 
incorporation into the workplace of these groups of immigrants occurs in a dual-
ised job market. If, at the beginning of this polarisation, during a time of economic 
growth, employment integration acted in a complementary way, similarly favour-
ing the job prospects of young people and university- educated Spanish women – 
as happened elsewhere in other countries of the south of the EU (Domingo and Gil 
2007) – it also accelerated market deregulation in such a way that, after the onset 
of the crisis, it exacerbated the differences between people of varying national 
origins. A second characteristic of this labour integration process was the femini-
sation of the workforce, spurred by the demand in the service sector owing to the 
externalisation of child care and domestic work, as mentioned earlier, and this was 
mainly met by female immigrants from Latin America.
In contrast to Spaniards, the foreign- born population is mostly concentrated 
in the secondary sector, in jobs with minimal educational requirements and low 
salaries. The specialisation into certain job niches brings about acute occupational 
segregation – not only vis- à- vis the autochthonous population but also among 
workers of different origins – together with marked over- qualification. This divi-
sion of labour might be described as what some American authors call ‘segmented 
assimilation’ (Portes and Zhou 1993), although the original concept referred spe-
cifically to the so- called second generation and hence not so much to the immi-
grants themselves but to their descendants. Assimilation into the job market where 
the demand is mainly for unskilled labour – using large numbers of workers with 
a nonlegal status and hence engaged in undeclared work – helped to bring about 
a situation in which the progress made by immigrants is conditioned by earlier 
prejudices held by the Spanish population about people of different origins. What 
frequently occurs is assimilation by downward social mobility, and the economic 












Figure 8.2  Main national origins of the immigrant population residing in Spain, 2018
Source: Authors, using Official Population Figures, 2018 (INE – Spanish National Statistical Institute)
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crisis only heightened the probability of this downward movement. Given that 
it is not long since the immigrants arrived, it is difficult to corroborate this trend 
for their descendants, although some school results give the impression that the 
inequality will be reproduced (Bayona and Domingo 2018).
The effects of the economic crisis deserve separate consideration (Figure 8.3). 
As we have noted, this affected flows, with a drastic drop in the numbers of arriv-
als and a concomitant rise in departures. However, as far as the population is con-
cerned, there are three main consequences which need to be taken into account, 
as they have had a considerable impact on integration policies with regard to 
the available resources, especially at the local level, the illegal status of immi-
grants and unemployment, and, increasingly, household vulnerability. In the case 
of the first effect, one of the earliest austerity measures adopted after the economic 
recession had finally been recognised in May 2012 was the cutting of EU integra-
tion funding which the government had been distributing among the municipal 
coffers. Since local administration was the most directly involved in applying 
integration policies, the effects of the cut were even more adverse. This was due 
to the associated suspension of contracts, in particular among intercultural media-
tors who were working to avoid community conflicts, many of whom were of 
immigrant origin. Besides, when the real estate bubble burst, municipal debt rose 
because local administrators had seen speculation on this market as an easy way 
of boosting the budget. Just at the time when investment in integration policies 
was the most necessary because of the economic situation and also growing sec-
ond generations, this investment either stopped or dropped to alarmingly low lev-
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Figure 8.3  Evolution of unemployment by birthplace, Spain, 2004–2018
Source: Authors, using the Labour Force Survey, 2Q2018 (INE – Spanish National Statistical Institute)
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Spanish government took advantage of the economic crisis to recentralise powers 
that had been devolved to the autonomous regions, which then led to new tensions 
between central and local administration at both regional and municipal levels. 
Immigration was one of the bones of contention.
Second, the crisis had a perverse, unforeseen effect on the system of continuous 
regularisation which, in force since 2006, was known as ‘El Arraigo’ or ‘social 
attachment’, a process consisting of the authorisation for foreigners in an irregular 
situation to live and work in Spain for a year (with the possibility of subsequent 
renewal in the form of a residence permit) – since it was linked with job offers. 
When the possibility of finding work was all but ruled out as an effect of the crisis, 
the individual (but generalised) transitory state of what had been an irregular situ-
ation during the boom years turned into an almost permanent structural element 
of the recession. This meant increasing numbers of people who were suddenly 
relegated to an irregular status because the loss of jobs for immigrants whose 
papers were in order could lead to the loss of the associated permit and hence to 
being condemned once more to an illegal status. Social and humanitarian Arraigo, 
entailing family links living on the municipality as well as a longer period of resi-
dence and close involvement with the community in question, then became the 
main way of achieving a legal status and, accordingly, was much more common 
than the earlier resort of joining the workforce (Sabater and Domingo 2012).
Third and finally, the impact on unemployment must also be taken into 
account. When the real estate bubble burst, the first sector to be hit by the crisis 
was the construction industry and its offshoots, a mostly male domain in which 
many foreign- born immigrants were employed. Meanwhile, a large percentage of 
women working in the service sector or as domestics were better able to resist the 
onslaught of the crisis, although they paid the price of having to accept precarious 
jobs or going back to work in the informal economy. Accordingly, unemploy-
ment levels rose more among men than among women who, on earlier occa-
sions, were the first to be forced out of the labour market (Domingo and Sabater 
2013 Hence, if, in 2007, male unemployment among foreign- born immigrants 
was estimated at 13.6 per cent (three points higher than the figure for Spanish 
workers), by 2013 it had grown to 35.3 per cent – which was well above the high 
figure of 24.3 per cent for Spanish- born workers (Figure 8.3). The effect among 
women who, before the crisis, were on record as being economically active (i.e. 
Latin American women) was very different to that among women who were not 
(mainly African). At a time when their male partners were losing their jobs, more 
and more women were registering as jobless, so their unemployment figures rose 
sharply in what has been called the ‘addition effect’. Consequently, at the worst 
moment, 40.7 per cent of Ecuadorian women were registered as unemployed, 
while the percentage of unemployed Moroccan women hit an all- time high of 
61.6 per cent (Figure 8.3).
Unemployment levels began to fall after 2014 but not equally for all origins. 
Not only did they continue to show a considerable difference from the figures for 
the autochthonous population but, in some groups such as unemployed Moroc-
can men, although the figures improved – dropping from 49.4 per cent in 2013 
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to 30.4 in 2018, or 19 percentage points – they were still a long way from the 
figures for immigrants born in Ecuador, which went from 46.8 to 19 per cent, a 
drop of 27.8 percentage points, or for Romanians, whose levels of unemployment 
fell by 27.4 percentage points from 43.6 to 16.2 (Figure 8.3). When viewed from 
the standpoint of family vulnerability, these unemployment levels in populations 
like those of Moroccan origin (who, as we have noted, still constitute the largest 
group of foreign- born nationals resident in Spain today), estimated at 30.4 per 
cent for men and 48.3 for women in 2018, give rise to totally anomalous situa-
tions (Figure 8.3). Figure 8.4 gives an approximate illustration of the problem: in 
18.3 per cent of homes in which at least one Moroccan- born person resides, all the 
economically active members of the household are unemployed.
Spatial distribution: diversity and vulnerability
The offers on the job and housing markets explain the spatial distribution of 
Spain’s immigrant population. One of the main characteristics of this distribution 
is its dispersal over the territory for the whole immigrant population, although 
some groups, based on national origins and type of employment, tend to be more 
concentrated than others in different parts of the country. By autonomous region 
(see Table 8.1), and in absolute numbers, Catalonia stands out, with more than 
1.38 million newcomers, followed by Madrid with almost 1.22 million and a long 
way ahead of other regions like the Autonomous Community of Valencia, with 
815,000 and Andalusia with 788,000. Relatively speaking, however, the Balearic 
Islands, with 22 per cent of the population consisting of immigrants stand out, 
together with Madrid with 18.5 per cent and Catalonia with 18.2 (Table 8.1). 
This spatial distribution means, first, a change in comparison with Spain’s inter-
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Figure 8.4  Percentage of households where all adults are unemployed, by large continental 
groups, Spain, 2018
Source: Authors, using the Labour Force Survey, 2Q2018 (INE – Spanish National Statistical Institute)
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international migration has replaced earlier migrations from elsewhere in Spain, 
in the Basque Country this demographic history has been interrupted and, at the 
other end of the scale, Andalusia came to be a net exporter of workers in the twen-
tieth century. This pattern will somehow become noticeable in attempts to make 
sense of the phenomenon – i.e. when justifying policies applied at the level of the 
autonomous regions. Consequently, while continuity prevails in regions which 
formerly received more immigrants – especially Catalonia, a land of immigrants – 
in the case of Andalusia, the situation of new immigrants will be compared with 
the migratory experience (especially in Europe) of generations of Andalusians 
who left their homeland in the 1960s. Moreover, the composition of immigrants 
by origin, sex and age will vary substantially in each autonomous region, thus 
presenting different challenges in the various integration projects.
At the municipal scale, in absolute numbers, the big cities unsurprising con-
centrate the greatest numbers of foreign- born immigrants. Heading this list are 
Madrid, with 679,000 foreign- born residents, Barcelona with 392,000 and Valen-
cia with 135,000 according to the Spanish Population Register (INE 2018). In 
relative terms, however, the picture is very different: leaving aside very small 
towns, the largest concentrations are found in tourist towns throughout the terri-
tory and especially along the Mediterranean coast: Llíber in Alicante (where 68.9 
per cent of the population is foreign- born), Benhavís in Malaga (64.1) and Adeje 
Table 8.1  Total population and foreign- born population by autonomous region, Spain, 
2018
Total Population Foreign- Born %
Andalusia 8,384,408 788,101 9.4
Aragon 1,308,728 167,858 12.8
Asturias 1,028,244 75,465 7.3
Balearic Islands 1,128,908 250,794 22.2
Canary Islands 2,127,685 395,033 18.6
Cantabria 580,229 49,111 8.5
Castile and Leon 2,409,164 179,657 7.5
Castile- La Mancha 2,026,807 198,081 9.8
Catalonia 7,600,065 1,380,590 18.2
Autonomous Region of Valencia 4,963,703 815,551 16.4
Extremadura 1,072,863 44,507 4.1
Galicia 2,701,743 221,963 8.2
Madrid 6,578,079 1,219,347 18.5
Murcia 1,478,509 226,621 15.3
Navarre 647,554 92,298 14.3
Basque Country 2,199,088 206,530 9.4
La Rioja 315,675 43,912 13.9
Ceuta 85,144 11,046 13.0
Melilla 86,384 20,439 23.7
Spain 46,722,980 6,386,904 13.7
Source: Authors, Spanish Population Register, 2018 (National Institute of Statistics)
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in Santa Cruz de Tenerife (52.3) (INE 2018) are good examples of clusters mainly 
consisting of retired European immigrants and their compatriots who accompany 
them, or people – usually of British origin – attracted by the job possibilities 
they generate. In these towns of the Alicante region, Andalusia and the Canary 
Islands, one finds not only the highest percentages of such immigrants but also 
much more pronounced segregation in these so- called golden ghettos than that 
found in neighbourhoods of Spain’s big cities.
The institutional and structural framework
Immigration has never been a competence defined in the constitutional frame-
work or in any other constitutional law delimiting governance and policy man-
agement. Instead, immigration emerged as an administrative and technical issue 
in the 1990s and as a political and social issue in 2000 (Arango 2000). Spain is 
developing its competence on immigration pragmatically, by taking the policy 
instruments in its administrative and policy structure and constructing its legal 
and regulatory instruments while respecting its already decentralised division 
(Zapata- Barrero 2012a).
At the beginning of the 2000s, immigration as a topic had entered the Spanish 
political and social agenda. This ‘politicization of immigration’ (Zapata- Barrero 
2003) evidences how migration has become a factual certainty in a country 
with a traditional emigration history. This implied that the main concerns of the 
Spanish migration policy were resolved and that these concerns perhaps remain 
unchanged for the different Spanish governments and administrations (Cebolla- 
Boado and Pinyol- Jiménez 2014). Instruments to manage economic migration, 
collaboration with third countries (non- UE) and fighting irregular migration flows 
(mainly via maritime borders) have progressively become crucial topics into the 
Spanish labour market – have been acquiring relevance over the years, but in an 
ambivalent process in which different actions and instruments have been devel-
oped, although lacking a theoretical and shared framework about what integration 
means (Cebolla- Boado and González- Ferrer 2013).
From national administration to local authorities, integration has become a cru-
cial and wide discussion in which the rights of the migrant population (including 
those in an irregular situation), the management of cultural and religious diver-
sity, opportunities and anti- discrimination measures have been argued with differ-
ent intensities. The absence of a structured model as in other European countries 
(Favell 1998) has been seen, nevertheless, as an opportunity to focus on maintain-
ing social cohesion in a multiply diverse scenario (Zapata- Barrero 2013). Defin-
ing the boundaries of a public philosophy of integration means understanding 
narratives, instruments and actions developed to manage diversity and to guaran-
tee social cohesion and conviviality (convivencia as living together) in a decen-
tralised Spain (Ferrero- Turrión and Pinyol- Jiménez 2009). It has been argued that, 
in the absence of traditions, Spain has followed a practical philosophy (Zapata- 
Barrero 2012b) – i.e. a way of managing diversity which is based not on estab-
lished and preconceived ideas, projected by its own social construction, such as 
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French republicanism or British multiculturalism but, rather, on questions and 
answers generated by the practice of diversity governance (Carrera 2005, 2006).
The Organic Law 4/2000 of 11 January 2000 on the rights and freedoms of 
foreign nationals in Spain and their social integration1 is the main legal migration 
framework in Spain. It regulates the rights, obligations and liberties of foreign 
citizens, including:
• the right to family reunification and legal guarantees;
• the conditions for entry into Spanish territory, authorisations to remain, tem-
porary residence (including residence on the basis of family reunification, 
labour or social reasons, humanitarian reasons or other exceptional circum-
stances) and permanent residence;
• the specific regimes such as those of students, stateless persons, persons with-
out identity documents, refugees and unaccompanied minors; and
• work permits and the annual quota of foreign workers.
In addition, this law regulates offences in the area of foreigners’ affairs, the regime 
of sanctions and coordination of public authorities, the performance of the Labour 
Inspectorate aimed at controlling working conditions and combating irregular 
employment and labour exploitation, and the support of public powers for immi-
grant associations, groups and organisations in support of immigration.
Competence in integration issues is complex in Spain. Integration is a cross- 
cutting topic affecting several areas in which different levels of administration 
(national, regional and local) participate but in which there is a lack of multilevel 
governance mechanisms for collaboration. While matters relating to nationality, 
immigration, foreign nationals and the right to asylum are exclusive to the state, 
integration policies (employment, education, housing, health, social services etc.) 
are mainly devolved to the autonomous communities (in some policies, with full 
responsibility for legislating and implementing but, in others, just for implement-
ing). Almost all communities have, in recent years, implemented their own immi-
gration and integration policies and plans. Moreover, the local authorities have a 
competence that affects integration policies; in fact, there are several municipali-
ties which have their own local integration plan or a number of ongoing initiatives 
in this area. NGOs additionally play a role, providing services or collaborating 
with the different administrations (Morales et al. 2009).
Lastly, to understand integration policies in Spain, the exceptionality of the 
Spanish Municipal Population Register (padrón) should be noted. Each town 
council is in charge of the creation, management and maintenance of its population 
register, containing personal data regulated by the law. The system of continuous 
and computerised management of municipal population registers was introduced 
in 1996; starting in 1998, population figures have been obtained (up to the first 
of January each year) which are declared official by the Council of Ministers (at 
the end of the year). In Spain, residents are entitled to public services by being on 
the municipal population register. Registration, or empadronamiento, is manda-
tory for all residents (on a permanent or a temporary basis) in the municipality, 
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regardless of their legal status. On registering, all residents (nationals, immigrants 
and irregular migrants alike) receive a card that entitles them to full health cover-
age and access to education for their children. Even irregular immigrants who 
do not have a health card are treated in hospitals without being reported to the 
police. Political participation is also related to the padrón, as it is the register that 
provides data for the electoral census.
Due to its exceptionality in the European scenario, the padrón has been con-
troversial, especially regarding irregular migrants. In 2003, for instance, a bill by 
the then- conservative majority in parliament authorised the police to use infor-
mation contained in the municipal registers to detect ‘unauthorised’ immigrants; 
however, this was met with widespread protest and there is no evidence that the 
plan was ever implemented. Furthermore, a legal reform passed in 2000 extended 
welfare benefits – health and education and, occasionally, other social benefits 
such as a basic income for vulnerable families – to irregular migrants. In 2012, 
the government adopted a legislative decree amending the law so that the health 
card was correlated to legal residence and affiliation in the social security pro-
gramme, thus limiting health care for irregular immigrants to minors below the 
age of 18, pregnant women or people in emergency situations. Several regional 
governments – such as those of Catalonia, Navarre, Andalusia and the Basque 
Country – in charge of health services, announced their refusal to comply, as 
did several medical associations. In 2015, the central government withdrew the 
decree and, in 2018, a new decree (Royal Legislative Decree 7/2018 of 27 July on 
universal access to the national health system) restoring universal access to health 
services was approved. In any case, this exceptional feature of the Spanish system 
was seldom questioned and has long been a widely accepted extension of registra-
tion to residents, including irregular migrants.
The rule of the padrón could explain why, in Spain, the national, regional and 
local authorities have all emphasised the residence criteria as crucial in talks about 
integration and social cohesion. Residence is beyond origin and legal status and is 
conceived as the sum of real residence with the purpose of permanent settlement. 
This criterion appears in almost all local and autonomous community integration 
programmes.
Building a common approach to integration? The role of  
central administration
Migrants’ integration was not a part of any normative and political framework 
until the mid- 1990s. Until its accession to the European Community in 1986, 
Spain had neither an immigration policy nor an immigration law. In 1985, as a 
precondition for EC membership, the first Spanish immigration law was enacted: 
it was more a ‘requested’ law to meet EC standards than a real need (Pinyol- 
Jiménez 2007). The first law on Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain was 
passed in 1985 and was mainly focused on managing migration flows, while the 
first mention of migrant social integration in a parliamentary debate happened 
in 1991. It was in 1994 that the first Action Plan for Migrants’ Integration was 
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approved. It aimed, among other objectives, to guarantee access to social services 
and benefits for the migrant population, to facilitate naturalisation processes for 
foreigners born in Spain and to acknowledge the role of native tongues for migrant 
children. In 2000, the Spanish Plan emphasised the importance of migrants’ inte-
gration, since which time the migratory law has been called ‘on the rights and 
freedoms of foreigners in Spain and their social integration’. Also, in 2000, the 
Foro para la Integración Social de los Inmigrantes (Forum for the Social Integra-
tion of Migrants) was created as a consultative organism – composed of persons 
belonging to local and autonomous administrations, representatives of central 
government and representatives of immigration associations – to canalise discus-
sions and reflections on integration issues.
In 2004, the creation of the Secretariat of State for Immigration and Emigration 
under the Ministry of Labour, with a General Direction on Integration, established 
a new approach to this topic, as responsibility for migration policies moved from 
the Home Affairs Ministry to Labour Affairs. Furthermore, in 2007, the Span-
ish government approved the first Strategic Plan on Citizenship and Integration 
(PECI- Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración) as a roadmap to guide pub-
lic administrations in dealing with integration issues. The PECI 2007–20102 was 
based on three main principles: equality and non- discrimination, citizenship and 
interculturality. The first equates the rights and obligations of the immigrant popu-
lation to those of the autochthonous population within the framework of basic 
constitutional values; the second entails recognition of the full civic, social, eco-
nomic, cultural and political participation of migrants and the latest aims to pro-
mote interaction between people of different origins or cultures, in a framework of 
respect for cultural diversity (Ferrero- Turrión and Pinyol- Jiménez 2009).
In parallel, the Support Fund for the Reception and Integration of Immigrants 
and their Educational Support was created in 2005. Its aim was to channel supple-
mentary funding to regions and municipalities with rapidly growing populations 
to support their provision of services to native and foreign residents in areas such 
as health care and education. The fund, which allocated assistance to autonomous 
communities to finance integration initiatives led by local authorities (it reached a 
peak of 200 million euros in 2007 and 2008) was created by the social democratic 
government; it ended in 2012 under the centre- right government.
Up to the present day, the fund has never been reinstated, although social enti-
ties and subnational administrations have continuously requested its restoration. 
Certainly, the effects of the economic crisis and the cutting of funds were clear 
signs of the government’s priorities and main concerns as, during the former, all 
national financial support to regions and local authorities to deal with migrants’ 
integration was cut back, although resources were allocated to return programmes 
which never met expectations (Parella et al. 2014).
The first plan was followed by a second PECI 2011–20143 which also empha-
sised the need to guarantee the full exercise of migrants’ civil, social, economic, 
political and cultural rights. The plans also sought to ensure access to public ser-
vices for the migrant population, along with the adaptation of public policies, par-
ticularly in education, employment, social services, health and housing, in order 
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to meet the new needs of migrants in Spain and to combat discrimination and 
xenophobia. The PECI II was approved under the centre- left government but was 
poorly implemented under the centre- right, which did not replace it with a new 
plan after 2014.
In 2017, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) 
regretted that there lacked a national integration strategy in Spain after the end of 
PECI II in 2014 (ECRI 2018). At the same time, the ECRI Report (2018) pointed 
to the lack of data and indicators to evaluate the outcome of these integration 
plans. The absence of a coherent system of integration indicators made it very 
difficult to assess the migrants’ situation and to monitor the results and impacts of 
integration policies and instruments. Currently, the Spanish government is prepar-
ing a third PECI.
Both previous PECI have had little impact in the different administrations and 
in public debate. It is difficult, due to the lack of clear impact indicators, to know 
the extent to which these plans have reconfigured the actions of the central admin-
istration regarding migrants’ integration, how much and in what way this integra-
tion has occurred and to what extent the plans have permeated the different social 
organisations, beyond those that have been directly involved. If the new PECI 
aims to become a roadmap rather than a general orientation framework, it must 
of necessity include a coherent system of integration indicators in areas such as 
education, employment, health and housing, and must evaluate and improve the 
impact of integration policies and instruments on such areas.
The meso level: exploring the ‘Catalan’ way of integration
Catalonia was traditionally a region of immigration, with important flows, mainly 
from southern regions of Spain, occurring during the 1960s, leading Catalan social 
entities (and, later, politicians) to consider the question of integration well before 
the issue was tackled at the Spanish level (Zapata- Barrero 2009). Considering its 
own culture, language and history, narratives on self- government, competence 
and identity have been present in the public debate in Catalonia which also had 
an impact on discussions of migrants’ integration at the public and political levels 
(Franco- Guillén and Zapata- Barrero 2014). Civic residence was understood as a 
crucial part of Catalan society, regardless of nationality or place of birth.4 Differ-
ent instruments promoted by the Catalan government have highlighted the impor-
tant and positive contribution of migration to Catalonia and recognised its impact 
on the process of nation- building there.
The first Interdepartmental Plan on Immigration was approved by the Catalan 
government in 19935 to promote the integration of immigrants in Catalonia and 
to facilitate their personal and social development, according to a framework of 
rights and obligations. This plan was a pioneer initiative in Spain and part of a 
process in which autonomous communities were progressively acquiring skill in 
areas such as education, health and social services; as such, the role of regional 
and, especially, local authorities in the integration of immigrants became clear 
(Pinyol- Jiménez 2013).
Spain: governance and integration policies 139
In 2000, the Catalan government approved the second Interdepartmental Plan 
on Immigration, 2001–2004, managed by the newly created Secretariat for Immi-
gration. The plan stated the importance of migration into Catalonia, and the role 
of positive ‘living together’ in strengthening social cohesion; it also recognised 
a Catalan identity based on a shared culture and language. Both elements config-
ured the so- called Catalan way of integration, which tries to balance a respect for 
diversity with a sense of belonging to Catalan society and acquiring the Catalan 
language.
The 2005–2008 Plan on Citizenship and Immigration emphasised the citizen-
ship concept by stating that residence was the only condition needed to be defined 
as a citizen and was thus the target of public policies. The plan was foreseen for all 
(resident) citizens without concern for their national origin, and integration was 
understood as a two- way process. The plan highlighted that the Catalan language 
and identity were the backbone of social cohesion, and that the latter had been 
enriched by newcomers, making all residents in Catalonia stronger, richer and of 
greater plurality.
Following this plan, in 2008 the Catalan government approved the National 
Agreement on Immigration (Pacte Nacional de la Immigració) – also known as 
an ‘agreement to live together’. As opposed to earlier plans, this one searched for 
political and social consensus: the consultation process involved more than 1,500 
people and the agreement was endorsed by all but one political party in the Catalan 
parliament and by more than 70 associations from civil society. A renewed plan 
was approved for the 2009–2012 period and, in 2014, the new Citizenship and 
Migration Plan: Horizon 2016’ was ratified which focused on three main areas: 
immigration policies6 mainly focused on migrants’ accession to labour market, 
policies to encourage equal opportunities, and policies designed to foster integra-
tion and settlement in a common public culture. Currently, in 2019, the Catalan 
government is working on a new intercultural plan.
Note that, since the 2008 agreement, the Catalan government has emphasised 
the idea of a ‘common public culture’, an interesting premise to link migration 
policies with nation- building, as took place for other national minorities in other 
Western countries (Zapata- Barrero 2009). From the beginning, the governmental 
narrative in Catalonia highlighted the need for instruments and policies to unite 
diverse groups through a shared sense of national identity. This notion implies 
encouraging participation in public life, making Catalan the common public lan-
guage, living together among a plurality of beliefs and ensuring equal opportu-
nities between men and women and, finally, incorporating inter alia the gender 
perspective.7
To summarise the main trends of this policy process, the ‘Catalan way of 
integration’ understands diversity as a positive contribution to Catalan society, 
emphasises the Catalan language as a key element of social cohesion and a strate-
gic instrument to ensure equal opportunities, promotes a ‘living together’ model 
based on residence to ensure equal rights and duties, pays attention to youth (edu-
cation) to ensure social mobility and endorses a common public culture of integra-
tion. More recently, issues such as fighting discrimination and hate speech have 
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also become priorities. In 2019, before the general, local and European elections, 
all parties in the Catalan parliament and several social entities approved an agree-
ment for living together and for avoiding the use of migration as a political tool 
in electoral campaigns. Parties have committed to defending democratic values, 
encouraging respect for diversity and avoiding the portrayal of migration as a 
threat to social cohesion.
Zooming in on the final trends in the definition of integration policies 
in Spain: the role of local authorities
While the overall picture of municipal policy efforts in Spain is highly complex, 
most cities with migrant populations have defined, designed and implemented a 
set of integration and diversity instruments with which to plug the gaps left by an 
undeveloped or inexistent national integration framework. At the local level, the 
main work focus has been on reception, education, employment, civic citizenship 
and social participation. It is worth mentioning that, despite the economic crisis 
and its impact on local budgets, cities (and regions) have generally endeavoured 
to provide public services to local residents, thus contributing to the fostering of 
social cohesion. However, beyond public service provision and welcome policies 
to facilitate integration, local authorities now face new challenges.
Regarding civic participation, foreign nationals can only vote at the local level 
if they are EU residents or nationals from countries with which Spain has signed 
bilateral agreements This limitation goes counter to the integration notion pro-
moted by most local authorities – which promote equal access to rights, duties 
and opportunities for both nationals and foreigners. Aside from the right to vote, 
municipalities have engaged migrant populations in local politics by promoting 
forums or regional and local advisory committees. The active participation of 
the immigrant population in local neighbourhood associations and in schools 
(through parents’ associations), trade unions and professional associations as well 
as cultural, leisure and sports associations, is considered a priority. As a result, 
most social agents, immigrant associations and local governments tend to pro-
mote migrants’ engagement in the local community as a way to ensure a harmoni-
ous neighbourhood and inclusive citizenship beyond mere (and limited by law) 
political participation.
In recent years, the different municipalities have also developed anti- 
discrimination measures and awareness- raising actions to fight xenophobia. 
Several regional and local authorities have defined bodies or policies to combat 
racism and xenophobia, most of which involve information campaigns, advocacy, 
awareness- raising and training programmes for both public and private agents. 
In their role as cooperating organisations, NGOs also deploy actions in this area.
Recently, the refugee question has also been introduced onto local agendas. The 
war in Syria and the humanitarian crisis created by the influx of displaced people 
have had a tremendous impact on a Spanish society unaccustomed to refugee and 
asylum issues. Several cities have traditionally had reception services and actions 
for refugees but, since 2015, more Spanish cities have spoken of their willingness 
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to attend to and receive asylum- seekers and refugees. The asylum system in Spain 
is highly centralised and refugees’ care is provided by different national centres 
and several NGOs directly appointed for the purpose. Cities such as Barcelona 
and Madrid took the initiative to create a network of ‘safe cities’ to encourage 
people to assist refugees and asylum- seekers.8 Although, until today, the asylum 
system has remained unchanged and the role of cities dismissed despite their com-
promise and good will, the local authorities have become a clear voice asking for 
solidarity and respect for human rights for displaced people.
Finally, the appearance in 2019 of a new far- right party in Spain on several 
municipal councils could affect the development of integration measures in vari-
ous regions and municipalities, although is too early to evaluate its impact.
The multiplicity of actions developed at the local level complicates assessment 
of the role played by local authorities in terms of migrant integration, although its 
importance is unquestionable. Most cities with a foreign population have devel-
oped strategic plans for migrant integration, inclusion and citizenship, but the lack 
of shared indicators and evaluation grids disguises a general assessment of inte-
gration policies. In Spain, 20 municipalities are part of the RECI (Spanish Net-
work of Intercultural Cities) which is related to the Intercultural Cities programme 
of the Council of Europe: through the ICC Index a limited assessment of these 
cities’ performance in terms of intercultural development could be undertaken. 
In spite of existing policy, academic and public debates on multiculturalism and 
interculturalism are recent in Spain and take place basically at the local level, with 
the leadership of Barcelona (Zapata- Barrero 2017).
Most cities have worked with a focus on citizenship, understanding it not as a 
question of national identity but of urban residence in a territory (Ferrero- Turrión 
and Pinyol- Jiménez 2009). Without being overconfident nor masking any current 
problems, this might explain why, with the considerable influx of migrants in 
a short period of time and without both a common approach to integration and 
enough resources, ‘living together’ in Spain has worked well enough.
Final remarks
Over a short period of time, Spain has had to confront new and different migra-
tion flows, to implement new responses and to look for new instruments and tools. 
During the earlier years of the twenty- first century, the main instruments were 
sketched out while, in recent years, integration has become the real challenge 
for Spanish society. Managing migration also implies the management of identi-
ties (Zapata- Barrero 2013) and, like other EU countries, Spain seeks to manage 
diversity and plurality without losing a common framework of identification and 
belonging.
The Spanish approach to integration was born in a specific and complex context: 
Spain is a country with its own cultural and regional diversity, of which migra-
tion has now become a part. Interestingly, as discussing internal diversity has been 
always a conflictual issue in Spanish politics, integration philosophies to deal with 
migration have been weaker than in other EU countries. The assimilation approach, 
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understood as a person abandoning her/his identity to adopt local norms and values, 
was present in most of the Spanish public instruments but in a weaker way, than, 
for instance, the French case. At the same time, as in the multiculturalism approach, 
the recognition of diversity is very much present in today’s Spain. This mixture of 
approaches has been seen via different instruments and public actions, most of them 
inspired by the intercultural approach at both national, regional and local levels. 
Note, however, that, despite the use of interculturalism as a public approach, public 
policies and instruments in Spain regarding integration could hardly be described as 
intercultural. Even now it seems evident that the existence of a philosophy (or phi-
losophies) of integration in Spain is a debate located more in the academic sphere 
than in the political or social scenario (Ferrero- Turrión and Pinyol- Jiménez 2009).
Furthermore, in Spain, the lack of evidence- based data complicates assump-
tions about the impacts, outcomes and results of integration policies developed 
at all administration levels. Similarly, there are several areas in which integration 
topics should be redefined and multilevel governance better defined. The current 
set of bodies and instruments for the promotion of multilevel cooperation are 
far from working properly. As most integration policies are handled by regional 
governments and local authorities, the role of central government could be both 
to define a set of principles or guidelines which would promote and guarantee a 
homogeneous approach to integration in Spain, and to support other administra-
tions in developing policies and instruments to fit it. The role of regional and local 
authorities should be strengthened, better coordinated and better funded. These 
administrations are key regarding integration policies, as they are designed to 
deal with the incorporation of a new and diverse citizenship in order not to simply 
avoid a negative impact in the maintenance of social cohesion and also to use their 
benefits and contributions to local development.
In Spain, the debates on migration, citizenship and national community are still 
open; however, they are indispensable to in- depth discussion. Talking about what 
kind of society the Spanish one is and will be will define the boundaries of the pub-
lic philosophy of integration. Within this framework, the instruments, policies and 
actions required to manage plurality and diversity should be identified in order to 
guarantee social cohesion and peacefully living together in a decentralised Spain.
Finally, this chapter has provided some evidence that the Spanish case con-
firms the multilevel governance’s argument that migration policies at the admis-
sions level and in the hands of central government, and integration policies under 
the decision- making of sub- state administration, are two arenas that mostly work 
independently and without structures ensuring cooperation and coordination. It 
is at this point that most of the tensions arise in Spain. The concrete case of local 
registration is just one illustration of the tensions between two policy narratives 
that often collapse and make explicit the fact that local claims for integration work 
better for decentralisation processes.
Notes
 1 Organic Law (LO) 4/2000 has been modified by LO 8/2000, LO 14/2003, LO 2/2009, 
LO 10/2011 and RDL 16/2012; see www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE- A- 2000- 
544&p=20180904&tn=6. Regarding foreign residents, this LO is also complemented 
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by the Royal Decree 240/2007 of 16 February 2007 on the entry, free movement and 
residence in Spain of citizens of the EU and EEA member- states. Asylum is regulated by 
Law 12/2009 of 30 October 2009 governing the right of asylum and subsidiary protec-
tion. Rules on citizenship are set out in the Civil Code.
 2 See http://extranjeros.mitramiss.gob.es/es/Programas_Integracion/Plan_estrategico/
pdf/PECIDEF180407.pdf
 3 See http://extranjeros.mitramiss.gob.es/es/Programas_Integracion/Plan_estrategico2011/ 
pdf/PECI- 2011- 2014.pdf
 4 In the 1980s, the- then Catalan president coined the axiom: ‘Is Catalan everybody who 
lives and works in Catalonia and wants to be?’
 5 See http://treballiaferssocials.gencat.cat/ca/ambits_tematics/immigracio/politiques_i_plans_ 
dactuacio/antecedents/
 6 As in most EU countries, issues regarding migration policies in terms of accession to the 
territory, border control, permits etc. are a national competence.
 7 See http://treballiaferssocials.gencat.cat/web/.content/03ambits_tematics/05immigracio_ 
refugi/03politiquesplansactuacio/continguts/Document_final_PNI_angles.pdf
 8 See, for instance, Barcelona’s initiative of Ciutat Refugi or City of Refuge (http://ciut 
atrefugi.barcelona/).
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Introduction. Immigration to Poland and the integration of 
immigrants from the perspective of migration transition
Poland is currently a country of basic paradoxes as far as the most recent migra-
tion trends are concerned. It is very likely that the foreign citizens who, in 2017 
or 2018, became its temporary or permanent residents largely outnumbered those 
Polish citizens who left their country of origin for residence elsewhere. Never-
theless, the country is generally and correctly considered to be an area of net 
emigration.
As far as the inflow of people to Poland is concerned, in recent years – 
especially between 2013 and 2018 – the country saw a sharply growing number of 
foreign citizens who had been granted a residence permit. Eurostat reports that, in 
2017, Poland – out of all the EU countries – issued the largest number of first resi-
dence permits to citizens of non- EU countries (683,200 or 21.8 per cent of the EU 
total), substantially more than such established immigration countries as Germany 
and the United Kingdom, not to mention France, Italy and Spain (Eurostat 2018). 
According to official Polish statistics, in 2018 the number of temporary residence 
permits – by far the largest component of all residence permits in Poland – was 
almost five times greater than in 2007 (GUS 2018a). The increase in 2007–2013, 
however, was a mere 39 per cent compared to 254 per cent in 2013–2018, which 
suggests that the massive inflow of foreigners in the latter period was a completely 
new phenomenon.
Despite such spectacular change, it would be premature to categorise Poland 
as an immigration country.1 This is because the majority of residence permits 
issued to migrants are granted for a period not exceeding one year. In contrast, 
the numbers of immigrants, sensu stricto and in accordance with the definition of 
‘immigrant’ recommended and followed by Eurostat – i.e. a person arriving in a 
country for residence longer than one year (see Note 1) – are relatively low and do 
not show a consistent rising trend. In addition, a predominant share of immigrants 
are Polish citizens, mostly returning migrants. For instance, in 2017, as many as 
209,400 immigrants arrived in Poland, of whom 132,800 were Polish citizens 
and only 76,600 were foreigners (Eurostat 2019).2 Note, too, that the stock of 
foreign residents in Poland is growing at very slow pace and is still low – in fact, 
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in relative terms (i.e. as a share of the total resident population) one of the lowest 
in the EU.3 The marginal presence of foreign citizens in Poland has resulted in a 
virtual invisibility in the public sphere of the process of immigrant integration and 
a somewhat insignificant incidence of integration failure, the more so since – at 
least until very recently – a large share of the foreigners who had settled in Poland 
had either been graduates from Polish academic institutions or had entered a Pol-
ish family through intermarriage.
This situation results, among a few other major causes, from the fact that, until 
1989, Poland as a potential place of residence was not only unattractive to foreign 
citizens but also practically inaccessible due to severe administrative restrictions. 
When, in terms of the inflow of foreign citizens, the opportunities available to 
them increased and the political and economic situation became more favourable, 
immigration was effectively hampered by the lack of earlier- established migrant 
networks.
This was in contrast to the situation of Poles who, earlier, had ventured to emi-
grate and were able to set up their ethnic communities abroad. Since the last two 
decades of the twentieth century, when the freedom to travel to foreign countries 
was established, several million Polish citizens became internationally mobile; 
however, until 2004 – the year of Poland’s accession to the European Union – the 
majority of their movements were temporary. Poland’s membership of the EU, 
entrance into the Schengen Area and access to the labour markets of a gradually 
growing number of European Economic Area countries radically changed that 
migration pattern. The outflow related to long- term residence in foreign countries 
has increasingly exceeded short- term circular movements. Moreover, despite the 
fact that, currently, the flow of emigrants is considerably lower than during the 
peak years (2005–2007), it continues to be higher than the flow of immigrants, 
according to various estimates. The total number of Poles who emigrated between 
2004 and 2017 and were still resident in other countries in 2018 is nearly 2 million 
(around 5 per cent of the total population, both in 2004 and 2018).4 Therefore, from 
any perspective, it is legitimate to perceive Poland as a country of emigration – 
in fact, one of the top European sending countries.
To sum up, a seemingly paradoxical migration situation in recent years consists 
in two opposing major tendencies of high intensity: net (long- term) emigration and 
net temporary (mostly short- term) inflows.5 This brings to mind the postwar history 
of several Western European countries which, initially and for more than two dec-
ades, experienced a large- scale inflow of temporary migrants – mainly the so- called 
guestworkers – that later transformed into long- term immigration, thus changing the 
migration status of these countries from one of net emigration to one of net immi-
gration. Analogically, one might hypothesise that, in Poland, the current inflow of 
foreigners – chiefly temporary labour – may in the next couple of decades take the 
form of predominantly long- term immigration and ultimately bring about a positive 
migration balance. An additional premise reinforcing such a hypothesis is the evolu-
tion, described earlier, of the outflows of Polish citizens over the last three decades. 
The major host countries first witnessed the mostly temporary migration of Poles, 
which then gradually and finally became mostly long term.
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A hypothesis assuming a shift in Poland’s migration balance from negative to 
positive in the predictable future seems consistent with the theory of migration 
transition. The theory in its updated6 and most elaborate form, authored by Hein 
de Haas (2010), posits that migration transition comprises of a series of relevant 
transitions and implies the existence of ‘patterned, non- linear regularities between 
the absolute and relative (vis- à- vis other regions or countries) levels of human 
development and the occurrence and relative importance of particular forms of 
(generally short- distance) internal and (generally long- distance) international 
immigration and emigration’ (2010: 22). One of these transitions assumes a turna-
bout in international migration from a negative to a positive balance. Migration 
transition in a much narrower ‘international’ meaning was first analysed by Jean- 
Claude Chesnais (1986), who argued that this phenomenon is specific to Euro-
pean countries and has its origins in a demographic transition and modernisation 
unique to Europe. He observed, however, that particular countries and regions of 
the continent differ in the timing and intensity of their migration transition; while 
Western European countries were the first to enter this process and experience its 
relatively low intensity, in the countries of Eastern Europe the transition came 
relatively late but was more intense.
Felice Dassetto (1990) identified a specific migration cycle which seems to 
aptly supplement the concept of European migration transition. As he argued, 
along with growing immigration, in a time sequence characterised by complex 
interactions between arriving foreigners, the native population and host- country 
institutions, migrants tend to gradually adapt and settle in the country. Initially, 
migrants are predominantly temporary workers who are largely marginalised and 
only loosely connected to the receiving society. Later, with the growing inflow of 
workers’ family members, there begins the settlement process and migrants’ par-
ticipation in education and public services. This stage of the cycle involves mul-
tifarious attempts by immigrants to adapt to the receiving society but it is not free 
of social tensions. It is only at the third and final stage that the immigrants become 
well- rooted in the neighbourhood and their inclusion and integration take place. 
It is conceivable, therefore, that for integration to become a social phenomenon 
requires a certain ‘critical mass’ of settled immigrants in the host country and, of 
course, a certain amount of time since the onset of systematic inflows of migrants. 
Therefore, there are good reasons, both empirical and theoretical, to expect the 
increasing immigration and solidifying of migrant ethnic communities in Poland. 
Ultimately, in the not- too- distant future, Poland may well join the group of net 
immigration countries which, at present, constitute an overwhelming majority in 
the EU (and EEA, plus Switzerland, as a whole). This presents a great challenge 
to Polish society and to policy- makers in particular who, until very recently, were 
above all preoccupied with the emigration of Poles.
In this chapter we first characterise and reflect on recent trends concerning the 
inflows of foreign citizens to Poland, highlighting their forms, intensity, pace and 
national composition. In this way, we can identify the major challenges faced 
by Poland, both now and in the years to come. Next, we attempt to describe and 
systematise the main directions taken by and contents of Polish immigration and 
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migrant integration policies since the latter were first initiated. In so doing, we 
examine the extent to which migration- related policies addressed the respective 
challenges and their accuracy and effectiveness. Finally, we present selected 
‘good practices’ developed thus far in the area of immigration and integration 
policies.
The flows and categories of foreign residents in Poland  
as a ‘subject’ of public policy7
In order to understand how Poland, as a ‘traditional’ emigration country, currently 
hosts the largest number – among all EU countries – of newly arriving foreign (be 
they only temporary) residents, we have to look back to the period when ideologi-
cally motivated barriers to the inflow (and, above all, the outflow) of migrants 
were lifted. The turning point in this respect seems to be the start of political and 
economic transition around 1990.
At that time, according to administrative registers, approximately 20,000 
foreign citizens were resident in Poland (0.5 persons per 1,000 inhabitants), a 
great majority of them originating from former communist countries (mainly the 
USSR) and married to a Polish citizen.8 Annually Poland admitted a mere 1,000–
2,000 immigrants, a majority of them ethnic Poles. Inflows of migrant workers 
and asylum- seekers were virtually nonexistent. Even short visits by foreign tour-
ists were relatively rare and citizens of ex- communist countries and Westerners of 
Polish descent prevailed among the visitors.
The situation started to change rapidly in 1989. People all around Eastern 
Europe were granted the freedom to travel abroad. Already, in that year, the inflow 
of visitors from the region to Poland increased by 40 per cent to around 9 million. 
In 1990 this figure doubled and, by 1991, reached 37 million. By the end of the 
decade, Poland had recorded nearly 90 million visits of foreigners, mostly the citi-
zens of the ex- German Democratic Republic, the ex- Soviet Union, Romania and 
Bulgaria. Such a tremendously strong inflow from other post- communist coun-
tries was spurred on and facilitated by the existence of bilateral agreements on the 
visa- free movement of persons – agreements which were previously concluded 
between the Soviet satellite countries but which remained ineffective in practice 
until 1989. Although, initially, the great majority of foreigners visited Poland for 
just a few days, most of them did so for reasons other than tourism, company 
business or a brief family reunion. ‘False tourists’, as they were usually referred 
to in the specialised literature, came to earn money and improve their livelihood 
in the home countries by engaging in petty trade on flea markets in numerous Pol-
ish towns. They also took on odd jobs or did whatever else was profitable. Over 
the course of time, these visits, especially those of Ukrainian migrants, recurred 
and became longer in duration and increasingly ‘regular’ work- or settlement- 
oriented. It has been argued (Okólski 2006) that ‘false tourism’, especially in the 
form of the circulation of petty traders (who decreased in number from the late 
1990s), turned out to be the vehicle for a variety of foreigner movements into 
Poland, including immigration.
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Indeed, between 1989 and the early years of the twenty- first century, the coun-
try saw arrivals of foreign citizens representing a wide range of strategies and 
forms of migration virtually never before observed in Poland. Apart from the 
slowly subsiding wave of short- term circular travellers from the former com-
munist countries, the largest group of incoming foreigners consisted of people 
granted permits for temporary residence (from 3–11 months’ duration). Many of 
them were work- permit holders. Nevertheless, the annual numbers of arrivals, 
though consistently increasing, remained relatively small at between 10,000 and 
less than 30,000 persons. Immigration (conceived as an arrival for permanent resi-
dence), after a sudden rise to 5,000 persons in 1991, grew slowly to reach 9,500 in 
2004; it continued to mostly include Polish citizens who did not figure as residents 
on the administrative registers. To be sure, the number of incoming foreigners 
granted permits to settle was also growing but remained very low (between 2,000 
and 3,000 a year).
In addition to foreigners who benefited from work permits, the other temporary 
residents included students and a large (though difficult to estimate) number of 
persons who engaged in irregular employment. With regard to foreign students, 
their enrollment rose from around 1,000 in the early 1990s to 1,700 in the aca-
demic year 2000/2001 and to 3,600 in 2006/2007. The stock of these students in 
the latter year approached 12,000.
Poland also became a transit country for various groups of undocumented 
migrants who, as a rule, headed for Germany or another Western European 
country. Some were asylum- seekers, usually assisted by networks of smugglers, 
although the majority were economic migrants from Eastern European countries 
who, after entering Poland from the east or the south, which was easy and per-
fectly legal, ventured the illegal crossing of the German- Polish border. As far as 
the arrival of asylum- seekers is concerned, it had all begun already in 1990, two 
years before the ratification by Poland of the 1951 Geneva Convention on refu-
gees. Between 1991 and 1995, Poland recorded a few hundred application per 
year; between 1996 and 1999 the respective numbers were between 3,000 and 
3,500 but, from then on, a steady rise of applications was observed, culminating 
in around 8,000 in 2004.
Migrants going to Poland after 1990 represented a large and growing variety of 
home countries. Those who obtained work permits were clustered in three major 
groups; the first (and by far the largest) included three countries of the ex- Soviet 
Union (Ukraine, Russia and Belarus), the second, five Western countries (Ger-
many, the United Kingdom, France, the USA and Italy), and the third, five Asian 
countries (Vietnam, China, Turkey, India and South Korea). Around the year 
2000, permits granted to citizens of these 13 countries accounted for more than 70 
per cent of the total, with Ukrainians having the largest share (13.5 per cent of the 
total). The majority of irregular workers, predominantly from Ukraine, developed 
a specific pattern of short- term pendular movements (usually adhering to an up- 
to- three- month legal sojourn in Poland, in accordance with the pre- 1990 bilateral 
agreement on visa- free travel, discussed earlier), while migrants from more remote 
countries, such as Vietnam or Armenia, became clandestine residents, often for 
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several years. The national composition of transit migrants gradually changed; in 
the early 1990s, Romanians and Bulgarians were the clear leaders; later came the 
citizens of Somalia, Armenia, Vietnam, Iran, Iraq and China and, in the second 
half of that decade, the citizens of Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and India (in 
addition to Vietnamese and Iraqis). With regards to asylum- seekers, they could 
be divided into two distinct groups – one comprised of people fleeing turmoil 
or civil war in their countries of origin, notably refugees from Bosnia, Armenia, 
Albania, Afghanistan and, from 2000 onwards, Chechnya, whereas another group 
was made up of ‘false refugees’ – those who, after being apprehended during 
illegal transit through Poland, applied for refugee status. Initially Romanians con-
stituted the largest nationality in this group but, from the mid- 1990s on, migrants 
from Asia and the Middle East took the lead. The migratory inflows also included 
growing numbers of returning Polish citizens whose emigration in earlier years 
had not been recorded, and ethnic Poles from Kazakhstan and several other suc-
cessor countries of the ex- Soviet Union.
It is worth mentioning that the process of settlement of non- Polish immigrants 
was on a small scale and at a slow pace. A major pathway leading to settlement in 
the 1990s was that of mixed (binational) marriages, concluded usually between 
Polish males and foreign women, among whom citizens of Ukraine, Belarus, Rus-
sia, Vietnam and Armenia predominated (between 1990 and 2000, the number 
of these unions increased to 11,600).9 Nevertheless, the population census car-
ried out in December 2002 revealed a surprisingly low number of foreigners – 
62,900 – who lived in Poland as long- term (over 12 months) or permanent (with 
no time limit) residents. This was about three times more than in 1990 but still 
much less than 1 per cent of the total population.
All in all, such a newly acquired and, indeed, impressive diversity of inflows to 
Poland notwithstanding, we can conclude that, around 2004, the year of Poland’s 
accession to the EU, the in- migration of foreign citizens was still relatively very 
low. It is true that the country did not offer attractive opportunities to immigrants, 
either in terms of demand for labour or the level of social security. The situation 
changed substantially after 2004 when, over a very short period, approximately 
2 million relatively young Poles left their country to seek employment in other 
EU countries, the influx of new cohorts to the domestic supply of labour shrank 
and, on top of that, the economy started to bloom. Year by year, in various parts of 
the country and in some sectors of its economy, and with growing strength, there 
emerged labour deficits. In order to cope with these deficits, the government intro-
duced, on 1 August 2007, a new form of inflow of foreign workers. The citizens 
of three countries, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, became eligible for entry and 
employment in Poland without applying for a work permit. Upon a company’s 
declaration of intention to employ a given foreigner (submitted to the local labour 
authorities), he or she was allowed to stay and work in the country for up to three 
months within a six- month period. As this regulation turned out to be somewhat 
ineffective,10 an amended version entered into force on 1 February 2008; the dura-
tion of stay and work of a foreigner was extended to up to six months within a 
12- month period. During the first 12 months that this regulation was in force, as 
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many as 163,000 ‘declarations of employment’ were recorded. Additionally, in 
2009, the citizens of Moldova entered the category of eligible foreign workers, 
joined, in 2010, by citizens of Georgia and, in 2014, citizens of Armenia. The out-
come of all this was a rapid and spectacular increase in employment declarations. 
Although, until 2011, the number of declarations did not exceed 200,000, by 2014 
it approached 400,000 and, in 2015, 800,000. In 2016, approximately 1.3 million 
declarations were recorded and, in 2017, 1.8 million. It is estimated that the latter 
number of declarations resulted in the actual employment of as many as 1.1 mil-
lion foreigners.
Apart from the fast- growing presence of migrant workers on the Polish labour 
market, facilitated by the new employment declarations procedure, work per-
mits issued to foreign citizens also increased significantly. Their number was 
still very low in 2008 (18,000); however, from 2009 this number increased and 
reached 36,600 in 2010 and 65,800 in 2015. The years 2016 and 2017 saw a vehe-
ment acceleration in the process and the respective figures reached 127,400 and 
235,600.
Note that many thousands more foreign citizens are also present in Poland’s 
economy, either self- employed or employees who, according to the law, do not 
need any permission to work in Poland. The latter pertains in particular to the 
citizens of EU countries and representatives of certain professions (e.g. scientists) 
or residence status (e.g. students). However, these estimates conceal statistics 
for foreign workers who remain in an irregular situation and whose number – 
believed to be relatively high – cannot be precisely determined. In effect, Poland, 
currently officially a net emigration country, may be hosting more foreign workers 
than the number of Polish citizens actually working abroad.
Apart from migration for work, some other types of inflow also displayed a 
tendency to increase. For instance, new admissions of foreign students rose from 
around 3,000 in 2004 to more than 20,000 in 2017, while the stock of foreign 
students went from 13,000 to 74,000. In the academic year 2017/2018, citizens 
of foreign countries accounted for 5.6 per cent of all persons studying in Pol-
ish universities. Less impressive and, in fact, highly erratic was the inflow of 
asylum- seekers. Between 2004 and 2017, foreigners submitted 128,500 applica-
tions for some kind of protection (on average 9,000 per year); the peak period was 
2012–2016 although, in 2017, the number of applications declined dramatically. 
It is worth noting that a majority of administrative procedures related to those 
applications had to be discontinued due to the ‘disappearance’ of the asylum- 
seeker. The strategy followed by persons who had recently requested international 
protection in Poland did not differ from that of their predecessors in the 1990s. 
For most of them, Poland was a short stop and a transit country on a journey to 
Western Europe.
With the distinct exception of the inflow of asylum- seekers, Ukrainians were 
the largest and increasing category of nationals. They dominated the numbers of 
incoming long- term residents (23 per cent in 2017), of foreigners granted first 
residence permit (87 per cent in 2016), of those to whom employment declara-
tions were issued (94 per cent in 2017), of work- permit holders (82 per cent in 
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2017) and of foreign students (52 per cent in 2017). The inflows of persons from 
most other countries also increased in absolute numbers but to a lesser degree 
than that from Ukraine. In effect, it seems appropriate to speak about the ‘Ukrai-
nisation’ of recent immigration to Poland. Having pointed out this phenomenon, 
it is worth highlighting a newly emerging trend related to the situation in the 
Polish labour market: its increasing demand for foreign workers. This trend was 
initiated in 2016 and accelerated in 2017 – in other words, 2017 saw a dramatic 
rise in the number of work permits granted to citizens of countries which, in 
the past had not played a significant role in the inflow of foreign labour. For 
example, the number of permits for citizens of Azerbaijan increased by 592 per 
cent, of Nepal by 484 per cent, of Bangladesh by 235 per cent and of India by 
122 per cent.
By the end of 2017 as many as 325,000 foreign citizens possessed a residence 
permit, of whom nearly 25 per cent were entitled to stay in Poland indefinitely 
and 75 per cent had temporary residence status. The actual stock of documented 
immigrants was even larger, because work- permit holders whose entry visa was 
valid did not need a residence permit and were not included in these statistics. 
Bearing in mind that, at the time of the population census in 2002, approximately 
74,000 foreigners (and around 95,000 in 2011) possessed a residence permit, we 
can see that not only did inflows of foreign citizens increase substantially but the 
stock of foreign residents also became much larger. Moreover, many symptoms 
indicate a slowly growing trend towards the settlement in Poland of migrating 
foreign citizens. All this notwithstanding, we have to admit, as we argued in the 
introductory part of this chapter, that Poland, with slightly less than 1 per cent of 
foreign residents out of the total population, is still among the EU countries with 
the lowest shares of such residents.
This description of the evolution of migration to Poland over the last three 
decades brings us to the following conclusions. During the past 30 years or so 
of the development of a democratic society and a market economy the country, 
though trying to catch up with the West, still lags behind other countries in many 
respects – including, among others, its attractiveness to international migrants. 
Since 1989 and, for a large part of the period from then to the present day, the most 
sizeable (and quite massive, at that) groups of foreigners entered Poland either 
because the country was a convenient transit area on their way to a Western desti-
nation or because it was relatively easy (and inexpensive) to circulate and engage 
in various profitable activities such as petty trade or short- term employment in 
the shadow economy. Thus, at least during the early decades of the transition, 
this presented a clear challenge to the Polish government as far as the protection 
and control of state borders were concerned and the prevention of the irregular 
residence and employment of foreign visitors. As we pointed out earlier, already 
by the early 1990s Poland was experiencing many other kinds of migratory move-
ment but these involved relatively small numbers of foreigners. In fact, we could 
say that these inflows smoothed the way for future, more numerous, migrations 
and only occasionally resulted in the setting up of small migrant communities all 
over the country.
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Immigration in the period that began with Poland’s accession to the EU, through 
developments in its labour market and the economy in general, was somehow 
inversely related to the emigration of Polish citizens. The economy grew rapidly, 
unemployment declined and, eventually, an unsatisfied demand for labour became 
evident in some sectors of the economy and certain regions which had suffered 
particularly from a massive outflow of Poles. In response, the period 2014–2017 
especially saw the arrival in Poland of large and growing numbers of migrant 
workers, many of whom ceased to be seasonal or short- term labour. Ultimately, 
compared to other EU countries, Poland became one of the largest migrant- worker 
receiving economies. Within a very short time- span, the migration- related focus 
of the government shifted from a preoccupation with the emigration of Polish citi-
zens and the control of irregular foreigners entering and staying in the country to 
a concern to fill the gaps in the labour market by bringing in adequate numbers of 
migrants with the required skills and, ultimately, successfully integrating masses 
of arriving foreigners. The next part of this chapter is devoted to ways in which 
the Polish government faced the challenges this posed.
Poland’s policies in real life, in light of international 
commitments and specific Polish challenges:  
evolution and the present state
In the years after the Second World War, Poland, like other former ‘Eastern Bloc’ 
states, carried out a different migration policy to most Western European coun-
tries. Migration to and from democratic countries was almost entirely blocked. 
Migration within the ‘Eastern Bloc’ was also limited, despite bilateral agreements 
between communist countries. Between 1945 and 1989, Polish migration policy 
can be described as having been very restrictive. Its aim was to strictly control 
and limit all migration flows (Okólski 2010). Low numbers of immigrants and 
a specific approach focused mostly on minimising migration led to a situation 
where institutions and regulations managing migration were hardly necessary 
(Stola 2010).
The fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 led to the democratisation of state insti-
tutions and policies. It was also a breakthrough moment in immigration policy 
because relatively liberal entry rules for former ‘Eastern Bloc’ states’ citizens 
caused a rapid inflow of foreigners, mostly from neighbouring former Soviet 
countries. The fear of an uncontrolled inflow of foreigners and the challenges 
of the political, social and economic transition at the time played a crucial role 
in the government’s approach to immigration policy. Not surprisingly, given the 
temporary character of immigration, security and border management became 
its priorities (Duszczyk and Lesińska 2010). This gave rise to the argument that 
immigration and the integration of foreigners were not the government’s prior-
ity in times of political, social and economic transition (Łodziński 1997). Even 
after Poland joined the European Union in 2004 and the country became more 
attractive to foreigners from neighbouring non- EU states, politicians and public 
opinion focused more on the economic migration of Poles to the so- called old EU 
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countries than on the immigration of foreigners into Poland and their integration 
(Duszczyk and Góra 2012).
It is also important to mention that Poland did not develop a clear institutional 
structure responsible for migration policy. From the early 1990s, the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs (now the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration) played 
a central role in shaping immigration policy; however, the task was carried out by 
inter- ministerial teams and commissions without clear and consistent objectives 
or division of responsibilities. The Ministry of Labour and Social Policy (now the 
Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy) became responsible for foreigners’ 
employment and integration although, in practice, the lack of a clear hierarchy 
and cooperation between inter- ministerial bodies caused chaos and ministries 
conducted their tasks independently (Lesińska et al. 2010). The Polish parlia-
ment did not play an active role in shaping immigration and migrant integration 
policies. Nor was the contribution of the President of Poland significant, at least 
until late 2014, when a taskforce devoted to migration and migration policy was 
created to discuss the effects of the influx of foreigners to Poland and their integra-
tion and employment (see KPRP 2015). As a result of this initiative, various rep-
resentatives of Polish public, social and economic life took part in a debate titled 
‘Poland’s migration policy in view of demographic challenges’ and discussed 
activities which could contribute to a better integration of foreigners settling in 
Poland. With reference to demographic issues, it is important to mention the activ-
ities of the Government Population Council – an advisory body of the President 
of the Council of Ministers (the Prime Minister) – responsible for submitting an 
annual report on the demographic situation of Poland and for, among other things, 
examining current migratory trends and suggesting government activities in the 
area of migration policy.
As far as migration management in ‘real life’ is concerned, the responsibilities 
of government agencies are highly dispersed and poorly coordinated. The institu-
tions dealing with administrative proceedings in the area of migrant residency 
status are the Office for Foreigners in the area of asylum applications, the Refugee 
Board as an appeal body in the area of asylum procedures and the Voivodeship 
Offices11 in the area of residency not related to asylum. Moreover, the responsi-
bility for conducting proceedings regarding permission to stay for humanitarian 
reasons and entry/exit procedures are entrusted to the Border Guards. On the other 
hand, the implementation of migrant integration programmes is commissioned 
out to local government agencies – Family Support Centres and Social Offices – 
and nongovernmental organisations.
Although Polish immigration and integration policies are often seen as closely 
connected and the latter is sometimes perceived as a part of the former (KPRP 
2015), these policies address different problems. Immigration policy regulates 
entry/exit rules and procedures and the legality of foreigners’ stay and employ-
ment; it also prevents and combats illegal phenomena related to migration. More-
over, asylum policy is often considered as a part of immigration policy. On the 
other hand, integration policy deals with the issues related to mutual relations 
between the host society and foreigners, including their socio- economic, cultural, 
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legal and political integration. In the case of Poland, the policy presented in the 
next section was often treated, especially at the beginning of its evolution, as a 
supplement to immigration policy and was not explicit. Nonetheless, the evolu-
tion of both policies after 1989 was far from linear. To highlight the differences 
in the development of immigration and integration policies, they are presented 
separately in the next section.
Poland’s immigration policy
The evolution of immigration policy has been aptly outlined by Lesińska et al. 
(2011) by means of its periodisation. The authors distinguished three phases: 
‘institutionalisation’ (1989–2001), ‘Europeanisation’ (2001–2004) and ‘stabilisa-
tion’ (after 2004). A similar but updated periodisation – divided into four phases – 
was proposed by Łodziński and Szonert (2016). The first phase (1989–1997) 
was related to the democratisation of the country. The second (1998–2004) was 
characterised by the gradual harmonisation of migration- related Polish laws and 
regulations with those at the European Union level. The third phase (2005–2015) 
was described as a period of maturation of immigration policy, with stable regula-
tions, whereas the fourth and final phase (after 2015) was considered transitory 
and was marked by the migration and refugee crisis. In view of both these perio-
disations, the evolution of immigration policy was somewhat slow and resulted 
equally strongly from Poland’s international commitments and the situations it 
had to face at particular moments.
Apart from slight differences in the time division adopted in the periodisations 
referred to earlier, the first decade after the onset of political transition of 1989 
could be characterised as the implementation of new laws regulating different 
fields of migration. Poland had to implement many acts of law and international 
agreements – with, inter alia the UN 1951 Refugee Convention signed in 1991, 
bilateral agreements on readmission and visa- free regimes with some Schengen 
Zone countries or the 1997 Act on Aliens as the most important ones (Duszczyk 
and Lesińska 2010). As mentioned earlier, the priority for the Polish authorities at 
that time was to control the situation at the borders. Poland, as a transit country on 
the migratory route from east to west was exposed to massive illegal immigration 
and this is why strengthening and protecting borders was the most important task 
within the field of migration (Okólski 2010).
Only after Poland had mastered this complicated situation at the borders and 
implemented the necessary laws regulating entry procedures could the process 
of unifying Polish law with European standards begin. Accession to the Euro-
pean Union became the top priority and the main driver of legal changes in the 
area of migration- related policies. As Kicinger and Koryś noticed, this situa-
tion ‘led to a paradox: attempting to create migration policy before there was 
a real need for it, in terms of immigrant numbers’ (2011: 347). Due to the low 
numbers of foreigners migrating to and settling in Poland, Polish immigration 
policy mostly took shape in response to pressure from the European Union, not 
because of the state administration’s need to have and implement that kind of 
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policy. The 2001 amendment to the Act on Aliens and the 2003 Act on Granting 
Protection to Aliens within the Territory of the Republic of Poland can serve 
as examples. Both acts led to the implementation into Polish law of regula-
tions already known in the European Union, although immigration policy was 
still not a political issue in Poland. Polish immigration policy was quite a reac-
tive one and depended on international obligations and external factors. The 
specific, mostly temporary, character of immigration to Poland and the very 
low number of asylum- seekers meant that the regulations in force did not cor-
respond with the actual needs of that time. Moreover, during negotiations with 
the EU, the priority for the Polish authorities was the free movement of workers 
and access to the EU labour markets for Polish citizens – not potential immigra-
tion to Poland.
On 1 May 2004 Poland became a European Union member- country and entered 
a period described as a time of mature immigration policy with stable regula-
tions. Declining unemployment, a significant outflow of people from Poland in 
the first years after accession to other EU countries and a new, strict visa regime 
for third- country nationals caused workforce shortages in some sectors of the Pol-
ish economy. To manage the new situation, Poland opened its labour market to 
migrants (Babakova 2018; Duszczyk et al. 2018). Regulations regarding labour 
immigration, which had existed since 1989, were rather restrictive and often led to 
the illegal employment of foreigners – mostly from Ukraine and other post- Soviet 
states – who had entered Poland thanks to non- visa or short- term visa regimes 
(Kicinger and Koryś 2011). In response to growing labour shortages, the first sea-
sonal migrant- worker scheme was created in 2007. The European Neighbourhood 
Policy also played a significant role in liberalising entry rules in the years follow-
ing (Babakova 2018). Since then, workers from countries with cultural and geo-
graphical ties to Poland became eligible for employment in Poland on preferential 
terms. This situation is an example of an immigration policy which is not proac-
tive but, rather, responds to challenges arising. Another important regulation – 
the Act on the Polish Charter – came into power in 2008, thanks to which all citi-
zens from the former Soviet- Union states who declared and could prove affiliation 
to the Polish nation could receive the Polish Charter, a document which allows 
foreigners access, among others, to the labour market and education on terms 
similar to those for Polish citizens.
The year 2012 brought a breakthrough in Poland’s immigration policy. That year 
Migration Policy of Poland: Its Present State and Proposed Activities, the first 
strategic document regarding immigration and integration policy, was approved 
by the government. This document and its later implementation were important 
steps in the creation of a new approach to immigration policy. The government 
attempted to determine responsibilities and allot the respective tasks among the 
various ministries and institutions, and to systematically evaluate progress in the 
implementation of policy targets. Nevertheless, the migration policy document 
was widely criticised, mostly by NGOs, for being too general, not defining spe-
cific solutions to particular problems and not securing the necessary human and 
financial resources (HFPCz 2014; SIP 2014).
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Another breakthrough in the evolution of Polish immigration policy was 
closely related to the migration and refugee crisis of 2015 and the following mas-
sive inflow of foreigners into European Union countries. The rapidly changing 
migration situation in Europe caused immigration rules and the presence of for-
eigners to become the most important policy concern and topic of public debate 
in many European countries, including Poland. For the first time in the history 
of democratic Poland, the subject of immigration came to the fore in political 
and public debate during presidential and parliamentary elections. The migra-
tion and refugee crisis became one of the main problems and topics of political 
dispute, even though mass migration from the Middle East and African countries 
did not affect Poland. Initially, when the Law and Justice party came to power in 
late 2015, Beata Szydło, the Prime Minister of the new right- wing government, 
ensured that her cabinet would honour all decisions and agreements regarding 
the European relocation scheme adopted by the previous centrists. The growing 
political and social dispute on immigration and refugees and the increasing tem-
perature of the rhetoric changed the situation. After the terrorist attack in Brussels 
in March 2016, Prime Minister Szydło openly rejected any possibility of partici-
pation in relocation. Moreover, some media, including the public ones, started an 
Islamophobic discourse and portrayed asylum- seekers entering Europe as a threat 
not only to the Polish nation but also to European culture (Jaskułowski 2019). 
Despite a significant change in rhetoric and attitude towards European solidarity 
and the relocation scheme, it is worth mentioning that the previous government 
led by the Civic Platform Party was hesitant about whether Poland should accept 
asylum- seekers. As Pędziwiatr and Legut (2016) noticed, the then Prime Minister, 
Ewa Kopacz, and her centrist government were very passive and reactive during 
the development of the relocation plan.
Withdrawal from the EU relocation scheme was not the only activity designed 
to stop the inflow of asylum- seekers into Poland. From mid- 2015, increasing 
numbers of alarming incidents were reported at the Polish- Belarusian border, 
across which most asylum- seekers were entering Poland. In many cases, foreign-
ers arriving at the Terespol check point and declaring that they sought refuge were 
denied entry by officers of the Border Guard. Whereas NGOs that assist foreigners 
in Poland argued that many of them – mostly Chechens and Tajiks – were indeed 
asking for asylum, Border Guard officials rejected such allegations and claimed 
that a majority of them did not express the will to seek international protection 
(Klaus et al. 2018). This situation continued in subsequent years and probably 
became one of the main reasons for the sharp decrease in the number of applica-
tions for refugee status in Poland – from approximately 12,300 in 2015 to 4,100 
in 2018 (UdSC 2019).
Another shift in immigration policy took place in October 2016, when the 
aforementioned strategic document Migration Policy of Poland: Its Present State 
of Play and Proposed Activities was annulled. As an argument, Jakub Skiba – 
Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration – stated that 
the document was out of date because of the new situation in Europe caused by 
the migration and refugee crisis. Skiba criticised the previous, pro- multicultural 
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approach, raised security considerations and emphasised terrorist threats caused – 
in his opinion – by the massive inflow of foreigners of the Islamic faith into 
Europe (Stefańska and Szulecka 2016). It took almost a year and a half before 
the government issued a document called Socio- Economic Priorities of Migra-
tion Policy – intended as the outline of a new immigration strategy. According to 
the document – which is still quite general in character and only briefly describes 
new policy goals and directions, as well as related activities – the focus of this 
new strategy is almost entirely the priorities of the labour market – its needs and 
protection. Foreigners are seen mostly as a source of human capital which can fill 
gaps and smooth over mismatches on the Polish labour market. Any new strategy 
should also ensure an increase in the return migration of foreigners and attract 
Polish citizens and foreigners with Polish roots to work and settle in Poland (MIiR 
2018). The plan was to publish more detailed solutions in a comprehensive action 
plan up to mid- 2018 but, by the beginning of 2019, Poland still had no elaborate 
immigration strategy. A shift in the priorities of immigration policy towards for-
eigners with Polish roots was already visible in the 2016 amendment to the Act on 
the Polish Charter. Thanks to the new law, Polish Charter- holders became privi-
leged in the naturalisation procedure and could obtain access to special financial 
support for subsistence.
Poland’s integration policy
As mentioned earlier, Polish decision- makers often perceive integration policy 
as an integral part of or as closely connected to immigration policy. In fact, 
especially at the beginning, the evolution of the former depended on the immi-
gration policy- building process. The nature of migration into Poland – mostly 
short- term – had an important influence, as did access to EU financial means 
allotted to integration activities; the involvement of the nongovernmental sec-
tor also played a role in shaping integration policy. All these factors resulted in 
integration policy, although closely related to immigration policy, evolving in a 
slightly different way.
The beginnings of Poland’s integration policy – which could be characterised 
as an attempt to cope with the new migration situation – were very similar to the 
first phase of its immigration policy evolution. Huge challenges in almost every 
aspect of the functioning of the country and the low number of foreigners, espe-
cially those who wished to settle in Poland, led to a situation in which integration 
policy was not seen as a crucial state activity. Legal changes in this field were lim-
ited to narrow groups of repatriates, asylum- seekers and foreigners being granted 
refugee status.
The first challenges requiring some kind of integration activity on the part of 
the Polish government appeared in 1990, when a group of asylum- seekers were 
deported from Sweden to Poland.12 A lack of legal regulations regarding asylum 
and integration pushed the Polish administration to start work on this subject but, 
first, ad hoc integration activities were undertaken by local authorities and NGOs, 
with cooperation from the Swedish Red Cross (Florczak 2003). A similarly 
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reactive attitude was observable in 1994, when a group of asylum- seekers from 
the former Yugoslavia (mostly Bosnians) arrived in Poland. Thanks to the support 
of the UNHCR (the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees) and of the Polish Humanitarian Action, two programmes – covering adapta-
tion and integration – were prepared. The first was directed at those foreigners 
who did not wish to stay in Poland but preferred to return to their home country. 
The second was addressed to those who intended to settle in Poland, and assured 
support in learning the Polish language and labour- market activation. After a few 
months, however, most foreigners decided to terminate the programme and to 
leave Poland (Florczak 2003).
From the beginning, responsibility for the integration of foreigners was taken 
by NGOs and local authorities. The first initiative to prepare an integration pro-
gramme for foreigners was undertaken in 1991 by the Catholic University of 
Lublin – the so- called Lublin programme, which was a local pilot integration 
programme offering free access to Polish language courses with elements of Pol-
ish culture, vocational and housekeeping courses and financial benefits up to 12 
months for a group of 40 refugees. Unfortunately, despite reasonable forms of 
support, the programme failed because no one wished to participate (Florczak 
2003). Another, similar, initiative was undertaken in 1996 by the Centre for For-
eigners in Podkowa Leśna- Dębak. An ‘Individual Adaptation Programme’ was 
offered to foreigners who were granted refugee status in Poland. The main aim 
of the programme was to provide financial benefits, free Polish language courses 
and assistance in finding accommodation and employment. Activities were pro-
vided by NGOs cooperating with the Centre for Foreigners in Podkowa Leśna- 
Dębak and were available for 15 months (Florczak 2003). Although the Individual 
Adaptation Programme helped to set up a country- wide integration programme 
for the future, it was deemed unsuccessful, because most refugees treated it, above 
all, as financial help to continue their migration to richer countries in the West 
(Łodziński and Ząbek 2008).
These examples show that the integration policy could be characterised in its 
evolution as a collection of ad hoc measures directed to a very narrow group of 
foreigners – asylum- seekers and those who received refugee status in Poland. 
Moreover, most of the field activities were carried out not by the administration 
but by NGOs.
The year 2000 brought important changes in the integration policy. An amend-
ment to the Act of Social Assistance introduced individual integration pro-
grammes (IIP), the first sustainable element of the integration policy in Poland. 
Within the framework of the IIP, foreigners granted refugee status could benefit 
from special integration support provided by the Family Support Centers (local 
government institutions responsible for social assistance). The IIP, lasting for 12 
months, included financial benefits for subsistence and Polish language classes, 
specialised social counselling and health insurance (Wach 2018). Integration pro-
grammes became a core element of the integration policy but were directed only 
at a narrow group of foreigners. In addition, the institutions initially responsible 
for their implementation were not prepared to handle this task, therefore the main 
Immigration and integration policies, Poland 161
responsibility for the integration of other categories of migrants still remained on 
the shoulders of NGOs and local administration.
As it turned out, Poland’s accession to the European Union was a key factor in 
creating the country’s integration policy. Since 2004, the European Refugee Fund 
(ERF)13 immediately became the main source of financing for NGOs and their 
activities with asylum- seekers and refugees. Also, the EQUAL Community Ini-
tiative Programme14 helped to finance and build initial cooperation between insti-
tutions and organisations working on the integration of foreigners. The lack of 
staff experienced in the integration of foreigners and the low number of subjects 
capable of collaborating and meeting the complex rules of project implementation 
limited the programme’s impact but helped to establish the foundations for future 
integration projects (Wach 2018).
Programmes and projects undertaken between 2000 and 2008, with increas-
ing European funds as a main source of financing integration, influenced further 
development. In the following years Poland, despite the low numbers of asylum- 
seekers entering the country – who often treated Poland only as a step on their 
journey westward – implemented a new type of subsidiary protection status intro-
duced in the European Union in 2004.15 This new category of international protec-
tion, implemented into Polish law in 2008 by the amendment to the act on granting 
protection to foreigners within the territory of the Republic of Poland, caused 
changes not only to the Polish asylum system but also to its integration policy. 
With the 2008 amendment to the Act on Social Assistance foreigners granted not 
only refugee status but also subsidiary protection status could benefit from IIPs. 
In 2014 another amendment to the Act on Social Assistance extended the group 
of foreigners entitled to support in the framework of the IIP by including foreign-
ers with temporary residency, granted to them on the basis of family reunification 
with refugee status or subsidiary protection holders.
The number of foreigners entitled to IIPs, however, was marginal compared 
to the total number of foreigners who could expect to receive such support. As 
in the previous period, the government decided to use European funds as the 
main source of finance for integration projects for foreigners other than refu-
gees. It also entrusted these activities to NGOs (Babis 2012). From 2008, NGOs 
and local authorities were able to finance their projects from the new edition of 
the European Refugee Fund directed at refugees and asylum- seekers, as well as 
from the European Integration Fund (EIF) for non- EU immigrants (EIF)16 aimed 
at third- country nationals other than forced migrants. Thanks to new sources of 
financing, NGOs provided a wide spectrum of integration activities and consid-
erably enriched the still weak integration offers. On the other hand, the Polish 
government exerted no real control over these activities and did not feel any 
pressure to improve the existing and introduce new forms of integration pro-
grammes. Furthermore, for the government, European funds were to remain as 
the principal source of financing for its integration policy (Pawlak and Matusz- 
Protasiewicz 2015).
The Migration Policy of Poland, adopted by the government in 2012, included 
some elements concerning migrant integration policy. The document examined 
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the already functioning instruments and programmes and highlighted the domi-
nant role of NGOs as stakeholders responsible for the integration of foreigners. 
Moreover, it was proposed to increase the role of NGOs in the integration system. 
European funds, as before, were seen as the main source of financing integra-
tion activities. As already mentioned, the implementation of the recommendations 
included in the document was assigned to various government agencies.
Although Migration Policy of Poland included general guidelines for integra-
tion policy, the following year, 2013, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy – 
responsible within the government for the integration of foreigners – presented 
another strategic document entitled Polish Immigrants Integration Policy: 
Assumptions and Guidelines. The document was intended to specify and opera-
tionalise those tasks of integration policy included in Migration Policy of Poland. 
It also postulated the extension of IIPs, strengthening housing and labour market 
support, among others; finally, however, it was not accepted by the government.
Like Poland’s immigration policy, the 2015 migration and refugee crisis played 
an important role in shaping the country’s integration policy. The crisis, which 
coincided with the parliamentary elections and change of government in Poland, 
resulted in regress rather than further development of the integration policy. The 
change of rhetoric in politics and the rising presence of extreme- right- wing move-
ments in the media and the public sphere are seen by some experts as factors rein-
forcing Islamophobia, anti- refugee sentiment and even hate crime (see Pędziwiatr 
2017; Piela and Łukjanowicz 2018). As one opinion poll showed, the fraction of 
Poles who opposed the acceptance of refugees in Poland almost tripled follow-
ing the change of government – from 21 per cent in May 2015 to 60 per cent in 
June 2018 (Bożewich 2018). The rapidly worsening atmosphere and conditions 
became unfavourable like never before to the integration of foreigners. Moreover, 
as mentioned earlier, in late 2016 the new migration situation in Europe prompted 
the government of the Law and Justice Party to cancel the official migration policy 
document. Evidently, the government’s interest in building an integration policy 
was reduced to a marginal level. The biggest threat to the system of foreigners’ 
integration appeared with the emergence of the new Asylum, Migration and Inte-
gration Fund (AMIF)17 which replaced ERF and EIF, hitherto the main sources 
of financing for NGOs. The ensuing stricter national rules introduced in 2015 for 
granting subsidies caused problems for many organisations in obtaining financial 
resources. This situation negatively affected most NGOs and limited their activi-
ties (Kosowicz 2015). Soon after the Law and Justice Party came into power, any 
ongoing calls for subsidies were cancelled and, later, the AMIF was suspended for 
NGOs (Koss- Goryszewska and Pawlak 2018). This caused a situation in which, 
due to a shortage of funding, NGOs were compelled to limit or even terminate 
their programmes.
In sum, since 1989 immigration and integration policies in Poland have been 
almost entirely built according not to a purposeful, long- term strategy but, rather, 
in an ad hoc fashion. Both central and local levels of governance expressed lit-
tle or no interest in immigration and integration policies (Łodziński and Szonert 
2016). Moreover, integration policy was often treated merely as a supplement 
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to or a part of the country’s policy on immigration. Currently, both policies are 
at the stage when, after almost three decades of slow but steady evolution, it is 
still not clear whether the central administration would like to continue on from 
previous developments or change the policies entirely and set new priorities. 
Moreover, Poland’s integration policy continues to be seen only as a part of a 
wider and all- embracing migration policy, despite the fact that quite different 
factors affect its evolution and content (e.g. the impact of NGOs and local gov-
ernments or specific sources of funding). It is also given a relatively low priority 
on the government agenda (Koss- Goryszewska and Pawlak 2018). Neglect of 
the issues of migrants’ integration finds official justification in the relatively few 
foreign citizens living nowadays in Poland. The current government immigration 
strategy is predominantly focused on filling the gaps and shortages on the labour 
market by importing short- term foreign workers who are not the subject of inte-
gration programmes. Nevertheless, a lack of strategic documents and the reactive 
nature of migration- related policies can cause social problems in the future, as 
experienced already in Western European countries where, initially, most migra-
tion flows were of a temporary nature. Such an analogy seems plausible bearing 
in mind the sharply rising inflow of immigrants and the growing demand for 
migrant workers on the labour market which have recently been observed in 
Poland. Therefore, it would be reasonable to prepare a sound integration policy 
before social conflicts arise.
‘Good practice’ developed thanks to local  
integration programmes
Poland as a unitary, centralised state, has just one immigration policy, regardless 
of its effectiveness. Local governments cannot introduce their own, independent 
policy in this area. However, the situation is slightly different for Poland’s migrant 
integration policy. As already mentioned, its only stable element – the Individual 
Integration Programme – is financed from the central budget but implemented at 
the local level. Moreover, it is directed only at a small group of migrants who have 
been granted refugee status or subsidiary protection. The lack of a central strat-
egy for integrating other categories of foreigners and the insufficient scope for 
assistance in IIPs caused a situation whereby some local authorities, mostly in big 
cities, decided to take matters into their own hands. Actions emerged which could 
be called ‘good practice’ and which could be a first step in the implementation 
of local integration policies. The most interesting and advanced examples can be 
found in Gdańsk, Warsaw and Wrocław, cities which are the most active in terms 
of local migrant integration. In 2017 the mayors of these cities, among others, 
signed the Declaration of Mayors on Cooperation between the Cities of the Union 
of Polish Metropolises in the Area of Migration, a document not only calling for 
the exchange of experiences but also for the preparation of a local environment for 
the integration of foreigners seen not as ‘others’ but as an inseparable component 
of the local community. The document could be seen as an act of opposition to the 
government’s policy towards foreigners.
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Warsaw, the capital of Poland and the largest city, with the highest number 
of foreigners and of NGOs focusing their activities on immigrants, is an inter-
esting example. Despite many years of experience in providing various types of 
integration activities, the city still has no local integration policy. The lack of 
such a strategic document does not mean that the local authorities are not willing 
to integrate foreigners. A good example of an inclusive policy is the Committee 
for Social Dialogue for Foreigners (Branżowa Komisja Dialogu Społecznego ds. 
Cudzo ziemców – BKDS) established in 2012. The Committee, as a part of the 
Warsaw City Council’s Centre of Social Communication, is a platform for the 
exchange of information between NGOs, social movements and local institutions 
working in the field of immigration and integration; it is also an advisory body to 
the City Council on matters related to foreigners. Thanks to its prerogatives, the 
Committee can have a real influence on the granting of subsidies from the city 
budget (Winiarska and Wojno 2018). Another important initiative is the Multi-
cultural Centre, established and supported by the City Hall but run by NGOs. 
The aim of the centre is to provide a public space for individuals and groups 
from various cultures and communities, where they can feel at home and conduct 
intercultural dialogue. The centre also promotes an image of an open and multi-
cultural Warsaw, friendly to foreigners (Gulińska and Malyugina 2015). It is also 
worth mentioning that Warsaw runs the greatest number of individual integra-
tion programmes of all Polish towns. Since 2004, the Warsaw Family Support 
Center, a local institution responsible for providing such support, participates in 
or runs its own projects to extend the integration offer for vulnerable foreigners. 
Thanks to this centre, refugees living in Warsaw have been able to participate in 
professional and free Polish language and vocational courses or to obtain free 
specialised counselling – e.g. consultations with psychologists, nurses, housing 
and labour- market assistants. The Warsaw Family Support Center, in coordination 
with the City Council’s Housing Policy Bureau, also provides housing support – 
e.g. social housing or training spaces for the most needy refugees.
A different approach was adopted in Gdańsk. The increasing number of for-
eigners (mostly Ukrainians) appearing in this northern Polish city and vivid 
debates about migration and the refugee crisis signalled the need to start work-
ing on a local integration strategy. At the initiative of the mayor of the city, 
an interdisciplinary and multisector group was set up to prepare a document 
which should become a roadmap for foreigners’ integration in Gdańsk. In 2016, 
Gdańsk City Council adopted the Immigrant Integration Model, the first docu-
ment of its kind (Gdansk City Hall 2016). Despite the still relatively low num-
ber of immigrants living in the city and the mostly declarative nature of the 
document, Gdańsk was the first Polish city with a written integration strategy 
which could help to build a comprehensive integration system for the future. 
These efforts were appreciated in 2018 by the Innovation in Politics Institute 
and Gdańsk won an ‘Innovation in Policy Award’ in the human- rights category 
(The Innovation in Politics Institute 2018).
Another interesting example of a city where an integration initiative has been 
undertaken at the local level is Wrocław. The project ‘Wrocław on Tongues of 
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the World’ (Wrocław na językach świata: www.wnjs.pl/en) is an innovative way 
to learn the Polish language during group or one- on- one meetings in the public 
space. Thanks to a website run by the Wrocław Integration Centre, a municipal 
institution, Polish volunteers have the opportunity to meet foreigners living in the 
city and to talk with them about everyday life, opinions and interests, and to get to 
know each other. It aims to give people a better understanding of their new neigh-
bours, their culture and way of living; however, it also improves the newcomers’ 
language skills through spontaneous conversations. The cooperation between the 
municipality and more than 70 public institutions, libraries, bookstores, NGOs, 
restaurants or cafés where the meetings take place is an important component 
of the project. The Wrocław Center for Social Development, another municipal 
unit, runs another integration project. ‘Wielokulturowy Wrocław’ (Multicultural 
Wrocław) is an umbrella project for many multicultural activities, like training 
sessions, workshops, debates and exhibitions, all undertaken by various actors 
such as public institutions, NGOs or businesses. The main aim of the project is 
to promote intercultural dialogue and a common understanding despite people’s 
differences, and to increase the social capital of the city (WCRS 2019). The exam-
ples of integration projects cited in this section fit into the ‘Wrocław Strategy for 
Intercultural Dialogue’ (Wrocławska Strategia Dialogu Międzykulturowego 2018) 
implemented in 2018. The document indicates four areas of action – education, 
integration, safety and cooperation and communication – whereby various stake-
holders, including local government institutions, NGOs and businesses, should 
respond to emerging new challenges and social needs related to the growing share 
of foreigners living in the city. The strategy is intended to be, among others, a tool 
to facilitate an understanding of the tasks and competences of the various local 
institutions, to increase their integration ability through cooperation with other 
partners and to engage all possible stakeholders in intercultural dialogue.
Efforts undertaken by these cities can serve as examples of local integration 
policy- building. It is evident that cities are trying to respond to the specific local 
needs of their residents. Insufficient integration support at the national level is 
slowly filled by programmes and solutions inspired by local governments cooper-
ating with nongovernmental actors and sometimes businesses – a type of activity 
that can often be more effective and can respond to local needs in a better way 
than centrally planned programmes. However, in Poland, this initiative is still in 
the early stages of its development.
Conclusion: ‘policy- tinkering’ or ‘policy- making’?
Since 1989, Polish decision- makers have not been able to develop comprehensive 
immigration and integration policies, understood as a system of state activities 
designed to achieve defined goals and specific ways to solve problems which can 
appear in society, both short- and long- term (Knill and Tosun 2011). It is even 
questionable whether Polish decision- makers follow any consistent migration- 
related public policy framework. The whole process mostly appears to be 
chaotic – composed of scattered ideas and activities and rarely evaluated.
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Preparation of the Migration Policy of Poland adopted by the government in 
2012 – coordinated by an inter- ministry task force and subject to thorough debate 
involving a wide range of stakeholders – and its careful implementation in the fol-
lowing few years, could have represented a breakthrough in the approach to immi-
gration and integration policy- making. Unfortunately, its cancellation after just 
three years reflects the lack of enduring migration doctrine and political consensus 
concerning basic national interests, and points to the enormous fragility of the 
strategic solutions and foundations of the system in the area of immigration and 
integration policies. Moreover, the dispersion of laws regulating issues related to 
particular elements of those policies (e.g. the visa regime, residency, participation 
in the labour market, education, social services, health care etc.) and the imperfect 
coordination at the institutional level all reinforce the view that Poland could be 
perceived as a country without any comprehensive vision of what its immigration 
and integration policy should look like. Another frequent critique is that the state 
has withdrawn from crucial social activities, including the integration of foreign-
ers, and has completely ceded its obligations and prerogatives to NGOs (Jóźwiak 
et al. 2018).
This view, however, sharply contrasts with the ‘good practice’ presented earlier – 
conducted by the local administration – and the idea of multilevel governance, which 
includes governing the process of foreigners’ integration by multiple actors with a 
common goal (Matusz- Protasiewicz 2013). However, the lack of coordination and 
cooperation between central and local institutions questions the effectiveness of local 
initiatives from a long- term perspective. Again, this deficiency might be attributed to 
the inability of the government to develop a stable and comprehensive strategy regard-
ing immigration.
In contrast, one trademark of government activities in this area which, for many 
years, was the implementation of European Union legal solutions concerning 
immigration and foreigners’ integration, can be seen as a reactive policy with-
out taking into consideration the specific economic, demographic and historical 
experiences and interests of Poland. On the other hand, it should be possible to 
use widely conceived European experience and design solutions which will be 
effective in the future, when significant numbers of foreigners decide to settle in 
Poland. Anyway, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, Poland is already facing a 
new dynamic immigration situation. Although only relatively few foreign citi-
zens become permanent residents, the numbers of migrant workers, expatriates, 
entrepreneurs and foreign students are increasing rapidly. It is fair to assume that 
this situation will probably change in the coming years and that more and more 
foreigners currently working in Poland will decide to settle in and ultimately bring 
their family members to Poland. It is doubtful, however, whether policy- makers 
are ready and properly equipped to cope with the ensuing challenges.
All this leads to the conclusion that policy- makers in Poland chose to respond 
to ad hoc migration- related challenges rather than to predict and prevent or miti-
gate them. Decision- makers still tend to focus on current economic premises and 
to concentrate on short- term migration as a tool to fill the gaps and shortages on 
the labour market. This results in very limited integration support.
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In light of this, it is doubtful whether immigration and integration policies are 
drawn up through a process of identification of the problem, policy formulation, 
adoption, implementation and, finally, evaluation. In the Polish case, these poli-
cies are not designed to stimulate or induce desirable results, on the one hand, or 
reduce or prohibit undesirable ones on the other. It is also doubtful whether, over 
the last three decades, Polish decision- makers were pursuing a comprehensive, 
goal- oriented long- term policy. The temporary nature of the process – scattered 
actions, a lack of real control and of coherent and specific goals – might be called 
‘policy- tinkering’ rather than ‘policy- making’. ‘Policy- tinkering’ is understood 
here as actions responding to short- term migration challenges and phenomena 
(e.g. an unexpected inflow of foreigners) or international legal obligations (e.g. 
the implementation of EU laws). This kind of approach limits the possibilities 
for achieving desired long- term goals – if they were even identified at all. Highly 
problematic also appear to be government policies or programmes which are 
meant to address problems previously faced by Western EU countries but which 
are frequently barely tailored to Polish needs and abilities. In addition, ‘policy- 
tinkering’ rarely ensures the continuity of a policy and causes many problems – 
i.e. chaotic management, insufficient cooperation and a lack of clear goals and 
responsibilities – to those stakeholders responsible for its implementation.
What is needed in Poland, instead of ‘policy- tinkering’, is ‘policy- making’ – 
i.e. a visionary and long- term strategy which would account for properly identi-
fied current and prospective national interests and provide the means for their 
accomplishment. Several prerequisites must be fulfilled in order to achieve such 
a fundamental change in the approach to immigration and migrant integration 
policies. The most important must include the development of a stable migration 
doctrine based on the consensus of major stakeholders (political parties and social 
partners), the systematic and knowledge- based monitoring of migration trends 
in Poland and abroad, and the inventing of an effective method of policy evalu-
ation. As the authors of the National Integration Evaluation Mechanism report 
noticed, the absence of basic data about foreigners and their integration makes it 
impossible to evaluate integration policy and identify emerging difficulties and 
challenges (Górska et al. 2019). In turn, the lack of any systematic evaluation 
leads to a situation where even a comprehensive policy cannot be improved and 
fixed if needed. Moreover, mature and factual debate on immigration and integra-
tion is needed in order to develop comprehensive and effective policies. It is also 
important to revise current perceptions of Polish integration policy, which is often 
seen only as subsidiary and complementary to immigration policy. Both policies 
should be treated as equally important and should complement each other. Both 
should respond to national needs and abilities in the short and long term.
Notes
 1 By ‘immigration country’ we understand one with a considerable inflow of foreign 
citizens seeking residence and a systematic excess in the number of immigrants rela-
tive to the number of emigrants. Whenever, in this chapter, we use immigration statis-
tics, we refer to the internationally recommended meaning of immigration, followed 
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inter alia by those of Eurostat. According to the respective definitions, to become an 
immigrant (and enter the immigration statistics) a former resident of a foreign country 
is required to go to a given host country for an authorised residence of longer than one 
year. Other concepts of the international inflow of people include, above all, short- term 
(temporary) migration – i.e. for a period of residence of less than 12 months. Although 
this kind of flow does not affect population balance statistics, it is of great importance 
for the study of migration because, very often, temporary migration transforms into 
more- permanent immigration and the related present trends are indicative of future 
immigration.
 2 This estimate of the flow of immigrants includes all documented migrants (both Polish 
returnees and foreigners) who arrived in Poland for a period of residence longer than 
12 months. Such estimates are regularly published by Eurostat based on information 
provided by the public statistics authority of each EU member- state. Note, however, 
that the respective estimates published by the Central Statistical Office of Poland are 
considerably lower (e.g. 29,300 in 2017) as they only account for newly arrived immi-
grants who declare their residence at the local administration offices (such a declara-
tion is not mandatory for all documented immigrants).
 3 According to Eurostat (2019), on 1 January 2018 foreign citizens made up only 0.6 per 
cent of Poland’s resident population and the foreign- born only 1.8 per cent.
 4 Of this number more than 350,000 have been officially recognised as emigrants (due to 
deregistration in their place of residence in Poland) whereas, by the end of 2018, more 
than 2.5 million persons were de facto residents of a foreign country although they did 
not figure in the official emigration statistics (they were considered to be temporary 
migrants instead) because they failed to deregister from their Polish place of residence. 
Note that approximately 1 million ‘temporary migrants’ left Poland before 2004 (GUS 
2018b).
 5 These tendencies were accompanied by two important trends: a decreasing short- term 
outflow and an increasing (although still relatively low) long- term inflow.
 6 The hypothesis of mobility transition put forth by Wilbur Zelinsky (1971) is generally 
recognised to be a pioneering work in this respect.
 7 This part of this chapter deals with a complex, diverse and dynamic immigration- 
related phenomenon that occurred over the last three decades or so. It benefits from 
the findings of a long list of analytical works based on a multitude of data sources and 
research projects. Since it is not possible here to refer to even the most distinct of these 
works, we decided instead to resort to the only synthesis of research on contemporary 
immigration to Poland – the monograph Immigration to Poland. Policy, Employment, 
Integration (Górny et al. 2010). This monograph, and particularly its introductory 
chapter (Okólski 2010) includes reference to publications and data sources and dis-
cusses the complex issues of the specific Polish concepts of migration and the qual-
ity of migration statistics. In turn, the description of the most recent developments in 
the area of immigration was based on the most reliable source – the latest edition of 
the Government Population Council’s report, Sytuacja Demograficzna Polski (Demo-
graphic Situation of Poland) (RRL 2018), especially its chapter devoted to interna-
tional migration (Kołodziejczyk et al. 2018).
 8 Most of these mixed marriages had their source in the exchange (very limited, in fact) 
of students between communist countries. It should be stressed, however, that the inci-
dence of foreign students was rather low; for instance, the number of new admissions 
in Poland was fewer than 1,000 per year.
 9 Before 1989, the most typical binational marriages were concluded between a Polish 
female and a foreign male, usually a citizen of a Western country (notably Germany, 
the USA, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands or Italy) and, as a rule, they led to the 
emigration of a Polish citizen. In the 1990s (and later) such a pattern radically changed 
and its outcome was the immigration of a foreign spouse (Górny and Kępińska 2004).
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 10 By the end of 2007, only 21,800 declarations had been submitted.
 11 Voivodeships are regional agencies of the government, of which Poland has 16.
 12 A group of a few hundred foreigners of African or Middle Eastern origin moved from 
Poland to Sweden in 1990 – without the necessary documents or with forged Swedish 
visas – to seek refuge. Sweden considered Poland to be a safe country where these 
foreigners could seek refuge and decided to transfer them back to Poland.
 13 The European Refugee Fund (ERF) was set up for the period 2000–2013. Its goal was 
to support EU countries’ efforts to receive refugees and to guarantee access to consist-
ent, fair and effective asylum procedures. For more about ERF see https://ec.europa.
eu/home- affairs/financing/fundings/migration- asylum- borders/refugee- fund_en 
(accessed 15 July 2019).
 14 The EQUAL Community Initiative Programme was set up for the period 2000–2008 
and was financed by the European Social Fund and EU Member States. The initia-
tive focused on supporting innovative, transnational projects aimed at tackling disad-
vantages and discrimination in the labour market. For more about EQUAL see http://
ec.europa.eu/employment_social/equal_consolidated/ (accessed 15 July 2019).
 15 The main objective of the European Council Directive on minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third- country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or 
as persons who otherwise need international protection, and the content of the pro-
tection granted, was to ensure that common criteria for the identification of persons 
genuinely in need of international protection were used, and that a minimum level 
of benefits was available for these persons in all member- states. See more at: https://
eur- lex.europa.eu/legal- content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32004L0083 (accessed 
15 July 2019).
 16 The European Fund for the Integration of Non- EU Immigrants was set up for the 
period 2007–2013. Its goal was to support national and EU initiatives that facilitate 
the integration of non- EU immigrants; see https://ec.europa.eu/home- affairs/financing/
fundings/migration- asylum- borders/integration- fund_en (accessed 15 July 2019).
 17 The Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) was set up for the period 2014–
2020. Its main goals are the promotion of efficient management of migration flows and 
the implementation, strengthening and development of a common EU approach to asy-
lum and immigration. For more about the AMIF, see https://ec.europa.eu/home- affairs/
financing/fundings/migration- asylum- borders/asylum- migration- integration- fund_en 
(accessed 15 July 2019).
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Introduction
Czechia, with its over half a million foreigners, is the Visegrad country with 
the highest number of immigrants (Eurostat 2019). It began setting up its 
immigration and integration policies in 1999, since when it has regularly 
issued migration- related policy documents. Czech nongovernmental organisa-
tions assisting immigrants, which were able to develop thanks to the existence 
of an integration policy, are among the oldest in the region and are also the 
most active in policy advocacy at both the national and the international level, 
delivering sources for evidence- based policy- making (Zogata- Kusz 2018). All 
this gives the impression that Czech immigration and integration policies are 
the result of systematic elaboration. A closer look, however, reveals that, even 
though many positive things have been done, the policies are not as system-
atic, coherent and evidence- based as one might expect. This chapter presents 
the immigration – integration policy nexus in Czechia through the diachronic 
analysis of its development, focusing on the period from 1999, when two cru-
cial legal acts were adopted and when the government issued the principles of 
integration policy.
Foreigners living in Czechia constitute about 5 per cent of the total popula-
tion. According to data from the Directorate of the Alien Police Service, there 
were approximately 564,000 foreigners with permanent (289,000) or long- 
term residence over 90 days (275,000) at the end of 2018 (see Figure 10.1). 
Clearly, the highest number of foreigners arrived from Ukraine (131,000) 
and Slovakia (almost 117,000). The number of foreigners has grown stead-
ily since 1993, with only two moments of decrease: in 2000 (as a result of 
policy restrictions) and in 2009 (as a result of the economic crisis and policy 
restrictions).
Already, in the first half of the 1990s, the Czech state was regulating immigra-
tion; however, attempts at more complex policy- making in migration were only 
successful following the formulation of the first conceptual policy documents 
between 1999 and 2003.
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First steps in comprehensive policy- making on immigration 
and integration
Between 1999 and 2003, the first steps towards more comprehensive and active 
policy- making in both immigration control and integration were taken. From a 
legal perspective, the year 1999 was crucial due to two basic legal acts which 
were adopted – the 1999 Act on Aliens and the 1999 Act on Asylum. To date, 
in their amended versions, they remain effective.2 The acts rendered the rules 
regarding foreigners’ residence more restrictive. For instance, foreigners could 
no longer apply for a visa or change the purpose of their residence when they 
were already on the territory of the Czech state. Yet for the first time, Czech law 
enabled foreigners to apply for permanent residence after ten years in the country 
on a long- term visa. In this way, the act opened up opportunities for the legal per-
manent settlement of foreign nationals. This, in turn, raised the issue of the need 
to integrate people who, in the future, may become Czech nationals. This was an 
important change, especially since the numbers were rapidly increasing – from 
around 78,000 in 1993 to almost 229,000 by 1999. Note, however, that a tempo-
rary consequence of the more restrictive rules of residence was a decrease in the 
number to 201,000 in 2000 (Czech Statistical Office 2019b). In relation to these 
new challenges, as well as European Union requirements for its future members, 
the government adopted the first policy document on foreigners’ integration – the 
1999 Principles of Foreigners Integration Concept in the Territory of the Czech 
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Figure 10.1  Trend in the number of foreigners in Czechia by type of residence, 2004–2018
Source: Czech Statistical Office, based on data from the Directorate of the Alien Police Service, May 
2019a, www.czso.cz/csu/cizinci/cizinci- pocet- cizincu (accessed 26 July 2019)
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Republic; the Foreigners Integration Concept (FIC) followed a year later. The first 
document regarding immigration policy, in the sense of immigration control – 
Principles of Government Policy in the Area of the Migration of Foreigners – was 
issued only in 2003. In the 1999 Principles, the integration of immigrants was 
considered to be ‘a natural consequence of migration’. The main rule of the gov-
ernment’s integration policy set out in the document was the positive approach: 
the state took responsibility for creating the conditions for the equal participation 
of foreigners in society. The document highlighted, for example, the state’s sup-
port for the development of relevant NGOs, creating a realistic media image of 
the relations between communities and immigrant rights protection on the Czech 
territory. Even though the policy was understood as a basic instrument for the 
recognition of personal endeavours, the document referred to immigrant commu-
nities several times (Government of the Czech Republic 1999). The overall idea 
of integration was close to a multicultural perspective. A year later, the FIC was 
oriented more towards the civic integration of individuals and no longer referred 
to immigrant communities. It concentrated mainly on the issue of dividing com-
petencies and responsibilities between specific ministries, which were supposed 
to formulate plans for foreigner integration within their areas. One of the key 
elements of the FIC was the model of support for NGO projects, through which 
ministries could carry out their partial policies. Otherwise, the document was 
somewhat general. The main goal of Czech integration policy was to make the 
status of legally long- term resident immigrants similar to that of native- Czech 
citizens (Government of the Czech Republic 2006).
Three years later, the government adopted the Principles of Government Policy 
in the Area of the Migration of Foreigners (Government of the Czech Republic 
2003). The principles were, however, very general (regarding, for example, the 
elimination of illegal immigration, support for beneficial immigration and the 
need for coordination) and were criticised as being too vague to have an impact 
on the reality (e.g. Baršová and Barša 2005; Drbohlav et al. 2005). As for the inte-
gration policy, the critics highlighted that the 2000 FIC focused on the rights of 
foreigners but that a crucial element – their social integration – was left out. The 
general nature of the 2003 document on immigration meant that Czech immigra-
tion policy was limited to the simple legal regulation of the entrance and stay of 
foreigners on Czech territory. Although it seemed that the documents might bring 
about a transformation of the Czech approach to migration from a purely legal one 
into a more comprehensive and political one, this proved not to be the case. Nev-
ertheless, one positive of the FIC was that it provided a foundation for the devel-
opment of nongovernmental actors engaged in integration policy implementation 
(based on the support for projects). NGOs provided, among other things, social 
and legal counselling for immigrants and their families, offered courses on the 
Czech language and on social and cultural orientation and work with the receiv-
ing society. Already in 2003, they created the Consortium of Migrants Assisting 
Organisations, which currently has 18 members (see www.migracnikonsorcium.
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cz). Using their experience and hard data from day- to- day work with foreigners, 
Consortium members engaged in policy advocacy, providing evidence and policy 
implementation feedback (see Zogata- Kusz 2018).
A new EU member
A key event in recent Czech history was its accession in 2004 to the European 
Union. In view of Czech immigration and integration policies, this translated into 
the division of foreign nationals into two basic categories: EU/EEA and Swiss 
nationals, their family members and foreigners with permanent residence made up 
one category, and third- country nationals (TCNs) – ‘the rest’ – comprised the sec-
ond. Whereas the rights of the first group resembled those of Czech citizens and 
were largely regulated by EU law, those of the second group were very limited. 
Czech immigration and integration policies mainly affected the second group.
With regard to immigration policy, which was, to a great extent, carried out on 
a legislative basis, after- accession amendments brought about a few important 
changes. Among these were the introduction of new long- term residence permits, 
which meant greater legal certainty for TCNs (before, only a visa was possible), 
the right to family reunification for TCNs (based on the implementation of an EU 
regulation) or the shortening of the minimum period of stay on Czech territory 
from ten to five years – necessary when applying for permanent residence. In 
2007, as a response to an allegedly increasing number of marriages of conveni-
ence, Czechia introduced a minimum two- year period of stay for EU nationals’ 
family members applying for permanent residence. The implementation of EU 
directives meant changes in the Act on Asylum (Dohnalová 2015).
As for integration policy, a change occurred – originally perceived as important 
but eventually only temporary – with the transfer of responsibility for this area 
from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs for 
the period 2004–2008.
Two years after EU accession, a new version of the Foreigners Integration Con-
cept was adopted which brought significant changes to the further development of 
Czech integration policy – due to the 2006 FIC transforming the original version 
of the document into a more concrete policy tool. This changed the definition of 
integration, underlining the bi- directionality of the process and the role of the 
majority. It concretised the target group of integration measures (TCNs resident 
on Czech territory for at least one year or permanently, persons granted asylum 
and the receiving majority but not EU nationals) and introduced the basic pre-
conditions for effective integration that remain in force today. These were knowl-
edge of the Czech language, the economic self- sufficiency of the foreigner, his 
or her orientation in Czech society (i.e. understanding how the society and its 
structures function), and the relations between the foreigner and members of the 
majority. In this way, the 2006 version completed the concept, with a concretised 
social integration aspect which was missing in its original version. One lesson 
from the past informing these changes was that integration should go beyond 
the simple convergence of foreigners’ rights with those of Czech nationals. It 
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was recognised that it should be linked to concrete requirements regarding social 
integration. Additionally, development in the integration policies of other coun-
tries also influenced the changes. The document, in fact, stressed the need for the 
further development of integration mainstreaming, which meant considering the 
impacts of existing or accepted measures within other policies or legal regula-
tions on the integration of foreigners. Therefore, the 2006 FIC defined three basic 
rules for the formulation of all policies in relation to foreigners. These were the 
principles of legal certainty, fair access and increasing rights – i.e. that foreigners 
would gain further rights as their length of legal residence increased (Government 
of the Czech Republic 2006).
Acceptance of the integration mainstreaming method should affect, inter alia, 
the linkages between immigration and integration policies: immigration policy 
should be formulated and implemented in such a way as to consider its possible 
effect on the integration of foreigners. The document also mentioned the nexus 
between the two policies by stating that ‘One of the basic factors affecting the 
success of the integration process is the number of migrants on the territory of the 
given state. Integration policy should therefore form a part of the overall migration 
policy setting, to prevent negative effects on the integration of foreigners’ (Gov-
ernment of the Czech Republic 2006: 6). This important sentence – expressing 
an awareness of the mutual influence of the two policies – was, however, only a 
footnote, together with the remark that Czechia lacked a comprehensive migration 
policy. Within a few years, policy documents would point to the link between the 
two policies in a more explicit way.
The main factor affecting Czech integration policy in that period was the 2004 
Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the EU – i.e. the 
comprehensive set of 11 principles adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs 
Council in the process of developing a common EU immigration policy. Among 
other important factors, there was the steadily growing number of foreigners liv-
ing on the Czech territory (from 201,000 in 2000 to 278,000 in 2005) and the rec-
ognised need to support their integration in order to increase the beneficial effects 
of migration on the one hand and to avoid social problems on the other. Therefore, 
the policy- makers emphasised the necessity not only to manage integration but 
also to accept a proactive approach in immigration policy – i.e. to try to actively 
manage immigration using instruments which would attract desirable immigrants. 
The latter manifested itself through the launching of the project Selection of Qual-
ified Foreign Workers (its pilot, five- year version began in July 2003), followed 
by opening of the Green Cards Project in 2009. The main idea of the first project 
was to attract qualified workers (i.e. those who had at least finished secondary 
school) who were interested in settling in Czechia together with their families. 
The selection was based on the points system. After two and half years, those reg-
istered on the project could be recommended for permanent residence following 
a reduced period of stay provided they were well integrated – something verified 
through so- called social audit (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic 
2003). The green cards were introduced to remove administrative obstacles and 
allow for the smooth filling of a job vacancy when no Czech or a foreigner with 
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free access to the labour market was interested in the post. The green cards were 
dual in nature – a residence permit and work permit in one document. There were 
three types:
• A – for people with higher education or for key personnel (issued for up to 
three years);
• B – for foreigners employed in positions where at least an apprenticeship 
certificate was required (issued for up to two years); and
• C – for foreigners employed in other positions, including the low- skilled (issued 
for up to two years but not extendable for low- skilled workers – Ministry of the 
Interior of the Czech Republic 2010).
Both projects however – and especially the first one – attracted rather more media 
attention than foreigners. Implementation of the Green Cards Project was, moreo-
ver, limited due to the beginning of the economic crisis. Instead of looking for 
ways to attract foreign workers, how to limit their number became the main con-
sideration, the more so in that, at that moment, jobless foreigners attracted nega-
tive media and, consequently, public attention. This gave rise to the launching 
of a Voluntary Return Programme (which was more expensive than effective) 
and so- called emergency projects for municipalities facing problems with large 
groups of jobless foreigners. These last ones were only used by a few munici-
palities (later, however, emergency projects were transformed into regular pro-
jects for the support of foreigners’ integration at the local level). This only proved 
that the policies looked better on paper than in real life. The crisis revealed the 
shortcomings of both projects which resulted in ad hoc and post factum actions. 
Despite the difficulties or, rather, because of them, Centres for Support of Integra-
tion of Foreigners (integration centres) were established in 2009, financed from 
EU funds. Originally launched in six regions (kraje – Czech territorial units) they 
were eventually in operation in all 14 regions. Most were units of the Ministry of 
the Interior, while others were run by NGOs or municipalities.
Economy first
2010 and 2011 marked the beginning of essential changes for Czech immigration 
and integration policies. In the 2010 Principles and subsequently in the 2011 reso-
lution on the New System of Economic Migration (NSEM) based on them, the 
Czech government clearly presented its vision concerning the preferred volume 
and composition of economic immigration. Given the fact that a vast majority 
of migration to Czechia was economic, the documents – when implemented – 
were to affect the lives of most foreigners living in the country. The 2010 Prin-
ciples stated that economic immigration should be driven mainly by the needs 
of Czechia and its integration capacity, without, however, specifying what that 
meant (one may assume that it concerned integration through access to the labour 
market); its volume and composition were thought to be easy to adjust promptly 
to the changing economic situation and its sources could be diversified. The 
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Principles then stated that there should be both circular and permanent economic 
immigration. They specified that qualified and highly qualified migrants should be 
the favoured group as far as the possibility of settlement was concerned, whereas 
the migration of people with low qualifications was to be based on the princi-
ple of temporariness and related to the provision of greater assistance from state 
authorities. Finally, the Principles referred to the need to ensure an effective inte-
gration component (in the case of long- term or permanent migration), as well as 
an effective return component. Simultaneously, they observed that those natural 
and legal persons engaged in immigrants’ acceptance must also be co- responsible 
for immigrants’ stay and departure, as well as for possible not observing of legal 
norms and decisions. Finally, it was felt that decision- making on the volume and 
composition of immigration flows should be fully dependent on the competence 
of Czech state authorities. The tools for managing migration should, however, be 
used in cooperation with the immigrant countries of origin (Government of the 
Czech Republic 2011a).
The Principles revealed the attitude of the Czech government towards both 
immigration and integration policy and the perceived nexus between them. 
Emphasis on the economic needs as the main factor influencing policy- making 
pertaining to labour migration remained in line with theoretical perspectives 
drawing on neoclassical economics (Brochmann 1999). Economic migration 
was perceived as a phenomenon that could and should be driven and economic 
migrants as a tool for fulfilling Czech labour- market needs. The migrants should 
be returned to their countries of origin when they were no longer needed (effec-
tive return component). Such a strategy revealed that the government completely 
ignored the experience of Western countries, which showed that it was not pos-
sible to import people when needed and export them when they were no longer 
considered useful (Castles 2004). As for the flexible adjustability of the migra-
tion volume and composition, the Principle conceding not only circular but also 
permanent migration was striking and seemed inconsistent. Note, however, that 
the original version of the Principle proposed by the Ministry of the Interior 
(MoI) declared: ‘For migration for economic activities, circular migration should 
be preferred over permanent settlement’. It was altered only after the interven-
tion of the Committee on Foreigners’ Rights, whose members represented sev-
eral NGOs (Čižinský 2011). Eventually, the government conceded the possibility 
of permanent settlement for economic migrants but with the reservation that it 
would be preferred if it were for qualified and highly qualified migrants. This 
differentiated approach seemed to follow the assumption that qualifications often 
related to high school or university degrees were directly and positively cor-
related with immigrants’ integration capacity. This, however, did not mean that 
their qualifications were truly needed or would be used on the labour market. It 
simply meant that the more highly qualified were preferred for their potential 
capacity to integrate, even if they were employed in low- or middle- skill posi-
tions that were below their actual qualifications – which they might subsequently 
have lost qualifications. For the government, it was easier, however, to justify 
accepting those immigrants.
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Another issue which deserves consideration was the Principle regarding migra-
tion management being fully in the hands of the Czech authorities. As the expe-
rience of countries with longer immigration histories had proved, this should, 
rather, have been acknowledged as a wish expressed because of the needs of 
Czech society at a time when the economic crisis was still felt. The gap hypoth-
esis, referring to the divergence between the goals of immigration policy (usually 
corresponding to the demand for a restrictive policy) and its eventual outputs and 
outcomes (Cornelius et al. 1994), is still valid as the experience of various states 
confirmed (see, e.g. Hollifield et al. 2014).
Implementation of the Principles may have had some important consequences 
for immigrant integration and its related policy. Even though one of the Principles 
raised the issue of an effective integration component, the stress put on the circu-
lar nature of migration, highlighting the efficiency of a return component, would 
eventually have produced important – and mostly negative – consequences for the 
integration of foreigners. Temporary residence meant the instability of their legal 
situation, uncertainty about their life prospects and, consequently, not only fewer 
opportunities to integrate but the even lower willingness of foreigners to learn the 
language and culture and to establish specific social networks in a country which 
they might soon have had to leave.
In January 2011, the government adopted a resolution known as the New Sys-
tem of Economic Migration to the Czech Republic. The document built on the 
Principles, described earlier, and represented a basis for the later transformation 
of both immigration and integration policies. Most measures presented in the 
document were introduced into the Czech legal system and practice in the fol-
lowing years. The main idea behind the document was to manage migration and 
prevent the uncontrolled inflow of foreigners – perceived as a source of inap-
propriate pressure on public services – and thus to hamper any negative effects 
on integration and integration policy. The government specified that the decisive 
indicator for the conditions for the entrance and stay of foreigners was the utility 
of migrants for Czech society, including the reduction of additional costs to the 
state (Government of the Czech Republic 2011a).
From the perspective of the immigration – integration policy nexus, a few 
issues were vital. Firstly, in a bid to simplify the administrative process, quotas 
were established for the various categories of residents (within a few years they 
were introduced for economic migrants from Ukraine, then from other selected 
countries – see remaining sections of this chapter). Second was the introduction 
of circular migration for Gastarbeiter or guestworkers, who were thus denied the 
opportunity to integrate (this was eventually established in 2019). Thirdly came 
the introduction of obligatory minimum pre- departure information and, subse-
quently, of post- arrival adaptation and integration courses – integration measures 
initiated in 2011 (Government of the Czech Republic 2011b).
The emphasis on the circularity of migration, together with the obligation for 
circular migrants to complete adaptation and integration courses, did not mean 
the state was willing to support the integration of such migrants into the host- 
country social majority, as understood in this publication. It actually meant that 
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the government was attempting to reduce the risk of migration- related negative 
phenomena emerging.
The new system – just like the Principles it was derived from – was strongly 
criticised by NGOs assisting immigrants and by academics. They were concerned 
about the introduction of circular migration as a policy tool and the associated 
potential risks. As examples from other countries had shown, such regulations 
might eventually bring about not circular but long- term migration with invalid 
social and economic rights which would prevent or hamper proper integration – 
even leading eventually to the disintegration of society (Consortium of Migrants 
Assisting Organisations 2018).
Living together?
After assuring, in one resolution, the fulfilling of Czech labour- market needs 
and the Czech government’s control and management of immigration and pre-
vention of negative phenomena related to it, the government adopted a resolu-
tion a month later which stressed the mutuality of integration and pointed to 
the possible beneficial effects of immigration. In February 2011, the govern-
ment issued an updated version of the Foreigners Integration Concept: Living 
Together. One of the main changes it introduced was the broadening of a set of 
four basic preconditions – ensuring that foreigners were independent and self- 
sufficient – and transforming them into integration policy aims. This added aim 
concerned informedness or the acquisition of knowledge and information by 
migrants. The implication was that foreigners should be given information about 
who they could turn to for support if they needed it. At the same time, the docu-
ment stressed that the policy aimed to support the receiving society in being 
‘open and helpful to immigrants through the measures adopted’ (Government 
of the Czech Republic 2011b: 15). The 2011 FIC broadened the category of 
migrants concerned by integration measures, after which, in exceptional cases, 
EU nationals could also be included in the target group.
In line with the resolution released a month earlier, the 2011 FIC yet again 
called attention to the need to introduce minimum pre- departure information on 
integration in migrants’ countries of origin. The aim was to help (all types of) 
economic migrants to avoid nasty surprises and problems following their arrival 
in Czechia, such as abuse by middlemen offering ‘assistance’ in arranging stay- 
related matters – often illegally – and charging extortionate sums of money (see 
Čermánková and Nekorjak 2009). This pre- departure information included the 
conditions of stay in Czechia, warnings about the risks related to noncompliance 
with Czech and EU law as well as contact details of institutions and organisations 
assisting immigrants. The state appeared to treat it as a measure of integration 
policy and did not see it as an immigration policy instrument aimed at reducing 
the likelihood of potential emigration from the country (Brochmann 1999). Sub-
sequently, adaptation and integration courses were supposed to provide arriving 
foreigners with information on their fundamental rights and obligations and a 
basic socio- cultural orientation – mainly regarding Czech institutions. The FIC 
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2011 also introduced courses for foreigners with long- term or permanent resi-
dence permits (Government of the Czech Republic 2011b).
However, these materials and courses represented only some elements of the 
broadly understood and increasingly highlighted need for migrant informedness. 
The 2011 FIC introduced informedness as a cross- cutting component of all areas 
of integration, crucial for all actors concerned – the foreigners themselves, the 
receiving majority, as well as state institutions (Government of the Czech Repub-
lic 2011b). This attitude gave rise to a growing number of information webpages, 
run mainly by the Ministry of the Interior.3
Finally, the FIC version of 2011 mentioned that, although integration was based 
on a voluntary principle, it was unsustainable. In future, if immigrants wanted to 
stay longer in Czechia, some integration elements would have to become com-
pulsory (Government of the Czech Republic 2011b). The same message was later 
repeated in the 2016 FIC.
The 2010 Principles and the 2011 NSEM represented a clear message regard-
ing Czech policy towards economic migration – it would be restrictive and 
oriented towards the needs of Czechia and not towards foreigners’ rights. Inte-
gration was understood as assimilation. The 2011 FIC contrasted greatly with 
these two resolutions. Despite attempts at comprehensive policy- making, the 
year 2011 again confirmed that Czech migration policy had still not been for-
mulated in a coherent way.
A time of panic
The year 2015 was critical for immigration- related matters due, firstly, to the so- 
called European migration crisis, which some preferred to call a crisis of European 
migration policies (e.g. Bojadžijev and Mezzadra 2015) or a crisis of solidarity 
(e.g. Agustín and Jørgensen 2019). The crisis involved the extraordinarily high 
numbers of people seeking asylum in European countries and not primarily eco-
nomic immigrants. In Czechia, rather than being a real crisis, it was a widely 
mediatised, broadly exaggerated issue misused by politicians trying to get into the 
spotlight. In fact, according to data from the Department for Asylum and Migra-
tion Policy of the Ministry of the Interior, the overall number of applications for 
international protection was 1,525 (about 400 more than in 2014), which was far 
from the record number of over 18,000 in 2001, when international migration 
was not attracting much public attention.4 The number of other migrants did not 
change dramatically – migration increased but in line with the trend over previous 
several years.
What was essential, however, in 2015 was not only the mediatisation of migra-
tion,5 but also the politicisation of a phenomenon which had always been apolitical 
in Czechia. Anti- immigrant political movements that used to be marginal – such 
as We Do Not Want Islam in Czechia (orig. Islam v ČR nechceme) – came to the 
fore and formed new offshoots – for example, Block against Islam (Blok proti 
Islamu). Established political parties also adopted an anti- immigrant rhetoric. In 
November 2015 as many as 81 per cent of Czechs had negative feelings in relation 
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to the immigration of people from outside the EU (Eurobarometer 2015). Moreo-
ver, the politicisation went hand- in- hand with a deep securitisation of the phe-
nomenon. All of this affected both Czech immigration and integration policy – in 
fact, everything relating to foreigners. The society became divided and both peo-
ple who were positive about helping refugees and those who tried to stay rational 
and were not strongly against accepting newcomers were labelled as irresponsi-
ble welcomers (sluničkář). The situation for Czech NGOs assisting immigrants 
worsened to the extent that people who publicly defended the rights of foreigners 
became the targets of attacks – mostly in virtual space, in anonymous Internet 
commentaries (Zogata- Kusz 2020). Likewise, their advocacy work became much 
more complicated. Fewer and fewer politicians were willing to defend the rights 
of foreigners, since this could put their political career at risk. NGOs also had to 
be very careful in selecting topics to be publicised. Therefore, the 2015 crisis not 
only raised issues such as Czechia refusing to take part in the EU system of trans-
ferring asylum- seekers under relocation and resettlement programmes or refusing 
both the Global Compact on Refugees and that on Migration (only in 2018), but 
also strongly and negatively affected the rights of immigrants already living in 
Czechia.
In the middle of summer 2015, the government adopted the Strategy on Migra-
tion Policy of the Czech Republic. This was the first comprehensive policy docu-
ment combining immigration control and integration issues, including matters 
such as asylum, return policies or combating irregular migration. The document 
contained seven Principles of migration strategy. For the first time, migration offi-
cially became clearly linked to the issue of security, which turned into a cross- 
cutting component of all migration- related areas. The overall sounding of the 
Principles was the spirit of safety – preventing negative phenomena and risks on 
the one hand, and bringing benefits to the Czech economy and meeting its inter-
national commitments on the other. The strategy emphasised the importance and 
meaning of informedness, not only for foreigners but also for the majority. In rela-
tion to this point, the government declared that a communication strategy would 
be introduced as a cross- sectional tool for informing the public and other partners 
on migration issues (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic 2015). Until 
December 2019, however, no such document was accepted.
Integration was one issue to which the strategy referred in the very first princi-
ple: ‘The Czech Republic will adhere to its responsibility to ensure to its citizens 
a peaceful coexistence with foreigners and, thanks to effective integration, will 
prevent the development of negative social phenomena’ (Ministry of the Interior 
of the Czech Republic 2015: 6, author’s emphasis). The intention was to apply 
this through a proactive integration policy at local, regional and national levels, 
support for foreigners’ integration (respecting their dignity and the prevention 
of security risks) and an increasing informedness among both foreigners and the 
Czech majority.
In light of the main topic of this book – i.e. the links between immigration 
policy and integration policy – the Principle regarding legal migration was signifi-
cant. The strategy confirmed the validity of both of the resolutions on economic 
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migration, presented earlier in this chapter. It also highlighted the fact that one 
of the policy aims was a ‘desirable volume of legal migration compliant with the 
absorption capacities and integration measures of the Czech Republic’ (Ministry 
of the Interior of the Czech Republic 2015: 20; author’s emphasis). In other words, 
it was recognised that an integration policy should not only react to immigration 
policy but should actively influence the policy of immigration control. Where this 
pertained to absorption capacity, even though it was appearing for the first time 
in a policy document, it was a formula that the Ministry of the Interior had been 
using for many years at various fora, taking it to imply ‘the maximum possible 
number of foreigners that Czech society was able to accept without radicalisation’ 
(Kušniráková and Čižinský 2011: 503). The Ministry had long been defending 
measures to limit the volume of immigration – because of far- right prevention 
on the one hand, and foreigners’ (alleged) criminality on the other. The number 
of foreigners sentenced for crimes was lower in the overall number of criminals 
than the rhetoric would suggest. Data on the most frequent countries of origin of 
those who committed crimes did not generally reflect those of foreigners living in 
Czechia. Besides, because of insufficient data, it was not possible to distinguish 
the share of criminals who were foreign nationals living in Czechia permanently 
or with long- term residence permits from that of foreigners staying in Czechia for 
a shorter time only (Zogata- Kusz 2017). Consequently, it was hard to assess the 
nexus between immigration policy and foreigners’ criminality.
In autumn 2015, the Consortium of Organisations Assisting Migrants presented 
a Migration Manifesto that they had been drawing up for many months. The Man-
ifesto called attention, among other things, to the need to create and implement 
integration policies at all levels, including the local. It reiterated the need for inte-
gration measures to apply to all immigrants regardless of their status or situa-
tion, to allow them access to legal counselling even if they were EU nationals or 
their stay on Czech territory was unauthorised (Consortium of Migrants Assisting 
Organisations 2015). Unfortunately, the timing of the publicising of the mani-
festo was ill- chosen. A fear of immigration was dominating the public sphere and 
Czech society was refusing to accept even rational and evidence- based arguments 
related to immigration of any type (and not only of asylum- seekers).
In 2015, the security issue was transformed and expanded; eventually the 2016 
National Security Audit positioned the security aspects of migration among the 
main threats for the Czech state and society – indeed, on a par with issues such 
as the influence of foreign powers and environmental or cyber threats. The audit 
discussed in detail the question of migration- related dangers, highlighting both 
hard security threats (e.g. terrorism or organised crime) and soft ones – such as 
the spread of infectious diseases or cultural aspects incompatible with Czech law. 
In relation to the immigration – integration policy nexus, the document noted that 
‘From a security standpoint, and that of a peaceful coexistence of the majority 
society and migrants, it is the ability of migrants to integrate that directly influ-
ences the volume of immigration’ (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic 
2016: 67). Therefore, again, although implicitly, it was stated that an effective 
integration policy would be vital for setting immigration policy goals. Integration 
is understood here as foreigners’ assimilation.
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A year later, in 2016, the Foreigners Integration Concept was again updated, 
this time with the subheading In Mutual Respect. The main aims of the integration 
policy were the same as those defined by the 2011 FIC. As in this latter version, 
the 2016 FIC repeated that integration had been voluntary but that this approach 
was untenable in the long term. As the Czech state had increasingly been focusing 
on questions of communication and of raising awareness of foreigners as well as 
of the majority, it perceived information and communication as the foundation for 
successful integration, the prevention of xenophobia and the development of both 
intercultural and interreligious dialogue between communities. Together with the 
procedure for their realisation, the 2016 FIC produced further measures in this 
regard (Government of the Czech Republic 2016). Providing impartial informa-
tion about immigration is challenging, however, when political entities transform 
it into the subject of a political battle, as in the parliamentary election campaign 
of 2017, when the atmosphere in Czech society lead to the first terrorist attacks 
in the country.6
The 2016 FIC followed the 2015 Strategy on Migration Policy, adding, 
however, some distinct perspectives and focuses. For instance, interestingly, 
the document again slightly redefined the term ‘integration’, pointing not only 
at its bi- but also its tri- directionality, recognising that integration may also 
be influenced to some extent by the countries of origin of foreigners. Whereas 
the strategy emphasised the need to ensure the security of its citizens, the 2016 
FIC underlined the need to ensure the security of all inhabitants of Czechia. 
The attitude towards circular migration also seemed different. Contrary to 
previous policy documents, the authors of the updated FIC appeared to have 
taken notice of the examples of some Western countries, which had lived 
under the illusion that guestworkers would return to their home countries. In 
the part presenting the procedure for implementation, the 2016 FIC admitted 
that, in the long term, the increasing percentage of permanent residence per-
mits in the overall number of permits was a positive trend. It had a favourable 
effect on the integration process, since permanent residence caused the situ-
ation of foreigners to converge with that of citizens, regarding, for example, 
the labour market, health insurance or access to social benefits (Government 
of the Czech Republic 2016).
All of this was remarkable, given the emphasis that the New System of Eco-
nomic Migration placed on the circularity of migration. It proved that various 
conflicting tendencies had been affecting Czech policy. In spite of the existence of 
conceptual documents, the actual vision of immigration and integration policies 
was ambiguous, however.
The current situation
Most foreigners living in Czechia do not need work permits, either because they 
are citizens of the EU/EEA and Switzerland or because of exceptional circum-
stances that grant them free access to the labour market. According to data from 
the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, for example, in 2018 Czech labour 
offices were informed of the employment of 366,000 citizens of the EU/EEA and 
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Switzerland, and of as many as 125,000 other foreigners who did not need a work 
permit.7
Foreigners with limited access to the Czech labour market mostly use the so- 
called Employee Cards, which replaced the Green Cards in 2014. In its basic 
form, an Employee Card is dual in nature – i.e. it combines residence permit and 
work permit. It is mostly issued for the duration of the working contract but for a 
maximum length of two years. Foreigners may extend it repeatedly. According to 
data from the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, at the end of 2018 there were 
over 45,000 Employee Card- holders (at the same time, the total number of for-
eigners holding a valid work permit issued in relation to long- term residence per-
mits for a different purpose was over 31,000). To increase the capacity of offices 
issuing Employee Cards and to make the process more manageable, the Ministry 
of the Interior launched a few special regimes. Quotas for Employee Cards for 
selected countries can now be set. These are Ukraine – for which the quota of 
newly issued cards per year increased in 2018 from 9,600 to 19,600 (Confedera-
tion of Industry of the Czech Republic 2018) – then the Philippines and Mongolia 
(quotas of 1,000 each) and Serbia – 2,000 Employee Cards per year (Ministry of 
Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic 2018). This illustrates that the state is 
attempting to implement the principle of diversification of immigration sources.
Lessons learned during the economic crisis – when, in some municipalities, the 
presence of larger groups of foreigners disrupted the capacity of the infrastructure 
and resulted in social discontent – were used in setting up the rules for special 
regimes. Employers making a collective application for more than 50 (in case 
of Regime Ukraine) or 30 (in case of Regime Other States) employees are now 
supposed to cooperate with the relevant Centre for Support of the Integration of 
Foreigners and the municipal authorities and to discuss their intentions with their 
current employees. In other words, the idea is to link immigration and integration 
policies and support economic migrants’ integration – or at least limit the risks 
related to unpreparedness and a shortage of information. In reality, it often ends 
with ‘solemn declarations’ or the circumvention of the requirement by applying 
several times for a smaller number of employees, rather than once for more. This 
is, for example, the case of a company situated in Moravia region that employs 
over 200 foreigners but does not cooperate with anyone regarding the group – an 
outstanding example of a policy gap.
In addition to Employee Cards, highly qualified professionals may work in 
Czechia if they are in possession of a Blue Card. Their number is small: accord-
ing to data from the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, at the end of 2018 it 
was 590 persons (including 442 in Prague). The main obstacle when applying for 
the card is not the qualification8 but the salary. The gross monthly or annual salary 
must be equal to at least one and a half times the average gross annual salary set by 
the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs which, for the period from April 2019 to 
April 2020, is over 382,000 CZK – i.e. almost 15,000 EUR (Ministry of Labour 
and Social Policy 2019). The recruitment of highly skilled employees – whether 
holders of Employee or of Blue Cards – is considerably easier thanks to Project 
Ukraine and Project India. In 2016, the quotas determined for these two projects 
was 500 (Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic 2016).
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Finally, many economic migrants stay in Czechia for business.9 As of Decem-
ber 2018, data from the Ministry of Industry and Trade showed that almost 90,000 
foreigners held a valid trade licence, 56,000 of whom were third- country nationals 
(nearly 22,000 were Ukrainians; slightly fewer, Vietnamese). Family reunifica-
tion is possible after at least 15 months of residence in Czechia (in general) or six 
months (for those with an Employee Card).
The 2019 amendment introduces several significant changes to the existing 
immigration rules. These concern, among other things, the quotas for economic 
inflows, circular migration and integration (Act amending Act No. 326/1999 
Coll., on the Residence of Aliens in the Territory of the Czech Republic 2019).
The amendment installs a system of quotas for long- term stays connected to 
Employee Cards as well as for long- term visas for the purpose ‘business’. The 
hope is that it will help to improve the current situation, in which quotas are in 
fact imposed but in an unpredictable way. Now – as the explanatory statement 
explains – quotas should be set in tripartite negotiations between employers, 
trade unions and the government, and should take into consideration – among 
other things – integration capacities (Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of 
the Czech Republic 2018). Again, it is not explained what integration capaci-
ties mean. Besides – as the Consortium of Organisations Assisting Migrants 
has pointed out – it is nowhere specified how market needs, which are the basis 
for the quotas, should be determined. Moreover, the quotas will only concern 
Employee Card holders and long- term stays for the purpose of entrepreneurship, 
but not, for example, seasonal employment (Consortium of Migrants Assisting 
Organisations 2018).
In relation to that since September 2019, the above- mentioned special regimes 
and projects were transformed into three governmental programs. Currently 
nationals of all third countries may apply for Employee Cards within the pro-
grams: Highly- skilled Employee as well as Key and Scientific Personnel. 
Nationals of nine (instead of only four) selected countries may also make their 
applications within the program Qualified Employee. This regards nationals of 
Belarus, Montenegro, the Philippines, India, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Mongolia, 
Serbia and Ukraine. Foreigners may be classified to the programs only through 
their employers to- be who had been classified for the programs. A specific – 
and controversial – thing related to the program is that a foreigner may change 
employer after only six months since the decision on the Employee Cards became 
final. This is to stop pulling over foreigners between the employers in the situation 
of labour force shortages. For the whole period of the contract, the employee will 
have to receive 1.2 of the guaranteed wage. Given the fact that before applying 
for foreign employees, the employers have to do a so- called labour market test 
(i.e. to ensure that it is not possible to find an employee from among the people 
who do not need any work permits), this measure should protect Czech nationals 
from salary reduction. The amendments maintain the requirement that employers 
making a collective application for more than 50 qualified employees have to 
deliver statement of a mayor of the municipality in which those people will live. 
The statement has to include explicit agreement for that. Besides, as before, the 
employers have to deliver a solemn declaration that they discussed their intentions 
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with their current employees. Cooperation with the Centre for Support of the Inte-
gration of Foreigners is not explicitly required anymore (Ministry of the Interior 
of the Czech Republic 2019).
In addition to quotas, the amendment introduces a one- year Extraordinary 
Work Visa (EWV), with no possibility of extending it or changing to another type 
of residence or family reunification. The uniqueness of the visa lies in the fact that 
foreigners can apply for it only after the government has stated which professions 
or branches it will cover, the maximum number of applications and the nationality 
of foreigners which the EWV would include (Chamber of Deputies of the Czech 
Republic 2018).
For a number of years, the Ministry of the Interior has been announcing the 
introduction of circular migration. To date, however, Czechia has had a policy 
in which economic migration was based on long- term permits (recently mainly 
Employee Cards) and the state could regulate foreigners’ length of stay, issuing 
positive or negative decisions on extensions. Currently it implies that Czechia 
is orienting its policy towards the Gastarbeiter model, as the country attempts 
to get the most out of migration at the lowest cost. This is how many politicians 
perceive circular migration, forgetting about the warning experience of Western 
countries which – to paraphrase the famous sentence of the Swiss novelist Max 
Frisch – wanted just hands but then realised that people came too. Germany is a 
striking example (see Bade 2004). EWV means that soon there will be second- 
category people. It is not expected that these people will integrate because they 
are not expected to stay. As in Western countries, one may suppose that they will 
stay, however, illegally and with no rights. The impossibility of extending the 
visa or changing it to some other type of residence permit means that, even after 
many years of living in Czechia, they will be able neither to bring their fami-
lies nor to apply for permanent residence. The measure unambiguously clashes 
with the concept of integration and integration policy. Besides, as the lawyers of 
the Consortium of Migrants Assisting Organisations (2018) have pointed out, it 
is also anti- family, anti- employee (uncertainty for the future, very limited social 
rights) but also anti- employer (after one year they will lose an educated and vet-
ted employee) and non- respectful of EU law – the 2011 Single Permit Directive. 
Altogether, it runs counter to the established system and is ill- conceived.
It is striking how the Czech authorities seem to be confident that they will better 
manage something that other states have not been able to do and which negatively 
affected their social and economic structures (Castles 2004; Zolberg 1989). Treat-
ing circular migration as a tool for solving labour market problems may lead to 
‘boiled frog syndrome’ – the negative effects of circularity may become visible, 
when it is already too late to reverse them.
The introduction of circular migration is in contrast with attempts to reinforce 
integration policy by adding a chapter to the Act on Aliens devoted to integration. 
Until now, integration policy has been shaped by general and nonbinding docu-
ments. The only integration component that has been compulsory is the Czech 
language test at the level of A1 for applicants for a permanent residence per-
mit. Including integration in binding law is, therefore, an essential step in Czech 
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policy development (Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Repub-
lic 2018). Given the significance of integration underlined by lawmakers and the 
fact that it is a cross- cutting topic overlapping with many areas – therefore the EU 
stresses the meaning of integration mainstreaming – it is surprising that the chap-
ter in the Act on Aliens consists of only two articles. One embeds the existence, 
functioning and financing of Centres for Supporting the Integration of Foreigners 
in law and the other concerns the introduction of compulsory adaptation and inte-
gration courses. Even the term integration does not gain its legal definition. All in 
all, it is modest and partial and does not indicate a complex approach to the issue.
The reinforcement of integration centres is an important systemic and stabilis-
ing element. Since the amendment, the centres will be grounded in the legal act 
and their budgets will be steadier and independent of financing from European 
projects. Their target group will broaden, since they will be entitled to also pro-
vide services to EU nationals. The scope of their tasks will stay the same but their 
focus will move towards the organisation of integration and adaptation courses, 
which will be obligatory for third- country nationals with long- term or permanent 
residence permits. As highlighted in Article 155b of the amended act, the aim of 
the one- day courses is the same as it currently is: to introduce foreigners to their 
rights and obligations and to the local context, practices and Czech values (Act 
amending Act No. 326/1999 Coll., on the Residence of Aliens in the Territory of 
the Czech Republic 2019). Foreigners will have to cover the cost of the obligatory 
course and this is one of the things that NGOs working with migrants criticise. 
Another thing is that given the fact that the number of immigrants has been rising 
recently, with between 15,000 and 30,000 per year, the question arises whether 
integration centres will be prepared to launch courses from January 2021.
General findings
At first glance, it seems that Czech immigration and integration policies have 
been developing in a systematic, well- organised way since 1999. A closer look 
overturns this view. It is important to recognise that many positive things have 
been done concerning integration policy – e.g. shortening the period of stay for 
permanent residence from ten to five years, increasing and disseminating infor-
mation, allowing family reunification, establishing integration centres and sup-
porting the development of migrant- assisting NGOs. In spite of this, the overall 
policy towards migration is inconsistent, uncoordinated, unsystematic, mainly 
representing a transposition of EU law that some authors have already noted (e.g. 
Dohnalová 2015; Drbohlav et al. 2010; Kušniráková and Čižinský 2011). The rel-
evant ministries, as Pořízek (2018) points out, are insufficiently involved in policy 
implementation. The same applies to the still- inadequate involvement of munici-
palities. One result of the situation is the delay in the implementation of integra-
tion measures and a number of unsolved problems such as the health insurance 
of TCNs. The policy is unstable and often changes, which Kušniráková (2014) 
ascribed a few years ago to the apolitical nature of migration policy- making, when 
the rules were set by government authorities – predominantly the Ministry of the 
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Interior – and political parties felt no commitment to or responsibility for it. Cur-
rently, the policies are no longer apolitical. Unfortunately, emotion- driven think-
ing about immigration and immigrant rights leads to an acceptance of rules that do 
not contribute to effective immigration control and integration.
Diachronic analysis of the development of the two policies reveals that, for 
many years, immigration policy and integration policy were treated as two sepa-
rate issues. If the documents make the connection between them, the formula-
tions that are used point, instead, to the precedence of immigration policy over 
integration policy. This latter policy is referred to as the one that follows, reacts 
to immigration rules, is a tool of immigration policy or must be prepared for the 
incoming immigration situation. This is striking, given the fact that the 2010 Prin-
ciples stated that ‘the volume and structure of legal migration is to be determined 
by the need of the Czech economy and the integration capacity’ of the Czech state. 
The 2015 Strategy similarly set as one of the goals an ‘advisable volume of legal 
migration, compliant with the absorption capacities and integration measures of 
the Czech Republic’. Therefore, one can see that the relation between the two 
policies should not be inherently unidirectional.
The aim of introducing the integration mainstreaming method – as an adap-
tation of EU principles – was to establish more connections between the two 
policies (and many others). The reality showed that immigration and integration 
policies were inconsistent with each other. One striking example was the project 
on the Selection of Qualified Foreign Workers10 versus the policy towards for-
eigners graduating from Czech senior schools and universities. As Kušniráková 
and Čižinský (2011) remind us, the state devoted a great amount of money to the 
project. At the same time, foreign graduates of Czech schools and universities – 
in other words, people with great integration potential – were highly unlikely to 
remain in Czechia.
Ill- conceived measures were also taken, driven probably by the desire to send 
a message to the Czech majority. This pertains to the widely mediatised Volun-
tary Return Programme. As Kušniráková and Čižinský (2011) noted, in 2009 the 
Czech state spent 100 million crowns (i.e. approximately 4 million EUR) to return 
over 2,000 foreigners to their countries of origin (1,300+ to Mongolia). In the 
same year, 19,000 foreigners arrived in Czechia but the state spent less than a 
quarter of that amount on an integration policy covering them and the more than 
430,000 other immigrants already residing in the country.
Despite some positive changes one may doubt about the overall development 
of migration- related policies. Even though the stabilisation of integration centres 
is a positive step, the issue of extraordinary working visas raises serious misgiv-
ings. Moreover, the attitude towards integration that the new amendment reveals 
proves that statements about the influence of integration policy on that of immi-
gration are only declaratory.
This all proves that Czech immigration and integration policies have not thus 
far been coordinated or systematic. Even the fact that, for many years, all issues 
regarding foreigners were the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior is not 
helpful in this regard. It seems that immigration policy documents understand 
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integration in an entirely different way to those of integration policy, despite the 
fact that both types are produced by one ministry – the Ministry of the Interior. The 
Foreigner Integration Concept refers to integration in terms of the bi- directionality 
of the process, the mutually beneficial effects of living together, the feeling of 
belonging and co- responsibility for common issues and mutual communication. 
It stresses the protection of rights and the safety of all inhabitants of Czechia. 
Integration is a key to social cohesion and economic, social and cultural develop-
ment (see Government of the Czech Republic 2016: 17). In contrast, immigration 
policy documents – although in an implicit way – define integration only in terms 
of the prevention of negative phenomena either produced by foreigners or – in 
relation to them – by the majority population and emphasise the need to ensure 
the safety of all its citizens. The stress laid on control and security indicates that 
the thinking of the authors of immigration policy documents is based on premises 
influenced by neorealism. As Weiner (1993, 1995) notes, making links between 
migration and economic and cultural threats may, consequently, negatively affect 
the ability of societies to absorb immigrants and supports the image of them as 
dangerous aliens. The price of this is the radicalisation of society, the rise of xeno-
phobia and extremism – as the case of the first terrorist attacks prove.
The relation between Czech immigration and integration policies is unbalanced – 
with the first taking precedence over the second. This is a result, for instance, of 
immigration rules having legal anchoring (when integration policy has been driven 
only by nonbinding documents and is dispersed) and from the position of the Min-
istry of the Interior (also responsible for security, internal control and the police) in 
policy- making.
Connecting points
Despite declarations pointing out the need to consider integration policy in immi-
gration policy- making, this has not occurred. Immigration rules do not build on 
integration policy, and integration policy documents do not produce recommenda-
tions for immigration policy. A closer look, however, allows us to identify a few 
ways in which the policies affect each other.
The influence of immigration policy on integration policy is the more visible 
and explicit. Legal and administrative obstacles put in the way of foreigners 
willing to extend their stay in Czechia are serious impediments to the imple-
mentation and development of integration measures concerning them. Over- 
restrictive immigration policy invalidates integration policy. The uncertain 
situation of foreigners consequently hampers both their possibilities and will-
ingness to learn the Czech language and culture and to build connections with 
the majority population.
The same applies to obstacles put in the way of foreigners in other areas. Short-
ages in integration mainstreaming eventually mean that the state itself is not par-
ticipating sufficiently in integration. If Czech integration policy documents define 
integration as a bi- directional process, the state’s responsibility is to create the 
right conditions for foreigners’ inclusion and to support their active participation 
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in social life – too restrictive immigration policy (as well as limited access to 
health insurance or social rights) means that the state is not creating them.
On the contrary, the liberalisation of immigration policy – for example, through 
reducing the number of years required for permanent residence from ten to five, or 
allowing dual citizenship – binds foreigners to their host country, stabilises their 
legal situation and may support their integration.
The same applies to the implementation of the 2010 Principle, which says that 
persons engaged in immigrants’ acceptance must be co- responsible for activi-
ties in the area of migration and integration – later translated into the obligatory 
engagement of employers in migrant integration while making collective applica-
tions for foreign employees. If this kind of measure were indeed carried out, it 
may represent an interface between immigration and integration policies.
Integration policy also affects immigration policy, although in an indirect way. 
I perceive the emphasis on informedness as the key aspect of that relation and its 
connecting of the two policies. Besides, in endeavouring to increase foreigners’ 
informedness at various stages of their immigration process – including their pre- 
immigration – integration policy may potentially affect which type of residence 
(or the purpose of their stay) they apply for, as well as its legality.
State or municipal support for social and legal counselling carried out by NGOs 
and integration centres may affect the legality of foreigners’ stay, as well as the 
volume and composition of those who decide to extend their residence in Czechia 
and/or to bring in their families (and whether they are able to make an applica-
tion). The organisation of language and socio- cultural courses may not only sup-
port foreigners’ integration but may also increase their opportunity for permanent 
residence or naturalisation. This is, however, more a matter of the influence of 
integration policy on immigration itself than on immigration policy.
The potential of using integration policy as one of the determinants of immi-
gration policy is not exploited nearly enough. Even though some NGOs assisting 
immigrants do engage in policy advocacy and offer policy- makers their findings 
following integration and immigration policy implementation as well as the possi-
bility of carrying out evidence- based policy- making, most do not avail themselves 
of this opportunity.
To conclude, I argue that Czech integration policy still mainly follows on from 
immigration policy rather than influences it. The influence of integration policy 
may be declaratory but the reality is that any influence is merely indirect. How-
ever, immigration policy affects both integration policy (to a lesser extent) and 
integration itself (to a greater extent).
Notes
 1 Acknowledgements: This article was supported by the Palacky University Olomouc 
Internal Grant Agency CMTF_2019_010.
 2 The Act on Aliens was amended 56 times.
 3 For example, www.cizinci.cz, www.imigracniportal.cz and www.vitejtevcr.cz.
 4 Positive decisions on asylum were made in 71 cases (of whom 29 regarded Syr-
ian nationals); in 2016 the figure was 148 (101 regarding Iraqi nationals), in 2017, 
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29 – mostly Ukrainian nationals (Department for Asylum and Migration Policy, Min-
istry of the Interior 2018).
 5 This was already the case for the period 2008–2009 when, during the financial crisis, 
many foreign workers lost their jobs.
 6 In June and again in July 2017 a Czech retiree, Jaromír Balda, attacked trains by felling 
trees onto the tracks to derail them. He left leaflets which included the phrase Allah 
Akbar and made anti- Czech threats so as to leave no doubt that the attack was carried 
out by a Muslim immigrant (he was sentenced for terrorism in 2019).
 7 The total number of immigrants about whom information is given and the number of 
permits mentioned in this section is higher than the number of foreigners because the 
latter may hold both a permit and a trade licence and because employers have to inform 
labour offices about every single contract – even part- time ones – given to foreigners.
 8 To have completed a university or a vocational education, the duration of which was at 
least three years, is sufficient.
 9 Foreigners may also undertake seasonal work. In line with EU law, they may then use 
the so- called Intra- Company Employee Transfer Card, as well as the European Union 
Member- State Intra- Company Employee Transfer Card.
 10 The project was discontinued at the end of 2010. Between its launch in 2003 until its 
demise, there were 1,964 qualified foreign workers in total who participated in the 
project, together with their approximately 1,800 family members. Almost 1,000 were 
eventually granted permanent residence in Czechia (Ministry of the Interior of the 
Czech Republic 2010).
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Introduction
Australia is one of the world’s major immigrant destinations, attracting settlers, 
labour migrants, students and refugees who, by and large, have successfully inte-
grated into the country’s economic and social fabric. From the early days of its 
European settlement, this island- continent has embraced large- scale immigra-
tion as an imperative of population growth and a development opportunity. This 
migration- based growth potential was to be realised in a controlled and selective 
manner through a comprehensive migration governance regime combining evolv-
ing immigration strategies, policies and procedures. Favouring particular catego-
ries of newcomers while discouraging others and a commitment to the smooth 
integration of new arrivals into the country’s socio- economic fabric have been the 
dominant features of Australia’s immigration policy.
Temporary and permanent migration streams provide two major entry points 
for different categories of newcomer to enter Australia. As of early 2019, the cur-
rent, unmet annual cap on permanent immigration is fixed at 190,000 (propor-
tionally about three times the US rate of annual admissions), although there are 
political pressures to reduce this intake to 160,000. Nevertheless, even if the cap 
is reduced well below the current target figure, pro rata, given its total population 
of 25 million, Australia remains one of the most immigrant- welcoming societies 
in the world.
This hospitable approach, however, has been restricted to those migrants who 
seek and are granted formal (authorised) visa entry into the country. In contrast, 
Australia applies a very harsh regime of border controls by refusing entry and 
reticulating to offshore detention centres all entry- seekers whom it regards as 
unauthorised and illegal. As a result, despite its enviable record of immigrant 
acceptance and assimilation and refugee assistance, Australia has attracted a great 
deal of international opprobrium as a country that turns away boatloads of asylum- 
seekers and detains unauthorised boat arrivals in offshore confinement facilities 
to stop them applying for asylum and to deter mass inflows of asylum- seekers.
Since 1945, about 7 million immigrants have come to Australia; as a result, 
about one in four Australian residents has been born overseas and nearly half 
of the population have at least one parent born overseas. Immigration keeps the 
11 ‘Fair Dinkum’ migration 
policy
Lessons from Australia
Stefan Markowski and Katarzyna  
Kwapisz Williams
198 Stefan Markowski et al.
population growing at over 1.5 per cent per annum, lowers its aging rate and 
contributes 0.5–1.0 per cent to the long- term annual GDP growth rate of about 3 
per cent (PC 2016). A modelling commissioned in the mid- 2010s by the Migra-
tion Council of Australia1 shows the likely increase in GDP per capita attributed 
to immigration at roughly the present rate to be nearly 6 per cent by 2050 (MCA 
2015). While apparently modest, the figure implies that immigrants, in their total-
ity, not only pay their way as new community members but also enhance the 
wellbeing of the existing population.
For much of its history, Australia’s immigration strategy has been framed as 
its de facto population policy, at times elevated to a ‘populate- or- perish’ policy 
imperative. This is not surprising given the country’s geographic isolation as a 
remote island- continent inhabited by a relatively small population of largely Euro-
pean origin, spread along the southern edge of the land mass and mostly confined 
to a few, large urban agglomerations. The vast, inhospitable and arid interior, the 
lack of fresh water and the extreme weather conditions have always proven a con-
straint on the scale of human settlement in Australia. This explains why the First 
Australians – the original inhabitants who settled in Australia some 50,000 years 
ago and numbered some 750,000 people in the late- eighteenth century – 
have lived mostly a nomadic existence and have been dispersed over large land 
areas, lacking the capacity to resist more effectively the relatively late and initially 
modest European colonisation of the continent. This also explains why, for the 
first 150 years of European settlement of Australia, border controls were largely 
absent (Withers 2016). The geographic remoteness of the continent and its harsh 
environment provide a degree of natural protection – before the advent of cheap 
intercontinental air travel, the notorious ‘tyranny of distance’ and the associated 
high cost and long duration of sea voyages had deterred many potential European 
settlers.
Historically, Australia has evolved over its 200 years of European settlement 
from a cluster of British colonies at the far end of the British Empire into a modern 
federal entity in the Asia- Pacific region. Despite its focus on primary industries, 
the region is able to support high levels of socio- economic development and pro-
vide superior living standards for its residents, combined with effective national 
security, stable liberal- democratic political regimes embedded in British parlia-
mentary and legal traditions and a generally friendly and tolerant multi- ethnic 
population. Not surprisingly, Australia has become one of the world’s favourite 
migrant destinations, with a long history of government- sponsored immigration 
underpinned by easy pathways to residence and naturalisation.
The successful migrant integration has often been attributed to the policy of 
multiculturalism, which encourages ‘migrants’, especially those from non- Anglo- 
Saxon background, to retain and cultivate their distinct ethnic identity (Pakulski 
2014). This policy of mutual tolerance and acceptance of diversity was intended 
to accelerate the two- way dynamics of social integration between ‘migrants’ and 
‘locals’. However, the efficacy of this policy has recently been questioned, as con-
cerns for the social cohesion, adaptability and employability of different migrant 
groups have dulled the appetite for high levels of ethnic and cultural diversity. 
‘Fair Dinkum’ migration policy, Australia 199
Additionally, the policy of social integration has been far less effective in relation 
to the country’s Indigenous population – some 800,000 people or about 3 per cent 
of the Australian population claim Indigenous ancestry – who often feel resentful 
towards the country’s history of accelerated immigrant settlement and see them-
selves as the dispossessed victims of European colonialism. For a long time, too, 
successive Australian immigration policies have marginalised Pacific Islanders – 
those inhabiting small island states in Australia’s vast maritime neighbourhood – 
who critically depend on opportunities offered by Australia and New Zealand for 
their economic wellbeing.
Inevitably, all forms of migration governance, even those generally regarded 
as highly successful, have their particular failings and unintended moral hazards 
(perverse responses to policy incentives) that partially offset their otherwise sub-
stantial accomplishments. It is therefore instructive to consider both the declared 
drivers of success and the apparent causes of failure. From the perspective of 
this book, the Australian migration governance experience is interesting for three 
reasons:
• the evolving history of immigration and integration strategies, policies and 
procedures has been a rich source of positive and negative lessons for other 
countries. The lessons cover such diverse policy options as the controversial 
White Australia policy, government- sponsored immigration, the progressive 
opening of the country to immigrants from Southern Europe, East Asia and 
now all parts of the world, the policy of multicultural integration of immi-
grants and the controversial policy of offshore detention and reticulation of 
unauthorised immigrants (the so- called Pacific Solution);
• the progressive transformation of the traditional settler immigration scheme 
into the competitive sourcing of human and social capital through a two- step 
programme of temporary work permits and educational opportunities (based 
on ‘merit points’) which subsequently funnels short- term migrants into the 
pool of permanent immigrants and naturalised citizens (Withers 2016); and
• the ‘idiorhythmic’ regional migration governance of Australia has been an 
interesting, albeit only emerging, alternative to the top- down, centralised EU 
model of migration governance (Chand and Markowski 2018).
Consequently, the present chapter focuses on:
• the history of Australian immigration strategies, policies and procedures and, 
especially, their evolution from the country’s early commitment to selec-
tive European settlement under the White Australia policy to the present- 
day focus on a large- scale and increasingly competitive immigration regime 
aimed at attracting to Australia globally footloose skilled labour as well as 
the human, social and cultural capital needed to keep the country in the first 
division of the world’s most prosperous nations;
• the effectiveness of the current migration policy, in particular as a means of 
funneling temporary, mostly skilled, labour migrants and foreign students 
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into permanent residents and citizens, and their subsequent integration into 
the social and cultural fabric of Australia;
• the moral hazards and adverse selection problems posed by different migra-
tion policy options;
• the challenges associated with Australia’s broader engagement in regional 
migration governance; and
• the lessons to be drawn from the Australian experience for member- states of 
the European Union.
Historic overview
‘Australia is a nation of immigrants’ declared the Committee for Economic 
Development of Australia in its 2016 assessment of the economic costs and 
 benefits of Australia’s in- bound migration (Taylor 2016: 14). As the population 
of the First Australians was small, nomadic and dispersed over a vast land mass, 
Captain Cook – who claimed possession of the eastern part of the mainland for 
the British Crown in 1770 – declared the continent to be an uninhabited terri-
tory (terra nullius) ready to attract settlers and explorers. The perception of Aus-
tralia as a nation of immigrants began with the arrival of the British First Fleet in 
1788,  followed by an influx of about 10 million settlers, with 70 per cent of them 
arriving after 1947 (CEDA 2016: 6). During the colonial period (1788–1900), 
immigrants came to Australia as British transported convicts or as beneficiaries of 
(British) s ubsidised- or assisted- passage schemes as well as self- funded, mostly 
European, free settlers (PC 2016).2
In 1901, when the former British colonies federated to form the Commonwealth 
of Australia, the share of those Australia- born in the total resident population was 
about 77 per cent. By 1905, the resident population numbered 4 million, increas-
ing to 6 million by the 1929 Great Depression. Between 1905 and 1929, a further 
700,000 new settlers arrived in Australia, mostly from the United Kingdom, of 
whom many were subsidised under the assisted- passage arrangements. After the 
Great Depression and until the end of the Second World War the rate of annual net 
overseas migration to Australia was negligible (PC 2016). Thus, by 1947, the ratio 
of the Australia- born in the total population increased to 90 per cent and it took the 
following 70 years to lower it again to about 72 per cent in 2015. Not surprisingly, 
in its 2016 overview of the significance of mass immigration for the Australian 
economy and society, the Productivity Commission – a government think- tank 
assisting with policy evaluation – opined that ‘Australia’s immigration policy is 
its de facto population policy’ (PC 2016: 3).
That said, from the very beginning of the British settlement of Australia, the 
nature of immigration that should drive population increase has been hotly con-
tested. While the early settlement was underpinned by shipments of convict labour 
from the United Kingdom, by the early 1840s, grassroots opposition to convict 
transportation had sprung up throughout Eastern Australia with the Australasian 
Anti- Transportation League, formed in 1851 (Creighton 2019).3 As the Sydney 
Morning Herald proclaimed in 1850, not to end the transportation of convicts 
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would condemn Australia to ‘the scorn of mankind as the willing – the abject – 
the self- polluted receptacle and home of felons and criminals of every hideous 
class, grade and order of depravity’ (cited in Creighton 2019). This passionate 
opposition to further convict arrivals followed the then- British government’s 
intention to revive their transportation to New South Wales (NSW) which had 
been suspended in 1840.4 Arguably, this populist, anti- convict sentiment was the 
earliest attempt to influence the selectivity of the Australian immigration strategy. 
However, the strong anti- convict sentiment of the free settlers largely ignored 
the economic fundamentals of Australian colonial existence, where much of the 
early labour was provided by convicts and emancipists (freed or pardoned former 
convicts). Not surprisingly, rich squatters favoured continued convict transporta-
tion as a source of cheap labour, although some were willing to compromise and 
establish a strict ratio (say, one in three) of transported convicts to free- settler 
arrivals (Creighton 2019).
This polarisation of settler sentiment also had its roots in the deep layer of 
social antipathy between the two ‘founding ethnicities’ of Australian colonies: the 
economically dominant Anglo- Scottish and mostly Protestant ‘upper class’ of big 
farmers, graziers, merchants and professionals, and the Irish- Catholic ‘working 
class’ of labourers, tradesmen and small farmers (Goldlust 2009).5 By the late- 
nineteenth century, the latter group became dominant and gave much of its cul-
tural identity to the emergent Australian nation – in particular, its strong sense of 
‘mateship’ and egalitarianism, its ethos of social fairness and its firm resentment 
of the dominance and privileges of the Anglophilic elite (Goldlust 2009). Argu-
ably, it is this increasingly middle core of Australian society rather than its ‘upper 
class’ priviligentsia that has mostly shaped the subsequent 100 years of Austral-
ian politics, and, thus, the changing social and political attitudes to new cohorts 
of immigrant settlers and the immigration strategies, policies and procedures of 
the emerging federation of Australian colonies. On the other hand, despite the 
undercurrent of tension between the two ‘founding ethnicities’, the social identity 
of the new federal state had been overwhelmingly ‘British Imperial’. Until 1948, 
when the passing of the Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948 (Cwlth) introduced 
Australian citizenship, Australians could only hold the status of British subjects 
(PC 2016). Thus, well into the late 1950s,
The maps of the world on every schoolroom wall (in Australia) showed in 
vivid red the Empire on which the sun never set. Empire Day for most was 
celebrated as a sacred occasion; Australia Day by contrast was a secular 
picnic. . . .
In Australia, unlike Britain, at the beginning or end of most public occa-
sions, concerts, plays, films, dances, even sporting finals, the ‘National 
Anthem’, namely ‘God Save the King’ or ‘God Save the Queen’, was played 
and everyone stood to show respect for the crowned symbol of the British 
peoples. The first visit of a reigning monarch to Australia in 1954 was an 
unparalleled quasi- religious national event which brought huge crowds of 
people into the streets to pay homage to the one whom the Sydney Morning 
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Herald declared was the symbol of ‘the supreme achievement of the British 
race’.
As late as 1947, 65 per cent of Australians, when asked in a public opinion 
poll whether they wished to have British or Australian nationality, opted for 
being British.
(Meany 2013: 26)
Not surprisingly, the scale and composition of non- British immigration emerged 
as a major issue during the first election campaign of the newly formed Australian 
Federation. The Immigration Restriction Act (Cwlth) was passed in 1901 (Taylor 
2016), restricting opportunities for people of non- European ethnicity to settle in 
Australia by demanding that they pass a written ‘dictation test’ in any European 
language of an examining customs official’s choosing (PC 2016). In 1905, the 
Act was amended to allow for a dictation test in any language at all.6 These two 
Acts which, together with the Naturalisation Act 1903 (Cwlth), precluded people 
from Asia, Africa and the Pacific Islands from seeking naturalisation in Australia, 
became the foundation for the notorious White Australia policy, which continued 
to influence the selectivity of immigration until the early 1970s. As expected, the 
scale of migration declined and the proportion of the overseas- born in the Aus-
tralian resident population reached its lowest point in 1947 (Taylor 2016). Unlike 
the more- devolved Canadian federal structure (Ongley and Pearson 1995), the 
Australian Federal Parliament has been solely responsible for all strategic and 
policy management of immigration although, as with all nations, the domestic 
governance of human flows is partially attenuated by the country’s obligations 
and responsibilities under various international treaties and agreements.
Australia emerged from the Second World War with a deep sense of national 
insecurity. The war demonstrated that the British Empire could not defend its 
distant outposts such as Australia. It was the United States rather than the United 
Kingdom that became the de facto guarantor of Australia’s national sovereignty 
but, to be more economically and militarily self- reliant and to reduce the country’s 
dependence on its new ‘big protector’, the nation of 7.4 million people inhabiting 
an island- continent about the size of the US had to ‘populate’ at an accelerated 
rate. Mass immigration was an obvious choice. In 1945, Australia established the 
world’s first Department of Immigration and, within the restricted scope of White 
Australia policy, embarked on its first programme of large- scale, government- 
sponsored immigration (DIBP 2015).7
This involved the acceptance of over 2 million displaced people from post-
war Europe and the subsidised arrival – under the so- called £10 assisted- passage 
scheme – of about 1 million immigrants from the UK, referred to by local wits 
as ‘£10 Poms’ (Taylor 2016).8 Many of these new immigrants were encouraged 
to work on big nation- building projects such as the Snowy Mountain Scheme 
( electricity generation), so there was little waste of the newly arriving human 
capital through long periods of involuntary unemployment.
In 1958, the White Australia policy was partially relaxed, with the removal of 
the dictation test and the introduction of a new universal visa scheme which, in 
‘Fair Dinkum’ migration policy, Australia 203
principle, allowed non- Europeans to settle in Australia. The universal visa condi-
tions required potential immigrants to demonstrate their capacity to ‘contribute to 
Australia’ as well as their ability to integrate into the country’s social fabric (Tay-
lor 2016). However, the 1958 amendment notwithstanding, the White Australia 
policy continued to be administered through informal and largely arbitrary selec-
tion procedures, which favoured European immigrants and discriminated against 
putative Asian, African and Pacific settlers. Nevertheless, even though the White 
Australia policy was increasingly hard to sustain, by 1970, the Australian popula-
tion had increased to over 13 million, to which the postwar surge in immigration 
contributed over 3 million (Taylor 2016).
The new immigrants who settled in Australia between the late 1940s and the 
early 1970s – the first wave of mass immigration – arrived at a time when contem-
porary political and intellectual debates around the question of what Australian 
identity was or what it might and should be had barely begun to surface (Goldlust 
2009). The new arrivals – or ‘migrants’, as they were described by the locals – 
were expected to fit into the existing British Imperial social and institutional 
structures regardless of their particular ethnic, economic or religious background. 
However, for the vast majority of these new immigrants, Australia was a ‘prom-
ised land’ – they were accepted as equal ‘club members’ regardless of their socio- 
economic or religious background. By international standards, the Australian host 
society was tolerant and ‘fair’, and it was these basic British- Australian qualities 
of inherent fairness and tolerance of diversity which, in our view, provided the 
foundation for the later policy of multiculturalism.
Like the earlier resentment towards continuing convict transportation to Aus-
tralian colonies, the selectivity of the White Australia policy focused on the social 
rather than the human capital of potential settlers. That is, the policy was less 
concerned with the importation of skills per se and the net economic benefits asso-
ciated with the increased availability of skilled labour in Australia and focused, 
instead, on migrants’ social compatibility with earlier vintages of British- Irish 
settlers and the ethno- European balance of new arrivals. The social capital to be 
contributed by potential European immigrants was deemed to be desirable as such 
and, thus, inherently importable, while that of Asian (especially Chinese), Middle 
Eastern or African settlers was not. This was to prevent what was then perceived 
to be a potentially adverse selection of immigrants from undesirable parts of the 
world. Thus, before the 1970s, it was mostly taken for granted that the arrival of 
working- age ‘displaced persons’ from Eastern and Northern Europe, Southern 
Europeans and the £10 Poms provided nearly all that was needed in the way of 
in- bound human and social capital in order to secure the supply of skilled labour 
across the wide range of occupations demanded by the expanding and urbanising 
Australian economy. Any additional skills in short supply could be targeted spe-
cifically within the remits of the restrictive immigration strategy.
Restrictions on the immigration of non- Europeans were relaxed in the form 
of a ministerial directive in 1966 and effectively dismantled between 1973 and 
1978, when Australia abandoned its White Australia policy and its associated dis-
criminating procedures, and adopted and rigorously applied a non- discriminatory 
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immigration regime, albeit one with more- stringent migrant entry requirements 
(PC 2016: 63–64). In particular, Australia abandoned its commitment to immigra-
tion as a target of population policy and begun to view it as a means of enhancing 
the wellbeing of the existing Australian community. In other words, the annual 
immigration intake was to be driven by the economic circumstances of the coun-
try, especially the rate of unemployment and the migrant absorptive capacity of 
the Australian community.9 Immigrants were deemed to be settlers and future 
nationals and were expected to apply offshore for entry and to arrive with valid 
entry visas. In response to the challenges posed by the influx of some 90,000 
post- Vietnam War refugees from Indochina, the humanitarian programme was 
introduced in 1977 which allowed for the protection of refugee rights (PC 2016). 
Although the family settlement stream continued to account for some 80 per cent 
of the migration programme in the early 1980s (Taylor 2016: 25), immigration 
priorities shifted from the broadly targeted immigration of people (population pol-
icy) to the importation of skills and human and social capital specifically required 
by the Australian economy under the ‘skilled migrant stream’. By the mid- 2010s, 
these proportions were nearly reversed, with the family stream reduced to 25 per 
cent of the total intake.
With the new focus on the management of human capital intake, Australia’s 
first points- based system – the Numerical Multifactor Assessment System – was 
introduced in 1979, with points allocated to applicants for permanent settlement 
on the basis of their family links to Australia and their youth, skills, command of 
the English language, literacy in the applicant’s own language and prospects for 
successful in- country integration (PC 2016). After further refinement of migration 
policies in response to various government reports (e.g. the FitzGerald Committee 
in 1988), a new migration act was introduced in 1989 that:
• capped the level of immigration through the points- tested components of the 
family and skilled migration streams;
• changed the previously fixed pass mark under the points system into a ‘float-
ing pass mark’ (to make the capped intake work);
• changed the conditions of transfer from temporary to permanent residency;
• restricted opportunities for illegal migrants to be granted permanent resi-
dency; and
• reduced ministerial discretion in immigration matters (PC 2016: 63–65).
In 1992, a universal visa system was introduced under the Migration Reform 
Act 1992 (Cwlth) to regulate the entry of legal migrants and the detention and 
removal of illegals under one visa system (PC 2016). Further reforms occurred in 
the 1990s to regulate the total intake by imposing caps on the various immigra-
tion streams and adding English- language proficiency into the points test for fam-
ily immigration in order to enhance the skilled component of the family stream. 
Access to welfare benefits was also delayed, with a two- year waiting period for 
new arrivals; various procedural measures were introduced to reduce the scope for 
abuse of the different visa provisions (e.g. spouse or fiancé(e) visa entitlements). 
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In 1996, the eligibility criteria were further changed to facilitate the temporary 
labour immigration of those whose skills were needed in Australia (the so- called 
457 visa) and to add a new visa category for long- term temporary business entry 
(PC 2016). In 2008, the skill stream of the immigration programme was again 
reformed to make it more demand- oriented by increasing the proportion of tem-
porary entrants sponsored by employers and state and territory governments. In 
2012, business entry visas were changed to introduce two new types of immigrant 
entry: Business Innovation and Investment and Significant Investor visas. The stu-
dent visa programme was also simplified and the conditions of entry eased in 
order to attract a larger proportion of foreign full- fee- paying students (PC 2016).
In the 2000s, unauthorised boat arrivals and post- 9/11 international terrorist 
activities added a new emphasis on border control. This emphasis involved, inter 
alia, the reticulation of authorised migrants seeking refugee- cum- immigrant sta-
tus in Australia to offshore detention centres, such as Christmas Island, deemed 
to be partially ‘ex- territorial’ and, later, to foreign detention centres (e.g. Nauru, 
Manus Island) under the so- called Pacific Solution.
The current migration system
The Australian Government aims to manage immigration to benefit (increase 
the wellbeing) of the existing Australian community and, given this broad goal, 
it sets specific policy objectives and restrictions for each immigration stream 
(DIBP 2015). As the governance of migration is a federal responsibility, the 
Federal Minister for Immigration and Border Protection is vested with various 
powers to cap the different visa (immigration) streams, set annual targets under 
various programmes and delay or fast track different categories of applicant. 
However, as temporary skilled visa streams have been uncapped and the per-
manent immigrant intake has been strongly influenced by employers and state/
territory governments, the Australian government’s ability to control and cap 
overall migrant numbers has been limited. In this section, we review various 
aspects of the current migration policy regime and the associated moral hazards 
of the different policy options.
The present merit- based migration system started to consolidate in 1996 and 
has largely been associated with the shift from traditional, permanent settler arriv-
als to temporary work and student visas. Temporary visas now outnumber perma-
nent residence visas by three to one, with over 80 per cent permanent (residence) 
visas granted on- shore to temporary migrants already in- country. In this context 
the in- country stock of temporary residents is an important policy variable, as 
permanent residents are now mostly drawn from the resident pool of temporary 
arrivals. In the late 1990s and 2000s, there was also a shift to a two- step immigra-
tion strategy, which aimed:
• at Step 1, to attract skilled or potentially skilled migrants to seek tempo-
rary residential status to work or study in Australia, with migrant numbers 
uncapped, lightly regulated and driven by market conditions; and
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• at Step 2, to induce temporary migrants with skilled employment and/or 
study experience in Australia to apply for permanent residence via the skilled 
migrant stream with annual numbers capped and more tightly regulated 
(Gregory 2014).
Step 1 can be described as ‘for the market competition’, aimed at attracting inter-
nationally mobile human capital and young foreign talent to work and/or study in 
Australia. Step 2 can therefore be labelled ‘in the market competition’, aimed at 
retaining the ‘market- tested’ segments of the temporary resident pool before they 
flow out again as internationally mobile human capital. Thus, a defining attribute 
of the two- step immigration management framework is the pathway from tempo-
rary to permanent residency. For example, it has been estimated that over 70 per 
cent of those granted temporary 457 skilled employment visas and between 15 
and 30 per cent of student visa- holders ultimately obtain permanent residency (PC 
2016). In principle, this for- and- in- the- market- competition framework enhances 
Australia’s ability to compete in the increasingly globalised and competitive mar-
ket for internationally footloose human capital. There is also a strong focus on 
‘brain utilisation’ to prevent ’brain waste’ through demand–supply mismatches. 
Nevertheless, some moral hazards are inherent in this approach.
Net overseas migration (NOM) is the most commonly used method for measur-
ing external migration flows into and out of Australia. In essence, it measures a 
net difference between immigration and emigration based on a duration of stay in 
or away from Australia of at least 12 months out of the preceding 16 months (PC 
2016: 66). NOM increased from about 97,000 in 1996 to peak at over 300,000 
in 2008 (at the outset of the Global Financial Crisis), to decline to 184,000 in 
2014 (PC 2016). During the 20- year period 1996–2015, the net natural increase 
of the Australian population (births minus deaths) fluctuated between 120,000 and 
160,000. Since the mid- 2000s, NOM added to it more than half the annual popula-
tion increase (67 per cent in 2008). Given the two- step immigration strategy, the 
increase in NOM since the mid- 2000s has largely been associated with a surge in 
temporary migration – i.e. foreign students, temporary skilled visa 457 holders 
and New Zealand citizens (PC 2016: 68). By attracting immigrants of working 
age (usually under 50), NOM delivers a demographic dividend to Australia – i.e. it 
increases the number of people in the workforce and reduces the age dependency 
ratio (of those over 65 to those aged 15–64). This is expected to reduce the impact 
of population aging.
Permanent immigration visa grants also provide a good measure of immigrant 
input to the pool of Australia’s long- term residents and citizens as, normally, a 
large percentage of permanent visa- holders remain in- country for good and seek 
citizenship by naturalisation.10 Applications for permanent residence can be lodged 
on- and off- shore under Family, Skill and Special Eligibility streams of the Migra-
tion Programme. A separate and small Humanitarian Programme also feeds the 
stock of permanent residents. Permanent immigration under the three streams of 
the Migration Programme increased from over 82,000 in 1996 to 190,000 in 2015, 
while visas under the Humanitarian Programme fluctuated at about 15,000 a year 
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during this period, although the number was nearly doubled in 2015 to accommo-
date an additional 12,000 Syrian refugees (PC 2016: 69). Increased immigration 
under the Migration Programme has largely been driven by skilled visa- holders 
who increased from 24,000 in 1996 to 130,000 in 2014, so the share of skilled 
permanent immigrants in the programme increased from 29 per cent in 1996 to 
68 per cent in 2014 (PC 2016: 70). Given the growth in the permanent component 
of NOM and permanent immigration visas, it can be argued that, since the mid- 
1990s, Australia has experienced another wave of mass immigration. Since 2008, 
this inflow of new permanent visa- holders has also been more tuned in to labour- 
market requirements as the ‘demand- driven’, employer- sponsored component of 
the skilled stream increased from 17 per cent in 2008 to 37 per cent in 2014.11
The stock of temporary migrants, excluding tourists, stood at over 1.5 million 
in the middle of 2015 and included 653,000 New Zealand citizens on ‘temporary’ 
444 visas, who are free to remain in Australia to reside and work permanently 
under the Trans- Tasman travel arrangement, unless they are involved in criminal 
activities that warrant their deportation. The Trans- Tasman category of ‘tempo-
rary’ migrant is broadly similar to the ‘freely moving’ (transnational) EU citi-
zens who are entitled to reside and work in any member- country within the EU. 
Thus, the contingent of ‘temporary’ New Zealand residents in Australia should 
better be described as NZ transnational immigrants. In 2015, other temporary 
categories of migrant comprised some 375,000 foreign students, 188,000 skilled 
457 visa- holders,12 about 144,000 working holiday- makers,13 around 102,000 
bridging visa- holders,14 over 26,000 temporary graduates and more than 49,000 
otherwise- defined temporary visa- holders. Excluding New Zealand transnational 
immigrants, the stock of temporary visa- holders almost doubled between 2003 
and 2015 (PC 2016: 71). In 2013–14, student visas accounted for 40 per cent of 
temporary visas granted, holiday- makers for 33 per cent and temporary skilled 
workers (visa category 457) for 13 per cent (PC 2016).
All permanent and temporary visa applicants have to meet a range of age, char-
acter and health requirements as well as other conditions specific to the different 
visa categories.15 Fees and immigrant visa application charges may also be set 
quite high in some cases to reduce/deter the demand for applications.16 Overall, 
however, the immigrant intakes are controlled administratively, particularly on 
the supply side, by applying the points system and quantitative caps to determine 
the immigrant flows and stocks and their composition. On the demand side, they 
are controlled by the market- mediated employer sponsorship of temporary visa- 
holders and state/territory visa sponsorship. The Productivity Commission (2016) 
describes this arrangement as the ‘hybrid system’; however, only some visa 
streams have been rationed by price so that it is mostly administrative restrictions 
which have only been supplemented by the use of a price mechanism. Gener-
ally, non- price rationing is preferred as it allows administrators to target particular 
outcomes (e.g. demographic dividend) which might otherwise get diluted or lost 
if only those who have the ability to pay qualify for entry. This objection also 
applies to unauthorised migrant entry facilitated by so- called people smugglers, 
who deliver only those unauthorised migrants who have the ability to pay high 
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agent (smuggling) fees and associated travel costs. This is normally associated 
with boat arrivals targeted by Pacific Solution border controls; however, far more 
significant and difficult to handle (in Australia and many other countries) are the 
aspiring immigrants arriving on tourist visas arranged by bogus tourist agencies 
or temporary workers and students funneled into Australia by shady market inter-
mediaries to be employed by equally shady entrepreneurs as virtually ‘indentured 
labour’ (Rizvi 2019).
In its assessment of the likely economic impact of immigration on the Austral-
ian economy, the Productivity Commission (PC 2016: 8–17) suggests that:
• as in several OECD countries, new immigrants have a lower employment- to- 
population ratio than their Australia- born peers;
• an all- immigrant unemployment rate is relatively higher during recessions 
than that of Australia- born natives but about the same at other times (this is 
not surprising, as newly arrived immigrants find it harder to secure and retain 
jobs during recessions and migrant inflows are restricted by governments);
• permanent skilled- stream immigrants outperform those from family and 
humanitarian streams in terms of labour- force participation rates, unemploy-
ment rates, hours of work and earnings;
• within occupations, there is no apparent difference in earnings between those 
born overseas and Australia- born natives. Median earnings by age group 
show that the permanent skilled- stream immigrants outperform, across 
most age groups, the general population as well as family and humanitar-
ian streams. As expected, the humanitarian stream lags considerably behind 
the general population for all age groups, as many refugees arrive with little 
human capital and lack the ability to accumulate it when in- country;17
• while, on average, immigrants, especially those from the permanent skilled 
stream, have higher formal qualifications than their local equivalents, in 
2012–2013, about 30 per cent of ‘highly educated’ immigrants were consid-
ered to be overqualified in their current employment relative to 22 per cent 
for those Australia- born. This difference is surprisingly small though;
• contrary to popular myth, there is little evidence of immigrants reducing 
wage levels and displacing the incumbent workers. Such effects are usually 
confined to particular market niches (e.g. unskilled youth labour) and tend to 
be temporary. Given the great size of the Australian continent and its small 
population, population- related agglomeration economies (combining scale 
and scope effects) are important sources of job growth (see also Withers 
2016). Overall, though, in line with various overseas studies, the Commission 
found a negligible effect from immigration on aggregate workforce participa-
tion, employment, wages or the propensity to invest in skills and education 
(PC 2016: 10);
• notwithstanding occasional claims of technological spill- in effects associated 
with immigration and anecdotal evidence of immigrant entrepreneurship and 
innovation, the empirical evidence regarding the impact of such activities on the 
GDP level or productivity growth is limited (but see Parham and Regan 2016);
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• the net fiscal impact of immigration (contributions to government revenues 
less the value of government services and benefits received) is likely to be 
positive but small (2 per cent of GDP). Overall, young, skilled immigrants 
and temporary migrants generate a larger net fiscal surplus than family- 
stream immigrants, while humanitarian immigrants are net beneficiaries of 
government service provision and welfare benefits;
• the Commission’s general equilibrium modelling of the Australian economy 
implies that Australia’s population would reach 27 million in 2060 with zero 
NOM, and the real GDP per capita would be 42 per cent above the 2014 level. 
With positive NOM at the present level, the in- country population would 
reach 40 million by 2060 and the real GDP per capita would be 50 per cent 
above the 2014 level. The projected effect is relatively small. Most studies 
indicate that, overall, immigrants ‘pay their way’ but they also capture the 
most benefits from their economic activity, especially if one allows for an 
implicit subsidy from skilled immigrants to family and humanitarian immi-
grant streams and for external effects and congestion associated with immi-
grant locational preference for the largest urban conurbations;
• there is also a possibility that positive NOM may increase the long- term 
growth rate of the total factor (all- input) productivity, but that the evidence 
is scant and any such effect is likely to be small, especially as the proba-
ble labour- saving effects of the Fourth Industrial Revolution are taken into 
consideration. However, with increased inflows of capital and technology, 
the rate of growth of labour productivity, measured, say, in GDP per person 
employed, is likely to increase; and
• the demographic dividend associated with the immigration of younger set-
tlers will lower the age dependency ratio and, thus, potentially moderate the 
economic pressures associated with long- term population aging.
Some of the benefits of Australia’s immigration actually flow directly offshore 
when immigrants remit part of their earnings back to their home countries – in 
2013, remittances were estimated at AUD 7 billion at current prices and exchange 
rates (PC 2016).
Overall, the Australian immigration system works well as it is flexible enough 
to adapt to changing domestic and international market conditions and robust 
enough to compete internationally for footloose human and social capital. It is 
also reinforced by broad support from the Australia- born public, who generally 
perceive the inflow of immigrants as welfare enhancing.18 Unsurprisingly, the pro-
jected growth in jobs and potential budget surpluses depend on future inflows of 
temporary skilled labour migrants, which may be vulnerable and unpredictable 
during economic downturns.
The system’s success has also been attributed to the proactive policy of mul-
ticulturalism as investment in social capital to complement the accumulation 
of human capital. As noted earlier, the policy of multiculturalism encouraging 
the proactive sustainment of ethnic diversity to smooth the absorption of new 
immigrants into the host community was adopted in Australia in the early 1970s 
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following the dismantling of the overtly racist White Australia policy of the 1950s 
and 1960s. This new migration policy of the 1970s paralleled Australia’s strategic 
re- orientation towards Asia after the Vietnam War. It was also broadly endorsed 
by the then- pre- dominant group of Australians of British- Irish ethnicity who were 
generally well- disposed to newcomers from very diverse cultural backgrounds. 
The cumulative experience of the post- 1945 mass immigration was also broadly 
positive (Markus 2016).
Professor Jerzy Zubrzycki of the Australian National University – a war refu-
gee who arrived in Australia following a distinguished military service in the Pol-
ish Armed Forces and an early academic career in the United Kingdom – came to 
be regarded as the inspirational and intellectual ‘father’ of the down- under ver-
sion of multiculturalism. This meant that new immigrants did not have to hide 
their cultural baggage and could retain and cultivate their cultural and religious 
heritage. Ethnic diversity was to be embraced as a social opportunity rather than 
divested as an impediment to one’s successful integration into the host society. 
In this respect, Australian multiculturalism was also a part of the broader social 
sentiment that emerged quite spontaneously in many parts of the world in the 
late 1960s. As immigrant destination countries rebuilt and liberalised after the 
devastation of WWII, they embraced mass secondary and tertiary education, 
grew wealthier and more socially tolerant and progressively integrated into the 
rapidly globalising world economy. Greater tolerance and acceptance of social 
differences was the new Zeitgeist as baby- boomers reached adulthood. By the 
late 1970s, especially after the arrival of Vietnamese war refugees, the idea of 
multiculturalism gained social traction in Australia and the declaratory rhetoric of 
‘Australian multiculturalism’ was soon enthusiastically adopted by the Australian 
political, cultural and administrative elites. The new rhetoric was soon followed 
by new, government- funded institutions (such as ethnic councils or departments 
of multicultural affairs) as the federal and state governments pump- primed their 
bureaucracies to be more ‘inclusive’, adopted the new language of social diver-
sity, and increased budgets to facilitate the growing ethnic and cultural heteroge-
neity (e.g. multilingual assistance and ‘multicultural’ radio and television). By 
and large, Australia has been associated with successful immigrant integration if 
measured by the various economic indicators reported in this chapter and, given 
the scale of immigration and the diversity of migrant source countries, by the 
absence of striking social pathologies such as street crime.
It was only some twenty years later that the moral hazard of the multicultural 
policy and problems associated with adverse selection by certain migrant groups 
became apparent: while the policy was broadly successful, some immigrant com-
munities set out to dismantle the institutional fabric of the all- inclusive and toler-
ant society, as it was that fabric of tolerance and acceptance that they found the 
most threatening to their parochial group identity. What was initially taken for 
granted was that the centripetal forces of social cohesion were strong enough to 
not be offset by the centrifugal forces of social diversity that were boosted by 
various multicultural initiatives. With hindsight, this assumption was rather over- 
optimistic as it became clear that some groups of immigrants were only too keen 
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to retain their home- country identity and openly hostile to the idea of identifying 
with Australia as their new home. It is only recently that more stringent require-
ments have been applied to those migrant residents who seek naturalisation. They 
are now expected to demonstrate a working knowledge of the English language 
and some basic familiarity with Australia’s history and institutions. On balance, 
it is difficult to determine whether it is the proactive policy of multiculturalism 
that has been a necessary albeit an insufficient condition for Australia’s integrative 
success of large- scale immigration or whether the credit is due to the relatively 
smooth absorption of mass immigration that has occurred regardless of various 
government multicultural initiatives. The jury is out to determine whether and to 
what extent the policy of migrant integration has made much real difference in this 
respect. Other factors that have also contributed to the formation of an immigrant 
absorptive capacity are:
• the long- term perspective, the high degree of bipartisanship and patience 
adopted by successive political elites. Absorptive/integrative processes may 
take two or three generations to work through when there are highly diverse 
migrant intakes – a long- term focus and planning are therefore necessary;
• social and welfare policies that minimise resource competition between 
immigrants and Australia- born welfare recipients;
• accessible educational opportunities for newcomers at all levels – from sec-
ondary through tertiary to higher degrees (e.g. the availability of repayable 
student loans at the tertiary level) – to reduce competition for educational 
resources between immigrants and the Australia- born;
• a state/private health care system with co- payments so that immigrants do not 
burden publicly funded health care and compete against the poorer natives;
• a private and partially compulsory superannuation system as the basis of old- 
age pensions, with state old- age pensions mostly intended to provide a social 
safety net – i.e. working age immigrants are expected to earn their old- age 
entitlements through their participation in compulsory and voluntary super-
annuation funds;
• steady long- term wage/salary growth, which has reduced competition 
between immigrants and the Australia- born by minimising potential displace-
ment effects;
• no military conscription, which otherwise might have created tension 
between those drafted into national service and those staying behind (often 
non- nationals); and
• the effective policing of Australian borders, which has helped to sustain public 
support for controlled immigration. There appears to be strong public antipathy 
towards unauthorised immigrants who try to jump the queue or get in under the 
fence as visa overstayers or bogus refugees (however, this is also resented by a 
large part of the Australian public – see remaining sections of this chapter).
The present model of immigration emphasises a market- driven focus on per-
manent and temporary skilled migration with pathways to permanent residency. 
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Similarly, it aims to attract a large influx of fee- paying foreign students by offer-
ing a pathway to residency to retain much of the newly formed human capital in- 
country. The integrity and effectiveness of this approach depends on the efficient 
and flexible administration of migrant selection using the meritocratic points sys-
tem which, in turn, depends on the effective system of border control that allows 
policy- makers to determine who comes to Australia as an immigrant, when and 
on what terms. It is also the strength of economic pull factors that is expected 
to provide the social bonding needed to underpin the successful integration of 
new arrivals into the existing social fabric of Australia. However, like all policy 
initiatives, the present economics- driven migration model creates its own moral 
hazards of unintended and sometimes perverse consequences and, thus, associ-
ated policy dilemmas.
First, the so- called Pacific Solution19 has been effective in preventing Australia 
from being inundated with unauthorised mass arrivals. This is the dilemma faced 
by all developed countries, particularly the European Union and the US, where a 
large number of de facto labour migrants seek asylum on humanitarian grounds to 
gain entry as refugees.20 However, the Pacific Solution has attracted a great deal 
of international opprobrium as Australia’s external obligations under the inter-
national system of migration governance (see the next section) tend to conflict 
with the full sovereignty of border control needed by the meritocratic system of 
human capital preferment. There is no easy way out of this dilemma, even if Aus-
tralia opted out of its international treaty obligations. The influx of unauthorised 
immigrants is only deterred by the randomness of the reticulation system and 
the harshness and ruthlessness of the Pacific Solution.21 In turn, this sits rather 
uncomfortably with the Australian national psyche and its profound sense of fair-
ness and ‘fair go’ for the underdog. Many Australians believe that the system of 
international migration governance should not be fundamentally different from its 
domestic counterpart, which aims to equalise opportunities for all citizens regard-
less of the geographic and social incidence of their birth. Thus, many Austral-
ians believe that unauthorised immigrants have an unalienable human right to 
settle in Australia as their preferred location, which should not be attenuated by 
the Westphalian concept of national sovereignty that restricts such rights to those 
entry- seekers who are authorised to settle on terms determined by the incumbents 
(Howe 2016). However, at the same time, opinion polls and elections results show 
that the majority of Australians approve of the Pacific Solution as a means of 
border control and an effective deterrent of mass unauthorised migrant arrivals. 
There is an element of contradiction22 in these conflicting social sentiments and, 
not surprisingly, the Pacific Solution has polarised Australian politics since its 
introduction in the early 2000s.23
Second, the market- oriented approach to the management of skilled permanent 
and temporary migration pertains to the partial delegation of the administration 
of migrant selection to employers and state/territory governments. Under the cur-
rent system, the Australian government uses market labour analysis and a public 
consultative process to compile the Consolidated Sponsored Occupations List 
(in 2016, CSOL comprised 649 occupations) and the Skilled Occupations List 
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(SOL, listing 191 occupations deemed to be in short supply) in a bid to guide 
the assessment of immigrant applications in employer- sponsored and independ-
ent points- tested categories respectively. As the Productivity Commission notes, 
the classification of occupations as skilled tends to be quite arbitrary and ‘there 
is a strong case to move to a universal points system for the entire permanent 
skill stream – similar to the approach adopted in Canada [and] in doing so, it 
would deliberately raise the standard across the entire cohort of permanent skilled 
migrants and generate better economic and social outcomes’ (PC 2016: 24–25). 
The actual application of the applicant sponsorship effectively shifts a large part 
of the selection process to those who have ‘vested interests in unduly influencing 
outcomes’ – i.e. shady employers, market intermediaries and local politicians (PC 
2016: 24–25). This applied in particular to the uncapped stream of temporary 457 
visa- holders, where conditions imposed on sponsoring organisations to demon-
strate the necessity to attract temporary foreign workers due to market skill short-
ages were often very laxed (Howe 2016). There is plenty of scope for the system to 
be ‘gamed’ by employers, market agents and ‘ethnic network’ operators and, thus, 
for some temporary foreign workers to be exploited by unscrupulous employers 
and market agents (see Rizvi 2019). For example, unskilled migrants may be fun-
neled into the country providing that they comply with some bogus or vague skill 
requirements. Not surprisingly, there has been pressure to tighten these tempo-
rary arrangements. Temporary visas are also opposed by unions which resist the 
fragmentation of the labour market and the resultant erosion of their membership 
and bargaining power. In 2017–18, Australian Government started to implement 
a number of changes to temporary and permanent skilled- migration programmes, 
including the 457 temporary- visa programme.24 There are also plans to contract 
out to the private sector some elements of migrant administration. This may easily 
backfire and add to tensions reported by Rizvi (2019) and Mares (2019).
Third, the effectiveness of the system of international student visas as a path 
to permanent immigration has also been questioned (see Boucher 2016). In prin-
ciple, this allows talented international students from poor backgrounds to work 
and study in order to fund their education.25 Visa numbers are uncapped and these 
temporary visa- holders have a right to work for up to 40 hours per fortnight dur-
ing semester time and unlimited hours at other times. The temporary graduate 
visa- holders have a right to work for between 18 and 48 months after graduation. 
A very high proportion of foreign students avail themselves of these work oppor-
tunities.26 Those who opt to remain in Australia, possibly up to a third of the stock, 
are effectively self- funding the formation of human capital, which will remain in 
country. However, the obvious moral hazard of this arrangement is that the sys-
tem can be gamed by unscrupulous educational agents and service- providers to 
import bogus students, who pay educational fees for a right to work as unskilled 
workers in Australia. As critics point out, ‘It’s a relationship that involves the gov-
ernment effectively contracting out a big chunk of the migration program to self- 
serving educational institutions that elect to ignore the costs of the program while 
scooping up many of the benefits’ (Sloan 2019a: 22). The obvious social oppor-
tunity cost of the programme pertains to the lowering of educational standards by 
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educational providers to target low- quality entrants, especially those with limited 
English- language skills, who would not normally meet admission requirements 
(Rizvi 2019; Sloan 2019b). However, to date, there has been no comprehensive 
cost – benefit analysis of the education sector as an exporter of Australia- based 
services.
Fourth, the unrestricted, market- oriented approach mostly funnels the new arriv-
als into the two major Australian conurbations: Sydney and Melbourne (Taylor 
2016). This is where immigrant communities agglomerate and, thus, benefit from 
strong agglomeration economies, but where infrastructural congestion (e.g. roads, 
public transport) and other negative externalities experienced by the incumbents 
(e.g. access to housing, primary schools etc.) may offset the benefits associated with 
the arrival of new skilled immigrants. Most foreign students live and study in major 
cities, in particular Sydney and Melbourne (Sloan 2019a). Clearly, such location- 
specific issues should easily be addressed under the meritocratic points system by 
assigning higher points to those visa applicants who commit to living in designated 
areas. However, this needs to be contractually enforced and, under the present sys-
tem, those contracts implicit in entry visas are highly incomplete. Once in- country, 
immigrants are practically free to settle where they wish even if they had previously 
committed to residing at a particular location.27 Again, under the two- step system of 
entry regulation this should be easily remedied by making the pathway to perma-
nent arrangements conditional on compliance with initial visa settings or by making 
subsequent naturalisation opportunities dependent on immigrant compliance with 
their earlier visa conditions. This remains to be implemented.
Fifth, the pathway to permanent residence has been formally reinforced by the 
policy of multiculturalism, which is intended to lower the absorption cost of the 
increasingly more socially and culturally diverse influx of immigrants. This is 
claimed to have worked well in Australia (Pakulski 2014), although the obvi-
ous moral hazard of encouraging high levels of ethnic and cultural diversity is 
the potential for increased social fragmentation and identity grouping, which per-
versely increase the social opportunity cost of immigrant integration.
All in all, the Australian migration system is largely geared to labour- market 
outcomes. Migrants account for a significant proportion of net population change 
but they are largely pre- selected as skilled people of working age. In this respect, 
challenges posed by migrant integration are secondary. Temporary migrant work-
ers and students are essentially foreigners allowed to stay in- country. It is intended 
that a significant proportion of them will opt to remain in Australia and will seek 
permanent Australian residency. It is at this point that they will be expected to 
integrate into the host society. Nevertheless, to obtain residency status they are 
first screened and assessed as potential Australians, so the migration policy paves 
the way to the migrant integration policy. Once accepted as permanent residents 
of Australia, immigrants are free to access state and federal public goods and 
services (e.g. the Medicare system, education, public housing) on the same basis 
as regular Australian citizens. They are also encouraged to naturalise and become 
Australian citizens. Given the in- country presence of large ethnic groups, many 
new migrants are also integrated through established ethnic channels.
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Regional migration governance
Finally, Australian migration strategies, policies and procedures should also be 
seen in the broader context of Australia’s participation in the international and 
regional governance of cross- border mobility. The UN defines international 
migration governance as ‘the [totality of] migration policies and programmes of 
individual countries, inter- state discussions and agreements, multilateral forums 
and consultative processes, the activities of international organisations, as well as 
relevant laws and norms’ (Chand and Markowski 2018: 2). Under this definition, 
the migration governance activities of sovereign nation- states account for the bulk 
of international migration governance as the sovereign Westphalian nation- state 
that is the basic building block and juridical territorial entity of the international 
legal order. It is therefore the nation- state which is recognised by other nation- 
states as the sovereign legal entity vested with the unchallengeable authority to 
govern its internal affairs, represent its territory and its inhabitants in relations 
with other nation- states, control the way they interact with other countries and, if 
need be, use force to protect its territorial integrity. However, some of that sov-
ereignty is surrendered when a nation- state federates or clubs with other states 
to form a supranational entity, such as the EU, or when it becomes a signatory to 
bi- and multilateral treaties and agreements that attenuate its freedom to act as a 
fully sovereign nation.
Accordingly, Australia is a signatory to multilateral treaties, usually UN- 
mediated, such as the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 
1967 Protocol, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment or 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In their totality, these international obli-
gations restrict Australia’s ability to defend its borders. All unauthorised immi-
grants landing on its shores can claim protection as refugees and asylum- seekers 
and, thus, are entitled to, at least, a formal review of their claims, temporary stay 
and shelter pending the outcome of screening and, if need be, appeal processes. 
Given the inherent inequalities between nation- states, a vast segment of humanity 
could claim asylum rights in prosperous democracies such as Australia. As noted 
earlier, the unauthorised arrivals of migrants from poor, oppressive and violent 
parts of the world can only be deterred by very harsh border control measures. 
For many, including a large part of the Australian electorate, the application of 
such harsh measures contravenes not only the spirit but also the letter of interna-
tional treaties and agreements, which have idealistically sought to provide refugee 
protection in exceptional circumstances. However, these treaties have also been 
used by all those who refuse to have their cross- border mobility constrained by 
the accident of their birth and who seek to improve their life chances of living a 
reasonably secure and prosperous existence, normally taken for granted by inhab-
itants of rich democracies such as Australia.
The emergence of nation- states from the post- First World War ruins of old 
empires has also elevated the importance of international free trade and the 
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unimpeded mobility of factors of production such as capital and labour. As global 
free trade and factor mobility have been difficult to secure, federal states such 
as the US, Canada or Australia and regional, quasi- federal economic clubs such 
the European Union have provided a means of securing regional agglomeration 
economies. Most of these entities have been structured as Buchanan- style, top- 
down economic clubs (Buchanan 1965), that is, as centrally managed entities that 
have been designed for geographically contiguous member- states operating as 
provinces or states. The federation of the former British colonies into the Com-
monwealth of Australia is an example of such an arrangement. However, this is 
geographically limited to the Australian continent and its offshore islands. In the 
vastness of the Pacific region, the federal model cannot be easily extended to 
include relatively small island- states dispersed over huge ocean areas. One model 
is to incorporate an archipelago such as Hawaii as an offshore state of the US. 
Another has been based on the special relationship between Australia and New 
Zealand, which Chand and Markowski (2018) describe as a self- regulating and 
relatively unstructured club – an alternative to the Buchanan- style arrangement – 
and label an idiorhythmic economic club.
The structured, top- down architecture of Buchanan- style clubs such as the EU 
experience a lot of friction as their Westphalian member- states find it challenging 
to surrender their national sovereignty to form working coalitions of members 
driven by some high- level vision of an ever- closer federal entity. In contrast, idio-
rhythmic economic clubs grow organically and bottom- up (through a series of 
new inter- state initiatives and partial reversals), using self- regulating management 
structures (e.g. regional coordination committees) that rely on weak, often dis-
cordant bonding mechanisms and makeshift forms of club governance as opposed 
to the overarching central design. An example of such an emergent design is the 
Australia – New Zealand Pacific (ANZPAC) migration governance system.
The outer boundary of the ANZPAC is provided by the Pacific Island Forum 
(PIF), which is the weak bonding force of this regional arrangement. The two 
largest and economically strongest nation- states within the ANZPAC system are 
Australia and New Zealand, with their dependent territories. Both Australia and 
New Zealand are immigrant destinations for inter- regional migrants that have 
long been integrated through the Australia – New Zealand Closer Economic 
Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA) and the Trans- Tasman Travel Arrange-
ment. The latter has provided the legal basis for the free mobility of workers and 
residents between Australia and New Zealand with largely unrestricted residen-
tial and employment rights. As Australia has been the larger and wealthier of the 
two foundation states of the ANZPAC, the New Zealand diaspora in Australia 
numbers well over 600,000 or more than 9 per cent of all foreign- born residents 
(Taylor 2016: 17). There are some non- reciprocal residential and labour- flow 
arrangements between New Zealand, the Cook Islands and Niue, which allow 
nationals of these island- states to emigrate to New Zealand (but not the reverse).
Most of the island- states in the Pacific are very poor and vulnerable. Temporary 
employment in Australia and New Zealand provides the most effective economic 
aid for Pacific Island economies (Berkelmans and Pryke 2016). In principle, 
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temporary workers from the Pacific Islands could have been employed in Australia 
under the uncapped 457 visa arrangements and in New Zealand under a similar 
but capped employer nomination scheme. However, the mainstream immigration 
strategies and policies of Australia and New Zealand are aimed at attracting skilled 
workers and human capital and the mostly unskilled Pacific- Island workers are 
unlikely to qualify. Thus, both Australia and New Zealand have separate seasonal 
worker programmes which aim to support economies of the neighbouring Pacific 
nations by offering limited seasonal work as a form of development assistance. 
In Australia, this is provided through the Seasonal Worker Program (SWP) and 
in New Zealand through the Recognised Employer Program (RSEP). It is these 
arrangements, together with the Trans- Tasman Travel Arrangement, that form the 
basis of the ANZPAC migration system (Chand and Markowski 2018).
While still largely embryonic, the concept of the ANZPAC as a self- regulating, 
bottom- up and idiorhythmic migration system provides some food for thought for 
countries seeking an alternative to Buchanan- style clubbing arrangements. This 
could be of interest to the post- Brexit United Kingdom as it will have to retain its 
united (federal) structure but also allow for flexible factor- flow arrangements with 
other states under free- trade agreements and limited market integration.
Concluding comment
In this chapter we have reviewed the history of Australian migration governance 
to highlight those aspects that should be of interest for EU member- states and the 
EU as a whole. This applies in particular to the enhanced understanding of the 
moral hazards that are inevitably associated with all migration strategies, policies 
and procedures. We also tried to emphasise that Australia is primarily a country 
of labour immigration. The system of immigrant selection mitigates against the 
acceptance of immigrants as such. Unlike the US, Australia does not aspire to 
attract the ‘huddled masses of humanity’. The most obvious exceptions from the 
country’s labour- oriented immigration policy are refugees under the humanitarian 
migrant intake and family members of accepted labour immigrants.
There are obvious limits to the portability of the Australian immigration experi-
ence. Ultimately, every country is unique and its particular experience is a product 
of many country- specific factors. There is, however, one strong element of simi-
larity. Over the past few decades, Europe as a region has evolved from a source 
of mass emigration to become the highly desirable destination for mass immi-
gration. It shares some similarities with Australia, which has been an immigrant 
destination for most of its modern history. Like Australia, but on a substantially 
greater scale, the European Union is confronted with pressures posed by the mass 
immigration of working- age people from poor countries who seek a better life in 
richer parts of the world. The benefits of these migrants for destination countries 
have been well documented (see, for example, PC 2016) and the experience of 
such inflows is broadly positive. It is the scale of the phenomenon and the rate 
of arrivals that are now posing problems for migrant destinations. Most of these 
destinations are democracies which face populist resistance to mass immigration 
218 Stefan Markowski et al.
from various sections of the electorate, even if the inflow of migrants is broadly 
beneficial for the country as a whole. These populist movements are now signifi-
cant enough to threaten the political stability of EU member- states. Thus, there is 
pressure to regulate mass migratory movements or they may otherwise destabilise 
the very social and economic fabric of wealthy democracies that has made them 
attractive as migrant destinations in the first place.
In this context, the Australian experience is instructive for three reasons. First, 
in Australia, unlike the European Union, there is a strong, bi- partisan political con-
sensus that immigration is good for the country as a source of substantial demo-
graphic, cultural and economic dividend. There is also a political consensus that 
inflows of people have to be regulated to deliver this dividend. It is the mechan-
ics of regulation where political interests diverge, often substantially. However, 
in a working democracy, the mechanics of regulation are the prerogative of the 
government of the day. In federal Australia, the responsibility for migration con-
trol is vested in the federal government. This is where the European Union is 
confronting an institutional ambiguity that has to be addressed sooner rather than 
later. Either responsibility for the regulation of cross- border migration has to be 
unambiguously assigned to the Union as a quasi- federal entity or it has to revert 
back to member- states, in which case the very concept of the EU as an ‘ever closer 
union’ is in doubt.
Second, to make the (cross- border) migration and subsequent migrant integra-
tion policies work, the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the decision- making 
entity have to be protected. This is the logic of the Australian Pacific Solution, 
where harsh border controls are enforced to stop the massive inflow of unauthor-
ised immigrants. This stringent implementation allows Australia to determine the 
scale and scope of migrant inflows and secure public support for regulated mass 
immigration. It is this capacity to enforce border controls that the EU lacks at 
present and, in its absence, member- states are encouraged to deflect unwanted 
migrant inflows to other parts of the Union and free ride at the expense of the 
Community. In the longer term, this also threatens the integrity of intra- EU free 
movement and the Schengen system of unimpeded intra- EU mobility. We do not 
wish to suggest that the potential Mediterranean Solution should be modelled on 
the Pacific one. Clearly, there is plenty of room for innovation and the EU as a 
whole has much larger resources at its disposal and much greater economic lever-
age to find a way of regaining border control that could avoid the harshness of the 
Pacific Solution. Nevertheless, some radical initiative is in order if the European 
project is to regain its momentum and appeal.28
Third, the Australian regional experience is also of value. For far too long, Aus-
tralia and New Zealand have neglected the plight of Pacific Islanders and their 
dependence on the Australian and New Zealand labour markets. Admittedly, their 
numbers are small so there has never been a threat of mass migration from the 
Pacific. However, a wealthy country like Australia should accept some responsibil-
ity for its less fortunate neighbours and provide well- targeted economic assistance 
to lift people out of poverty. The schemes presently operated by Australia and New 
Zealand are far from adequate but do represent a step in the right direction. The EU 
‘Fair Dinkum’ migration policy, Australia 219
faces a much more demanding task in its African and Middle Eastern neighbour-
hoods. If massive flows of unauthorised labour migrants are to be brought under 
control, the EU must confront the sources and causes of recurrent mass emigration. 
There are many potential solutions that would inevitably involve substantial invest-
ment of European resources at the expense of current programmes of intra- EU assis-
tance for new member- states. However, the potentially destabilising mass migration 
cannot only be regulated by means of border controls; economic capacity- building 
in source countries is a necessary, albeit not a sufficient, condition for the effective 
management of mass inflows of job- seekers.
Australia is also quite unambiguous with regard to the ultimate objectives of 
its immigration system. While it serves as a backdoor population policy, it is pri-
marily an instrument for attracting inflows of skilled and relatively young labour 
migrants. The EU should similarly be more explicit as to why it wants to attract 
migrants as opposed to stopping the unauthorised job- seekers at its border. The 
policy of migrant integration is a secondary challenge. Unlike economically moti-
vated immigration where quantitative policy targets could be specified, this is 
an area where it is easy to claim integrative success as well as to criticise the 
outcomes. Much of it is, in our opinion, a declaratory rhetoric of different vested 
interests. The main lesson, however, is that migration strategies and policies have 
to be designed with greater understanding and acceptance of the inevitable moral 
hazards of different policy initiatives. It is not that Australia has adopted a wiser 
and more anticipatory approach but it has learnt much faster from its mistakes and 
its strategic agility makes it more politically resilient, bipartisan and effective at 
addressing problems of mass, cross- border mobility as they emerge.29
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Notes
 1 The Migration Council Australia (MCA) is an independent, non- partisan, not- for- 
profit body established to enhance the productive benefits of Australia’s migration and 
humanitarian programmes. It aims to enhance understanding of migration and settle-
ment processes in Australia through commissioned migration- related research and to 
foster the development of migration- focused partnerships between the Australian cor-
porate sector, the community and the government.
 2 Some Chinese labourers came to Australia during the Gold Rush of the 1850s but their 
arrivals were soon restricted under colonial legislation such as the Victoria’s Immigra-
tion Act 1855 (Vic) (PC 2016).
 3 In Tasmania, for example, there were two convicts for every free settler (Creighton 2019).
 4 By 1850, the NSW Legislative Council received 36,000 signatures opposing further 
convict transportation and only 525 in favour of it (Creighton 2019).
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 5 Arguably, an antipodean rehash of the centuries- old antagonism between the pre-
dominantly Catholic Ireland and the predominantly Protestant Great Britain (Goldlust 
2009).
 6 Inevitably, absurdities followed. For example, a Czech national was set a dictation 
test in Scottish Gaelic while an illegal Japanese immigrant was administered a test in 
Greek (PC 2016).
 7 It targeted the annual population growth of 2 per cent of which half was to result from 
the immigration of new settlers. The settler intake was to be ‘balanced between assisted 
and non- assisted immigrants, British and non- British immigrants, and between north-
ern and southern Europeans within the non- British intake’ (DIMA 2001: 4).
 8 The term ‘Pom’ in Australia usually denotes an English person (or, less commonly, a 
person from another part of the UK).
 9 As the economy stagnated in the early 1970s, the overall migrant intake was capped 
(e.g. at 50,000 people in 1975).
 10 Of the 7 million immigrants who have settled in Australia since 1945, over 60 per cent 
have become Australian citizens (PC 2016: 4).
 11 State- and territory- sponsored visas under the points- tested skill stream also increased 
sixfold between 2005 and 2014. Business Innovation and Investment visas have 
remained a small component of the stream and the so- called Distinguish Talent com-
ponent is negligible (PC 2016).
 12 These have to be nominated under one of the targeted occupations listed on the Consol-
idated Sponsored Occupations Lists. Sponsors of 457 visas must also meet minimum 
annual salary requirements of AUD 53,900 plus superannuation.
 13 These are temporary holiday- makers- cum- seasonal workers aged 18–30 years who are 
allowed to stay and work for up to two years under bilateral arrangements with a num-
ber of countries. They provide a pool of unskilled labour services but this appears to 
be working well, with the programme both offering the holiday experience and chan-
neling unskilled labour to agricultural jobs in rural areas.
 14 Allowed to remain in Australia pending the outcome of a substantive visa application.
 15 For example, permanent family- stream visas require applicants to be related to an Aus-
tralian permanent resident, a citizen or a New Zealand citizen while skill- stream immi-
grants should normally be under 50 years of age. Applicants under the investor stream 
must buy state/territory assets worth at least AUD 1.5 million and must be nominated 
by the state/territory concerned, while the fast- tracked premium- investor visa may be 
granted to those who acquire assets worth at least AUD 15 million in asset categories 
chosen by the Australian Trade and Investment Commission (PC 2016).
 16 For example, eligible Australian residents can sponsor parents to join them in Australia 
through a noncontributory stream – with application charges of AUD 7,000 per appli-
cant and a waiting period of up to 30 years – or a contributory stream where the charge 
per applicant may exceed AUD 47,000 but the waiting period is reduced to up to two 
years (PC 2016: 77).
 17 For example, of the 70,000 immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa who 
arrived between 2006 and 2015 as mostly humanitarian refugees, the 2016 census 
shows that 44,000 were either unemployed or looking for work in 2016. This com-
pares with 31,000 mostly skilled and family- stream arrivals from Southern and Eastern 
Europe of whom only 3,900 were in the same category (Creighton 2019).
 18 For example, in 2016, the Lowy Institute in Sydney found that over 70 per cent of its 
survey respondents agreed that, overall, immigration had a positive impact on Aus-
tralia and that the absorption of immigrants from many countries makes Australia 
stronger. Only 35 per cent of respondents opined that immigrants take away jobs from 
other Australians (Berkelmans and Pryke 2016).
 19 Whereby unauthorised immigrants – usually funneled into the Australian territorial 
waters in boatloads by black/grey market agents (often described as ‘people smug-
glers’) to claim, on arrival, refugee and asylum- seeker status – are reticulated to off-
shore detention centres in the Pacific region (e.g. Nauru or Papua New Guinea Manus 
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Island). The UNHCR- determined ‘genuine refugees’ are resettled in Australia but others 
are left behind to deter further inflows. Migrant- swapping mechanisms are also agreed 
with Canada, New Zealand and the US to increase the randomness of the final settlement 
destination – thus to deter people smugglers from targeting specific destination countries.
 20 Given the present wording of international treaties and agreements governing such 
matters, most of those claiming asylum come from source countries which are defined 
not only as poor but also as politically and socially highly illiberal so that claims of 
oppression and human rights abuse can easily be sustained.
 21 Not surprisingly, the effectiveness of the deterrence factor is either misunderstood or 
deliberately undervalued by the critics of the Pacific Solution (Gordon 2017).
 22 Inevitably, in democracies such as Australia, migration strategies are formed by 
national political elites and as such reflect the prevailing elite consensus. However, 
as pointed out by Withers (2016), the Australian public’s perceptions of immigration 
and immigrants are more influenced by opinion- makers (e.g. media personalities) than 
by experts – hence the oft- observed lack of transitivity between the different public 
strands of opinion as reflected in the various polls.
 23 The Australian Labor Party, which previously championed the relaxation of strict bor-
der controls, was severely beaten in the 2013 election that was fought largely on the 
issue of border control following the unauthorised arrival of 51,000 asylum- seekers 
in 800 boats and the deaths at sea, Mediterranean- style, of 1,200 people (Creighton 
2019). It also lost the ‘unlosable’ federal election in 2019, which was also fought on 
issues related to border control. Prior to the election, the Independents- controlled fed-
eral parliament passed the so- called medivac bill, which was to facilitate the imme-
diate evacuation on ‘medical grounds’ of the vast majority of unauthorised refugees 
and asylum- seekers from Nauru and their eventual resettlement on the Australian 
continent. It was feared that the medivac policy, supported by the- then Labor opposi-
tion, would trigger another wave of boat arrivals. Not surprisingly, the threat of the 
Mediterranean- style refugee scenario allowed the incumbent Coalition government to 
use it as a major part of their re- election platform.
 24 The changes result in a shorter list of occupations eligible for skilled migration visas 
and the introduction of a new Temporary Skill Shortage (TSS) visa (https://immi.
homeaffairs.gov.au/visas/getting- a- visa/visa- listing/temporary- skill- shortage- 482). 
The new visa conditions include tightened English language requirements, a mini-
mum two- year work experience, stricter visa renewal procedures and a requirement 
that sponsoring employers pay the going market wage rate.
 25 In 2017, international students studying and living in Australia contributed AUD 
30.3 billion to the Australian economy, making the educational industry the country’s 
third largest export sector and its leading service export sector (The Australian 27 Feb-
ruary 2019: 29).
 26 For example, the 2016 population census showed that 51 per cent of foreign students 
were in the labour force (i.e. either working or looking for work). Those who worked 
while studying were employed as cleaners and laundry workers, sales assistants, food 
preparation assistants, food- sector workers, carers and aides, road and rail drivers, 
sales support workers and factory process workers. Only in tenth place were ‘educa-
tional professionals’ – i.e. students employed as teaching and research assistants (The 
Australian 20 February 2019).
 27 Similarly, students can change their declared courses to reduce their academic work-
loads and fees and seek market- mediated employment opportunities.
 28 The lessons of Brexit should not go amiss in this respect, as the key ‘red line’ drawn 
by Mrs. Theresa May, the- then British Prime Minister, and her Brexit negotiating team 
related to the free movement of people.
 29 An example of this is the immediate post- 2019 Federal election response of the opposi-
tion Australian Labor Party, which has set out to examine the implementation of gov-
ernment migration policy and the workings of federal administration machinery tasked 
with policy implementation (Rizvi 2019).
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There is no reason to expect that migrations will cease in the future. Growing ine-
quality in the world, military conflicts and climate change will stimulate flows of 
people in search of safer living conditions. Migration policies at both national and 
European levels (of the European Union and, to a lesser degree, the Council of 
Europe) and at world level (for example, through the actions of the International 
Organization for Migration, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
or the International Labour Organization) will be of interest not only to politicians 
but to large parts of society. The key issue is thus how to manage migrations so 
that they bring significantly more benefits than challenges.
This book has focused on the relationship between immigration and integration 
policies – the two basic components of migration policy (the third – diaspora 
policies – is not within the scope of this publication). We hypothesised that a very close 
relationship between immigration and integration policies is needed to make migration 
policies more effective. In the Delphi survey presented in Chapter 4, we asked experts 
from seven European countries if integration policy should be treated as primary to 
immigration policy. This would mean that a given state’s or group of states’ instru-
ments of admission of migrants would be dependent on the effectiveness of its inte-
gration policy. This effectiveness would be measured by how the inflow of migrants 
impacted on the level of social cohesion in a given territory.
The results of our empirical study and the case studies in this book looking at 
the relations between immigration and integration policies in selected European 
states and in Australia all demonstrate clearly that decision- making within the 
two has to be very closely interlinked. States should aim to treat this as one single 
system of migration management, which means that the impact of one field’s 
decisions on the other should be forecast and taken into consideration. For exam-
ple, a decision to open up the labour market or liberalise the visa regime should 
be taken based on a country’s or state’s capacity to integrate newcomers in the 
receiving society. Such an approach would anticipate any potential challenges 
resulting from the acceptance of migrants whose stay is initially planned as short- 
term but who change their plans during their stay. The problem is well- known in 
the history of immigration into Europe. As we know, migrants were encouraged 
to go to a number of countries to fill shortages in their labour markets but were 
not offered any integration instruments on the assumption that they would leave 
12 Conclusions
Maciej Duszczyk, Marta Pachocka  
and Dominika Pszczółkowska
Conclusions 225
once their employment had ceased. This did not happen. Thus, if a state wishes to 
liberalise its immigration policy, for example by opening up its labour market, it 
should, at the same time, prepare its integration policies to deal with larger num-
bers of newcomers and, in the future, also their family members. This would help 
to avoid the many challenges which can and do occur, especially with the second 
or even the third generation.
In this book, analysis of the views of experts, as well as examples from both 
individual European countries and Australia, demonstrate that giving priority to 
integration policy is not seen as a possible alternative to today’s logic of decision- 
making in migration policy. Immigration policy, or the regulation of the inflows 
of foreigners based on the needs of the labour market, is still given priority. How-
ever, our results also demonstrate a certain difference of opinion between experts 
from Central and Eastern Europe – which has only recently become a destination 
for migrants – and Western Europe. In the latter, the need to build close ties in 
decision- making in the two fields and the importance of integration policies has 
been raised much more frequently. This is probably a result of the experiences 
which Western European countries had with inflows of migrants and their integra-
tion. In Central and Eastern Europe there are almost no citizens of migrant origin 
and current inflows are mostly from culturally similar countries. This leads some 
to mistaken conclusions concerning the lack of need for an integration policy. 
Instead of falling into this trap, Central and Eastern European countries should 
learn from the experiences of those who, before them, accepted large inflows of 
migrants. An open immigration policy for citizens from, for example, Ukraine and 
going to Poland, Czechia or Hungary, should be accompanied by a broad offer in 
the destination country’s integration policy.
Another important conclusion from the survey and case studies (see, in particu-
lar, the chapters on Poland and Spain) is that local governments and nongovern-
mental organisations alike should be involved in the execution of migration – and 
especially integration – policy to a much larger degree than is the case presently. 
These are the entities with the largest practical experience of preparing and imple-
menting integration instruments and the first to which migrants turn with their 
expectations and problems. This means that representatives of local governments 
(especially big cities) should be involved on a permanent basis not only in creat-
ing the assumptions and strategies of migration policy but also in deciding on 
particular instruments.
This book, which, to our knowledge, is the first such comprehensive contribu-
tion to demonstrate the relationship between integration and immigration policies, 
includes both the results of empirical studies and the descriptions of the situation 
in particular countries. It offers both theoretical and practical knowledge. We thus 
believe that it can be useful for both scholars and practitioners of migration policy. 
That was our goal. We do have a sense of insufficiency, which results in part 
from the lack of data available on many issues and, even more, from the extreme 
politicisation of migration issues, especially in recent years. This encourages us to 
continue our research in this field, to find the optimal relationship between immi-
gration and integration policies and to help to create effective migration policies.
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